{ "id": 3806209, "name": "REGGIE L. CRENSHAW, Plaintiff v. ALAINA D. WILLIAMS, F/K/A ALAINA CRENSHAW Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Crenshaw v. Williams", "decision_date": "2011-04-19", "docket_number": "No. COA10-720", "first_page": "136", "last_page": "147", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "211 N.C. App. 136" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "611 S.E.2d 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632675 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461", "parenthetical": "\"As the trial court had already considered the parties' past domestic troubles and communication difficulties in the prior order, without findings of additional changes in circumstances or conditions, modification of the prior custody order was in error.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/611/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "622 S.E.2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634491 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200", "parenthetical": "quoting Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 624-25, 501 S.E.2d at 902" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/622/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 S.E.2d 143", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639850, 12639851 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/653/0143-01", "/se2d/653/0143-02" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633472, 12633473, 12633471 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0234-02", "/se2d/616/0234-03", "/se2d/616/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "611 S.E.2d 869", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632723 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/611/0869-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 S.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639899 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/653/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 N.C. App. 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551543 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/46/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 576", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11078803 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9004318 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96", "parenthetical": "\"As the trial court had already considered the parties' past domestic troubles and communication difficulties in the prior order, without findings of additional changes in circumstances or conditions, modification of the prior custody order was in error.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5", "parenthetical": "\"There is no evidence in this record of any substantial change in conditions affecting the welfare of Timmy between 7 June 1974 and 7 August 1974. The friction between the parents had existed from the date of the first custody order in 1973.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564905 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88", "parenthetical": "\"There is no evidence in this record of any substantial change in conditions affecting the welfare of Timmy between 7 June 1974 and 7 August 1974. The friction between the parents had existed from the date of the first custody order in 1973.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 S.E.2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 692", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4735043, 4738989, 4737172, 4737238, 4734968 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0692-05", "/nc/318/0692-02", "/nc/318/0692-01", "/nc/318/0692-04", "/nc/318/0692-03" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 N.C. App. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358679 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/82/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 S.E.2d 92", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525389 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 S.E.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575017 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8353081 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705", "parenthetical": "quoting Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 624-25, 501 S.E.2d at 902" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 S.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 N.C. App. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9186928 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/157/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 S.E.2d 729", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2510111 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" }, { "page": "257" }, { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491698 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" }, { "page": "480-81" }, { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 79", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" }, { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11080722 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540" }, { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 S.