{ "id": 3806140, "name": "GARY LAWRENCE WALKER, Plaintiff v. TOWN OF STONEVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Walker v. Town of Stoneville", "decision_date": "2011-04-19", "docket_number": "No. COA10-278", "first_page": "24", "last_page": "42", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "211 N.C. App. 24" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "598 S.E.2d 135", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631395, 12631396 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/598/0135-02", "/se2d/598/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12631395, 12631396, 12631398, 12631340, 12631278, 12631343, 12631381 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/598/0135-02", "/se2d/598/0135-01", "/se2d/598/0136-01", "/se2d/597/0129-02", "/se2d/595/0150-02", "/se2d/597/0130-01", "/se2d/597/0775-03" ] }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132001, 132154, 131944, 132110, 132314 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0091-05", "/nc/350/0091-02", "/nc/350/0091-04", "/nc/350/0091-03", "/nc/350/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "622 S.E.2d 495", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634508, 12634509 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/622/0495-01", "/se2d/622/0495-02" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12631460, 12631464, 12631499, 12631468, 12631471, 12631472, 12631474 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/599/0040-01", "/se2d/599/0042-03", "/se2d/599/0907-01", "/se2d/599/0043-01", "/se2d/599/0045-01", "/se2d/599/0046-01", "/se2d/599/0048-02" ] }, { "cite": "29 CFR \u00a7 825.105", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7 2611", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)(A)(I)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 S.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4762957, 4765550, 4763995, 4764923, 4761023 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0321-05", "/nc/309/0321-01", "/nc/309/0321-02", "/nc/309/0321-04", "/nc/309/0321-03" ] }, { "cite": "303 S.E.2d 565", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 N.C. 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App. 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8958329 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440", "parenthetical": "quoting Chalmers v. Womack, 269 N.C. 433, 435-36, 152 S.E.2d 505, 507 (1967)" }, { "page": "440-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565527 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" }, { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 S.E.2d 315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155846 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 42", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11464960 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "570 S.E.2d 726", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511201, 1511111, 1511229, 1511345, 1511357 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0304-01", "/nc/356/0304-04", "/nc/356/0304-05", "/nc/356/0304-03", "/nc/356/0304-02" ] }, { "cite": "192 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2", "parenthetical": "upholding instruction on grounds that it \"sufficiently covered the meaning of the terms\" that defendant requested trial court to define in its charge to jury" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 N.C. App. 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551859 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430", "parenthetical": "upholding instruction on grounds that it \"sufficiently covered the meaning of the terms\" that defendant requested trial court to define in its charge to jury" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/16/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 S.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9081951 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143422.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 S.E.2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 N.C. App. 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550824 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/2/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-21", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(10)" }, { "page": "(10)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7 630", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "510 S.E.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659776, 1659845, 1659883, 1659694, 1659889 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0501-01", "/nc/348/0501-02", "/nc/348/0501-04", "/nc/348/0501-03", "/nc/348/0501-05" ] }, { "cite": "500 S.E.2d 728", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11651268 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 U.S. 202", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11595292 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" }, { "page": "654" }, { "page": "211" }, { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/519/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 662", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "504 S.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 681", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11470041 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0681-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E.2d 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82" }, { "page": "85" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4707236 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" }, { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "843 F. Supp. 1022", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3840370 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1025" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/843/1022-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-422.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 7, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3796293 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 639", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8999494 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0639-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 S.E. 634", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637" }, { "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269512 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" }, { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/161/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584", "parenthetical": "\"Ordinarily, the question of whether an actor is reasonable in relying on the representations of another is a matter for the finder of fact.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4749057 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544", "parenthetical": "\"Ordinarily, the question of whether an actor is reasonable in relying on the representations of another is a matter for the finder of fact.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562592, 8562531, 8562570, 8562646, 8562616 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0095-03", "/nc/301/0095-01", "/nc/301/0095-02", "/nc/301/0095-05", "/nc/301/0095-04" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 617", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 N.C. App. 