{ "id": 4079016, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: WHITNEY MONIQUE MANGUM, Deceased", "name_abbreviation": "In re the Estate of Mangum", "decision_date": "2011-05-17", "docket_number": "No. COA10-1454", "first_page": "211", "last_page": "215", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "212 N.C. App. 211" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "651 S.E.2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639567 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/651/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "643 S.E.2d 904", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638283 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0904-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8157953 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52-10", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3740769 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 786", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 N.C. App. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11912947 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/123/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 29-19", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(2) and (c)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)(2)" }, { "page": "(b)(2)" }, { "page": "(b)(2)" }, { "page": "(b)(2)" }, { "page": "(b)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2" }, { "page": "2" }, { "page": "2-3" }, { "page": "2" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915470 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" }, { "page": "403" }, { "page": "403" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 S.E.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363-64" }, { "page": "415" }, { "page": "363" }, { "page": "363" }, { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 N.C. App. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522746 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415-16" }, { "page": "415" }, { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/62/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 2949", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(2)" }, { "page": "(b)(2)" }, { "page": "(b)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 449, "char_count": 10225, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.64245052257338e-08, "percentile": 0.4514087500854297 }, "sha256": "4cc068348e77571228f067cc324d2301ff07e38cee9b087492629cd7daa19a89", "simhash": "1:0acb616ff4fb1d42", "word_count": 1702 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:12:23.503415+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER (Robert C.) and Judge BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: WHITNEY MONIQUE MANGUM, Deceased" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCullough, Judge.\nShannon Street (\u201crespondent) appeals from an order finding Samuel Earl Mangum (\u201cpetitioner\u201d) to be a legal heir of the Estate of Whitney Monique Mangum. For reasons discussed herein, we affirm.\nI. Background\nPetitioner filed a Petition for Acknowledgment as Heir of the estate of his daughter, Whitney. On 12 March 1988, respondent gave birth to Whitney out of wedlock. Petitioner was designated as Whitney\u2019s biological father on the birth certificate.\nWhitney was fatally injured in a hit-and-run automobile accident and died 27 September 2009. Soon thereafter, the liability carrier tendered policy limits to the heirs of the estate. Respondent qualified as administratrix of Whitney\u2019s estate and refused to recognize petitioner as an heir of the estate.\nAccompanying the Petition, petitioner included a copy of Whitney\u2019s birth and death certificates, acknowledging him as her biological father. Petitioner also referenced a 1996 civil action filed in Wake County District Court by respondent, seeking mutual custody, visitation and support. The civil action was resolved by a \u201cParenting Agreement\u201d attached to the trial court\u2019s order. The parties and the district court judge signed the Parenting Agreement on different dates. The Assistant Clerk of Superior Court for Wake County deemed petitioner to be a legal heir of Whitney\u2019s estate, which respondent appealed to the Wake County Superior Court. After reviewing the decision of the Assistant Clerk of Court, the trial judge affirmed the decision of the Clerk. Respondent-appellant appeals.\nII. Analysis\nA. Compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 2949(b)(2)\nThe main issue respondent raises to this Court on appeal is whether or not the trial court erred in concluding that the voluntary Parenting Agreement satisfied the requirement of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 2949(b)(2) (2009) to recognize petitioner as decedent\u2019s father. Respondent argues, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 2949(b)(2), that petitioner and respondent did not follow the specified requirements by signing the Parenting Agreement in the presence of a certifying officer. Based upon prior case law and our interpretation of the statute, we disagree.\nIn reviewing an appeal to the superior court from an order of the clerk of court in a probate matter, the trial court sits as an appellate court. In re Estate of Swinson, 62 N.C. App. 412, 415-16, 303 S.E.2d 361, 363-64 (1983). When the order appealed from contains specific findings of fact or conclusions to which the appellant takes exception, the trial court on appeal is to apply the whole record test. Id. at 415, 303 S.E.2d at 363. In applying the whole record test, the trial court \u201creviews the Clerk\u2019s findings and may either affirm, reverse, or modify them.\u201d In re Estate of Pate, 119 N.C. App. 400, 403, 459 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1995). The judge must affirm if there is sufficient evidence to support the clerk\u2019s findings. Swinson, 62 N.C. App. at 415, 303 S.E.2d at 363. \u201cMoreover, even though the Clerk may have made an erroneous finding which is not supported by the evidence, the Clerk\u2019s order will not be disturbed if the legal conclusions upon which it is based are supported by other proper findings.\u201d Pate, 119 N.C. App. at 403, 459 S.E.2d at 2. \u201cThe standard of review in this Court is the same as in the Superior Court.\u201d Id. at 403, 459 S.E.2d at 2-3. In the case before us, respondent took exception to a few of the Clerk\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 29-19(b)(2) and (c) state:\n(b) For purposes of intestate succession, an illegitimate child shall be entitled to take by, through and from:\n(2) Any person who has acknowledged himself during his own lifetime and the child\u2019s lifetime to be the father of such child in a written instrument executed or acknowledged before a certifying officer named in G.S. 52-10(b) and filed during his own lifetime and the child\u2019s lifetime in the office of the clerk of superior court of the county where either he or the child resides.