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564207 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 S.E.2d 898", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "899", "parenthetical": "quoting Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 362, 204 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1974)" }, { "page": "903" }, { "page": "902" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659910 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619", "parenthetical": "quoting Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 362, 204 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1974)" }, { "page": "625" }, { "page": "624-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150229 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 S.E.2d 471", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8172392 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "688 S.E.2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "773" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 631", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3800229, 3793893, 3794537, 3799052, 3804845, 3795663, 3804149, 3798264, 3796825 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0631-01", "/nc/359/0631-07", "/nc/359/0631-05", "/nc/359/0631-04", "/nc/359/0631-08", "/nc/359/0631-03", "/nc/359/0631-06", "/nc/359/0631-02", "/nc/359/0631-09" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9004519 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "578 S.E.2d 610", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613-14", "parenthetical": "\"Enacted by states as a mechanism to reduce the multiple, conflicting child support orders existing in numerous states, UIFSA creates a structure designed to provide for only one controlling support order at a time [.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 N.C. App. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9185889 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243", "parenthetical": "\"Enacted by states as a mechanism to reduce the multiple, conflicting child support orders existing in numerous states, UIFSA creates a structure designed to provide for only one controlling support order at a time [.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/157/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 661", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798444 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8374767 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0459-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1087, "char_count": 28014, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.66923306217887e-08, "percentile": 0.3531362253166111 }, "sha256": "baaf597c00d0fec1a651e660dbac117cadab5963262ae2d64a3468f7d0895b42", "simhash": "1:2fb9066a564fbed8", "word_count": 4457 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:31:50.212435+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge THIGPEN concur." ], "parties": [ "REGGIE L. CRENSHAW, Plaintiff v. ALAINA D. WILLIAMS, F/K/A ALAINA CRENSHAW Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Robert G, Judge.\nDefendant Alaina D. Williams (formerly Crenshaw) appeals from the trial court\u2019s order modifying a custody order entered in Michigan and granting plaintiff Reggie L. Crenshaw primary custody of the couple\u2019s two sons, Jhavon-Gabriel and Christian. After careful review, we reverse in part and affirm in part.\nFacts\nOn 15 August 2002, the Circuit Court for Wayne County, Michigan entered a \u201cJudgment of Divorce\u201d (the \u201cMichigan divorce judgment\u201d), which granted the parties a divorce and awarded them \u201cjoint legal and joint physical custody\u201d of the juveniles. Under the terms of the judgment, \u201cprimar [y]\u201d custody of the juveniles was with Ms. Williams for the first three years after entry of the Michigan divorce judgment (August 2002-August 2005) and then alternated to Mr. Crenshaw for the second three-year period (August 2005-August 2008). At the time of the couple\u2019s divorce, Mr. Crenshaw was living in Dearborn, Michigan and Ms. Williams was living in Norcross, Georgia, near Atlanta. Mr. Crenshaw moved to Charlotte, North Carolina shortly after the Michigan divorce judgment was entered.\nWhen Ms. Williams refused to \u201cagree to the switch\u201d in custody in 2005, Mr. Crenshaw filed a motion in Michigan state court requesting enforcement of the terms of the Michigan divorce judgment. After holding a hearing on 15 August 2005, the Michigan circuit court entered an \u201cOrder for Change of Custody\u201d (the \u201cMichigan custody order\u201d) on 6 September 2005, in which the court determined that \u201cit was in the best interests of the minor children to enforce the custody agreement set forth in the [Michigan divorce judgment] . . . .\u201d The custody order also directed Ms. Williams to pay child support to Mr. Crenshaw while he had primary custody. Mr. Crenshaw has retained custody of Jhavon and Christian since entry of the 2005 Michigan custody order.\nMr. Crenshaw married Myra McCaskill on 9 June 2007. Ms. McCaskill helps parent Jhavon and Christian, including helping them with their homework, driving them to and from activities, buying them clothes, and cooking meals for them. Mr. Crenshaw and Ms. McCaskill have been members of the PTA Boards of their sons\u2019 schools and have participated on the schools\u2019 Leadership Teams. Ms. Williams has not volunteered at her sons\u2019 schools since they moved to Charlotte to live with their father.\nMr. Crenshaw and Ms. McCaskill also encourage and support the children\u2019s participation in sports. Mr. Crenshaw has helped coach football teams on which the boys played and paid for Christian to attend a football camp in the Atlanta area during the summer of 2008.