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551063 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/46/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 S.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327", "parenthetical": "quoting Stanford v. Owens, 46 N.C. App. 388, 395, 265 S.E.2d 617, 622, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 95, - S.E.2d - (1980)" }, { "page": "327", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132102 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224", "parenthetical": "quoting Stanford v. Owens, 46 N.C. App. 388, 395, 265 S.E.2d 617, 622, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 95, - S.E.2d - (1980)" }, { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135848, 135570, 135571, 135636 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0381-03", "/nc/353/0381-02", "/nc/353/0381-04", "/nc/353/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2555838 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 609", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" }, { "page": "612" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2516944 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" }, { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 S.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240", "parenthetical": "quoting Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C. 200, 206, 367 S.E.2d 609, 612 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 329 N.C. 646, 407 S.E.2d 178 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12130550 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532", "parenthetical": "quoting Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C. 200, 206, 367 S.E.2d 609, 612 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 329 N.C. 646, 407 S.E.2d 178 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "593 S.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. App. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8918134 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/162/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4680731 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 408", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4713937 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 S.E.2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524781 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 S.E.2d 423", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521657 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 923", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755493, 4755336, 4753483, 4753324, 4752111 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0622-01", "/nc/312/0622-05", "/nc/312/0622-03", "/nc/312/0622-04", "/nc/312/0622-02" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. App. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521768 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/70/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-24", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1486, "char_count": 45345, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0876840973429536e-07, "percentile": 0.564880230469035 }, "sha256": "b2251a28bfaa619000d00c6db7b0ea643bef2ade9359023ae53cb1a30fd5c1d3", "simhash": "1:132957a872af3257", "word_count": 7220 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:31:50.212435+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "GARY LAWRENCE WALKER, Plaintiff v. TOWN OF STONEVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEPHENS, Judge.\nThis appeal addresses, in its paramount legal issues, the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff Gary Lawrence Walker (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019) on his negligent misrepresentation claim against Defendant Town of Stoneville (\u201cDefendant\u201d or \u201cTown\u201d) and the statutory construction of the law prohibiting wrongful discrimination in the workplace. But this case involves much more than just these primary legal issues; this case raises, in its essence, issues of competency, trust, accountability, and fundamental fairness.\nFor the reasons stated below, we hold that the trial court erred in setting aside the jury\u2019s verdict on Plaintiff\u2019s negligent misrepresentation claim and in directing a verdict for Defendant on Plaintiff\u2019s wrongful discharge claim.\nI. Procedure\nOn 19 October 2007, Plaintiff filed this action against the Town for negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract, seeking damages for the loss of Plaintiff\u2019s retirement benefits. Defendant filed an answer on 11 January 2008.\nOn 18 August 2008, Plaintiff filed a Supplemental and Amended Complaint adding claims for wrongful discharge based on age discrimination. Defendant filed an answer on 19 September 2008 and an amended answer on 25 September 2008.\nOn 14 January 2009, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. By order entered 23 March 2009, following a hearing, the Honorable John O. Craig, III granted Defendant\u2019s motion as to Plaintiff\u2019s contract claims and one of Plaintiff\u2019s wrongful discharge claims, and denied Defendant\u2019s motion as to Plaintiff\u2019s negligent misrepresentation claim and remaining wrongful discharge claim.\nThese remaining claims came on for trial before a jury starting 19 May 2009, the Honorable James M. Webb presiding. At the conclusion of Plaintiff\u2019s evidence, Defendant made an oral motion for directed verdict on all of Plaintiff\u2019s claims. The court granted Defendant\u2019s motion on Plaintiff\u2019s wrongful discharge claim and took Defendant\u2019s motion on Plaintiff\u2019s negligent misrepresentation claim under advisement. At the close of all the evidence, Defendant made an oral motion for directed verdict on Plaintiff\u2019s negligent misrepresentation claim, which the trial court also took under advisement.\nThe matter was submitted to the jury. On 28 May 2009, the jury returned a verdict finding Defendant liable for negligent misrepresentation and awarding Plaintiff $170,008.13 in damages from Defendant. After the jury\u2019s verdict was announced, Defendant made an oral motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (\u201cJNOV\u201d). The trial court set Defendant\u2019s motions for directed verdict and JNOV for hearing during the court\u2019s 15 June 2009 civil term.\nDefendant\u2019s motions were heard on 16 June 2009. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that the evidence presented at trial was \u201cinsufficient to justify a verdict for [] Plaintiff as a matter of law[.]\u201d Thus, by \u201cOrder and Judgment\u201d entered 25 June 2009, the trial court allowed Defendant\u2019s motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence, which the court had taken under advisement before submitting the case to the jury, and Defendant\u2019s post-trial motion for JNOV, and entered judgment for Defendant.\nPlaintiff filed notice of appeal on 2 July 2009, challenging Judge Webb\u2019s 25 June 2009 order and judgment. Defendant filed notice of cross-appeal on 16 July 2009, challenging Judge Craig\u2019s 23 March 2009 order and Judge Webb\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s written requests for special jury instructions and issues to be submitted to the jury.