{ "id": 3806710, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES BRANDON HOWELL", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Howell", "decision_date": "2011-05-03", "docket_number": "No. COA10-476", "first_page": "613", "last_page": "620", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "211 N.C. App. 613" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "407 U.S. 514", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9139028 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/407/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 S.E.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366", "parenthetical": "holding that \"in the absence of a showing of actual prejudice, . . . our courts should consider dismissal in cases of serious crimes with extreme caution\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4685621 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346", "parenthetical": "holding that \"in the absence of a showing of actual prejudice, . . . our courts should consider dismissal in cases of serious crimes with extreme caution\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 L. Ed. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "534 U.S. 838", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9117696, 9117539, 9117635, 9117510, 9117672, 9117610, 9117586, 9117779, 9117492, 9117653, 9117716, 9117559, 9117528, 9117750 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/534/0838-11", "/us/534/0838-04", "/us/534/0838-08", "/us/534/0838-02", "/us/534/0838-10", "/us/534/0838-07", "/us/534/0838-06", "/us/534/0838-14", "/us/534/0838-01", "/us/534/0838-09", "/us/534/0838-12", "/us/534/0838-05", "/us/534/0838-03", "/us/534/0838-13" ] }, { "cite": "140 L. Ed. 2d 150", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 1135", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11634688, 11634848, 11634818, 11634787, 11635043, 11634759, 11634727, 11634921, 11635018, 11634704, 11635185, 11634993, 11635091, 11634969, 11635131, 11634878 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/1135-01", "/us/522/1135-07", "/us/522/1135-06", "/us/522/1135-05", "/us/522/1135-13", "/us/522/1135-04", "/us/522/1135-03", "/us/522/1135-09", "/us/522/1135-12", "/us/522/1135-02", "/us/522/1135-16", "/us/522/1135-11", "/us/522/1135-14", "/us/522/1135-10", "/us/522/1135-15", "/us/522/1135-08" ] }, { "cite": "489 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551309 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E.2d 383", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" }, { "page": "388" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 134", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571067 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" }, { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 516", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523002 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564644 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 S.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254", "parenthetical": "some emphasis added" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "255-57", "parenthetical": "some internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491870 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" }, { "page": "119-22" }, { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 900", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "903", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526837 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721" }, { "page": "721", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "721" }, { "page": "721" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135728 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" }, { "page": "62" }, { "page": "62" }, { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "686 S.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "trial court did not err when it refused to rule on the defendant's pro se motion because the defendant was represented by counsel at the time, and defendant's counsel in no manner adopted the defendant's motion as his own" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151348 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "trial court did not err when it refused to rule on the defendant's pro se motion because the defendant was represented by counsel at the time, and defendant's counsel in no manner adopted the defendant's motion as his own" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 U.S. 514", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9139028 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" }, { "page": "117" }, { "page": "533" }, { "page": "118", "parenthetical": "holding that none of the factors alone is sufficient to establish a violation and that all must be considered together" }, { "page": "522" }, { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/407/0514-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 727, "char_count": 18357, "ocr_confidence": 0.729, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.159551614682297e-08, "percentile": 0.3248558120569964 }, "sha256": "15878d0a58bd07530021658531d84e438113f7c3bba6a6603be1a401abb0fd00", "simhash": "1:094eb5aa436e2b86", "word_count": 3089 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:31:50.212435+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES BRANDON HOWELL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nCharles Brandon Howell (Defendant) was indicted on 13 April 2009 on one count each of robbery with a dangerous weapon and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. Defendant was also indicted on that same date for having attained habitual felon status. By at least 26 April 2009, Defendant was in state prison on other charges, as on that date Defendant sent a letter from prison requesting a speedy trial in the present case. Upon the State\u2019s request, Defendant was transported from prison to the Forsyth County Jail on 13 May 2009 so that he could be tried on the present charges. Transfers of this kind are made pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-711 (2009), which states in relevant part:\n(a) When a criminal defendant is confined in a penal or other institution under the control of the State or any of its subdivisions and his presence is required for trial, the prosecutor may make written request to the custodian of the institution for temporary release of the defendant to the custody of an appropriate law-enforcement officer who must produce him at the trial. The period of the temporary release may not exceed 60 days.