{ "id": 3806259, "name": "KENNETH HEATHERLY, Employee, Plaintiff v. THE HOLLINGSWORTH COMPANY, INC., Employer, STONEWOOD INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Heatherly v. Hollingsworth Co.", "decision_date": "2011-04-19", "docket_number": "No. COA10-994", "first_page": "282", "last_page": "295", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "211 N.C. App. 282" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "658 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640626 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31" }, { "page": "31" }, { "page": "32" }, { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/658/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9079718 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 903", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 744", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2570853, 2570349, 2567695, 2568946, 2569780 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0744-04", "/nc/321/0744-03", "/nc/321/0744-02", "/nc/321/0744-01", "/nc/321/0744-05" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574", "parenthetical": "holding employee's own testimony regarding pain resulting from \"physical exertion\" was competent evidence regarding her \"ability to engage in any activity\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8357925 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139", "parenthetical": "holding employee's own testimony regarding pain resulting from \"physical exertion\" was competent evidence regarding her \"ability to engage in any activity\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813", "parenthetical": "\"This Court has previously held that an employee's own testimony as to pain and ability to work is competent evidence as to the employee's ability to work.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9366720 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499", "parenthetical": "\"This Court has previously held that an employee's own testimony as to pain and ability to work is competent evidence as to the employee's ability to work.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 532", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he Commission, in its proper role as sole judge of the credibility of witnesses, found [plaintiffs] testimony that he was unable to work due to pain more credible than the expert testimony that [plaintiff] was capable of performing medium to light work.\"" }, { "page": "536", "parenthetical": "\"[Plaintiff's] testimony is competent evidence as to his ability to work, and the Commission chose to believe him.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523702 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265-66", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he Commission, in its proper role as sole judge of the credibility of witnesses, found [plaintiffs] testimony that he was unable to work due to pain more credible than the expert testimony that [plaintiff] was capable of performing medium to light work.\"" }, { "page": "265" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 620", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491599 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" }, { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9125102 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" }, { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135589, 135576, 135762, 135672, 135965 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0398-01", "/nc/353/0398-04", "/nc/353/0398-02", "/nc/353/0398-05", "/nc/353/0398-03" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 790", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9441761 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 S.E.2d 454", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 762", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525626 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0762-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572767 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "807" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4704100 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4738158 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 S.E.2d 479", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 N.C. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561051 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/266/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 460", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462", "parenthetical": "explaining that judicial decisions \"must be interpreted like other written documents, not by focusing on isolated parts, but as a whole\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 N.C. App. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358289 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80", "parenthetical": "explaining that judicial decisions \"must be interpreted like other written documents, not by focusing on isolated parts, but as a whole\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/82/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 N.W. 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "weight": 2, "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" }, { "page": "432-33", "parenthetical": "recognizing that \"lightning is more apt to strike at higher elevations, such as the building into which [employee] took his team for shelter\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 Wis. 