{ "id": 3806525, "name": "JAMES L. McDOWELL, Plaintiff v. CENTRAL STATION ORIGINAL INTERIORS, INC., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "McDowell v. Central Station Original Interiors, Inc.", "decision_date": "2011-04-19", "docket_number": "No. COA10-324", "first_page": "159", "last_page": "167", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "211 N.C. App. 159" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "603 S.E.2d 126", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631828 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/603/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 739", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12631834, 12631804, 12631805, 12631806 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/603/0127-02", "/se2d/602/0682-02", "/se2d/602/0682-01", "/se2d/602/0685-02" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-240", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "593 S.E.2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813" }, { "page": "813" }, { "page": "813" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8918898 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "575 S.E.2d 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 12, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "47" }, { "page": "48" }, { "page": "48" }, { "page": "48" }, { "page": "49" }, { "page": "49-50" }, { "page": "50-51", "parenthetical": "2003" }, { "page": "48" }, { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 N.C. App. 685", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9251800 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/155/0685-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-241", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811" }, { "page": "811", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "811" }, { "page": "811" }, { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N.C. App. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8896347 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/164/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150896 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0569-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 809, "char_count": 20403, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.791485538846438e-08, "percentile": 0.30134614025759804 }, "sha256": "98df22666aa32a0c904f753d0fa2aa9f59bb1655e7d1f1d2205752ddd232ba2f", "simhash": "1:8b7257d8d27fac7c", "word_count": 3253 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:31:50.212435+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STEPHENS concur." ], "parties": [ "JAMES L. McDOWELL, Plaintiff v. CENTRAL STATION ORIGINAL INTERIORS, INC., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nPlaintiff filed a complaint alleging defendant terminated him in violation of the Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act. The trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff appeals. As we conclude that plaintiff has forecast a genuine issue as to a material fact, we reverse.\nI. Background\nOn 27 February 2009, plaintiff sued defendant alleging in pertinent part:\n8. On or about November 5, 2007 Plaintiff was injured at work in a job related hernia injury and received medical care resulting in Plaintiff being out of work as a result of the job related injury through March 1, 2008.\n9. After Plaintiff\u2019s hernia injury on November 5, 2007, Plaintiff filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim due to his health injuries and said claim was reported to the Defendant.\n10. On or about March 3, 2008 Plaintiff returned to his employment. After March 3, 2008, the Plaintiff returned to work with unrestricted duty.\n11. For the approximate fifteen (15) month period the Plaintiff was employed by Defendant, he only missed work during the above stated period of time due to his hernia injury, when the Plaintiff was in that hospital for three (3) day[s] during the summer of 2007 due to a blood disorder and Plaintiff was tardy on only one (1) occasion.\n12. When Plaintiff returned to work, Lisa Hyatt, Chief Financial Officer of Defendant, informed Plaintiff that his job had been \u201ccut\u201d, that Plaintiff had been assigned to \u201cclean up duty\u201d, that Plaintiff had been put on probation for ninety (90) days due to Plaintiffs \u201csorry\u201d work record, and that Plaintiff had done nothing except \u201ccost the company money\u201d since Plaintiff had been there and that Plaintiff was a \u201crisk to the company\u201d.\n13. On or about March 18, 2008 at 5:30 P.M. Plaintiff fell on his back porch steps when he saw a snake and injured his back.\n14. On or about March 19, 2008 at 6:30 A.M. Plaintiff contacted his supervisor, Defendant employee Derek Latham that Plaintiff hurt his back and that he had to go see a doctor. Plaintiff\u2019s doctor instructed Plaintiff to have bed rest for the rest of the week and Plaintiff relayed this information to his supervisor Derek Latham.