\nMs. Williams has had \u201csporadic employment\u201d since August 2005, working as an insurance adjuster, substitute teacher, waitress, and working for her family\u2019s home renovation business. Ms. Williams is currently unemployed and living off \u00f3f her savings. Her parents own the townhome in which she lives and allow her to live there rent-free in exchange for working for the family business.\nSince August 2005, Ms. Williams has missed four or five visits with Jhavon and Christian. On some weekend visits, Ms. Williams will give up spending Friday nights with the children because Saturday morning flights typically are less expensive.\nMs. Williams is late for \u201cthe majority\u201d of exchanges, often returning Jhavon and Christian to Charlotte after 9:00 p.m. on Sunday nights. When she does not return them on Sunday nights, Ms. Williams will leave Norcross around 3:00 a.m. and drive the children directly to their schools in Charlotte. When Jhavon and Christian return from visiting their mother, they typically are \u201cexhausted\u201d and Mr. Crenshaw and Ms. McCaskill are left to \u201cdeal with the ramifications of the exhaustion.\u201d\nMr. Crenshaw and Ms. Williams are \u201c[r]arely\u201d able to agree on issues involving their children. Because Ms. Williams often yells and curses at Mr. Crenshaw on the telephone, he usually resorts to communicating with her through email. Although Mr. Crenshaw notifies Ms. Williams through email about Jhavon\u2019s and Christian\u2019s activities, she does not fully participate in the activities.\nThe parties also differ regarding dietary habits, health care, and time spent with the children. Ms. Williams does not support the children seeing medical doctors and they often come home to Charlotte sick. While Mr. Crenshaw disciplines Jhavon and Christian by taking away their privileges, Ms. Williams does not discipline them because they \u201csee eye to eye\u201d on most issues.\nMr. Crenshaw\u2019s position with Wachovia was eliminated in November 2008, but he obtained employment that same month with ServiceMaster, which is headquartered in Memphis, Tennessee. On 3 November 2008, Mr. Crenshaw registered the 2002 Michigan divorce judgment and 2005 custody order in Mecklenburg County, requesting modification of custody and child support. At the time of the 6 April and 17 June 2009 hearings on Mr. Crenshaw\u2019s motions in Mecklenburg County District Court, Mr. Crenshaw planned on moving his family to the Memphis area in late June or early July of 2009.\nThe district court entered an order on 6 July 2009, concluding that \u201cMr. Crenshaw ha[d] met his burden of showing that a change in circumstances actually has occurred, and that the changes have affected the welfare of Jhavon and Christian\u201d and awarding him \u201cprimary custody\u201d of the children. The court also concluded that Ms. Williams should pay $454 per month in child support; that she was currently $16,400 in arrears; and that she should pay an additional $100 per month \u201ctowards retirement of the arrearage.\u201d Ms. Williams filed numerous post-trial motions, including a \u201cMotion for New Trial and to Amend Findings of Fact,\u201d a \u201cMotion for Relief from Child Support Order and for Sanctions,\u201d and a \u201cMotion to Extract Fraudulent Evidence.\u201d The trial court denied Ms. Williams\u2019 motions on 26 October 2009. Ms. Williams timely appealed to this Court.\nSupport\nMs. Williams first contends that the Michigan child support order was not properly registered under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (\u201cUIFSA\u201d), codified in Chapter 52C of the North Carolina General Statutes, and thus \u201cthe trial court lacked authority to address the issue of child support.\u201d Whether the trial court complied with the registration procedures set out in UIFSA is a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal. State ex rel. Lively v. Berry, 187 N.C. App. 459, 462, 653 S.E.2d 192, 194 (2007).\nUIFSA, enacted in North Carolina in 1995, was \u201cpromulgated and intended to be used as [a] procedural mechanism]] for the establishment, modification, and enforcement of child and spousal support obligations.\u201d Welsher v. Rager, 127 N.C. App. 521, 524, 491 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1997); accord New Hanover Cty. ex rel. Mannthey v. Kilbourne, 157 N.C. App. 239, 243, 578 S.E.2d 610, 613-14 (2003) (\u201cEnacted by states as a mechanism to reduce the multiple, conflicting child support orders existing in numerous states, UIFSA creates a structure designed to provide for only one controlling support order at a time [.]\u201d).\nUnder UIFSA, a child support order is first entered by the \u201cissuing tribunal\u201d in the \u201cissuing state.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52C-1-101(9) and (10) (2009); Hook v. Hook, 170 N.C. App. 138, 141, 611 S.E.2d 869, 871, disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 631, 616 S.E.2d 234 (2005). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52C-6-609 (2009) establishes that if an obligee wants to modify an order against an obligor who resides in a different state, the obligee must \u201cregister\u201d the order in the state in which the obligor resides. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52C-6-609 cmt. (\u201cA petitioner wishing to register a support order of another state for purposes of modification must. . . follow the procedure for registration set forth in [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52C-6-602 (2009),]\u201d which requires registration in \u201cthe tribunal for the county in which the obligor resides in this State[.]