{ "id": 3806343, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: J.S.W.", "name_abbreviation": "In re J.S.W.", "decision_date": "2011-05-03", "docket_number": "No. COA10-981", "first_page": "620", "last_page": "626", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "211 N.C. App. 620" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "657 S.E.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640598 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "898-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0894-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 N.C. App. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156084 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/189/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "694 S.E.2d 753", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755", "parenthetical": "omission in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153021 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217", "parenthetical": "omission in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "801" }, { "page": "803" }, { "page": "800-01" }, { "page": "804" }, { "page": "805" }, { "page": "804" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 743", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2555196 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748" }, { "page": "754" }, { "page": "753" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0743-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 714, "char_count": 15387, "ocr_confidence": 0.705, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.087085966315723e-08, "percentile": 0.37810775840599203 }, "sha256": "074299e43d54bcf3c109424f0160754ff6a206e7c04623f891e2cd9936d5f772", "simhash": "1:cbc90163e2476e42", "word_count": 2459 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:31:50.212435+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER and THIGPEN concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: J.S.W." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nOn 12 June 2007, pursuant to a plea, the juvenile, J.S.W., admitted the allegations contained in petitions alleging that he had committed the offenses of first-degree rape, first-degree sexual offense, breaking or entering, larceny after breaking or entering, selling or delivering a controlled substance, and possession of stolen goods, and the State voluntarily dismissed allegations of simple assault and indecent liberties between children. The juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for the offense of first-degree rape under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2. The district court entered a Level 3 Disposition and Commitment Order in which it ordered that the juvenile be committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (the Department) for placement in a youth development center for a minimum period of six months and for a total period of commitment that is indefinite. The district court also ordered that the juvenile\n[Have n]o contact with [specified individuals] Register as a Sex Offender Undergo a Sex Offender Specific Evaluation and Treatment Undergo a Psychological Evaluation Cooperate with Substance Abuse Treatment Remain in YDC for the maximum time allowed by law.\nOn 3 April 2009, a Motion for Review was filed requesting \u201cto extend [the juvenile\u2019s] commitment at the Youth Development Center.\u201d On 7 August 2009, the district court entered an order which included findings that the district court\u2019s original order that the juvenile remain in the Department\u2019s custody until his twenty-first birthday should remain in effect and that the juvenile had \u201cnot successfully completed sex offender specific treatment as ordered.\u201d The district court ordered that the juvenile remain in the Department\u2019s custody until his twenty-first birthday, that he be provided all educational benefits available, and that the district court would \u201centertain a request for an earlier release upon successful completion of sex offender specific treatment.\u201d On 14 December 2009, a second Motion for Review was filed. On 9 February 2010, the district court entered an order finding and concluding that the juvenile had \u201csuccessfully completed the Sex Offender Specific Treatment\u201d and ordering that the juvenile \u201cshall remain in the Youth Development Center until his twenty-first birthday.\u201d\nOn 5 March 2010, a juvenile court counselor filed a Motion for Review stating \u201c[t]hat the Youth Development Center staff and [the juvenile\u2019s] parent would like some clarification as to whether the juvenile can work off campus and participate in home visits or overnight visits.\u201d On 25 March 2010, a letter signed by a Work Force Investment Act Career Specialist at the C.A. Dillon Youth Development Center (the YDC) was filed. The letter stated that J.S.W. \u201cwould be a great candidate for the [Work Force Investment Act] program,\u201d stated that if J.S.W. were placed in the program, he \u201cwould be able to go off C.A. Dillon\u2019s campus and participate in on-the-job training programs,\u201d and requested \u201cthe permission of the court to include [J.S.W.] in[] th[e] program.\u201d The district court conducted a hearing on the motion. During the hearing, the State requested that the juvenile be denied the opportunities to work off campus and to participate in home and overnight visits. The State noted that \u201c[t]he victim [of the rape]... was mentally challenged\u201d and that, following the rape, additional petitions were filed alleging the juvenile\u2019s delinquency for having committed felony drug offenses. The district court heard from Mr. Peter Koontz, a senior psychologist at the YDC, and Ms. Monica Glover, a psychologist who treated J.S.W., both of whom requested that J.S.W. be allowed to participate in the YDC\u2019s programs; Mr. Eric Duane Lee, a minister familiar with J.S.W.\u2019s case; and J.S.W.\u2019s mother. Following the hearing, the district court ordered\n1. That the juvenile may work off campus but is to not be ' around anybody who is twenty five years or younger.\n2. That the juvenile have no home or overnight visits.\n3. That the juvenile can participate in outings with YDC but there is to be direct supervision at all times.