\n15. Plaintiff was instructed by Derek Latham that he had to talk to Lisa Hyatt who requested that Plaintiff provide her with a doctor\u2019s note. Plaintiff presented Lisa Hyatt with a doctor[\u2019]s note on the morning of March 19, 2008 and Plaintiff was terminated by Defendant on March 19, 2008. Lisa Hyatt told Plaintiff he was on ninety (90) day probation since [he] had had [sic] returned to work on March 3, 2008 and that now Plaintiff was \u201cout the door\u201d and \u201cfired.\u201d\n16. The Defendant\u2019s assertions said [sic] that it was proper to terminate the Plaintiff due to absenteeism, failure to follow safety procedures, and insubordination is a ploy used by the Defendant to terminate the Plaintiff\u2019s employment because of Defendant\u2019s retaliatory discharge for Plaintiff filing a workers\u2019 compensation claim.\nPlaintiff alleged defendant terminated him contrary to the Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act (\u201cREDA\u201d). Plaintiff requested, inter alia, \u201chis back pay losses, prejudgment interest on back pay losses, front pay losses, job benefits, wage increases and diminished retirement benefits, emotional distress damages, punitive damages, and compensatory damages [,]\u201d and \u201c[t]hat the Defendant be ordered to implement procedures and policies to prevent illegal discriminatory activities and that the Defendant is enjoined from committing further violations of the Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act[.]\u201d\nOn or about 20 November 2009, defendant filed an amended motion for summary judgment because \u201cthere [was] no genuine issue as to any material fact and that Central Station is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d On 11 December 2009, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant and dismissed all of plaintiffs claims with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals.\nII. Summary Judgment\nPlaintiff argues that \u201cthe trial court committed reversible error by dismissing this action and granting Defendant\u2019s Motion for Summary Judgment.\u201d (Original in all caps.) \u201cOur standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment is de novo; such judgment is appropriate only when the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). \u201cThe evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.\u201d Wiley v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 164 N.C. App. 183, 186, 594 S.E.2d 809, 811 (2004).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-241(a) provides in pertinent part that\n[n]o person shall discriminate or take any retaliatory action against an employee because the employee in good faith does or threatens to . . .\n[f]ile a claim or complaint, initiate any inquiry, investigation, inspection, proceeding or other action, or testify or provide information to any person with respect to . . .\nChapter 97 of the General Statutes.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-241(a) (2007).\nThe statute [which REDA replaced] does not prohibit all discharges of employees who are involved in a workers\u2019 compensation claim, it only prohibits those discharges made because the employee exercises his compensation rights. Furthermore, our appellate courts indicated in applying the former provision that a plaintiff fails to make out a case of retaliatory action where there is no close temporal connection between the filing of the claim and the alleged retaliatory act.\nSalter v. E & J Healthcare, Inc., 155 N.C. App. 685, 691, 575 S.E.2d 46, 50 (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nThe North Carolina Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act (REDA) prohibits discrimination or retaliation against an employee for filing a worker\u2019s compensation claim. In order to state a claim under REDA, a plaintiff must show (1) that he exercised his rights as listed under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-241(a), (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that the alleged retaliatory action was taken because the employee exercised his rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-241(a). An adverse action includes the discharge, suspension, demotion, retaliatory relocation of an employee, or other adverse employment action taken against an employee in the terms, conditions, privileges, and benefits of employment. If plaintiff presents a prima facie case of retaliatory discrimination, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show that he would have taken the same unfavorable action in the absence of the protected activity of the employee. Although evidence of retaliation in a case such as this one may often be completely circumstantial, the causal nexus between protected activity and retaliatory discharge must be something more than speculation.