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-711(a). Defendant wrote additional letters to the Forsyth County Clerk of Superior Court inquiring about the status of his case, including one dated 24 May 2009, that stated: \u201cI filed a speedy trial motion back in April. Could you let me know what day yall received it on?\u201d Defendant also wrote to the Forsyth County Clerk of Superior Court on 3 August 2009. In his letter, Defendant enclosed a \u201cMotion and Request for Dismissal\u201d and requested that it be filed. In his \u201cMotion and Request for Dismissal,\u201d Defendant asked that his charges be dismissed because he had been held at the Forsyth County Jail for over sixty days, which constituted a violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-711(a). The trial court heard Defendant\u2019s \u201cMotion and Request for Dismissal\u201d on 9 November 2009. Though Defendant\u2019s \u201cMotion and Request for Dismissal\u201d was written in terms that could be viewed as limiting the review to possible violations of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-711, because Defendant had written the filing himself and because of his earlier correspondences, the State, the trial court, and Defendant\u2019s attorney all proceeded as if the request for dismissal also encompassed alleged violations of Defendant\u2019s right to a speedy trial. The State conceded: \u201c[C]ertainly it would be appropriate to inquire into the analysis under the North Carolina and U.S. constitutions, despite any lack of citing, because it\u2019s clear what [Defendant\u2019s] intent is, is to request a speedy trial.\u201d Both Defendant and the State made arguments concerning N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-711 and issues involving Defendant\u2019s constitutional right to a speedy trial. Though not entirely clear from either the transcript or the subsequent order dismissing the charges, it appears that both Defendant and the State ultimately based their arguments concerning whether the charges against Defendant should be dismissed on Sixth Amendment grounds. In delivering its ruling in open court, the trial court, though mentioning three statutes, appears to have based its ruling on its analysis with respect to the Sixth Amendment arguments and law presented by Defendant and the State. The trial court determined that the charges against Defendant should be dismissed and it did dismiss the charges by judgment entered 9 November 2009. The State appeals.\nI.\nThe State first argues that the trial court should not have considered Defendant\u2019s \u201cMotion and Request for Dismissal\u201d because Defendant filed it himself when he was represented by counsel. However, Defendant\u2019s counsel, the State, and the trial court all agreed to address the \u201cMotion and Request for Dismissal\u201d at the hearing, despite its having been filed by Defendant personally. The facts in the present case are clearly distinguishable from those cited by the State in State v. Williams, 363 N.C. 689, 686 S.E.2d 493 (2009) (trial court did not err when it refused to rule on the defendant\u2019s pro se motion because the defendant was represented by counsel at the time, and defendant\u2019s counsel in no manner adopted the defendant\u2019s motion as his own); and State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 61, 540 S.E.2d 713, 721 (2000) (trial court did not err in denying the defendant\u2019s \u201cmotion\u201d for a speedy trial where the defendant had \u201cmentioned that he had been denied his right to a speedy trial. However, defense counsel never demanded a speedy trial, nor did counsel file a motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial.\u201d). Nowhere in Williams or Grooms does our Supreme Court state that a trial court cannot consider a motion filed by a defendant personally when the defendant is represented by counsel, only that it is not error for the trial court to refuse to do so. Further, unlike in Williams and Grooms, Defendant\u2019s counsel in the present case argued the speedy trial issue at the hearing, and both the State and the trial court consented to addressing this issue. This argument is without merit.\nII.\nThe State also argues that, based upon the facts and law presented to the trial court at the hearing, the trial court erred in dismissing the charges against Defendant. First, because we cannot determine from the record the grounds upon which the trial court made its ruling dismissing the charges against Defendant, we must remand.\nThe order dismissing the charges against Defendant was filed on 9 November 2009 and states in full: \u201cThis matter came on to be heard by the [trial court] where the court heard a motion to dismiss regarding a speedy trial. The court allows the motion and dismisses the case.\u201d At the conclusion of the hearing on Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the trial court made the following statements before rendering its ruling:\nTHE COURT: Madam Clerk, show we are on the motion to dismiss and the request for a speedy trial, whether his rights have been denied as the basis for the motion to dismiss.\nAnd as I understand, you\u2019re relying on, after the1 court made inquiry, 7A-49.4 and then 15A-954 and 15A-711.\nThe operative date, as the court views it, would be the date of indictment, which is April 13th. The date of the filing of the defendant\u2019s motion was May 6th.\nAnd in pertinent part, the cases submitted by counsel would rely \u2014 the court will rely on [State v. Pippin, 72 N.C. App. 387, 324 S.E.2d 900 (1985)] for the determination of time of trial. And what length of time is appropriate between formal accusation against an accused and time accused is brought to trial is initially within the sound discretion of the trial court.