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis.", "case_ids": [ 8688897 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" }, { "page": "200-01" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis/206/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 P.2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "850" }, { "page": "852", "parenthetical": "considering it a \"matter of common knowledge\" that a \"dilapidated house\" without windows or doors, containing metal, and surrounded by metal fencing is \"much more liable to be struck by lightning ... than the average house in the same locality\"" }, { "page": "846", "parenthetical": "\"The courts have uniformly construed the words 'out of the employment' liberally and with a view to extending the scope of a remedial statute.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Okla. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Okla.", "case_ids": [ 6287475 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" }, { "page": "80" }, { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/okla/152/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Mo. App. 967", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo. App.", "case_ids": [ 1832973 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "972" }, { "page": "846" }, { "page": "972" }, { "page": "846", "parenthetical": "taking judicial notice of fact that isolated location and comparative height of barn in which employee took shelter \"render[ed] it more likely to be struck by lightning than the ordinary object in that vicinity\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo-app/232/0967-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 N.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" }, { "page": "120" }, { "page": "120", "parenthetical": "taking judicial notice of \"common knowledge\" that \"a person in wet clothes, standing close to an iron bed and near to an electric light and electric wiring, in a building on the top of an exposed hill, [i]s in a position of unusual danger from lightning\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Mass. 4", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 932102 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" }, { "page": "6" }, { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/314/0004-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 A. 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "weight": 2, "year": 1919, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" }, { "page": "612", "parenthetical": "concluding that compensation commissioner could take judicial notice of fact that \"there is greater danger [of being struck by lightning] under a tall tree in a thunder shower than in other places\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Conn. 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 389462 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1919, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" }, { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/94/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 P.2d 884", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"The [industrial accident commission's] implied finding that there is increased danger from lightning to one who is standing upon the wet roof of a building during a storm is in accordance with common knowledge and requires no supporting expert testimony.\"" }, { "page": "886" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Cal. App. 2d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4452095 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466", "parenthetical": "\"The [industrial accident commission's] implied finding that there is increased danger from lightning to one who is standing upon the wet roof of a building during a storm is in accordance with common knowledge and requires no supporting expert testimony.\"" }, { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/77/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 Ind. 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind.", "case_ids": [ 1707515 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272-73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ind/226/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4729720 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 S.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560002 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 S.E.2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 N.C. 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8632327 ], "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "728" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/222/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986640 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 68", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798896, 798810, 798767, 798951 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0305-03", "/nc/343/0305-02", "/nc/343/0305-01", "/nc/343/0305-04" ] }, { "cite": "465 S.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917453 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684964 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525-26" }, { "page": "526", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" }, { "page": "528" }, { "page": "529-30" }, { "page": "529" }, { "page": "528" }, { "page": "527" }, { "page": "529-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621281 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692" }, { "page": "692-93" }, { "page": "695" }, { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 N.C. App. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156984 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398-99" }, { "page": "399" }, { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/189/0398-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1266, "char_count": 32949, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.7817273071113374e-08, "percentile": 0.3003300578527937 }, "sha256": "8375725e874e15b74d8e4be0fe7eb15af325df7b6c54e4864c799ab45e6a0666", "simhash": "1:1d20ee9a2939fc4e", "word_count": 5330 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:31:50.212435+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge THIGPEN concur." ], "parties": [ "KENNETH HEATHERLY, Employee, Plaintiff v. THE HOLLINGSWORTH COMPANY, INC., Employer, STONEWOOD INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.