\nII. Evidence\nFrom 1968 through March 1994, Plaintiff was employed by the Eden Police Department of the City of Eden, North Carolina. Plaintiff started as a patrol officer, and during his 26 years of service, moved through the ranks to ultimately become a lieutenant, supervising seven other police officers. While employed by the City of Eden, Plaintiff was enrolled as a member of the North Carolina Local Governmental Employees\u2019 Retirement System (LGERS), which is administered by the State Retirement System through local governmental employers such as the City of Eden and the Town of Stoneville. Eden\u2019s Finance Officer, Margie Blackstock, enrolled Plaintiff in LGERS when he started working for Eden. Plaintiff received periodic statements from the State Retirement System regarding his retirement account but, otherwise, had no contact with the State Retirement System during his employment.\nAt age 55, after more than 25 years of service, Plaintiff decided to retire. Because of his age at retirement and his years of service, Plaintiff was entitled to full retirement benefits. Plaintiff talked to Ms. Blackstock, who explained to Plaintiff his rights regarding his retirement benefits and provided Plaintiff with the information he needed to file for retirement. With Ms. Blackstock\u2019s assistance, Plaintiff filled out an application for retirement on 10 January 1994 for his retirement benefits to begin in April 1994. Ms. Blackstock sent the application to LGERS. Plaintiff retired 1 April 1994 and began receiving monthly retirement benefits.\nFollowing his retirement, Plaintiff\u2019s son, a sergeant with the Town of Stoneville\u2019s Police Department, informed Plaintiff that the police department was short-handed and needed some extra help. Plaintiff spoke with Police Chief Garrison and informed her that he was willing to work for the Town as long as his work did not jeopardize his retirement benefits. Chief Garrison referred Plaintiff to the Town\u2019s Finance Officer, Amy Winn, who administered LGERS for the Town.\nPlaintiff went to see Ms. Winn and told her that he was interested in working for the Town only if he could continue to receive his retirement benefits. Ms. Winn researched some information on her computer and told Plaintiff that he could work for the Town without jeopardizing his retirement benefits as long as three conditions were met: (1) that he not receive regular employee benefits from the Town; (2) that he not be enrolled as an active member of LGERS; and (3) that he not receive compensation exceeding the maximum compensation established yearly by LGERS.\nBased on the information he received from Ms. Winn, Plaintiff agreed to work for the Town under the following conditions: (1) Plaintiff received no benefits, i.e., he received no vacation, holiday leave, or other benefits which \u201cregular\u201d employees for the Town received; (2) Plaintiff was not enrolled in LGERS; and (3) Plaintiff received only the statutory maximum salary provided under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-24(5)c (\u201csalary cap\u201d).\nPlaintiff initially worked sporadic hours, filling in as needed. Less than a year later, however, Plaintiff was asked to work more regular hours, and Plaintiff assumed a position requiring approximately 42 hours per week. On 5 February 1997, Plaintiff was appointed the Town\u2019s police chief. He served in that position until 3 April 2007. During this time, the Town still considered Plaintiff to be a part-time employee with no benefits.\nOn a yearly basis, the Town Administrator, Bob Wyatt, and/or the Town Finance Officer, Ms. Winn and later Penny French, would calculate how much Plaintiff could earn during the year under the salary cap and set his salary accordingly. Mr. Wyatt or Ms. Winn would tell Plaintiff what his salary for the upcoming year would be or write Plaintiff\u2019s salary on a note and give it to him. The Town\u2019s budget each year reflected the overall salary of the police chief, which did not exceed the salary cap established by LGERS.\nDuring his years of employment with the Town, Plaintiff was never informed that the North Carolina General Statutes imposed a limitation on the number of hours he could work without affecting his retirement benefits. Specifically, Plaintiff was never informed by the Town that employees who work over 1,000 hours in a year must become members of LGERS, which ends their eligibility for retirement benefits. Mr. Wyatt was unaware of the 1,000-hour rule. Ms. Winn believed that Plaintiff would continue to receive his retirement benefits as long as he stayed under the salary cap, and Ms. Winn never enrolled Plaintiff in LGERS. When Shirley Price took over as the Town Finance Officer on 3 April 1997, Ms. Price was also unaware of the 1,000-hour rule.\nIn the fall of 2006, the State Retirement System became aware of the nature of the Town\u2019s compensation arrangement with Plaintiff. Through communications with the Town, the State Retirement System concluded that Plaintiff was working in excess of 1,000 hours per year and, thus, was receiving retirement benefits in violation of the law. Based on that information, the State Retirement System immediately terminated Plaintiff\u2019s eligibility for retirement benefits and informed him that he was required to reimburse LGERS $174,283.37 for the overpayment of retirement benefits. Additionally, the State Retirement System determined that Plaintiff should have been enrolled as a member of LGERS, and that he would be required to pay LGERS the contributions to the retirement system which should have been deducted from his pay.\nDuring the fall of 2006, the Town drafted an \u201cagreement\u201d indicating that it would pay Plaintiff for more than 2,000 hours of work for which he had not been compensated. The Town Council approved the \u201cagreement.\u201d The Mayor of Stoneville signed the document on behalf of the Town, and Plaintiff signed the document as well. When P1a.iut.iff retained legal counsel, counsel informed the Town that the \u201cagreement\u201d was void for lack of consideration. Plaintiffs counsel wrote a letter to the Town stating his position that the Town would be liable for any amounts owed by Plaintiff to LGERS.\nAs a result of the State Retirement System\u2019s decision to terminate Plaintiff\u2019s eligibility for retirement benefits and demand payment from him of $174,283.37, the Town enrolled Plaintiff in LGERS and began treating him as a regular employee as of January 2007. Plaintiff continued to serve as the Town\u2019s police chief until 3 April 2007 when the Town demoted him to the position of patrol officer. Plaintiff was 68 years old at the time.\nThe Town Council meeting minutes of 3 April 2007 reflect that Plaintiff was retiring. However, at no time had Plaintiff given notice of his intent to retire, particularly in light of the LGERS decision to stop his retirement benefits and collect all the money paid to Plaintiff for the prior 12-year period. Plaintiff learned of his demotion from the Town Administrator, Kevin Baughn, the day after the Town Council meeting.