\u201d).\nIt is undisputed in this case that Ms. Williams is not a resident of North Carolina; she resides in Georgia. Consequently, Mr. Crenshaw, as the party seeking modification in this case, was required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 52C-6-602 and -609 to register the Michigan support order in Georgia, not North Carolina:\nIn the overwhelming majority of cases, the party seeking modification must seek that relief in a new forum, almost invariably the State of residence of the other party. This rule applies to either obligor or obligee, depending on which of those parties seeks to modify.. . .\n.... This restriction attempts to achieve a rough justice between the parties in the majority of cases by preventing a litigant from choosing to seek modification in a local tribunal to the marked disadvantage of the other party. ... In short, the obligee is required to register the existing order and seek modification of that order in a State which has personal jurisdiction over the obligor other than the State of the obligee\u2019s residence. Most typically this will be the State of residence of the obligor. . . .\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52C-6-611 cmt (2009). As North Carolina is not the proper forum for modifying the Michigan support order, the trial court lacked the authority to modify that order. See Lacarrubba v. Lacarrubba, - N.C. App. -, -, 688 S.E.2d 769, 773 (2010) (concluding North Carolina court \u201clacked authority to modify [New York child support] order or reduce arrearages\u201d where obligee, who resided in Florida, registered foreign order in North Carolina for \u201cenforcement only\u201d and obligee did not consent to personal jurisdiction in North Carolina). Consequently, the portion of the trial court\u2019s order modifying Ms. Williams\u2019 child support obligations is reversed.\nCustody\nMs. Williams also contends that the trial court erred in modifying the Michigan custody order. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.7(b) (2009) provides that \u201cwhen an order for custody of a minor child has been entered by a court of another state, a court of this State may, upon gaming jurisdiction, and a showing of changed circumstances, enter a new order for custody which modifies or supersedes such order for custody.\u201d As a threshold issue, we note that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-203(2) (2009) to modify the Michigan custody order as the record indicates that North Carolina was the juveniles\u2019 \u201chome state\u201d at the time this custody action was initiated, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-102(7) (2009), and neither the juveniles nor their parents continued to reside in Michigan. See In re T.J.D.W., 182 N.C. App. 394, 397, 642 S.E.2d 471, 473 (holding trial court had jurisdiction to modify South Carolina custody order where \u201cthe child and a parent . . . lived in North Carolina for the six months immediately preceding the commencement of the proceeding\u201d and \u201cthe child and both parents had left South Carolina at the time of the commencement of the proceeding\u201d), aff\u2019d per curiam, 362 N.C. 84, 653 S.E.2d 143 (2007).\nOur Courts have interpreted N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.7(b) as authorizing trial courts to modify a foreign custody order if the party moving for modification shows that \u201c \u2018a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child\u2019 \u201d warrants a change in custody. Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 619, 501 S.E.2d 898, 899 (1998) (quoting Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 362, 204 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1974)). \u201cThe party seeking the custody change has the burden of showing the requisite change.\u201d Metz v. Metz, 138 N.C. App. 538, 540, 530 S.E.2d 79, 80 (2000). In determining whether modification is warranted, the trial court engages in a two-step analysis: the court first determines whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child involved, and, if so, the court then determines whether modification of custody is in the child\u2019s best interest. Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 474, 586 S.E.2d 250, 253 (2003).\nWhen reviewing a trial court\u2019s order modifying custody, the appellate court must determine whether the trial court\u2019s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, in turn, whether the court\u2019s findings support its conclusions of law. Id. If supported by substantial evidence, the trial court\u2019s findings are binding on appeal, despite the existence of evidence that might support contrary findings. Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 625, 501 S.E.2d at 903. Unchallenged findings are \u201cpresumed to be supported by competent evidence and [are] binding on appeal.\u201d Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). The trial court\u2019s conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. Scott v. Scott, 157 N.C. App. 382, 385, 579 S.E.2d 431, 433 (2003). \u201c \u2018[T]he trial court is vested with broad discretion in cases involving child custody,\u2019 and its decision [to modify custody] will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.\u201d Karger v. Wood, 174 N.C. App. 703, 705, 622 S.E.2d 197, 200 (2005) (quoting Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 624-25, 501 S.E.2d at 902) (second alteration added).