\nDefendant-employer The Hollingsworth Company, Inc. and defendant-carrier Stonewood Insurance Company appeal the Industrial Commission\u2019s decision awarding plaintiff Kenneth Heatherly temporary total disability and medical benefits. After careful review, we affirm.\nFactual and Procedural Background\nThe underlying facts regarding plaintiff\u2019s injury and treatment are set out in greater detail in this Court\u2019s prior opinion in this case. See Heatherly v. Hollingsworth Co., 189 N.C. App. 398, 398-99, 658 S.E.2d 30, 31 (2008). Pertinent to this appeal, during July 2004, plaintiff was working as a framer and drywall hanger for his brother Randy Heatherly\u2019s construction company CDS Drywall. On 12 July 2004, plaintiff was working at a job site where a new house was being built on Ridge Mountain in Brevard. The job site was located \u201cat or near the top of the mountain,\u201d near some metal towers. The house under construction had a metal roof and weather vanes had been attached to the top of the roof. Plaintiff and the rest of the construction crew set up their equipment in the unfinished garage, which did not have doors, and ran all of their electrical cords for their equipment from the garage to various locations around the house. That day, plaintiff was hanging drywall inside the house with his uncle Billy Cole Justice.\nThe construction crew stopped work early on 12 July 2004 due to inclement weather, including rain, thunder, and lightning. Plaintiff called his brother from \u00e1 \u201clandline\u201d in the garage to inform him that the crew was finishing working for the day due to the weather. While making the call, plaintiff was standing inside the unfinished garage, with his left leg on the floor and his right leg propped up against the drywall, approximately five feet from the entrance to the garage and several feet from an electrical drop cord and the electrical outlet the crew used to power their equipment. Lightning was striking outside and sparks were \u201cflying\u201d from the drop cord. Plaintiff was struck by an \u201celectrical charge or jolt from the lightning,\u201d throwing him backwards roughly eight feet through the air. As plaintiff landed, he struck his head, shoulders and right arm on the garage\u2019s concrete floor. Although he was \u201cdazed and confused,\u201d plaintiff was conscious; plaintiff felt pain and a \u201cburning sensation\u201d in his right hand and left foot.\nMr. Justice drove plaintiff to Transylvania Community Hospital in Brevard, where he primarily complained of pain in his right hand and left foot. X-rays of plaintiff\u2019s right hand showed closed right fourth and fifth metacarpal fractures. Plaintiff was given morphine for the pain. Plaintiff\u2019s brother, who visited him in the hospital, noticed bruising and swelling to his right hand that had not been there the day before. Although plaintiff was referred to an orthopaedic surgeon for treatment of his hand fractures, plaintiff did not receive further treatment due to defendants\u2019 denial of his workers\u2019 compensation claim and his lack of health insurance. Plaintiff did not return to work until 3 January 2005.\nAfter conducting a hearing on 28 January 2005, the deputy commissioner issued an opinion and award on 6 January 2006, in which the deputy commissioner awarded plaintiff past and future medical benefits as well as temporary total disability benefits for the period of 12 July 2004 through 2 January 2005. Defendants appealed to the Full Commission, which affirmed the deputy commissioner\u2019s decision with minor modifications. On defendants\u2019 appeal to this Court, we determined that the Full Commission had erroneously applied the \u201cpositional risk\u201d test rather than the \u201cincreased risk\u201d test, as set out in Pope v. Goodson, 249 N.C. 690, 107 S.E.2d 524 (1959), in \u201creaching its ultimate conclusion of law that plaintiff\u2019s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment....\u201d Heatherly, 189 N.C. App. at 399, 658 S.E.2d at 31. Consequently, this Court \u201creverse[d] the Full Commission\u2019s opinion and award and remand[ed] the matter to the Full Commission to make new findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with the \u2018increased risk\u2019 principles set forth in Pope.\u201d Id. at 401, 658 S.E.2d at 32.\nOn remand, the Commission amended its opinion and award to include findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding whether plaintiff\u2019s employment exposed him to an \u201cincreased risk\u201d of being struck by lightning. Specifically, the Commission concluded, based on its findings that \u201c[t]he work conditions at the time of Plaintiff\u2019s injury [a]re consistent with several of the factors set forth in Pope,\u201d that plaintiff\u2019s \u201cemployment placed him at an increased risk of sustaining injuries due to lightning greater than members of the general public in that neighborhood, and therefore, the danger to which he was exposed was incident to his employment.\u201d The Commission, accordingly, awarded plaintiff temporary total disability benefits as well as past and future medical treatment. Defendants timely appealed to this Court.\nStandard of Review\nAppellate review of a decision by the Industrial Commission is limited to \u201creviewing whether any competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law.\u201d Deese v. Champion Int\u2019l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000). The Commission, as the fact-finding body, \u201cis the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and its [factual] determination[s] [are] binding on appeal, if supported by competent evidence, even though the evidence might also support contrary findings.