\nPlaintiff continued to serve as a patrol officer until 10 October 2007, when the Town suspended him without pay due to an alleged issue concerning a credit of sick leave on his time sheet. Plaintiff informed the acting police chief that the credit had been authorized by the Town. The Town asked the State Bureau of Investigation (\u201cSBI\u201d) to investigate. At that time, Mr. Baughn and the police chief informed Plaintiff that if he was cleared in the investigation, he would be reinstated with back pay. Although Plaintiff was cleared by the SBI inquiry, he remained on suspension without pay. In February 2008, Plaintiff received a letter informing him that his employment with the Town was terminated, effective 6 February 2008.\nIII. Discussion\nA. Plaintiffs Claims\n1. Negligent Misrepresentation\nPlaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in granting the Town\u2019s motions for directed verdict and JNOV because Plaintiff offered substantial evidence to support the jury\u2019s negligent misrepresentation verdict in his favor. We agree.\nThe question presented by the Town\u2019s directed verdict motion is whether the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, is sufficient to take the case to the jury and to support a verdict for Plaintiff. Henderson v. Traditional Log Homes, Inc., 70 N.C. App. 303, 306, 319 S.E.2d 290, 292, disc. review denied, 312 N.C. 622, 323 S.E.2d 923 (1984). If there is more than a scintilla of evidence \u201cto support [Plaintiff\u2019s] prima facie case in all its constituent elements[,]\u201d the motion for directed verdict should be denied. Douglas v. Doub, 95 N.C. App. 505, 511, 383 S.E.2d 423, 426 (1989). A JNOV motion is \u201cessentially a renewal of a motion for directed verdictf.]\u201d Smith v. Price, 74 N.C. App. 413, 418, 328 S.E.2d 811, 815 (1985), aff\u2019d in part, rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 315 N.C. 523, 340 S.E.2d 408 (1986). On appeal, we apply the same standard of review as we employ to review a directed verdict motion. N. Nat\u2019l Life Ins. Co. v. Lacy J. Miller Machine Co., 311 N.C. 62, 69, 316 S.E.2d 256, 261 (1984).\n\u2018North Carolina expressly recognizes a cause of action in negligence based on negligent misrepresentation.\u201d Hunter v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 162 N.C. App. 477, 483, 593 S.E.2d 595, 600 (citation and quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, 358 N.C. 543, 579 S.E.2d 48 (2004). \u201cIt has long been held in North Carolina that \u2018[t]he tort of negligent misrepresentation occurs when (1) a party justifiably relies, (2) to his detriment, (3) on information prepared without reasonable care, (4) by one who owed the relying party a duty of care.\u2019 \u201d Simms v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of. Am., 140 N.C. App. 529, 532, 537 S.E.2d 237, 240 (2000) (quoting Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C. 200, 206, 367 S.E.2d 609, 612 (1988), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 329 N.C. 646, 407 S.E.2d 178 (1991)), disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 381, 547 S.E.2d 18 (2001).\nThe Town concedes that \u201cthere is no doubt that [it] had a duty toward Plaintiff with regard to providing [P]laintiff accurate information regarding his questions about the State Retirement System[.]\u201d It is also not in dispute that Plaintiff did not receive accurate information from the Town concerning the conditions under which Plaintiff could work for the Town without jeopardizing his retirement benefits. Moreover, as a result of Plaintiff\u2019s reliance on the information he received from the Town, Plaintiff (1) worked full-time for approximately 12 years for a salary which was well below the reasonable and customary pay received by police officers in North Carolina, (2) is required to reimburse the State Retirement System $174,283.37 for benefits wrongfully paid to him, (3) is required to make contributions . to the LGERS system for all the years he was not enrolled in the system, and (4) has been embroiled in this legal battle since 2006. It is thus unassailable that Plaintiff\u2019s reliance on the information was to his detriment. Accordingly, the contested issue on appeal concerning Plaintiff\u2019s negligent misrepresentation claim is whether Plaintiff offered sufficient evidence of justifiable reliance.\nJustifiable reliance requires actual reliance. Raritan, 322 N.C. at 206, 367 S.E.2d at 612. North Carolina\u2019s Pattern Jury Instructions instruct that \u201c[a]ctual reliance is direct reliance upon false information.\u201d N.C.P.I. \u2014 Civil 800.10 (1992). Moreover, \u201cthe \u2018question of justifiable reliance is analogous to that of reasonable reliance in fraud actions, where it is generally for the jury to decide whether plaintiff reasonably relied upon the representations made by defendant.\u2019 \u201d Marcus Bros. Textiles, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, L.L.P., 350 N.C. 214, 224, 513 S.E.2d 320, 327 (1999) (quoting Stanford v. Owens, 46 N.C. App. 388, 395, 265 S.E.2d 617, 622, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 95, - S.E.2d - (1980)); see also Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Bus. Sys., Inc., 319 N.C. 534, 544, 356 S.E.2d 578, 584 (1987) (\u201cOrdinarily, the question of whether an actor is reasonable in relying on the representations of another is a matter for the finder of fact.\u201d). \u201cWhat is reasonable is, as in other cases of negligence, dependent upon the circumstances.\u201d Marcus Bros. Textiles, 350 N.C. at 225, 513 S.E.2d at 327 (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nThe evidence presented at trial concerning the reasonableness of Plaintiff\u2019s reliance on the information he received from the Town, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, tended to show the following: The Local Governmental Employees\u2019 Retirement System Employer Manual, distributed by the North Carolina Department of State Treasurer to the Town, as a local governmental unit and employer, states that \u201c[i]t is the responsibility of the employer to ensure that all eligible members are reported to the LGERS, as required by State law, and to remit monthly contributions in an accurate and timely manner.\u201d (Emphasis added). The Manual further \u201cadvises all personnel and payroll offices to contact LGERS when they are in doubt about a specific question or set of circumstances.\u201d Gary Austin, the Special Assistant to the Senior Deputy Director of the State Retirement System, testified that, as a general rule, all communications initiated by LGERS to employees are conveyed through the employer. Furthermore, until 2006, only the employer could access LGERS information via computer.\nThe Town, through its Finance Officer, administered LGERS for the Town and its employees. Consistent with this responsibility, the Finance Officer enrolled employees in the system, prepared necessary forms for the system, and provided manuals and pamphl\u00e9ts to employees and retirees. With respect to retirees, the only interactions initiated by LGERS after retirement were to send the retiree a pamphlet, which Plaintiff did not recall receiving, and his or her monthly check.\nPlaintiff had relied on the City of Eden\u2019s Finance Officer, Ms. Blackstock, to enroll him in LGERS when he began to work for Eden in 1967 and to assist him in applying for retirement benefits when he retired in 1994. During his 26-year career with the City of Eden, Plaintiff had no interaction with LGERS, except for receiving periodic statements of his retirement account.