{ "id": 3806115, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: V.M.", "name_abbreviation": "In re V.M.", "decision_date": "2011-04-19", "docket_number": "No. COA10-1558", "first_page": "389", "last_page": "392", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "211 N.C. App. 389" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "638 S.E.2d 610", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637398 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/638/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 S.E.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. App. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8915796 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/162/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "590 S.E.2d 270", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491426, 491843, 491462, 491729, 491667, 491540, 491799, 491609, 491677 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0657-03", "/nc/357/0657-02", "/nc/357/0657-08", "/nc/357/0657-04", "/nc/357/0657-05", "/nc/357/0657-01", "/nc/357/0657-09", "/nc/357/0657-07", "/nc/357/0657-06" ] }, { "cite": "585 S.E.2d 478", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. App. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8956465 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.C. App. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8372718 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/181/0126-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 406, "char_count": 8299, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.966205063330921e-08, "percentile": 0.4220024024566683 }, "sha256": "bbfaae6072fb92aff8330c308bb0b0ce17d2552dc79df3757b18f849c289ace6", "simhash": "1:4aed6e2f554c1d54", "word_count": 1310 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:31:50.212435+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: V.M." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nJuvenile V.M. (\u201cthe juvenile\u201d) appeals from the trial court\u2019s 7 May 2010 adjudication order and 27 August 2010 dispositional order. The juvenile argues that the trial court erred by imposing a Level 3 disposition without making sufficient findings of fact to demonstrate that it considered the factors listed in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2501(c). We agree, and reverse the trial court\u2019s dispositional order and remand the matter for a new dispositional hearing.\nOn 15 January 2010, the trial court adjudicated the juvenile delinquent of felonious larceny, based on the juvenile\u2019s admission. The terms of the juvenile\u2019s admission provided that the State would dismiss one count of felonious breaking or entering and two counts of simple assault. On the same date, the trial court entered a Level 2 disposition and placed the juvenile on probation for 12 months.\nIn March 2010, three new delinquency petitions were filed against the juvenile for felonious larceny of a debit card, disorderly conduct, and simple affray. On 23 March 2010, Court Counselor David A. Hughey filed a motion for review of the juvenile\u2019s probation. In the motion, Mr. Hughey alleged that the juvenile had violated his probation due to the petition alleging that the juvenile committed disorderly conduct and that the juvenile had been suspended from school on two occasions and had three unexcused absences from school.\nOn 7 May 2010, the juvenile signed another transcript of admission, in which the juvenile admitted to the probation violation and to the new misdemeanor charges of public disturbance and simple affray. In return for the juvenile\u2019s admissions, the State agreed to dismiss the petition for felonious larceny. The juvenile also indicated that he understood that a Level 3 disposition could be imposed given his delinquency history level, and that such a level was the most restrictive disposition possible.\nThe matter came on for disposition on 27 August 2010. Mr. Hughey informed the trial court that the juvenile was eligible for confinement to a youth development center. The trial court then stated:\n[The juvenile] has five delinquency history points; is that right? And he\u2019s (inaudible) by his (inaudible) disposition of the probation violation and the misdemeanor offenses; is that correct, Mr. Hughey?\nMadame Clerk, I\u2019ll incorporate the Office of Juvenile Justice \u2014 what\u2019s the \u2014 is the felony larceny the most \u2014 -what\u2019s the most\u2014\nMr. Hughey informed the trial court that the juvenile was currently on probation for felonious larceny, and the trial court confirmed that the larceny charge was the most serious charge that the juvenile was facing. In open court, the trial court ordered that the juvenile be confined to a youth development center until his eighteenth birthday.\nThe trial cpurt entered a Juvenile Level 3 Dispesitien and Cemmitment Order based en the juvenile\u2019s probation violation. In that order, the trial court checked a box indicating that it found that \u201c[t]he juvenile has been adjudicated for a violent or serious offense and Level III is authorized by G.S. 7B-2508.\u201d The trial court also checked boxes indicating that it had received, considered, and incorporated by reference the predisposition report, risk assessment, and needs assessment. The written order provided that the juvenile was to be confined to a youth development center for an indefinite commitment. The juvenile gave written notice of appeal on 2 September 2010.