\u201d Counts v. Black & Decker Corp., 121 N.C. App. 387, 389, 465 S.E.2d 343, 345, disc. review denied, 343 N.C. 305, 471 S.E.2d 68 (1996). The Commission\u2019s conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. McRae v. Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C. 488, 496, 597 S.E.2d 695, 701 (2004).\nI\nDefendants first contend that \u201c[t]he Industrial Commission erred in finding and concluding that plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, as plaintiff failed to present expert evidence that his employment placed him at an increased risk of sustaining a lightning strike over the general public.\u201d As our Supreme Court has explained, the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act \u201cdoes not contemplate compensation for every injury an employee may receive during the course of his employment but only those from accidents arising out of, as well as, in the course of employment.\u201d Bryan v. T.A. Loving Co., 222 N.C. 724, 728, 24 S.E.2d 751, 754 (1943); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6) (2009). In lightning strike cases, \u201c[t]he generally recognized rule is that where the injured employee is by reason of his [or her] employment peculiarly or specially exposed to risk of injury from lightning- \u2014 -that is, one greater than other persons in the community, \u2014 death or injury resulting from this source usually is compensable as an injury by accident arising out and in the course of the employment.\u201d Pope, 249 N.C. at 692, 107 S.E.2d at 525-26.\n\u201cWhether an accident arose out of the employment is a mixed question of law and fact.\u201d Sandy v. Stackhouse, Inc., 258 N.C. 194, 197, 128 S.E.2d 218, 221 (1962). Whether an employee\u2019s job exposed him or her to an increased risk of injury by accident is a question of law. Dillingham v. Yeargin Construction Co., 320 N.C. 499, 502, 358 S.E.2d 380, 382 (1987); Heatherly, 189 N.C. App. at 400, 658 S.E.2d at 31.\nDefendants claim that the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Pope \u201cclearly requires workers\u2019 compensation claimants to present expert testimony that proves the requisite increased risk in lightning strike cases.\u201d In Pope, 249 N.C. at 692-93, 107 S.E.2d at 526 (internal citation omitted), the Supreme Court exhaustively surveyed caselaw from the \u201ccourts of the land\u201d in order to answer \u201cthe question of if and when an accidental injury or death due to a true Act of God in the form of a bolt \u00f3f lightning arises \u2018out of\u2019 the employment.. . .\u201d After summarizing numerous cases and their holdings, the Pope Court concluded:\n[T]he great majority of the courts have reached the conclusion that the workman is entitled to compensation for injuries produced by lightning in all cases where he was subjected to a danger from lightning greater than were the other people in the neighborhood; that is, Was the danger to which he was subjected one which was incident to the employment, or was it one to which other people, the public generally, in that neighborhood, were subjected?\nId. at 696, 107 S.E.2d at 528. The Court then applied the \u201cincreased risk\u201d test, as articulated in lightning strike cases, to the facts of that case, holding:\nThe evidence shows that Pope, when killed by lightning, by reason of his employment had on wet clothes, and had tied around his waist a nail apron containing nails, and that these circumstances, incidental to his employment, peculiarly exposed him to risk of injury from lightning greater than that of other persons in the community. Such being the case his death is compensable under our Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act as an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.\nId. at 698, 107 S.E.2d at 529-30.\nWe do not believe, as defendants suggest, that \u201cPope confirms the requirement of expert testimony.\u201d As defendants acknowledge, Pope involved expert testimony regarding \u201cthe effect lightning might have and its behavior.\u201d Id. at 697, 107 S.E.2d at 529. Consequently, as the Court held that the evidence presented in that case, which consisted of expert testimony, was sufficient to support the Commission\u2019s determination that the employee\u2019s job exposed him to an increased risk of injury by lightning, the existence of the expert evidence obviated the need for the Court to determine \u2014 and it did not determine\u2014 whether expert evidence is, in fact, required.\nDefendants nonetheless point out that the Pope Court cites as \u201csupport[ing] [its] position,\u201d id. at 696, 107 S.E.2d at 528, the Indiana Supreme Court\u2019s decision in E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Co. v. Lilly, 226 Ind. 267, 272-73, 79 N.E.2d 387, 389 (1948), where the court upheld the industrial board\u2019s determination that the employee\u2019s death from being struck by lightning arose out his employment based on expert evidence \u201cthat the risk or hazard was increased; [and] that the [employee] was more exposed to injury by lightning than others in the same locality and not so engaged[.]\u201d Defendants\u2019 isolated focus on Pope\u2019s reference to E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Co. ignores the fact that Pope also cited to at least six cases in which the employees\u2019 jobs were held to expose them to an increased risk of lightning injuries despite no expert evidence being presented on the issue. See Truck Ins. Exch. v. Indus. Acc. Comm\u2019n, 77 Cal. App. 2d 461, 466, 175 P.2d 884 (1946) (\u201cThe [industrial accident commission\u2019s] implied finding that there is increased danger from lightning to one who is standing upon the wet roof of a building during a storm is in accordance with common knowledge and requires no supporting expert testimony.