\nWhen Plaintiff was recruited to work for the Town, he was referred to the Town Finance Officer, Ms. Winn, to determine if he could work for the Town without jeopardizing his retirement benefits. Ms. Winn looked up some information on her computer and told Plaintiff that he could work for the Town if he met the following conditions: (1) that he receive no benefits, i. e., no vacation, holiday leave, or other benefits which \u201cregular\u201d employees for the Town received; (2) that he not be enrolled in LGERS; and (3) that he receive only the statutory maximum salary provided under the salary cap. Ms. Winn did not inform Plaintiff of any restriction on the number of hours he could work to avoid affecting his retirement benefits.\nBased on Ms. Winn\u2019s information, Plaintiff commenced work for the Town (1) without benefits; (2) without becoming a member of LGERS; and (3) while receiving a salary which did not exceed the salary cap. Each year thereafter, several months prior to the end of the year, the Town would calculate how much Plaintiff could earn in the upcoming year under the salary cap and set Plaintiff\u2019s salary accordingly. The Town relayed this salary information to Plaintiff either in a meeting or by giving him a slip of paper with his salary stated thereon. Plaintiff worked for the Town from 1996 through 2007, during which time Plaintiff continued to comply with the above-stated conditions in order not to jeopardize his retirement benefits. We conclude that these actions evidence Plaintiff\u2019s actual reliance on the Town\u2019s advice.\nThe Town argues, however, that Plaintiff began to receive sick benefits, in contravention of the first requirement that he not receive benefits, and, thus, Plaintiff failed to actually rely on Ms. Winn\u2019s representations. We disagree.\nRegular full-time employees of the Town receive the following employment benefits: vacation pay, holiday pay, sick leave, health care insurance, life insurance, the opportunity to participate in the Town\u2019s 401(k) plan, and enrollment in the State Retirement System. It is undisputed that from 1994 through 2006, Plaintiff did not receive vacation pay, holiday pay, or life insurance; did not have the opportunity to invest in the Town\u2019s 401(k) plan; and was not enrolled in LGERS.\nAround the end of 1999, Plaintiff became concerned that his heart condition would require treatment and cause him to miss work. He approached Bob Wyatt, Town Administrator, and asked if he could receive compensated leave time if he needed to miss work. Mr. Wyatt approached the Town Council and, after obtaining approval from the Council, instructed Plaintiff to record eight hours each month on his time sheets to cover any absence from work due to sickness. These hours were logged in a record of compensatory time maintained by the Finance Officer.\nIt is evident that Plaintiff began his employment without any \u201cregular\u201d benefits and was attempting to comply with the requirement by asking Mr. Wyatt how he might be able to receive compensated leave time. Furthermore, it is evident from the process by which Mr. Wyatt and the Town Council approved Plaintiff\u2019s compensatory time that the Town was also attempting to comply with this requirement and did not consider Plaintiff a regular, full-time employee after the compensatory time was approved. We thus conclude that Plaintiff\u2019s actions evidence actual reliance on the Town\u2019s advice.\nDefendant nonetheless argues that Plaintiff offered insufficient evidence that Plaintiff\u2019s reliance was reasonable because he failed to show he was denied the opportunity to investigate or that he could not have learned the true facts by exercise of reasonable diligence. In essence, the Town argues that it was Plaintiff\u2019s duty to investigate\u2014 that is, to doubt the Town\u2019s veracity and ascertain the facts for. himself. We categorically reject the Town\u2019s contention.\n\u201c[Ajman is not expected to deal with another as if he is a knave, and certainly not unless there is something to excite his suspicion.\u201d White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Bullock, 161 N.C. 1, 8, 76 S.E. 634, 637 (1912). Where the parties are not on equal footing, and the defendant who possesses superior knowledge and/or experience makes a representation \u201ccontaining nothing so improbable or unreasonable as to put the other party upon further inquiry or give him cause to suspect that it is false, and an investigation would be necessary for him to discover the truth, the statement may be relied on.\u201d Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). If, in such an instance, the plaintiff who relies on the false or misleading representation is injured, the defendant \u201cwill not be heard to say that he is a person unworthy of belief and that plaintiff ought not to have trusted him, or that plaintiff was negligent and was cheated through his own credulity.\u201d White Sewing Machine, 161 N.C. at 8, 76 S.E.2d at 637 (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nIn this case, Plaintiff and the Town were not on equal footing. The Town, which was in a position of authority and was responsible for enrolling Plaintiff in LGERS if he qualified, possessed superior knowledge and experience with LGERS than Plaintiff and possessed superior access to printed and electronic material concerning LGERS than Plaintiff. Moreover, there was nothing in the Town\u2019s initial representation to Plaintiff, through Ms. Winn, or the Town\u2019s subsequent representations to Plaintiff regarding his yearly salary, that would put a person of ordinary prudence upon inquiry. Plaintiff understood that the Town was cognizant of the facts and rules concerning his employment, and Plaintiff relied upon the Town\u2019s positive and unequivocal statements. There was absolutely nothing to arouse Plaintiff\u2019s suspicion or to induce him to believe that the Town did not know the truth. Accordingly, Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence upon which a jury could conclude that his reliance upon the Town\u2019s advice was reasonable.\nCiting Eastway Wrecker Serv. v. City of Charlotte, 165 N.C. App. 639, 645, 599 S.E.2d 410, 414 (2004), aff'd per curiam, 360 N.C. 167, 622 S.E.2d 495 (2005), the Town argues further that when the party relying on a false or misleading representation could have discovered the truth upon inquiry, that party must show that he was denied the opportunity to investigate or that he could not have learned the true facts by exercise of reasonable diligence.\nIn response, Plaintiff argues that this requirement has only been applied in commercial settings involving real estate or business and that, in contrast to a commercial arms-length transaction, Plaintiff had every reason to trust the Town Finance Officer who was charged with the duty to inform him of the requirements of the retirement system. However, we need not determine whether Plaintiff was required to show that he was denied the opportunity to investigate, or that he could not have learned the true facts by exercise of reasonable diligence, because we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to show that Plaintiff could not have learned the true facts by exercise of reasonable diligence.