\nMs. Williams first contends that \u201cthe trial court\u2019s decision regarding child support tainted its concurrent decision regarding custody modification[.]\u201d In support of her argument, Ms. Williams points to Lee\u2019s North Carolina Family Law, where Professor Suzanne Reynolds explains: \u201c[I]t is the law of child support, not custody, that should address disparities in standards of living. If the better custodian cannot provide for the child\u2019s economic needs, then an award of child support \u2014 not a disposition of custody \u2014 should address those needs.\u201d Suzanne Reynolds, 3 Lee's North Carolina Family Law \u00a7 13.29 (5th ed. 2002) [hereinafter Lee\u2019s Family Law]; see also Jolly v. Queen, 264 N.C. 711, 715, 142 S.E.2d 592, 596 (1965) (observing that if atrial court were permitted to base a custody determination on comparative standards of living, \u201ca judge might find it to be in the best interest of a legitimate child of poor but honest, industrious parents, who were providing him with the necessities, that his custody be given to a more affluent neighbor or relative who had no child and desired him\u201d).\nProfessor Reynolds further explains, however, that, while \u201cthe law of custody discourages the making of custody decisions based on relative standards of living[,]\u201d it is \u201cnot error for the [court\u2019s] findings to include these comparisons\u201d so long as its findings \u201creveal that other factors were more important.\u201d Lee\u2019s Family Law \u00a7 13.29. Here, in addition to making findings regarding the parties\u2019 respective incomes and standards of living, the trial court also made findings addressing: Mr. Crenshaw (and Ms. McCaskill\u2019s) level of involvement in Jhavon\u2019s and Christian\u2019s education and extra-curricular activities, and Ms. Williams\u2019 lack of \u201cfull]] participation]\u201d in the boys\u2019 activities; Ms. Williams\u2019 missing four or five visits per year with her children and her election to \u201cforgo\u201d Friday nights during some weekend visits; Ms. Williams\u2019 returning the boys \u201cexhausted\u201d at the end of weekend visits; Ms. Williams\u2019 disapproval of the children seeing medical doctors and her returning the boys \u201cwith colds\u201d; and Mr. Crenshaw\u2019s disciplining the boys by taking away their privileges and Ms. Williams\u2019 not disciplining them.\nThe trial court\u2019s findings demonstrate that it considered factors beyond the parties\u2019 relative incomes and standards of living in determining whether there had been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the children\u2019s welfare. See Metz, 138 N.C. App. at 541, 530 S.E.2d at 81 (\u201caffirming trial court\u2019s order finding a substantial change of circumstances affecting the child\u2019s welfare where, in addition to considering parents\u2019 relative standards of living, trial court made findings regarding other factors, including child\u2019s educational and developmental needs and custodial parent\u2019s work schedule); see also White v. White, 90 N.C. App. 553, 558, 369 S.E.2d 92, 95 (1988) (\u201cPlaintiff argues that she is being denied custody of her child because defendant has a greater income. We disagree. Defendant\u2019s income and stable home environment simply provide part of the basis for determining that the child\u2019s best interests and welfare will be promoted by awarding custody to defendant.\u201d).\nMs. Williams next contends that \u201c[s]everal of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact lack competent evidentiary support.\u201d She complains of various \u201cnuanced discrepancies between the evidence and factual findings,\u201d contending, for example, that there is no evidentiary support for the date stated in the order regarding Mr. Crenshaw\u2019s and Ms. McCaskill\u2019s marriage; that, contrary to the court\u2019s characterization of the evidence, her written request for an extension to respond to Mr. Crenshaw\u2019s petition for registration constitutes a \u201cresponse\u201d; that, contrary to the court\u2019s characterization, she did not \u201ccancel]]\u201d four to five visits a year, she simply \u201cmiss[ed]\u201d four to five visits a year; that the court\u2019s description of Mr. Crenshaw and Ms. McCaskill having to \u201cdeal\u201d with the boys being \u201cexhausted\u201d when she drives them directly to school in Charlotte from Atlanta is a \u201cstretch[]\u201d; and, that, contrary to the court\u2019s statement that the \u201cpresent custody schedule is not working well,\u201d it is only the \u201cpresent exchange procedure\u201d that is \u201cproblematic.\u201d\nAssuming, without deciding, that the challenged findings are not supported by evidence in the record, Ms. Williams, as the appellant, \u201cmust not only show error, but also that the error is material and prejudicial, amounting to a denial of a substantial right and that a different result would have likely ensued.\u201d Cook v. Southern Bonded, Inc., 82 N.C. App. 277, 281, 346 S.E.2d 168, 171 (1986), disc. review denied, 318 N.C. 692, 351 S.E.2d 741 (1987). Ms. Williams fails to provide any explanation as to how any of these \u201cnuanced discrepancies\u201d are material or prejudicial. This argument is overruled.