\nThe juvenile appeals from that order.\nThe juvenile first contends that the district court erred by ordering that he have no home or overnight visits and by ordering that he may work off campus on the condition that he not be around anyone twenty-five years of age or younger which, the juvenile contends, effectively prevents him from working off campus entirely. The juvenile contends that upon being committed to the Department, the Department had authority, as provided by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143B-516, over the \u201cservices, privileges, or punishments [he] should and should not receive while in the custody of the Department,\u201d and that, therefore, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and exceeded its authority by entering an order concerning those services, privileges, and punishments. We disagree.\n\u201cThe court has exclusive, original jurisdiction over any case involving a juvenile who is alleged to be delinquent.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1601(a) (2009). When a juvenile is committed to the Department for placement in a youth development center \u201cfor an offense that would be ... first-degree rape pursuant to G.S. 14-27.2 ... if committed by an adult, jurisdiction shall continue until terminated by order of the court or until the juvenile reaches the age of 21 years, whichever occurs first.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1602(a) (2009). \u201cCommitment of a juvenile to the Department for placement in a youth development center does not terminate the court\u2019s continuing jurisdiction over the juvenile and the juvenile\u2019s parent, guardian, or custodian.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2513(g) (2009). \u201cCommitment of a juvenile to the Department for placement in a youth development center transfers only physical custody of the juvenile.\u201d Id. Upon a motion or petition and \u201cafter notice, the court may conduct a review hearing to determine whether the order of the court is in the best interests of the juvenile, and the court may modify or vacate the order in light of changes in circumstances or the needs of the juvenile.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2600(a) (2009). In a case of delinquency, the court \u201cmay reduce the nature or the duration of the disposition on the basis that it was imposed in an illegal manner or is unduly severe with reference to the seriousness of the offense, the culpability of the juvenile, or the dispositions given to juveniles convicted of similar offenses.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2600(b).\nIn any case where the court finds the juvenile to be delinquent or undisciplined, the jurisdiction of the court to modify any order or disposition made in the case shall continue (i) during the minority of the juvenile, . . . (iii) until the juvenile reaches the age of 21 years if the juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent and committed for an offense that would be .. . first-degree rape pursuant to G.S. 14-27.2 ... if committed by an adult, or (iv) until terminated by order of the court.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2600(c). \u201cThe North Carolina Juvenile Code patently provides for jurisdiction to lie exclusively in- the district court between the stages of allegation and the final release of a juvenile.\u201d In re Doe, 329 N.C. 743, 748, 407 S.E.2d 798, 801 (1991).\nIn In re Doe, our Supreme Court addressed a juvenile\u2019s challenge to a district court\u2019s order based on the Separation of Powers Clause of the Constitution of North Carolina. Id. at 751, 407 S.E.2d at 803. The district court in In re Doe had entered an order denying the conditional release of a juvenile based on the failure of the Department of Human Resources, Division of Youth Services, to comply with the district court\u2019s original order that the juvenile receive specific treatment for sexual offenders while he was committed. Id. at 747-48, 407 S.E.2d at 800-01. In rejecting the juvenile\u2019s argument, our Supreme Court reasoned that \u201c[n]ecessary, functional overlap of two of the three separate, coordinate branches of government has been drafted directly into the Juvenile Code by the third, the legislative branch.\u201d Id. at 753, 407 S.E.2d at 804. The Court noted that \u201c[t]he Code combines and coordinates the custodial and administrative role of DYS as an executive agency with the continuing jurisdiction and supervisory role of the district court,\u201d id., and cited various portions of the Juvenile Code reflecting that functional overlap, which include statutes now codified as N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-2506 and 7B-2514. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2506(I9) (2009) (authorizing court to suspend imposition of more severe, statutorily permissible disposition with the provision that the juvenile meet certain conditions); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2514(a)(l) (2009) (requiring written notification of post-release planning decision to the committing court). The Court further noted that, in the context of the Juvenile Code, \u201covemice concerns about the separation of powers as a question of a precise division of labor are bootless.\u201d In re Doe, 329 N.C. at 754, 407 S.E.2d at 805.\nThe juvenile argues that the holding in In re Doe is inapplicable and attempts to distinguish the facts in In re Doe from the facts here on the ground that in In re Doe, the district court\u2019s denial of the juvenile\u2019s conditional release from the detention center and order that he receive specialized sex offender treatment involved \u201cdispositional directives,\u201d whereas here, the district court\u2019s order involved \u201cprivileges or punishments\u201d the juvenile should and should not receive while in the custody of the Department. For his argument, the juvenile relies on no authority aside from N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143B-516 and the Department\u2019s policies. Although N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143B-516 provides the Secretary of the Department the powers and duties of, among other things, \u201c[o]perat[ing] juvenile facilities and implementing] programs that meet the needs of juveniles receiving services and that assist them to become productive, responsible citizens\u201d and \u201c[a]dopt[ing] rules to implement this Article and the responsibilities of the Secretary and the Department under Chapter 7B of the General Statutes,\u201d see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143B-516(b)(4)-(5) (2009), given the \u201c[n]ecessary, functional overlap\u201d of the Department and the committing court in juvenile cases, see In re Doe, 329 N.C. at 753, 407 S.E.2d at 804, under the circumstances in this case, we are unwilling to accept the juvenile\u2019s argument that the district court was without authority to enter an order affecting \u201cprivileges or punishments\u201d established by the Department.