\nWiley at 186-87, 594 S.E.2d at 811 (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nHere, there is no dispute that plaintiff \u201cexercised his rights\u201d to file a worker\u2019s compensation claim and \u201cthat he suffered an adverse employment action\u201d as he was terminated from employment. Id. at 186, 594 S.E.2d at 811. Thus, the only issue left in considering whether plaintiff properly brought a REDA claim is whether \u201cthe alleged retaliatory action was taken because . . . [plaintiff] exercised his rights\u201d to file a worker\u2019s compensation claim. Id.\nMs. Lisa Hyatt, defendant\u2019s Chief Financial Officer, stated in her affidavit that \u201cplaintiff had excessive absences from work, failed to follow company procedures including, but not limited to, driving a forklift without certification, preparing the wrong products for shipment to customers, not following instructions of the manager and engaging in insubordinate behavior.\u201d Ms. Hyatt stated that plaintiff \u201cwas terminated for not reporting to work and for excessive absenteeism.\u201d\nHowever, Mr. Mike West, a former employee of defendant who worked as a shipping manager, filed an affidavit stating that plaintiff \u201cwas a very good employee and always on time.\u201d Mr. West claimed he only knew of one time when plaintiff was tardy and that even then plaintiff informed him beforehand. Mr. West asserted that plaintiff only missed work \u201cdue to an illness or injury\u201d and that Lisa told him that they \u201cneed to get rid of James before he gets hurt again.\u201d In Mr. West\u2019s deposition he also stated that he was told \u201cthey needed to get rid of [plaintiff] before he cost the company a bunch of money and that [he] needed to start writing him up for whatever [he] could.\u201d\nMr. Derek Latham, also a former employee of defendant and plaintiff\u2019s former supervisor,-testified in his deposition that defendant had never been absent without a doctor\u2019s note. Mr. Latham testified that he was present when plaintiff returned from his 5 November 2007 injury (\u201cworker\u2019s compensation injury\u201d) and that Ms. Hyatt put plaintiff on ninety-days probation for plaintiff \u201cnot [to] get hurt[.]\u201d Mr. Latham also testified that he believed plaintiff was fired \u201cbecause he filed a health insurance claim[.]\u201d\nDuring plaintiff\u2019s deposition he stated that when he returned from his worker\u2019s compensation injury, Ms. Hyatt told him he hadn\u2019t \u201cdone nothing but cost the company money. Now [he\u2019s] a risk to that company[.]\u201d Thus, defendant has presented evidence that plaintiff was terminated for excessive absences, but plaintiff has presented evidence that he was terminated due to his \u201chealth claim[;]\u201d the conflicting evidence creates a question of material fact.\nPlaintiff directs our attention to Tarrant v. Freeway Foods of Greensboro, Inc., wherein\na district manager allegedly asked [the] plaintiff if she was going to behave and stated, \u201cYou\u2019re not going to fall again, are you?\u201d Similarly, when she was fired, [the] plaintiff was told that her job performance was fine, but she was being terminated because \u201cshe cost the company a lot of money.\u201d\n163 N.C. App. 504, 511, 593 S.E.2d 808, 813, disc. review denied, 358 N.C. 739, 603 S.E.2d 126 (2004). This Court determined that \u201c[t]hese statements strongly suggest that [the] plaintiff was terminated because she instituted and later settled a workers\u2019 compensation claim[,]\u201d and therefore reversed the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the plaintiff\u2019s REDA claim. Id.\nDefendant states that Tarrant and this case are similar to the extent that employees alleged their employers told them they were costing the employer money but contends that the similarities end there. Defendant claims the \u201ccosts\u201d statement made here is distinguishable from Tarrant because the statement was not made at the time defendant was being terminated; the basis for the statement was different as it involved plaintiffs absences and mistakes; defendant \u201cnever acknowledged\u201d plaintiff \u201cwas a good worker[;]\u201d and plaintiff was put on probation rather than terminated upon returning to work from his worker\u2019s compensation injury.