\n(c). Any person described under subdivision (b)(1) or (2) above and his lineal and collateral kin shall be entitled to inherit by, through and from the illegitimate child.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 29-19 \u201cprovides the only means by which a putative father may inherit from his illegitimate child.\u201d In re Estate of Morris, 123 N.C. App. 264, 266, 472 S.E.2d 786, 787 (1996). This Court has held that,\n\u201c[w]hen construing statutes, this Court first determines whether the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. If the statute is clear and unambiguous, we will apply the plain meaning of the words, with no need to resort to judicial construction. However, when the language of a statute is ambiguous, this Court will determine the purpose of the statute and the intent of the legislature in its enactment.\u201d\nWiggs v. Edgecombe County, 361 N.C. 318, 322, 643 S.E.2d 904, 907 (2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted).\nThe language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 29-19(b) is clear and unambiguous and, on its face, the statute does not place any limitations on the type of written instrument which must be filed with the Clerk of Superior Court. To meet the requirements imposed by this statute, the father of the child must:\n(1) acknowledge himself to be the father of the child in a written instrument;\n(2) execute the instrument or acknowledge parentage before a certifying officer named in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52-10(b); and\n(3) file the instrument during the lifetime of both the father and child in the superior court of the county in which either reside.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 29-19(b)(2) (2005); see also In re Estate of Morris, 123 N.C. App. 264, 472 S.E.2d 786 (1996).\nIn re Estate of Potts, 186 N.C. App. 460, 462-63, 651 S.E.2d 297, 299 (2007).\nIn the case at bar, petitioner meets the requirements as laid out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 29-19(b)(2) and further examined in Potts. First, petitioner clearly acknowledged himself to be Whitney\u2019s father in the Parenting Agreement, as he is referred to as her father throughout the document. The Parenting Agreement and Order Approving Parenting Agreement meet the requirements of a written instrument in similar fashion to the voluntary support agreement in Potts. See generally Potts, 186 N.C. App. 460, 651 S.E.2d 297 (voluntary support agreement found to meet the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 29-19(b)(2)).\nThe dispositive issue arises in petitioner\u2019s meeting of the second requirement that he execute the instrument or acknowledge parentage before a certifying officer named in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52-10(b) (2009). Respondent contends that because petitioner and respondent did not appear \u201cin the presence\u201d of the district court judge, then the Parenting Agreement does not meet the second requirement. This is not the case as the Parenting Agreement was acknowledged by all parties and approved by the district court judge.\nAs the assistant clerk of court determined and the superior court affirmed, the meaning of \u201cbefore\u201d in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 29-19(b)(2), considering case law and the purpose and intent of the statute is \u201cin the jurisdiction of\u2019 the certifying officer (or, as in here, the district court judge). Petitioner properly accepted parentage of Whitney in the Parenting Agreement and acknowledged it before the district court by presenting it for consideration.\nAs for the final requirement, petitioner clearly met the condition by filing the Parenting Agreement in the Wake County Superior Court. Both respondent and Whitney were residents of Wake County at the time of Whitney\u2019s death. Therefore, the assistant clerk of court and the superior court judge did not err in concluding that the Parenting Agreement satisfied the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 29-19(b)(2).\nB. Findings of Fact\nRespondent also contends that the superior court erred by finding that petitioner was a legal heir of Whitney\u2019s estate based on findings of fact unsupported by the evidence. This argument is without merit.\nRespondent assigned error to four findings of fact and also argued that the assistant clerk of court erred by not conducting an evidentiary hearing. As stated above, \u201c[i]f there is evidence to support the findings of the Clerk, the judge must affirm.\u201d Swinson, 62 N.C. App. at 415, 303 S.E.2d at 363. \u201cMoreover, even though the Clerk may have made an erroneous finding which is not supported by the evidence, the Clerk\u2019s order will not be disturbed if the legal conclusions upon which it is based are supported by other proper findings.\u201d Pate, 119 N.C. App. at 403, 459 S.E.2d at 2.\nThe assistant clerk clearly based his decisions on the pleadings and documentation filed with the trial court. The evidence reviewed by the assistant clerk in the form of birth and death certificates, the Parenting Agreement, and the fact that petitioner has held himself out as Whitney\u2019s father, is enough to support the corresponding findings of fact. For those reasons, the assistant clerk had sufficient findings of fact to determine that petitioner was a legal heir of Whitney\u2019s estate. We find no error on the part of the superior court.\nIII. Conclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court in finding that petitioner is a legal heir of the Estate of Whitney Monique Mangum.\nAffirmed.\nJudges HUNTER (Robert C.) and Judge BRYANT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCullough, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lorie Cramer for petitioner-appellee.", "George Lig\u00f3n, Jr., for respondent-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: WHITNEY MONIQUE MANGUM, Deceased\nNo. COA10-1454\n(Filed 17 May 2011)\n1. Parent and Child\u2014 voluntary parenting agreement \u2014 statutory requirements\nThe assistant clerk of court and the superior court judge did not err by concluding that the parties\u2019 voluntary parenting agreement satisfied the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 29-19(b)(2).\n2. Estates\u2014 legal heir \u2014 father\nThe superior court did not err by finding that petitioner was a legal heir of his child\u2019s estate. The birth and death certificates, the parenting agreement, and the fact that petitioner held himself out as the child\u2019s father was enough to support the corresponding findings of fact.\nAppeal by respondent from order entered 17 August 2010 by Judge Shannon R. Joseph in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 April 2011.\nLorie Cramer for petitioner-appellee.\nGeorge Lig\u00f3n, Jr., for respondent-appellant." }, "file_name": "0211-01", "first_page_order": 221, "last_page_order": 225 }