\nAs discussed supra, the Town possessed superior knowledge and experience with LGERS than Plaintiff, possessed superior access to printed and electronic material concerning LGERS than Plaintiff, and was advised by LGERS \u201cto contact the LGERS when they are in doubt about a specific question or set of circumstances.\u201d Even in the Town\u2019s superior position, however, the Town did not determine for 12 years that Plaintiff\u2019s benefits were subject to termination if he worked more than 1,000 hours. Accordingly, it cannot reasonably be \u00e1sserted that Plaintiff would have discovered that his retirement benefits were subject to termination if he worked more than 1,000 hours, had he made further reasonable inquiry into the matter.\nGiven the Town\u2019s position of authority and its superior knowledge and experience with LGERS, Plaintiff had every reason to trust the Town\u2019s advice concerning the requirements of LGERS. Thus, by inquiring with proper Town officials, Plaintiff did exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to determine how he could return to work with the Town without jeopardizing his retirement benefits. Plaintiff was not required to distrust the Town\u2019s information and make a separate inquiry into the specifics of North Carolina\u2019s retirement statutes. Accordingly, Plaintiff presented substantial evidence that he justifiably relied on the Town\u2019s misrepresentations.\nWe thus conclude that Plaintiff presented substantial evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict on his negligent misrepresentation claim, and the trial court erred in granting Defendant\u2019s motion for directed verdict and JNOV. The trial court\u2019s order on this issue is reversed, the trial court\u2019s judgment entered in favor of Defendant is vacated, and the jury verdict is reinstated.\nIn light of our holding, the Town\u2019s argument on its cross-appeal, contending that the trial court erred in failing to grant the Town summary judgment on this issue, is overruled.\n2. Wrongful Discharge\nPlaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in directing a verdict against him on his wrongful discharge claim. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that he offered substantial evidence that the Town \u201cregularly employ[ed] 15 or more employees,\u201d as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-422.2. We agree.\nThe North Carolina legislature has declared that \u201c[i]t is the public policy of this State to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain and hold employment without discrimination or abridgement on account of race, religion, color, national origin, age, sex or handicap by employers which regularly employ 15 or more employees.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-422.2 (2009).\nAt issue is the interpretation to be accorded the statutory term \u201cregularly employ[.]\u201d \u201c[T]he plain language of this statute provides no guidance concerning the requisite elements to establish the prima facie case of a claim under it.\u201d Newton v. Lat Purser & Assocs., 843 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (W.D.N.C. 1994). Moreover, we know of no North Carolina court decision directly construing the term, \u201cregularly employ\u201d as applicable under this statute. We thus \u201clook to federal decisions for guidance in establishing evidentiary standards and principles of law to be applied in discrimination cases.\u201d N.C. Dept. of Corr. v. Gibson, 308 N.C. 131, 136, 301 S.E.2d 78, 82 (1983); see also Brewer v. Cabarrus Plastics, Inc., 130 N.C. App. 681, 685-86, 504 S.E.2d 580, 584 (1998), disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 91, 527 S.E.2d 662 (1999).\nSimilar to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-422.2, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits an employer \u201cwho has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year\u201d from discriminating against an employee on the basis of \u201crace, color, religion, sex, or national origin.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e (2005). To count an individual as an \u201cemployee\u201d under section 2000e(b), \u201call one needs to know about a given employee for a given year is whether the employee started or ended employment during that year and if so, when. He is counted as an employee for each working day after arrival and before departure.\u201d Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., 519 U.S. 202, 211, 136 L. Ed. 2d 644, 654 (1997). \u201cWhether the employee is actually working or receiving pay for each day is irrelevant, so long as he or she appears on the company payroll.\u201d Russell v. Buchanan, 129 N.C. App. 519, 522, 500 S.E.2d 728, 730, disc. review denied, 348 N.C. 501, 510 S.E.2d 655 (1998). Thus, under this so-called \u201cpayroll method,\u201d if 15 or more individuals appear on the employer\u2019s payroll for 20 or more weeks during the year, the employer is governed by Title VII. Metro. Educ. Enters., 519 U.S. at 211, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 654.\nThe \u201cpayroll method\u201d has also been adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, which, like Title VII, applies to an \u201cemployer\u201d \u201cwho has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year[.]\u201d See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 630(b) (2009); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Policy Guidance No: N-915-052, \u201cWhether Part-Time Employees Are Employees Within the Meaning of \u00a7 701(b) of Title VII and \u00a7 11(b) of the ADEA,\u201d (Apr. 20, 1990).\n\u201cThe ultimate purpose of... [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 143-422.2, and Title VII... is the same; that is, the elimination of discriminatory practices in employment.\u201d Gibson, 308 N.C. at 141, 301 S.E.2d at 85. Accordingly, we find the language of Title VII, and the principles of law applied to claims arising under Title VII, to be instructive here. We conclude that an employer regularly employs 15 or more employees, and is thus governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-422.2, when 15 or more employees appear on the employer\u2019s payroll each working day during each of 20 or more calendar work weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.\nThe Town argues, however, that an employee must work for a minimum of 1,000 hours per year to be considered \u201cregularly employed\u201d under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-422.2. In support of its position, the Town first relies on Title 20. Department of State, Chapter 2. Retirement Systems, Subchapter 2C. Local Governmental Employees\u2019 Retirement System, Section .0800 Membership, Subsection .0802 Regularly Employed, of the North Carolina Administrative Code which states, \u201cAn officer or employee [who] is in a regular position, the duties of which require not less than 1,000 hours of service per year[,[ shall be an employee as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-21(10).\u201d However, because N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128-21(10) defines an \u201cemployee\u201d solely for the purposes of the North Carolina Local Governmental Employees\u2019 Retirement System, we conclude that the Town\u2019s reliance is misplaced. As N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-422.2 and the public policy prohibiting discrimination by an employer in the workplace are wholly unrelated to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 128 et. seq. and the relevant administrative regulations governing the North Carolina Local Governmental Employees\u2019 Retirement System, the Town\u2019s argument is unavailing.