\nWhile we agree with defendant that there are factual differences between Tarrant and the present case, we do find the similar language used by the employers regarding \u201ccosts\u201d compelling when considering this case. Here, the alleged \u201ccosts\u201d statement was made when defendant returned to work from his worker\u2019s compensation injury, on 3 March 2008, but defendant was not terminated until 19 March 2008; accordingly, defendant was terminated from employment within three weeks of the statement being made. The fact that defendant did not terminate plaintiff until three weeks after making the \u201ccosts\u201d statement does not resolve the factual issue as to whether plaintiff was terminated in violation of REDA. See generally Tarrant at 511, 593 S.E.2d at 813 (\u201c[A] long interval between the filing of a workers\u2019 compensation claim and the termination of the employee could reveal that the two events were not causally related. However, such a concern does not arise where the employer openly admits that the firing was retaliatory. We believe that strictly requiring a close temporal connection would allow employers to circumvent the statute. By simply delaying the retaliatory firing for several months, an employer could prevent a REDA claim from ever going forward, even where there is direct evidence of a wrongful motive.\u201d).\nNext, while defendant is correct that the \u201ccosts\u201d statement could be interpreted as being based upon the cost of plaintiffs absences and mistakes, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff. See Wiley at 186, 594 S.E.2d at 811. In this light, the \u201ccosts\u201d statement could easily be interpreted as referring to the cost of plaintiffs worker\u2019s compensation claim, particularly as the statement was made on the very day that plaintiff returned to work from his worker\u2019s compensation injury.\nAlso, while defendant may have \u201cnever acknowledged . . . [plaintiff] was a good worker[,]\u201d defendant does acknowledge that \u201cthe issue is not whether the appellant worked hard or was punctual; it is whether the termination was a result of the filing of the workers\u2019 comp claim.\u201d While plaintiff\u2019s work performance is relevant in the analysis of defendant\u2019s motive in terminating plaintiff\u2019s employment, evidence that plaintiff was a \u201cbad\u201d worker does not preclude the possibility that plaintiff\u2019s employment was terminated in violation of REDA. In addition, plaintiff has presented evidence from Mr. West that plaintiff \u201cwas a very good employee\u201d and from Mr. Latham that plaintiff was never absent without a doctor\u2019s note.\nLastly, although defendant was put on probation instead of immediately being terminated upon his return to work from his worker\u2019s compensation injury, we again note that \u201cstrictly requiring a close temporal connection would allow employers to circumvent the statute. By simply delaying the retaliatory firing for several months, an employer could prevent a REDA claim from ever going forward, even where there is direct evidence of a wrongful motive.\u201d Tarrant at 511, 593 S.E.2d at 813. One method of \u201cdelaying the retaliatory firing\u201d could be putting an employee on probation. Id.\nDefendant contends that this case is \u201con point\u201d with Salter. In Salter, on 2 June 1999, the plaintiff fell at work and broke her foot. 155 N.C. App. at 687, 575 S.E.2d at 47. The plaintiff alleged that her supervisor was opposed to her seeking worker\u2019s compensation, while plaintiff\u2019s supervisor denied such allegations; however, \u201cit has never been contested that plaintiff has failed to get all the workers\u2019 compensation to which she was entitled.\u201d Id. at 687, 575 S.E.2d at 48.\nAfter two and one-half months of light duty, on 16 August 1999, plaintiff reinjured her foot while away from work when she tripped at her home. . . . Plaintiff had a scheduled appointment with her physician on 24 August 1999, and planned to return to work after this appointment.\nPrior to August 24th, however, plaintiff was summoned to work to pick up her check and discuss some things with Frances Ivey[, plaintiff\u2019s supervisor]. On 23 August 1999, Ms. Ivey gave plaintiff her check along with a letter that had been faxed to her from defendant\u2019s head office.\nId. at 687-88, 575 S.E.2d at 48. The letter essentially informed plaintiff that her leave due to her injury would be without pay and that she would be allowed to return to work if an appropriate position was available though one was not guaranteed; the letter also provided that a failure to follow the employer\u2019s \u201cprocedure\u201d would result in \u201cimmediate dismissal.\u201d Id. at 688, 575 S.E.2d at 48. The plaintiff claimed that upon receiving the letter her supervisor informed her she must sign it or be terminated from employment. Id. Plaintiff filed suit, and defendant filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted in defendant\u2019s favor. Id. at 689, 575 S.E.2d at 49. Plaintiff appealed because \u201cthe trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether defendant took retaliatory action against her because she filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim, in violation of REDA, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-240, et. seq. (2001).