\u201d); Chiulla de Luca v. Bd. of Park Com\u2019rs, 94 Conn. 7, 10, 107 A. 611, 612 (1919) (holding that compensation commission, in determining whether decedent\u2019s employment exposed him to an increased risk of injury by lightning, could take judicial notice of \u201cscientific authority\u201d establishing that \u201cthere is greater danger [of being struck by lightning] under a tall tree in a thunder-shower\u201d); Bauer\u2019s Case, 314 Mass. 4, 6, 49 N.E.2d 118, 120 (1943) (\u201cCertain facts as to the operation of lightning have become matters of common knowledge, of which judicial notice may be taken. We think that it could have been found, without expert evidence, that a person in wet clothes, standing close to an iron bed and near to an electric light and electric wiring, in a building on the top of an exposed hill, was in a position of unusual danger from lightning.\u201d (internal citations omitted)); Buhrkuhl v. F. T. O\u2019Dell Const. Co., 232 Mo. App. 967, 972, 95 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937) (finding \u201cno serious doubt\u201d that \u201cthere was sufficient competent evidence to show that [the decedent\u2019s] employment had brought about an excessive exposure to the lightning which killed him,\u201d despite the fact that the claimant \u201cintroduced not a word of expert evidence regarding the characteristics and propensities of lightning or atmospheric electricity,\u201d where the evidence showed that the comparative height of the barn in which the decedent took shelter during storm \u201cexposed [him] to a risk and danger from lightning greater than that confronting the neighborhood generally\u201d); Consolidated Pipe Line Co. v. Mahon, 152 Okla. 72, 77, 3 P.2d 844, 850 (1931) (holding industrial commission could properly take judicial notice of \u201cgenerally known\u201d principle that a dilapidated frame house without doors or windows, containing metal, and surrounded by metal fencing, such as the one decedent took refuge in during storm, \u201cis much more liable to be struck by lightning ... than the average house in the same locality\u201d); Nebraska Seed Co. v. Indus. Comm\u2019n, 206 Wis. 199, 201, 239 N.W. 432, 433 (1931) (affirming industrial commission\u2019s determination, without expert evidence, that \u201c[t]he building into which [the employee] entered was so situated, and its height above the surrounding surface was such, as to increase the danger from lightning\u201d and that \u201c[i]t all resulted in an unusual risk of such an accident incidental to the employment\u201d).\nWe find it unreasonable to read Pope as standing for the proposition that expert evidence is mandated in all workers compensation cases to establish an increased risk of lightning strike injury when the majority of the cases relied upon by the Court in articulating its holding concluded that non-expert evidence was competent to support a determination on that issue. See Reavis v. Reavis, 82 N.C. App. 77, 80, 345 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1986) (explaining that judicial decisions \u201cmust be interpreted like other written documents, not by focusing on isolated parts, but as a whole\u201d). Indeed, in one of the few instances in which the Pope Court directly quoted another appellate court, our Supreme Court observed:\nThe [Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts] closed its opinion with these words: \u201cWe think that it could have been found, without expert evidence, that a person in wet clothes, standing close to an iron bed and near to an electric light and electric wiring, in a building on the top of an exposed hill, was in a position of unusual danger from lightning.\u201d\nPope, 249 N.C. at 695, 107 S.E.2d at 527 (quoting Bauer\u2019s Case, 314 Mass, at 6, 49 N.E.2d at 120) (emphasis added).\nThe cases relied upon by the Supreme Court in Pope in reaching its conclusion set out \u201cspecific work-related factors within the job description or environment of the injured employee,\u201d 1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Law \u00a7 5.01 [4] (2009) [hereinafter Larson\u2019s], such as \u201cheight above the surrounding area, nearness to trees or tall structures, nearness to metallic objects likely to attract lightning, or presence of wetness and other conditions facilitating transmission of lightning,\u201d that \u201cenhanced the probability of injury from lightning[,]\u201d Larson\u2019s \u00a7 5.01[1]. See, e.g., Truck Ins. Exch., 77 Cal. App. 2d at 464, 175 P.2d at 886 (finding certain \u201cfacts\u201d to be \u201ccommon knowledge\u201d and thus properly judicially noticed: that \u201ca person standing upon a wet surface is more susceptible to electric shock than one who stands upon a dry surface; that as between a short gap and a long one in its path, an electric force is more likely to jump the short one, and hence, where atmospheric conditions are such that an electric force is about to be discharged toward the earth, an object which projects above the surrounding surface and is closest to the point of discharge and which is a ready conductor of electrical energy will be the one most likely to receive it\u201d); Chiulla de Luca, 94 Conn, at 10, 107 A. at 612 (concluding that compensation commissioner could take judicial notice of fact that \u201cthere is greater danger [of being struck by lightning] under a tall tree in a thunder shower than in other places\u201d); Bauer\u2019s Case, 314 Mass, at 6, 49 N.E.2d at 120 (taking judicial notice of \u201ccommon knowledge\u201d that \u201ca person in wet clothes, standing close to an iron bed and near to an electric light and electric wiring, in a building on the top of an exposed hill, [i]s in a position of unusual danger from lightning\u201d); Buhrkuhl, 232 Mo. App. at 972, 95 S.W.2d at 846 (taking judicial notice of fact that isolated location and comparative height of barn in which employee took shelter \u201crender[ed] it more likely to be struck by lightning than the ordinary object in that vicinity\u201d); Consolidated Pipe Line Co., 152 Okla. at 80, 3 P.2d at 852 (considering it a \u201cmatter of common knowledge\u201d that a \u201cdilapidated house\u201d without windows or doors, containing metal, and surrounded by metal fencing is \u201cmuch more liable to be struck by lightning ... than the average house in the same locality\u201d); Nebraska Seed Co., 206 Wis. at 200-01, 239 N.W. at 432-33 (recognizing that \u201clightning is more apt to strike at higher elevations, such as the building into which [employee] took his team for shelter\u201d).