\nThe Town also cites for support of its position Patterson v. L. M. Parker & Co., 2 N.C. App. 43, 162 S.E.2d 571 (1968), a workers\u2019 compensation case in which this Court stated that \u201cthe term\u2019 regularly employed\u2019 connotes employment of the same number of persons throughout the period with some constancy.\u201d Id. at 48-49, 162 S.E.2d at 575. While the term \u201cregularly employ\u201d as used in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-422.2 similarly connotes employment of the same number of persons throughout the period with some constancy, such constancy does not require employees to work at least 1,000 hours. Instead, as we have already concluded, constancy of employment is evidenced by the requisite number of individuals appearing on the employer\u2019s payroll each working day during each of 20 or more calendar work weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.\nAt trial, Shirley Price, Finance Officer for the Town starting in 2007, testified, based on forms submitted by the Town to the Employment Security Commission, that \u201cthe number of covered workers who worked during or received pay for the payroll period\u201d for the first three quarters of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008 was as follows:\n2007\nfirst quarter:\nfirst month, 19 employees second month, 20 employees third month, 18 employees\nsecond quarter:\nfirst month, 47 employees second month, 41 employees third month, 48 employees\nthird quarter:\nfirst month, 11 employees second month, 20 employees third month, 20 employees\n2008\nfirst quarter:\nfirst month, 21 employees second month, 21 employees third month, 23 employees\nWhile the Town argues that these numbers include many employees who did not work at least 1,000 hours, the Town does not contest that this evidence was sufficient to show that the Town regularly employed 15 or more employees based on the \u201cpayroll method.\u201d We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the Town \u201cregularly employed] 15 or more employees[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143422.2. Accordingly, the trial court erred in directing a verdict against Plaintiff on this issue, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nBased on our holding, the Town\u2019s argument on its cross-appeal, contending that the trial court erred in failing to grant the Town summary judgment on this issue, is overruled.\nB. Defendant\u2019s Claims\n1. Jury Instruction\nDefendant contends that the trial \u25a0 court erred by refusing Defendant\u2019s request to instruct the jury that Plaintiff must prove that he was denied the opportunity to investigate or that he could not have learned the true facts by exercise of reasonable diligence. We disagree.\nTo prevail on this issue, Defendant must demonstrate that \u201c(1) the requested instruction was a correct statement of law and (2) was supported by the evidence, and that (3) the instruction given, considered in its entirety, failed to encompass the substance of the law requested and (4) such failure likely misled the jury.\u201d Liborio v. King, 150 N.C. App. 531, 534, 564 S.E.2d 272, 274 (citing Faeber v. E. C. T. Corp., 16 N.C. App. 429, 430, 192 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1972) (upholding instruction on grounds that it \u201csufficiently covered the meaning of the terms\u201d that defendant requested trial court to define in its charge to jury)), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 304, 570 S.E.2d 726 (2002). When a request is made for a specific jury instruction that is correct as a matter of law and is supported by the evidence, the trial court is required to give an instruction expressing \u201cat least the substance of the requested instruction[.]\u201d Parker v. Barefoot, 130 N.C. App. 18, 20, 502 S.E.2d 42,44 (1998), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 351 N.C. 40, 519 S.E.2d 315 (1999). On appeal, this Court \u201cmust consider and review the challenged instructions in their entirety; it cannot dissect and examine them in fragment\u201d in order to determine if the court\u2019s instruction provided \u201cthe substance of the instruction requested[.]\u201d Id.\nThe trial court instructed the jury with respect to the element of justifiable reliance as follows:\n[T]hat Plaintiff actually relied on the false information supplied by the Defendant and that the Plaintiff\u2019s reliance was justifiable. Actual reliance is direct reliance upon false information. Reliance is justifiable if, under the same or similar circumstances, a reasonable person, in the exercise of ordinary care, would have relied on the false information and/or would not have discovered the information was false. In this case, Plaintiff\u2019s reliance may be justified if Plaintiff could not have discovered the truth about the Local Governmental Employees\u2019 Retirement System rules by the exercise of reasonable diligence or if the Plaintiff was induced by the Defendant to forego additional investigation to learn about those rules.\n(Emphasis added). The Town\u2019s proposed jury instruction differed from the emphasized language as follows:\nIn this case, Plaintiff\u2019s reliance would be justified only if Plaintiff could not have discovered the truth about the State Retirement System rules about re-employment after retirement by the exercise of reasonable diligence or if the Plaintiff was induced by the Town of Stoneville to forego additional investigations to learn about the State Retirement System\u2019s rules regarding re-employment after retirement.\n(Emphasis added).\nThe Town argues that the trial court\u2019s failure to instruct the jury as proposed by the Town misled the jury because the instruction allowed the jury to find justifiable reliance \u201ceven if Plaintiff could have discovered the truth through reasonable diligence.\u201d\nWe need not determine whether the Town\u2019s proffered instruction was a correct statement of the law because we conclude that Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court\u2019s instruction \u201clikely misled the jury[.]\u201d As explained supra, Plaintiff could not have discovered the truth about the Local Governmental Employees\u2019 Retirement System rules by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Defendant\u2019s argument is overruled.\n2. Submission of Issues\nThe Town finally argues that the trial court submitted an insufficient verdict sheet to the jury. Specifically, the Town argues that the verdict sheet did not inquire into whether Plaintiff justifiably relied upon the Town\u2019s representations.\n\u201c[T]he trial judge must submit to the jury such issues as are necessary to settle the material controversies raised in the pleadings and supported by the evidence.\u201d Rental Towel & Uniform Serv. v. Bynum Int\u2019l, Inc., 304 N.C. 174, 176, 282 S.E.2d.426, 428 (1981). \u201c \u2018The number, form and phraseology of the issues lie within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the issues will not be held for error if they are sufficiently comprehensive to resolve all factual controversies and to enable the court to render judgment fully determining the cause.