{ "id": 3806090, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEREMIE LABRANDON STEVENSON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Stevenson", "decision_date": "2011-05-03", "docket_number": "No. COA10-1313", "first_page": "583", "last_page": "591", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "211 N.C. App. 583" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "617 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633690 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19", "parenthetical": "\"The decision whether to exclude evidence under Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/617/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "626 S.E.2d 271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635151 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/626/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 L. Ed. 2d 1013", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "526 U.S. 1133", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11199169, 11199267, 11198885, 11198728, 11198826, 11199120, 11199313, 11199058, 11198934, 11199000, 11198777, 11199226, 11198686, 11199359 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/526/1133-10", "/us/526/1133-12", "/us/526/1133-05", "/us/526/1133-02", "/us/526/1133-04", "/us/526/1133-09", "/us/526/1133-13", "/us/526/1133-08", "/us/526/1133-06", "/us/526/1133-07", "/us/526/1133-03", "/us/526/1133-11", "/us/526/1133-01", "/us/526/1133-14" ] }, { "cite": "506 S.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571701 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4689817 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 L. Ed. 2d 523", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "547 U.S. 1073", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3801139 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673", "parenthetical": "\"The decision whether to exclude evidence under Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 S.E.2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561569 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 L. Ed. 2d 116", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "549 U.S. 867", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3787721 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0297-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 848, "char_count": 21119, "ocr_confidence": 0.718, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.11291913157871367 }, "sha256": "eebffda788830d6b742c7659ede3ff3808b25364d0614c53859ae01cdbd2d9da", "simhash": "1:8bf1f2b2360f8ef8", "word_count": 3381 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:31:50.212435+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, ROBERT C., and ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEREMIE LABRANDON STEVENSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEPHENS, Judge.\nFactual and Procedural Background\nOn 24 March 2008, Defendant Jeremie LaBrandon Stevenson (\u201cStevenson\u201d) was indicted on one count each of first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. Stevenson pled not guilty to the charges and was tried non-capitally before a jury at the 14 December 2009 Criminal Session of Iredell County Superior Court, the Honorable Jerry Cash Martin presiding.\nThe evidence presented at trial tended to show the following: In the evening of 2 March 2008, Theodore Barbone (\u201cBarbone\u201d), a reputed drug dealer and the victim in this case, was driven by two friends to Daughtry Lane near Statesville, North Carolina, so that Barbone could \u201cdrop some [marijuana] off.\u201d When the three arrived, Barbone got out of his vehicle and got into the back seat of \u201can old red four-door car[,]\u201d in which Barbone\u2019s friends observed two men sitting in the front seats. As soon as Barbone got into the red car, the car sped off; Barbone\u2019s two friends followed. When Barbone\u2019s friends caught up with the red car, they saw the red car\u2019s front seat passenger struggling with Barbone and then heard two gunshots come from the direction of the red car. Immediately thereafter, when a third car pulled up behind them, Barbone\u2019s friends drove away from the red car. The third car followed Barbone\u2019s friends for several miles before it \u201cturned around and came back the same way they just came from.\u201d After the third car turned around, Barbone\u2019s friends called the Iredell County sheriff\u2019s office and \u201ctold them that [they] thought there had been a shootingf.]\u201d Barbone\u2019s friends then returned to the location of the shooting, where they met law enforcement officers and gave statements detailing the events of the evening.