\nRather than requiring expert evidence in each and every lightning strike case, we read Pope as sanctioning the use of non-expert evidence regarding case-specific \u201cwork-related factors\u201d to support a determination that an employee\u2019s job exposed him or her to an increased risk of being struck by lightning. Our conclusion is reinforced by one of the leading workers\u2019 compensation commentators, who explains that, \u201cin jurisdictions adhering to the increased-risk test, the parties would ordinarily do well either to arm themselves with the testimony of electrical experts or be prepared to show an increased risk that arises from specific work-related factors within the job description or environment of the injured worker.\u201d Larson\u2019s \u00a7 5.01[4] (emphasis added). In \u201cclose cases,\u201d where \u201cexperts may differ\u201d or where there are \u201cno special circumstances associated with the duties of the worker that can be shown to have increased his or her risk,\u201d expert evidence may be warranted to \u201cdo justice to [the parties\u2019] case . . . .\u201d Larson\u2019s \u00a7 5.01[4], We, however, decline to establish a \u201cbright-line\u201d rule requiring expert evidence in every workers\u2019 compensation case in order to establish that the employee\u2019s job exposed him or her to an increased risk of a lightning strike injury. Such a requirement would undermine the well-established principle that the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act \u201cmust be liberally construed to accomplish the humane purpose for which it was passed, i.e., compensation for injured employees.\u201d Barnhardt v. Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419, 427, 146 S.E.2d 479, 484 (1966), overruled in part on other grounds by Derebery v. Pitt County Fire Marshall, 318 N.C. 192, 347 S.E.2d 814 (1986); see also Consolidated Pipe Line Co., 152 Okla. at 74, 3 P.2d at 846 (\u201cThe courts have uniformly construed the words \u2018out of the employment\u2019 liberally and with a view to extending the scope of a remedial statute.\u201d).\nHere, the Commission made numerous findings with respect to the relevant \u201cwork-related\u201d factors set out in Pope: that plaintiff was working at a home construction site \u201clocat[ed] at or near the top of [a] mountain, near some metal towers\u201d; that the unfinished house \u201chad a metal roof and weather vanes on top of the roof\u2019; and, that plaintiff, at the time of the lightning strike, was standing in the \u201cunfinished garage, which did not have doors on it,\u201d several feet away from an electrical drop cord and other metal or electrically charged objects. Based on these findings, the Commission concluded that \u201c[t]he work conditions at the time of Plaintiff\u2019s injury [a]re consistent with several of the factors set forth in Pope, and the cases cited therein, as relevant to a finding of compensability under the \u2018increased risk\u2019 test in cases involving work-related injuries due to lightning strikes\u201d:\nBecause Plaintiff was working at a high elevation that had a metal roof and an unfinished garage with no doors, and he was near metal and electrically charged objects such as the electrical drop cord and other tools and equipment used in furtherance of his work, his employment placed him at an increased risk of sustaining injuries due to lightning greater than members of the general public in that neighborhood, and therefore, the danger to which he was exposed was incident to his employment.\nAside from arguing that plaintiff was required to present expert evidence to establish that his employment exposed him to an \u201cincreased risk\u201d of being struck by lightning, defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Commission\u2019s findings of fact or conclusions of law. In any event, we conclude that the non-expert evidence in this case, particularly plaintiff\u2019s testimony and the testimony of his uncle, Mr. Justice, describing the physical characteristics of the jobsite, supports the Commission\u2019s findings. The Commission\u2019s findings, in turn, support the conclusion that \u201ccircumstances, incidental to [plaintiff\u2019s] employment, peculiarly exposed him to risk of injury from lightning greater than that of other persons in the community.\u201d Pope, 249 N.C. at 698, 107 S.E.2d at 529-30. Defendants\u2019 argument is overruled.\nII\nDefendants next contend that plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of proving disability for the period of 12 July 2004 through 2 January 2005, and thus the Commission erroneously concluded that plaintiff is entitled to temporary total disability benefits for this period. It is well established that the \u201cclaimant ordinarily has the burden of proving both the existence and degree of disability.