\u201d Id. at 690, 575 S.E.2d at 49-50. This Court determined that\n[s]everal things are wrong with plaintiff\u2019s claim. First, there is no close temporal connection between plaintiff\u2019s instituting a workers\u2019 compensation claim and her termination. Second, plaintiff offers little more than mere speculation that defendant gave her the letter because she filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim. Nothing in the letter refers to workers\u2019 compensation. Plaintiff was allowed to return to work after filing her workers\u2019 compensation claim. Defendant filed all necessary papers for plaintiff to receive benefits, and plaintiff indeed received them. It was not until the second injury occurred and plaintiff was out of work for a full week following a sustained period of light duty was she offered the letter. To recover, plaintiff must show that her discharge was caused by her good faith institution of the workers\u2019 compensation proceedings. This she fails to do. Despite plaintiff\u2019s assertions that one of defendant\u2019s employees was less than cordial, her allegations do not raise a triable, material issue of fact. Thus, summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s REDA claim is affirmed.\nId. at 691-92, 575 S.E.2d at 50-51 (2003) (citation, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted).\nHere, we do not believe Salter is \u201con point\u201d with the present case. In Salter, the plaintiff returned to work from her worker\u2019s compensation injury and worked for two and one-half months. Id. at 687, 575 S.E.2d at 48. It was only after the Salter plaintiff\u2019s second non-worker\u2019s compensation injury that she received the letter. Id. at 687-88, 575 S.E.2d at 48. Here, however, plaintiff was allegedly told he had \u201cdone nothing except \u2018cost the company money\u2019 \u201d upon his return to work from his worker\u2019s compensation injury. In other words, in Salter, it appears that the plaintiff simply returned to work after her worker\u2019s compensation injury and proceeded to work for two and one-half months before she received the letter, see id., but here, plaintiff was told he \u201ccost the company money\u201d and placed on probation the very day he returned to work from his worker\u2019s compensation injury.\nFinally, defendant spends a large portion of its brief addressing various statements by Mr. West, Mr. Latham, and plaintiff and how these statements are \u201cspeculation[.]\u201d While defendant is correct in noting that more than speculation is required to create a genuine issue of material fact, Wiley at 187, 594 S.E.2d at 811, we do not believe that the testimonies of Mr. West, Mr. Latham, and plaintiff can be completely characterized as such. Mr. West testified that Ms. Hyatt told him that they \u201cneed to get rid of James before he gets hurt again[;]\u201d Mr. Latham testified that Ms. Hyatt put plaintiff on ninety-days probation for plaintiff \u201cnot [to] get hurt[;]\u201d and during plaintiff\u2019s deposition he stated that when he returned from his worker\u2019s compensation injury, Ms. Hyatt told him he hadn\u2019t \u201cdone nothing but cost the company money. Now [he\u2019s] a risk to that company[.]\u201d Accordingly, we conclude that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to why plaintiff was terminated from employment, and thus the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant.\nIII. Conclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant.\nREVERSED.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge STEPHENS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Morgan, Herring, Morgan, Green, & Rosenblutt, L.L.R by Todd J. Combs, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Clayton B. Krohn, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JAMES L. McDOWELL, Plaintiff v. CENTRAL STATION ORIGINAL INTERIORS, INC., Defendant\nNo. COA10-324\n(Filed 19 April 2011)\n1. Employer and Employee\u2014 Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act\u2014 reason for termination \u2014 summary judgment improper\nThe trial court erred by granting defendant employer\u2019s motion for summary judgment in a case alleging termination in violation of the Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act. There was a genuine issue of material fact as to why plaintiff was terminated after he exercised his right to file a workers\u2019 compensation claim.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 11 December 2009 by Judge Edgar B. Gregory in Superior Court, Guilford County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 October 2010.\nMorgan, Herring, Morgan, Green, & Rosenblutt, L.L.R by Todd J. Combs, for plaintiff-appellant.\nClayton B. Krohn, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0159-01", "first_page_order": 167, "last_page_order": 175 }