\nPrior to Barbone\u2019s friends\u2019 return to the scene of the shooting, a truck driver came upon Barbone lying face down in the middle of Cool Springs Road in Iredell County. The truck driver saw that Barbone was bleeding, but still breathing and called 911 to report a hit-and-run. When law enforcement and emergency medical personnel arrived, Barbone was lying bloody in the middle of the road and no longer breathing. Barbone was also missing a shoe and had two fresh wounds in his torso. A later post-mortem examination revealed that Barbone died from internal bleeding associated with two close-range gunshot wounds to the abdomen.\nThrough their investigation of Barbone\u2019s death, law enforcement officers discovered that Barbone planned to meet and sell marijuana to Josh Hemphill (\u201cHemphill\u201d) on the night Barbone was shot. Law enforcement officers learned that Hemphill, along with Stevenson and two others, were at an apartment rented by Crystal Waugh (\u201cWaugh\u201d) and Kayla Robinson (\u201cRobinson\u201d) in the late evening of 2 March 2008 and that Stevenson was at Waugh\u2019s and Robinson\u2019s apartment earlier that day with a \u201csilver gun with a black handle\u201d in his lap. Officers also located a red car registered to Stevenson abandoned behind a house near Stevenson\u2019s home. Officers impounded and searched Stevenson\u2019s car and found a shoe matching the one on Barbone\u2019s foot when he died and blood stains with DNA matching that of Barbone. Officers then obtained and executed a search warrant for Stevenson\u2019s residence and arrested Stevenson at his residence.\nOn the following day, Stevenson gave a statement to police indicating that Hemphill asked Stevenson to drive Hemphill to meet Barbone so Hemphill could buy some marijuana. Stevenson stated that after Barbone got into the car with Hemphill and Stevenson, Hemphill pulled out a gun and demanded Barbone\u2019s marijuana. A struggle for the gun ensued, and Barbone was shot. Stevenson stopped the car, Barbone got out, and Hemphill shot at him again.\nLater, while he was still in custody, Stevenson gave another statement, in which he confirmed he was driving the car when Hemphill shot Barbone, but further indicated that, rather than attempting to buy drugs from Barbone, he and Hemphill \u201cplanned to rob [Barbone] for his [marijuana]\u201d on the night of the shooting.\nFollowing the presentation of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on the charges of robbery with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, first- and second-degree kidnapping, and first- and second-degree murder. The jury returned verdicts finding Stevenson guilty of first-degree murder based on the felony murder rule, first-degree kidnapping, robbery with a firearm, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a firearm. The trial court arrested judgment on the first-degree kidnapping and robbery with a dangerous weapon charges, consolidated the other two judgments, and sentenced Stevenson to life imprisonment without parole. Stevenson gave notice of appeal in open court.\nDiscussion\nOn appeal, Stevenson argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of guns found by law enforcement officers during the search of Stevenson\u2019s family residence. Stevenson contends that the evidence was irrelevant and highly prejudicial and, thus, should not have been admitted by the trial court.\nThe evidence of which Stevenson complains includes a photograph of three guns found in Stevenson\u2019s residence, where he lived with his parents, and testimony about how and where the guns were found. Stevenson contends that this evidence should not have been admitted because (1) the guns were found under a mattress in a bedroom that was not Stevenson\u2019s room, and (2) investigators concluded that the guns were not possible murder weapons in this case. However, as conceded by Stevenson on appeal, the evidence of the guns was admitted without objection by Stevenson and, thus, our review of this issue may only be for plain error. N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4) (2009).\nTo show plain error, a defendant must convince the Court \u201cnot only that there was error, but that absent the error, the jury probably would have reached a different result.\u201d State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 297 310, 626 S.E.2d 271, 282 (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 867, 166 L. Ed. 2d 116 (2006). In this case, assuming the admission of the evidence of the guns was error, Stevenson has fallen far short of convincing this Court that a different outcome would have resulted absent the alleged error.\nThe largely undisputed evidence presented at trial tended to show that Stevenson admitted in a written statement that he and Hemphill met Barbone in order to rob Barbone; that Stevenson admitted that he knew Hemphill had a gun at the ready when Barbone got into Stevenson\u2019s car; that Stevenson admitted to driving away from Barbone\u2019s friends when Barbone got in the car; that Stevenson\u2019s statement was corroborated by testimony from Barbone\u2019s two friends, who testified that Barbone got into a red car similar to Stevenson\u2019s; and that Stevenson\u2019s car had Barbone\u2019s shoe and blood in it.