\nMs. Williams also argues that the trial court\u2019s findings do not support its conclusion that Mr. Crenshaw satisfied his burden of proving that a substantial change of circumstances affecting the children\u2019s welfare has occurred. Ms. Williams argues that Mr. Crenshaw failed to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances because \u201cthe disparity in the parties\u2019 respective stability\u201d was the basis for the 2005 Michigan custody order that \u201cswitched\u201d custody from Ms. Williams to Mr. Crenshaw and there has been no change in the parties\u2019 respective \u201cfinancial and occupational stability.\u201d Our courts have held that when the circumstances existing at the time of the request for modification are the same as the circumstances at the time of the initial custody determination, the trial court lacks the basis to modify the initial custody order. See Tucker v. Tucker, 288 N.C. 81, 88, 216 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1975) (\u201cThere is no evidence in this record of any substantial change in conditions affecting the welfare of Timmy between 7 June 1974 and 7 August 1974. The friction between the parents had existed from the date of the first custody order in 1973.\u201d); Ford v. Wright, 170 N.C. App. 89, 96, 611 S.E.2d 456, 461 (2005) (\u201cAs the trial court had already considered the parties\u2019 past domestic troubles and communication difficulties in the prior order, without findings of additional changes in circumstances or conditions, modification of the prior custody order was in error.\u201d); see also Lee\u2019s Family Law \u00a7 13.106(b) (explaining that if \u201cthe existing facts are no different from the facts before the court at the time of the previous order, then the court has no basis to modify the order\u201d).\nAs the trial court\u2019s findings indicate, the evidence in this case reveals material changes in the circumstances \u2014 with respect to the parties\u2019 comparative stability as well as other considerations\u2014 between the time of the hearing resulting in the Michigan custody order and the modification proceedings in this case. Here, the court specifically found that since entry of the Michigan custody order \u201cMr. Crenshaw and Ms. McCaskill, his present spouse, have been members of PTA Boards at each child\u2019s school, and they have participated on the schools\u2019 Leadership Teams\u201d and that \u201cMs. Williams has not volunteered at the minor children\u2019s schools\u201d; that \u201cMr. Crenshaw has helped coach football teams on which the boys played, and he and Ms. McCaskill encourage and support the sports in which the children participate\u201d; that Ms. McCaskill \u201cassists with parenting\u201d the children, helps them with their homework, provides transportation, and generally helps take care of them; that although Mr. Crenshaw\u2019s position with Wachovia was eliminated, he found other employment and \u201c[h]is prospects for future employment in the position are good\u201d; that his \u201cmonthly income totals $20,833\u201d and that he is able to pay for the children\u2019s insurance; that Mr. Crenshaw has shown financial and \u201cvocational stability\u201d while Ms. Williams\u2019 average monthly income over the past three years is $1,584 and she is currently unemployed; that since August 2005, Ms. Williams misses roughly four or five visits with her sons each year and often forgoes the Friday night portion of weekend visits because \u201cflights typically are less expensive when the children leave Charlotte on a Saturday\u201d; that \u201cMs. Williams is late for the majority of exchanges,\u201d often not returning the boys to Charlotte until after 9:00 p.m. on Sunday nights before school or leaving the Atlanta area around 3:00 a.m. Monday mornings and driving the boys directly to their schools; that \u201c[w]hen the children return from visiting Ms. Williams, they typically are exhausted, and Mr. Crenshaw and Ms. McCaskill have to deal with the ramifications of the exhaustion\u201d; that \u201cMs. Williams does not support the children seeing medical doctors, and they often return to Charlotte with colds\u201d; that while Mr. Crenshaw disciplines the boys by restricting their privileges, Ms. Williams does not discipline them; that although Ms. Williams has \u201cspent good quality time\u201d with her children, she has not visited with them \u201cconsistent[ly]\u201d; that while Mr. Crenshaw advises Ms. Williams of the boy\u2019s activities, she \u201chas not fully participated in these activities\u201d; and, that the \u201cminor children are bright, well mannered [sic] and well-adjusted\u201d and are \u201cinvolved in their respective schools, in sports and in the community.\u201d\nThese unchallenged findings support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that \u201cMr. Crenshaw has met his.burden of showing that a change in circumstances actually has occurred, and that the changes have affected the welfare of Jhavon and Christian.\u201d See Shipman, 357 N.C. at 480-81, 586 S.E.2d at 257 (concluding that \u201cculmination of a series of developments that occurred after the original custody decree\u201d established \u201csubstantial change in circumstances\u201d where father \u201csecured new employment,\u201d father owned a house with girlfriend, father and girlfriend could \u201cprovide for the child,\u201d and girlfriend helped take care of child). This contention is overruled.