\u2019 \u201d Griffis v. Lazarovich, 161 N.C. App. 434, 440, 588 S.E.2d 918, 923 (2003) (quoting Chalmers v. Womack, 269 N.C. 433, 435-36, 152 S.E.2d 505, 507 (1967)), disc. review denied, 358 N.C. 375, 598 S.E.2d 135 (2004). Further, N.C. R. Civ. P. 49(b) provides that \u201cissues shall be framed in concise and direct terms, and prolixity and confusion must be avoided by not having too many issues.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 49(b) (2009).\nThe Town proposed that the following issues be presented to the jury:\nDid the Plaintiff justifiably rely on a negligent misrepresentation made by the Defendant?\nDid such reliance cause him financial damage?\nWhat amount, if any, is the Plaintiff entitled to recover from the Defendant?\nThe trial court submitted the following issues to the jury:\n1. Was the plaintiff financially damaged by a negligent misrepresentation of the Defendant?\n2. What amount is the Plaintiff entitled to recover from the defendant for negligent misrepresentation?\nThe issues submitted to the jury properly reflect the \u201cmaterial controversies\u201d involved in this negligent misrepresentation action. Uniform Serv., 304 N.C. at 176, 282 S.E.2d at 428. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to submit one element of negligent misrepresentation as a separate issue or by combining the elements of the offense of negligent misrepresentation into one issue. Griffis, 161 N.C. App. at 440-41, 588 S.E.2d at 923. We conclude that the issues as presented allowed the jury to render judgment fully determining the cause. Chalmers, 269 N.C. at 435-36, 152 S.E.2d at 507. This argument is overruled.\nFor the reasons stated, the order and judgment of the trial court are\nREVERSED in part, and REVERSED and REMANDED in part.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge STROUD concur.\n. Although the written order originally allowed \u201cDefendant\u2019s Motion for Directed Verdict at the close of Plaintiff\u2019s evidence,\u201d this language was deleted by Judge Webb.\n. LGERS is a division of the Department of State Treasurer, Retirement Systems Division (\u201cState Retirement System\u201d).\n. Ms. Price only became aware of the rule when she was deposed in this case.\n. Plaintiff was not represented by counsel at this point.\n. Plaintiff contested the State Retirement System\u2019s position. Although this Court was \u201cvery distressed and troubled that [Plaintiff] must reimburse the retirement benefits paid to him by [the State Retirement System,]\u201d ultimately, this Court affirmed the State Retirement System\u2019s decision. Walker v. Dep\u2019t of State Treasurer, \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014,\u2014,\u2014S.E.2d \u2014, \u2014 (2010).\n. It was not until 2008 that LGERS initiated direct mailings to employees.\n. Moreover, to the extent that the Town\u2019s approval of compensated leave time constituted grounds for Plaintiff\u2019s disqualification for his retirement benefits, such advice could arguably constitute further negligent misrepresentation by the Town.\n. Cf. Libby Hill Seafood Restaurants, Inc. v. Owens, 62 N.C. App. 695, 699-700, 303 S.E.2d 565, 569 (\u201cA purchaser who is on equal footing with the vendor and has equal means of knowing the truth is contributorily negligent if he relies on a vendor\u2019s statements regarding the physical condition of property.\u201d) (emphasis added), disc. review denied, 309 N.C. 321, 307 S.E.2d 164 (1983).\n. Although the Town argues that Ms. Winn\u2019s initial representation was not \u201cfalse\u201d since Plaintiff was not working more than 1,000 hours at the time she gave him the information, such argument is irrelevant, at best, where the Town continued to represent to Plaintiff that he could receive his retirement benefits if his salary was below the salary cap even after Plaintiff\u2019s hours exceeded 1,000.\n. The Department of Labor has likewise adopted the \u201cpayroll method\u201d under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, which defines an \u201cemployer\u201d as a company who \u201cemploys 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar work weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.\u201d See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 2611(4)(A)(I) (2009); 29 CFR \u00a7 825.105(b)-(d) (2009).\n. Ms. Price testified that the fourth quarter records for 2007 were not available.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEPHENS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Elliot Pishko Morgan, P.A., by Robert M. Elliot, for Plaintiff", "Gray King Chamberlin & Martineau, LLC, by Elizabeth A. Martineau and Susan M. Hill, for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GARY LAWRENCE WALKER, Plaintiff v. TOWN OF STONEVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, Defendant\nNo. COA10-278\n(Filed 19 April 2011)\n1. Fraud\u2014 negligent misrepresentation \u2014 erroneous grant of directed verdict and JNOV\nThe trial court erred by granting the town\u2019s motions for directed verdict and JNOV because plaintiff offered substantial evidence to support the jury\u2019s negligent misrepresentation verdict. By inquiring with proper town officials, plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to determine how he could return to work with the town without jeopardizing his retirement benefits. Further, plaintiff presented substantial evidence that he justifiably relied on the town\u2019s representations.\n2. Public Officers and Employees\u2014 wrongful discharge \u2014 regular employee \u2014 payroll method\nThe trial court erred by directing verdict against plaintiff on his wrongful discharge claim. Plaintiff offered substantial evidence that the town regularly employed 15 or more employees based on the payroll method as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143-422.2.\n3. Criminal Law\u2014 denial of requested instruction \u2014 denied opportunity to investigate or could have learned through reasonable diligence\nAlthough defendant contended that the trial court erred by refusing his request to instruct the jury that plaintiff must prove that he was denied the opportunity to investigate or that he could not have learned the true facts by exercise of reasonable diligence, defendant failed to demonstrate that the trial court\u2019s instruction likely misled the jury.\n4. Jury\u2014 verdict sheet \u2014 properly reflected material controversies involved\nThe trial court did not improperly submit an insufficient verdict sheet to the jury in a negligent misrepresentation case. The issues submitted properly reflected the material controversies involved.\nAppeal by Plaintiff from order and judgment entered 25 June 2009 by Judge James M. Webb in Rockingham County Superior Court. Cross-appeal by Defendant from order entered 23 March 2009 by Judge John 0. Craig, III and order entered 28 May 2009 by Judge James M. Webb in Rockingham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 October 2010.\nElliot Pishko Morgan, P.A., by Robert M. Elliot, for Plaintiff\nGray King Chamberlin & Martineau, LLC, by Elizabeth A. Martineau and Susan M. Hill, for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0024-01", "first_page_order": 32, "last_page_order": 50 }