\nDespite this overwhelming evidence of his guilt, Stevenson argues on appeal that this case was not a \u201cslam dunk\u201d and that admission of the evidence of the three guns was \u201ca basic fundamental error entitling him to a new trial.\u201d In support of this argument, Stevenson contends that \u201c[t]he fact that the jurors asked for access to documentary evidence, didn\u2019t arrive at a quick verdict, and announced that they were deadlocked on one of the charges[] tends to indicate that the jurors found the State\u2019s case less than compelling.\u201d We are unconvinced.\nFirst, we note that the evidence of the guns was not among the evidence that the jury asked to review. Second, regarding the time taken by the jury to reach its verdict, rather than the jurors deliberating \u201cfor the better part of two days\u201d as Stevenson contends, the transcript indicates that the jurors deliberated for less than six and one half hours. Third, regarding the jury\u2019s deadlock, the transcript indicates that after five hours of deliberation, the jurors had reached unanimous verdicts on the charges of first-degree kidnapping, conspiracy to commit robbery with a firearm, and robbery with a firearm, but were deadlocked at 11 to one on the charge of first-degree murder.\nIn our view, these circumstances do not indicate that the jurors found the State\u2019s evidence \u201cless than compelling.\u201d Instead, they tend to indicate that the jury returned verdicts finding Stevenson guilty after meaningful, but relatively brief, consideration of the State\u2019s evidence. Considering the plenary evidence of Stevenson\u2019s guilt, the circumstances offered by Stevenson, while perhaps showing the State\u2019s case was not a \u201cslam dunk,\u201d show that, at the very least, the State\u2019s case was an uncontested lay-up. Stevenson\u2019s argument is overruled.\nStevenson next argues that the trial court erred by admitting a picture of Stevenson holding a firearm. We disagree. The complained-of evidence was a properly authenticated picture of Stevenson lying down with a silver revolver on his chest. The picture was offered by the State and admitted by the trial court to illustrate Robinson\u2019s testimony that she saw Stevenson at her apartment with a silver gun with a black handle. Indeed, just before the trial court received the picture into evidence, Robinson testified that the gun depicted in the picture \u201cappears to be the same firearm that [she] last saw ... in [Stevenson\u2019s] lap on the day that [Barbone] was shot.\u201d\nAs correctly stated by the State on appeal, \u201c[w]here a proper foundation has been laid, photographs may be used contemporaneously with the witness\u2019s testimony in order to illustrate his testimony and facilitate his explanation.\u201d State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383, 395, 226 S.E.2d 652, 662 (1976). In this case, the photograph clearly illustrated Robinson\u2019s testimony, and the trial court appropriately allowed the photograph into evidence for that purpose. Nevertheless, Stevenson argues that the picture was inadmissible under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 403 because any relevance of the picture was substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice to Stevenson caused by the fact that, in the picture, he was making what Stevenson characterizes as a \u201cgang sign.\u201d We are again unpersuaded.\nBefore allowing the picture into evidence, the trial court explained the basis for its ruling as follows:\nThe [c]ourt\u2019s of the view that [the picture\u2019s] probative value is not substantially outweighed by its [] unfair prejudice to [Stevenson] as to the hand gesture. It\u2019s a hand gesture with no particular significance. The officer [who found the picture and testified in voir dire that the gesture was \u201csome kind of gang sign, but I couldn\u2019t tell you exactly what it is\u201d] speculated. He thought it may have some gang significance but nothing else in the picture, not even a hand gesture by itself[,] indicates that.\nOn appeal, this Court reviews a trial court\u2019s ruling under Rule 403 for abuse, of discretion. See State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 673, 617 S.E.2d 1, 19 (2005) (\u201cThe decision whether to exclude evidence under Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.\u201d), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1073, 164 L. Ed. 2d 523 (2006). In this case, because there was no evidence that Stevenson\u2019s hand gesture was a \u201cgang sign,\u201d and because there was no evidence to indicate any affiliation between Stevenson and any kind of gang, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the picture\u2019s probative value was not substantially outweighed by any potential unfair prejudice to Stevenson, especially in light of the picture\u2019s strong probative value in illustrating Robinson\u2019s testimony. Accordingly, Stevenson\u2019s argument is overruled.