\nOn appeal, the juvenile\u2019s sole contention is that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact in its Juvenile Level 3 Disposition and Commitment Order to demonstrate that it considered the factors listed in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2501(c). The State concedes that the instant case is indistinguishable from prior cases in which we have reversed similar dispositional orders when the trial court failed to make such findings.\nAt the outset, we note that we have previously held that juvenile probation revocation proceedings are dispositional, and subject to the statutory provisions governing juvenile delinquency dispositions. In re D.J.M., 181 N.C. App. 126, 130-31, 638 S.E.2d 610, 613 (2007); In re O\u2019Neal, 160 N.C. App. 409, 412-13, 585 S.E.2d 478, 481-82, disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 657, 590 S.E.2d 270 (2003). Accordingly, a juvenile dispositional order entered after a probation revocation \u201cshall be in writing and shall contain appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2512 (2009).\nIf the trial court finds that the juvenile has violated the conditions of his probation:\n[T]he court may continue the original conditions of probation, modify the conditions of probation, or, except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, order a new disposition at the next higher level on the disposition chart in G.S. 7B-2508. In the court\u2019s discretion, part of the new disposition may include an order of confinement in a secure juvenile detention facility for up to twice the term authorized by G.S. 7B-2508.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2510(e) (2009). In considering the dispositional options outlined in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2508, however, the trial court must consider the following factors:\n(1) The seriousness of the offense;\n(2) The need to hold the juvenile accountable;\n(3) The importance of protecting the public safety;\n(4) The degree of culpability indicated by the circumstances of the particular case; and\n(5) The rehabilitative and treatment needs of the juvenile indicated by a risk and needs assessment.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2501(c) (2009).\nFurther, we have previously held that the trial court is required to make findings demonstrating that it considered the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2501(c) factors in a dispositional order entered in a juvenile delinquency matter. In re Ferrell, 162 N.C. App. 175, 177, 589 S.E.2d 894, 895 (2004).\nIn this case, the trial court\u2019s dispositional order does not contain findings addressing the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2501(c) factors. In the preprinted portions of the dispositional order, the trial court found that the juvenile had previously been given a Level 2 disposition on 15 January 2010, had been placed on probation, and had violated the terms of his probation. As we indicated above, the trial court checked boxes indicating that it had received, considered, and incorporated by reference the predisposition report, risk assessment, and needs assessment, and that \u201c[t]he juvenile has been adjudicated for a violent or serious offense and Level III is authorized by G.S. 7B-2508.\u201d\nThe trial court\u2019s order contains no additional findings of fact, including in the area designated as \u201cOther Findings,\u201d which includes the following instructions:\n(Continue on attached pages if necessary. State any findings regarding the seriousness of the offense(s); the need to hold the juvenile accountable; the importance of protecting the public; the degree of the juvenile\u2019s culpability; the juvenile\u2019s rehabilitative and treatment needs; and available and appropriate resources.)\nThe trial court did not attach any additional findings of fact to its order demonstrating that it considered the seriousness of the offense, the need to hold the juvenile accountable, the importance of protecting the public, the degree of the juvenile\u2019s culpability, the juvenile\u2019s rehabilitative and treatment needs, or the available and appropriate resources. As such, we hold the trial court\u2019s written order contains insufficient findings to allow this Court to determine whether it properly considered all of the factors required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2501(c). For that reason, we must reverse the trial court\u2019s dispositional order and remand this matter for a new dispositional hearing.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges ELMORE and GEER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Jennifer M. Jones, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Peter Wood, for juvenile-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: V.M.\nNo. COA10-1558\n(Filed 19 April 2011)\nJuveniles\u2014 disposition order \u2014 required findings\nA juvenile disposition order was remanded where the order did not demonstate that the court considered the factors listed in N.C.G.S \u00a7 7B-2501.\nAppeal by juvenile from orders entered 7 May 2010 and 27 August 2010 by Judge C. Thomas Edwards in Catawba County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 April 2011.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Jennifer M. Jones, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nPeter Wood, for juvenile-appellant." }, "file_name": "0389-01", "first_page_order": 397, "last_page_order": 400 }