\u201d Peoples v. Cone Mills Corp., 316 N.C. 426, 440, 342 S.E.2d 798, 807 (1986). \u201c[I]n order to support a conclusion of disability, the Commission must find: (1) that [the] plaintiff was incapable after his injury of earning the same wages he had earned before his injury in the same employment, (2) that [the] plaintiff was incapable after his injury of earning the same wages he had earned before his injury in any other employment, and (3) that this individual\u2019s incapacity to earn was caused by [the] plaintiff\u2019s injury.\u201d Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1982). A plaintiff may establish the first two elements through any one of four methods of proof:\n(1) the production of medical evidence that he is physically or mentally, as a consequence of the work related injury, incapable of work in any employment; (2) the production of evidence that he is capable of some work, but that he has, after a reasonable effort on his part, been unsuccessful in his effort to obtain employment; (3) the production of evidence that, he is capable of some work but that it would be futile because of preexisting conditions, i.e., age, inexperience, lack of education, to seek other employment; or (4) the production of evidence that he has obtained other employment at a wage less than that earned prior to the injury.\nRussell v. Lowes Product Distribution, 108 N.C. App. 762, 765, 425 S.E.2d 454, 457 (1993).\nOn the issue of disability, the Commission found:\n7. [Plaintiff\u2019s uncle] took Plaintiff to Transylvania Community Hospital in Brevard, North Carolina, where he received treatment for a possible lightning strike injury. Plaintiff\u2019s chief complaints were pain in his right hand and left foot. X-rays of his right hand revealed closed right fourth (4th) and fifth (5th) metacarpal fractures. Plaintiff received morphine for pain. Plaintiff\u2019s brother visited him in the hospital, where he observed that Plaintiff\u2019s right hand had bruising and swelling that was not there the day before.\n8. Although Plaintiff received a referral to an orthopaedic surgeon for further treatment of his right hand fractures, he did not receive this treatment, due to the denial of his workers\u2019 compensation claim, and his lack of health insurance. Plaintiff did not receive any further treatment for his fractures, and was unable to earn wages in any employment from July 12, 2004 until he returned to work on January 3, 2005.\nBased on these findings, the Commission concluded that, \u201c[d]ue to Plaintiff\u2019s hand fractures and the lack of medical treatment needed to effect a cure, to give relief, and/or lessen his period of disability, Plaintiff was unable to return to his regular job hanging sheetrock, and his physical limitations resulting from his July 12, 2004 work injury impeded his ability to work or to find suitable work.\u201d\nDefendants contend that because plaintiff failed to \u201cproduce medical evidence that he [wa]s physically or mentally unable to work in any employment as a result of his work-related injury,\u201d the Commission erred in concluding that plaintiff had established temporary total disability under Russell\u2019s first prong. In determining if a plaintiff has met the burden of proving loss of wage earning capacity under Russell\u2019s first prong, \u201cthe Commission must consider not only the plaintiff\u2019s physical limitations, but also [plaintiff\u2019s] testimony as to his pain in determining the extent of incapacity to work and earn wages such pain might cause.\u201d Webb v. Power Circuit, Inc., 141 N.C. App. 507, 512, 540 S.E.2d 790, 793 (2000), cert. denied, 353 N.C. 398, 548 S.E.2d 159 (2001). \u201c[M]edical evidence that a plaintiff suffers from genuine pain as a result of a physical injury, combined with the plaintiff\u2019s own credible testimony that [the] pain is so severe that [the plaintiff] is unable to work, may be sufficient to support a conclusion of total disability by the Commission.\u201d Knight v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 149 N.C. App. 1, 8, 562 S.E.2d 434, 440 (2002), aff\u2019d per curiam, 357 N.C. 44, 577 S.E.2d 620 (2003).\nHere, the medical records indicate that when plaintiff was seen in Transylvania Community Hospital\u2019s emergency department immediately after the accident on 12 July 2004, he complained of pain in his right hand and left foot. His right hand was swollen and X-rays of plaintiff\u2019s hand showed closed right fourth and fifth metacarpal fractures. Plaintiff was initially given morphine for the pain, his right hand was placed in a splint, and he was discharged with a prescription of Percocet. Three days later, on 15 July 2004, Dr. G. Ruffin Benton, III, with Medical Associates of Transylvania, P.A., saw plaintiff for a follow-up, and plaintiff continued to complain that his right hand \u201churt[].\u201d Dr. Benton refilled the prescription for Percocet and referred plaintiff to an orthopaedic surgeon for an evaluation of his right hand. In addition to the medical evidence regarding the pain in plaintiffs fractured right hand, plaintiff testified that his right hand \u201churt[] bad\u201d and that he was \u201cunable to work at all\u201d from 12 July 2004 to 2 January 2005.\nThis Court, moreover, has held that a plaintiffs testimony regarding his or her pain and its effect on the plaintiffs ability to work is sufficient to support a determination of disability under Russell\u2019s first method of proof. See Matthews v. Petroleum Tank Service, Inc., 108 N.C. App. 259, 265-66, 423 S.E.2d 532, 536 (1992) (\u201c[T]he Commission, in its proper role as sole judge of the credibility of witnesses, found [plaintiffs] testimony that he was unable to work due to pain more credible than the expert testimony that [plaintiff] was capable of performing medium to light work.\u201d); see also Boles v. U.S. Air, Inc., 148 N.C. App. 493, 499, 560 S.E.2d 809, 813 (2002) (\u201cThis Court has previously held that an employee\u2019s own testimony as to pain and ability to work is competent evidence as to the employee\u2019s ability to work.