\nMs. Williams further argues that the trial court\u2019s findings fail to indicate that the court considered the impact on the children\u2019s welfare of Mr. Crenshaw\u2019s planned relocation to Memphis. Ms. Williams is correct that a parent\u2019s relocation is not, without more, \u201ca substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child which justifies a modification of a custody decree.\u201d Evans v. Evans, 138 N.C. App. 135, 140, 530 S.E.2d 576, 579 (2000). Rather, where a parent relocates, \u201cthe effect on the welfare of the child must be shown in order for the court to modify a custody decree based on change of circumstance.\u201d Gordon v. Gordon, 46 N.C. App. 495, 500, 265 S.E.2d 425, 428 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 501 S.E.2d 898 (1998).\nHere, the trial court\u2019s uncontested findings establish that the court considered the impact of the relocation on the boys\u2019 welfare. Specifically, the court found that Mr. Crenshaw took a job with ServiceMaster in Memphis after he lost his job with Wachovia in Charlotte and that he plans to relocate his family to the Memphis area because \u201c[h]is prospects for future employment in this position axe good\u201d and his monthly salary of $20,833 allows him to \u201csupport the children financially.\u201d This argument is overruled.\nMs. Williams also argues that the trial court\u2019s findings regarding \u201cthe parties\u2019 purported difficulties concerning communication and visitation\u201d fail to support its conclusion that the children\u2019s welfare has been affected by a substantial change in circumstances. With respect to this issue, the court\u2019s findings indicate that, since entry of the Michigan custody order, Ms. Williams has missed four to five visits with her children a year; that, during weekend visits, she will \u201cforgo\u201d having the children on Friday nights because it is cheaper for the children to fly to Atlanta on Saturdays; that she is \u201clate for the majority of exchanges, oftentimes returning the children to Charlotte after 9 pm on a Sunday night before school resumes\u201d; that when she fails to return the children on Sundays, she will \u201cleave [Atlanta] around 3 am and drive the children directly to their schools in Charlotte\u201d; that the boys are \u201cexhausted\u201d after visiting with Ms. Williams and it is \u201cMr. Crenshaw and Ms. McCaskill that have to deal with the ramifications of the exhaustion\u201d; that \u201c[t]he parties\u2019 communication about the children is dysfunctional\u201d and that they are \u201c[rjarely . . . able to resolve issues regarding the children,\u201d including \u201cdietary habits, health care and time with the children\u201d; that \u201cMs. Williams does not support the children seeing medical doctors,\u201d and the children often are sick when they return to Charlotte; and, that Ms. Williams does \u201cnot fully participate []\u201d in the children\u2019s activities despite being notified of them by Mr. Crenshaw. Contrary to Ms. Williams\u2019 argument, these findings reveal how the parties\u2019 communication and visitation \u201cproblems\u201d affect the children\u2019s welfare.\nIn her final argument on appeal, Ms. Williams challenges the trial court\u2019s conclusion that modification of the Michigan custody order and granting Mr. Williams primary custody is \u201cin the best interests of Jhavon and Christian.\u201d Although Ms. Williams asserts that the trial court\u2019s \u201cbest interests\u201d determination is not supported by the evidence or its findings, where, as here, the appellate court \u201cdetermine [s] that the trial court has properly concluded that the facts show that a substantial change of circumstances has affected the welfare of the minor child and that modification was in the child\u2019s best interests, [the appellate court] will defer to the trial court\u2019s judgment and not disturb its decision to modify an existing custody agreement.\u201d Shipman, 357 N.C. at 475, 586 S.E.2d at 254. Consequently, that portion of the trial court\u2019s order modifying custody is affirmed.\nReversed in part; affirmed in part.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge THIGPEN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Robert G, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Todd W. Cline, P.A., by Todd W. Cline, for plaintiff-appellee.", "James, McElroy & Diehl, P.A., by Preston 0. Odom III, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "REGGIE L. CRENSHAW, Plaintiff v. ALAINA D. WILLIAMS, F/K/A ALAINA CRENSHAW Defendant\nNo. COA10-720\n(Filed 19 April 2011)\n1. Child Custody and Support\u2014 foreign support order\u2014 improper modification\nThe trial court lacked authority to modify a Michigan child support order, and the portion of the trial court\u2019s order modifying defendant mother\u2019s support obligation was reversed.\n2. Child Custody and Support\u2014 foreign custody order \u2014 modification \u2014 substantial change in circumstances \u2014 best interests of child\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by modifying a Michigan child custody order. The evidence revealed substantial changes in circumstances affecting the welfare of the minor children and that modification was in the best interests of the children.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 6 July 2009 by Judge Christy T. Mann in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 January 2011.\nTodd W. Cline, P.A., by Todd W. Cline, for plaintiff-appellee.\nJames, McElroy & Diehl, P.A., by Preston 0. Odom III, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0136-01", "first_page_order": 144, "last_page_order": 155 }