\nAnd, further, that in [State v. Spivey, 357 N.C. 114, 579 S.E.2d 251 (2003),] in the first headnote that dismissal of the charge is the only possible remedy for denial of the right to a speedy trial, where it is impossible to determine precisely when the right has been denied.\nThe court views that the question of whether the defendant has been denied a speedy trial must be answered in light of the facts in the particular case and whether there is a showing of neglect or willingness on the part of the state, but following most closely would be those trigger dates in April and May.\nThe motion is allowed.\nThese statements by the trial court in open court are the only indication we have concerning the reasons supporting the trial court\u2019s decision to dismiss the case. While it seems evident that the trial court based its ruling to dismiss, at least in part, on a determination that Defendant\u2019s constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated, it is not evident to our Court whether the trial court also based its decision to dismiss in part on potential violations of any of the statutes referenced in the above quote. We therefore remand to the trial court for additional findings and conclusions that make clear what statutory violations, if any, it has found. See Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 714, 268 S.E.2d 185, 190 (1980). If the trial court does find statutory violations occurred, it should further indicate what remedy it is granting Defendant for the violations.\nWe note that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-711 does not guarantee a defendant the right to have his matter tried within a specific period of time. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-711 is not a \u201cspeedy trial\u201d statute. \u201cNorth Carolina\u2019s Speedy Trial Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-701, et seq., was repealed 1 October 1989, thus, we now apply federal constitutional standards to speedy trial issues.\u201d State v. Joyce, 104 N.C. App. 558, 568, 410 S.E.2d 516, 522 (1991) (citations omitted). A violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-711 does not constitute a violation of a defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Id. \u201cWe follow the same [Sixth Amendment] analysis when reviewing [speedy trial] claims under Article I, Section 18 of the North Carolina Constitution.\u201d Grooms, 353 N.C. at 62, 540 S.E.2d at 721 (citations omitted).\nSecond, the State argues that dismissal of the charges against Defendant, based upon a Sixth Amendment violation of Defendant\u2019s right to a speedy trial, constituted error. Because we hold that the trial court reached its Sixth Amendment ruling under a misapprehension of the law and without conducting a complete analysis, including consideration of all the relevant facts and law in this case, we vacate the 9 November 2009 order and remand to the trial court for further action.\nWe have no way of determining which headnote the trial court referenced in making its determination in reliance on Spivey. We caution that headnotes are not reliable expressions of the law and they do not have precedential value. The actual holdings of the relevant appellate opinions must be consulted.\nOur Supreme Court in Spivey stated:\n\u201cThe right to a speedy trial is different from other constitutional rights in that, among other things, deprivation of a speedy trial does not per se prejudice the ability of the accused to defend himself, it is impossible to determine precisely when the right has been denied; it cannot be said precisely how long a delay is too long; there is no fixed point when the accused is put to a choice of either exercising or waiving his right to a speedy trial; and dismissal of the charges is the only possible remedy for denial of the right to a speedy trial.\u201d State v. McKoy, 294 N.C. 134, 140, 240 S.E.2d 383, 388 (1978).\nIn Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court identified four factors that \u201ccourts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right\u201d to a speedy trial under the federal Constitution. 407 U.S. 514, 530, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 117 (1972). These factors are: (i) the length of delay, (ii) the reason for delay, (Hi) the defendant\u2019s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (iv) whether the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the delay. Id.; see also State v. Flowers, 347 N.C. 1, 27, 489 S.E.2d 391, 406 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1135, 140 L. Ed. 2d 150 (1998). \u201cWe follow the same analysis when reviewing such claims under Article I, Section 18 of the North Carolina Constitution.\u201d State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 62, 540 S.E.2d 713, 721 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 838, 151 L. Ed. 2d 54 (2001).\nSpivey, 357 N.C. at 118, 579 S.E.2d at 254 (some emphasis added). The language quoted above: \u201cdeprivation of a speedy trial does not per se prejudice the ability of the accused to defend himself[,]\u201d may lead to some understandable confusion, especially as it is followed by the language \u201cdismissal of the charges is the only possible remedy for denial of the right to a speedy trial.\u201d When read in context, we understand these statements to mean that an unwarranted delay does not per se establish a violation of a defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. In order to conclude there has been a Sixth Amendment violation of a defendant\u2019s right to a speedy trial, the trial court must examine and consider all the Barker factors listed above. Id. at 118, 579 S.E.2d at 254.\nFirst, the length of the delay is not per se determinative of whether defendant has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial.\nSecond, defendant has the burden of showing that the delay was caused by the neglect or willfulness of the prosecution. Only after the defendant has carried his burden of proof by offering prima facie evidence showing that the delay was caused by the neglect or willfulness of the prosecution must the State offer evidence fully explaining the reasons for the delay and sufficient to rebut the prima facie evidence.\nThird, defendant\u2019s ... assertion of his right to a speedy trial is not determinative of whether he was denied the right.... See Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 118 (holding that none of the factors alone is sufficient to establish a violation and that all must be considered together).\nFourth, in considering whether a defendant has been prejudiced because of a delay, this Court has noted that a speedy trial serves \u201c \u2018(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.\u2019 \u201d\nA defendant must show actual, substantial prejudice. State v. Goldman, 311 N.C. 338, 346, 317 S.E.2d 361, 366 (1984) (holding that \u201cin the absence of a showing of actual prejudice, . . . our courts should consider dismissal in cases of serious crimes with extreme caution\u201d).\nSpivey, 357 N.C. at 119-22, 579 S.E.2d at 255-57 (some internal citations omitted). However,\n\u201c \u2018none of the four factors ... [are] either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.... In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.\u2019 \u201d Barker v. Wingo, [407 U.S. 514, 33 L. Ed. 2d. (1972)].\nState v. Pippin, 72 N.C. App. 387, 391, 324 S.E.2d 900, 903 (1985) (citations omitted).\nIt is only after a trial court has considered all of the factors together and determined that a defendant has suffered an actual Sixth Amendment violation of his right to a speedy trial that dismissal of charges becomes mandatory.\nThe amorphous quality of the right also leads to the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the indictment when the right has been deprived. This is indeed a serious consequence because it means that a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free, without having been tried. Such a remedy is more serious than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial, but it is the only possible remedy.\nBarker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 112 (1972).\nIt appears the trial court erroneously believed \u201cdismissal of the charge[s] [was] the only possible remedy for denial of the right to a speedy trial, where it [wajs impossible to determine precisely when the right ha[d] been denied.\u201d (Emphasis added). \u201c \u2018[I]t is impossible to determine precisely when the right has been denied; it cannot be said precisely how long a delay is too long; there is no fixed point when the accused is put to a choice of either exercising or waiving his right to a speedy trial[.]\u2019 \u201d Spivey, 357 N.C. at 118, 579 S.E.2d at 254, quoting State v. McKoy, 294 N.C. 134, 140, 240 S.E.2d 383, 388 (1978).\n[T]he length of the delay is not per se determinative of whether the defendant has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial. The United States Supreme Court has found post accusation delay \u201cpresumptively prejudicial\u201d as it approaches one year. However, presumptive prejudice \u201cdoes not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry.\u201d\nGrooms, 353 N.C. at 62, 540 S.E.2d 713, 721 (internal citations omitted). We hold the trial court relied upon an incorrect standard in ruling on Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss with respect to Defendant\u2019s constitutional rights, and did not conduct a full inquiry into all of the Barker factors before making its determination.\nWe therefore vacate the trial court\u2019s 9 November 2009 order dismissing this case and remand for action consistent with this opinion.\nVacated and remanded.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge ERVIN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Robert G. Montgomery, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES BRANDON HOWELL\nNo. COA10-476\n(Filed 3 May 2011)\n1. Constitutional Law\u2014 motion for speedy trial \u2014 motion filed by defendant personally \u2014 represented by counsel\nA trial court could consider a speedy trial motion filed by a defendant personally even though the defendant was represented by counsel.\n2. Constitutional Law\u2014 speedy trial violations \u2014 constitutional or statutory basis uncertain\nA trial court order dismissing charges against a defendant for speedy trial violations was remanded where the grounds for the dismissal could not be determined from the record. While it seemed evident that the trial court based its ruling at least in part on a violation of defendant\u2019s constitutional right to a speedy trial, it was not evident whether the court also based its decision in part on potential statutory violations. It was noted that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-711 does not guarantee a right to trial within a specific time and that a violation of the statute is not a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.\n3. Constitutional Law\u2014 speedy trial \u2014 time of denial impossible to determine \u2014 analysis of all Barker factors required\nThe trial court relied upon an incorrect standard in ruling on defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for violation of his constitutional speedy trial rights where the trial court believed that dismissal was the only possible remedy when it was impossible to determine precisely when the right had been denied. In order to conclude that there has been a Sixth Amendment violation of a defendant\u2019s right to a speedy trial, the court must examine and consider all of the factors in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514. Reliance on headnotes rather than holdings was cautioned against.\nAppeal by the State from order entered 9 November 2009 by Judge Patrice A. Hinnant in Superior Court, Forsyth County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 December 2010.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Robert G. Montgomery, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0613-01", "first_page_order": 621, "last_page_order": 628 }