\u201d); Knight, 149 N.C. App. at 8, 562 S.E.2d at 440 (concluding that employee\u2019s testimony that \u201cthe pain in his lower back and left leg is so severe that, not only is he unable to work in any employment, he is often unable to undertake even simple chores, such as sweeping, for more than thirty minutes\u201d was competent evidence supporting Commission\u2019s finding of disability under Russell\u2019s first prong); Niple v. Seawell Realty & Insurance Co., 88 N.C. App. 136, 139, 362 S.E.2d 572, 574 (1987) (holding employee\u2019s own testimony regarding pain resulting from \u201cphysical exertion\u201d was competent evidence regarding her \u201cability to engage in any activity\u201d), disc. review denied, 321 N.C. 744, 365 S.E.2d 903 (1988). Expert evidence is thus not required under Russell\u2019s first prong. See Matthews, 108 N.C. App. at 265, 423 S.E.2d at 536 (\u201c[Plaintiff\u2019s] testimony is competent evidence as to his ability to work, and the Commission chose to believe him.\u201d). Plaintiff\u2019s testimony regarding the pain in his fractured right hand and his inability to \u201cwork at all\u201d is sufficient to support the Commission\u2019s determination that plaintiff was temporarily totally disabled during the period of 12 July 2004 to 2 January 2005. Defendants\u2019 argument is overruled.\nIll\nDefendants\u2019 final argument on appeal is that the Commission erred in concluding that, \u201c[a]s a result of Plaintiff\u2019s July 12, 2004 work injury, Defendants are responsible for providing all reasonably necessary medical treatment for his injuries.\u201d \u201cSubsequent to the establishment of a compensable injury under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, an employee may seek compensation under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-25 for additional medical treatment when such treatment lessens the period of disability, effects a cure, or gives relief.\u201d Pomeroy v. Tanner Masonry, 151 N.C. App. 171, 182, 565 S.E.2d 209, 216 (2002); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25 (2009).\nDefendants point to plaintiffs testimony that, at the time he returned to work on 3 January 2005, he was able to use his right hand \u201cpretty good.\u201d Defendants claim that this evidence \u201cproves that plaintiff\u2019s hand has improved and that additional treatment is not necessary.\u201d Defendants\u2019 contention ignores competent evidence establishing that plaintiff\u2019s hand was x-rayed immediately after the accident, revealing closed right fourth and fifth metacarpal fractures, and that plaintiff was referred to an orthopaedic surgeon for evaluation of his hand, but was not seen because defendants denied plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim and plaintiff did not have health insurance. Plaintiff testified that he had not been seen by \u201cany medical personnel\u201d since 15 July 2004 and that his hand had not been \u201cfixed.\u201d Without, at the very least, the orthopaedic evaluation ordered by Dr. Benton, it cannot be determined whether the fractures in plaintiff\u2019s right hand have properly healed. We thus conclude that the Commission properly determined that plaintiff is entitled to additional medical treatment reasonably related to his compensable hand injury.\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge THIGPEN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bazzle, Carr & Paree, P.A., by Ervin W. Bazzle, for plaintiff - appellee.", "Brooks, Stevens & Pope, P.A., by Bambee B. Blake and Ginny P. Lanier, for defendants-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KENNETH HEATHERLY, Employee, Plaintiff v. THE HOLLINGSWORTH COMPANY, INC., Employer, STONEWOOD INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants\nNo. COA10-994\n(Filed 19 April 2011)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 compensable injury \u2014 increased risk \u2014 lightning strike \u2014 expert testimony not required\u2014 findings and conclusions\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case in finding and concluding that plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Plaintiff was not required to present expert evidence to establish that his employment exposed him to an \u201cincreased risk\u201d of being struck by lightning. The non-expert evidence supported the Commission\u2019s findings which, in turn, supported the conclusion that plaintiff\u2019s employment peculiarly exposed him to risk of injury from lightning greater than that of other persons in the community.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 temporary total disability benefits \u2014 testimony sufficient\nThe Industrial Commission did not erroneously conclude in a workers\u2019 compensation case that plaintiff was entitled to temporary total disability benefits for the period of 12 July 2004 to 2 January 2005. Plaintiff\u2019s testimony regarding the pain in his fractured right hand and his inability to work at all was sufficient to support the Commission\u2019s determination that plaintiff was temporarily totally disabled during the relevant period.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 additional medical treatment\u2014 properly determined\nThe Industrial Commission properly determined that plaintiff was entitled to additional medical treatment reasonably related to his compensable hand injury.\nAppeal by defendants from opinion and award entered 7 May 2010 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 January 2011.\nBazzle, Carr & Paree, P.A., by Ervin W. Bazzle, for plaintiff - appellee.\nBrooks, Stevens & Pope, P.A., by Bambee B. Blake and Ginny P. Lanier, for defendants-appellants." }, "file_name": "0282-01", "first_page_order": 290, "last_page_order": 303 }