\nStevenson next argues that the trial court erred \u201cwhen it failed to meaningfully evaluate and exercise its discretion with respect to the jury\u2019s request for a transcript of Alisha Hemphill\u2019s trial testimony\u201d in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1233. We disagree.\nSection 15A-1233 provides as follows:\nIf the jury after retiring for deliberation requests a review of certain testimony or other evidence, the jurors must be conducted to the courtroom. The judge in his discretion, after notice to the prosecutor and defendant, may direct that requested parts of the testimony be read to the jury and may permit the jury to reexamine in open court the requested materials admitted into evidence.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1233(a) (2009).\nIn this case, after less than 30 minutes of deliberation, the jurors requested to review Stevenson\u2019s written statements, Waugh\u2019s and Robinson\u2019s written statements, photographs of the crime scene and Stevenson\u2019s car, and a copy of the testimony of Alisha Hemphill, Hemphill\u2019s sister. Upon receipt of the request, the trial court granted all of the jury\u2019s requests except for the copy of Alisha Hemphill\u2019s testimony, which the court \u201cpropose[d] in its discretion to deny that request.\u201d Neither party objected to the court\u2019s decision on any of the jury\u2019s requests, and the triaLcourt informed the jury that \u201c[i]n the [cjourt\u2019s discretion, the [c]ourt will deny that portion of \u2014 deny [the copy of Alisha Hemphill\u2019s transcript] requestf,]\u201d but that the court would grant the rest of the requests.\nStevenson argues on appeal that the trial court \u201cfailed to give any meaningful consideration to the jurors\u2019 request\u201d based on the lack of \u201cevidence that [the court] weighed the pros and cons of the issue.\u201d Stevenson further argues that \u201cthe trial judge should give some sort of explanation to demonstrate that he is actually exercising his discretion[.]\u201d These arguments are unavailing.\nAs previously stated by our Supreme Court in State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 331 S.E.2d 652 (1985):\nThis statute [section 15A-1233] imposes two duties upon the trial court when it receives a request from the jury to review evidence. First, the court must conduct all jurors to the courtroom. Second, the trial court must exercise its discretion in determining whether to permit requested evidence to be read to or examined by the jury together with other evidence relating to the same factual issue.\nid. at 34, 331 S.E.2d at 656. By summoning the jurors and exercising its discretion regarding the jury\u2019s requests, the trial court in this case complied with the requirements of section 15A-1233. Despite Stevenson\u2019s contention otherwise, there is nothing to indicate that the trial court failed to give meaningful consideration to the request, 'and there is no requirement that the judge \u201cgive some sort of explanation to demonstrate that he is actually exercising his discretion^]\u201d Furthermore, \u201cwhen a trial court assigns no reason for a ruling which is to be made as a matter of discretion, the reviewing court on appeal presumes that the trial court exercised its discretion.\u201d State v. Guevara, 349 N.C. 243, 252, 506 S.E.2d 711, 717 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1013 (1999). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s denial of the jury\u2019s request to review Alisha Hemphill\u2019s testimony was not error.\nFinally, Stevenson argues that the trial court erred by allowing Robinson to read to the jury the following portion of her prior statement to police:\nAfter I heard about [Stevenson] being arrested, me and [Waugh] started talking. We was wondering why [Stevenson and another person] came in and took a shower that night, \u2018cause that\u2019s not normal. We was wondering why they didn\u2019t have the gun like normal. Usually over the last couple of weeks, I would see [] them with a gun.\nRobinson\u2019s prior statement was admitted by the trial court as opinion-based evidence of Robinson\u2019s state of mind at the time Stevenson returned to Robinson\u2019s and Waugh\u2019s apartment.\nOn appeal, Stevenson argues that the evidence was improperly admitted because it was not proper opinion testimony and because it was inadmissible non-corroborative hearsay. Stevenson further argues that admission of the evidence of Robinson\u2019s \u201cspeculation about [Stevenson\u2019s] motive for taking a shower and the reason for the absence of the gun\u201d was clearly prejudicial in that \u201c[h]ad the trial court not admitted [Robinson\u2019s] out-of-court statements, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different verdict.\u201d We disagree.\nAssuming arguendo that it was error for the trial court to admit Robinson\u2019s statement, we conclude that Stevenson has failed to satisfy his burden in showing that he was prejudiced by the alleged error. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (2009) (\u201cA defendant is prejudiced by errors relating to rights arising other than under the Constitution of the United States when there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises. The burden of showing such prejudice under this subsection is upon the defendant.\u201d). As discussed supra, the evidence of Stevenson\u2019s guilt was overwhelming. This is so despite the allegedly erroneous admission of Robinson\u2019s statement that Stevenson\u2019s shower and lack of possession of a gun were inconsistent with his normal routine. Based on the overwhelming evidence against Stevenson, we conclude there is no reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different result had Robinson\u2019s statement been excluded. Accordingly, Stevenson\u2019s argument is overruled.\nWe hold that Stevenson received a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.\nNO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.\nJudges HUNTER, ROBERT C., and ERVIN concur.\n. On appeal, Stevenson seems to argue that the picture was admitted as substantive evidence and that such admission was erroneous due to the picture\u2019s irrelevance, rather than arguing that it was inadmissible to illustrate Robinson\u2019s evidence, the purpose for which it was admitted by the trial court. To the extent Robinson\u2019s argument addresses the admissibility of the picture as substantive evidence, that argument is overruled as the picture was plainly not admitted for substantive purposes.\n. In arguing for the existence of this requirement, Stevenson cites various cases from other jurisdictions standing for the proposition that the trial court should generally grant these requests. Because those cases are not binding, and because the North Carolina legislature has not amended section 15A-1233 to include language favoring granting such requests, we decline to adopt the rules from other jurisdictions and, instead, apply North Carolina law as written.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEPHENS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Francis W. Crawley, for the State.", "Paul F. Herzog for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEREMIE LABRANDON STEVENSON\nNo. COA10-1313\n(Filed 3 May 2011)\n1. Admission of evidence of guns \u2014 no plain error\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, robbery with a firearm, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a firearm case by admitting evidence of guns found by law enforcement officers during the search of defendant\u2019s family residence. Even assuming the admission of the evidence of the guns was error, defendant fell far short of convincing the Court of Appeals that a different, outcome would have resulted absent the alleged error.\n2. Evidence\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 first-degree kidnapping\u2014 robbery with a firearm \u2014 admission of photograph \u2014 illustrative of witness\u2019s testimony \u2014 no unfair prejudice\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, robbery with a firearm, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a firearm case by admitting into evidence a picture of defendant holding a firearm. The photograph clearly illustrated the witness\u2019s testimony, and the trial court appropriately allowed the photograph into evidence for that purpose. Furthermore, the relevance of the picture was not substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice to defendant.\n3. Request for transcript \u2014 trial court\u2019s denial \u2014 no abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, robbery with a firearm, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a firearm case by failing to meaningfully evaluate and exercise its discretion with respect to the jury\u2019s request for a transcript of a witness\u2019s trial testimony. By summoning the jurors and exercising its discretion regarding the jury\u2019s request, the trial court in this case complied with the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1233.\n4. Admission of witness\u2019s prior statement \u2014 failure to show prejudice\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, robbery with a firearm, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a firearm case by allowing a witness to read to the jury a portion of her prior statement to police. Assuming arguendo that it was error for the trial court to admit the statement, defendant failed to satisfy his burden in showing that he was prejudiced by the alleged error.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment dated 21 December 2009 by Judge Jerry Cash Martin in Iredell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 March 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Francis W. Crawley, for the State.\nPaul F. Herzog for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0583-01", "first_page_order": 591, "last_page_order": 599 }