\nThe juvenile next contends the district court abused its discretion in entering its order by considering punishment as a purpose of the Juvenile Code instead of considering the factors set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2501(c). We disagree.\nAfter hearing testimony which included requests that the juvenile be permitted to have home and overnight visits and work off campus, the district court stated that \u201cpart of the process of juvenile court is . . . punishment. That young girl is going to need help the rest of her life too.\u201d The district court continued, \u201c[T]here are two goals this Court has. One of them is definitely rehabilitation because I know that at some point he will be on the streets. And it varies for different persons and varies for different crimes and the nature of them. Punishment sometimes is also my goal.\u201d The district court then repeated, \u201cPunishment is one of the goals. And I make no bones about it.\u201d\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2501 requires that the district court consider the \u201cseriousness of the offense,\u201d the \u201cneed to hold the juvenile accountable,\u201d the \u201cimportance of protecting the public safety,\u201d the \u201cdegree of culpability indicated by the circumstances of the particular case,\u201d and the \u201crehabilitative and treatment needs of the juvenile indicated by a risk and needs assessment\u201d in selecting disposition \u201cdesigned to protect the public and to meet the needs and best interests of the juvenile.\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2501(c) (2009). The district court\u2019s statements reflect that it considered these dispositional objectives. Indeed, the trial court allowed the juvenile to work off campus as long as the juvenile did not come into contact with anyone aged twenty-five years or younger. By doing so, the district court ultimately balanced the importance of protecting the public safety with the rehabilitative needs of the juvenile. Although \u201cdispositions in juvenile actions have a greater focus on accountability and responsibility\u201d than do criminal sentences, which are \u201cdesigned to impose a punishment commensurate with the injury the offense has caused ... and to provide a general deterrent to criminal behavior,\u201d In re D.L.H., 364 N.C. 214, 217, 694 S.E.2d 753, 755 (2010) (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), taken as a whole, the district court\u2019s statements and decision demonstrate that it exercised its discretion in accordance with the criteria set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2501(c). See In re Z.A.K., 189 N.C. App. 354, 362, 657 S.E.2d 894, 898-99 (2008) (\u201cWe also find no merit in defendant\u2019s claim that the trial court failed to exercise dispositional discretion. Although defendant notes two instances in which the trial judge indicated a general policy preference on his part for level II dispositions for juveniles who commit felonies, the extended discussion in the transcripts reveals that the judge considered a variety of factors before designing] an appropriate plan to meet the needs of the juvenile and to achieve the objectives of the State.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)).\nNo error.\nJudges HUNTER and THIGPEN concur.\n. The Department of Human Resources, Division of Youth Services is now part of the Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by LaToya B. Powell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Staples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Kristen L. Todd, Assistant Appellate Defender, for juvenile-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: J.S.W.\nNo. COA10-981\n(Filed 3 May 2011)\n1. Jurisdiction\u2014 subject matter \u2014 juvenile delinquent\u2014 Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention\nThe district court had subject matter jurisdiction in a juvenile delinquency case to order that defendant have no home or overnight visits and that defendant be allowed to work off campus only on the condition that he not be around anyone twenty-five years of age or younger. The court retained jurisdiction even though the juvenile had been committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention for placement in a youth development center.\n2. Juveniles\u2014 delinquency \u2014 district court order \u2014 exercised discretion in accordance with statute\nThe district court did not abuse its discretion in a juvenile delinquency case by entering an order that defendant have no home or overnight visits and that defendant be allowed to work off campus only on the condition that he not be around anyone twenty-five years of age or younger. Taken as a whole, the district court\u2019s statements and decision demonstrated that it exercised its discretion in accordance with the criteria set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2501(c).\nAppeal by juvenile from order entered 31 March 2010 by Judge John W. Dickson in Cumberland County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 January 2011.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by LaToya B. Powell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nStaples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Kristen L. Todd, Assistant Appellate Defender, for juvenile-appellant." }, "file_name": "0620-01", "first_page_order": 628, "last_page_order": 634 }