{ "id": 4079061, "name": "LEONARDO CORTEZ VITELA, GREGORIO LANDEROS ORTIZ, RAYMUNDO REYES GALINDO, ARTURO SEGOVIA CASTRO, ISIDRO SILVA AMARO AND EFRAIN VASQUEZ FLORES, Plaintiffs v. JOHN A. RICHARDSON, d/b/a J&J AMUSEMENTS, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Vitela v. Richardson", "decision_date": "2011-06-07", "docket_number": "No. COA10-693", "first_page": "378", "last_page": "385", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "212 N.C. App. 378" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "662 S.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641439 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "913", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/662/0909-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 642", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633604 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "629 S.E.2d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635722 ], "weight": 13, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" }, { "page": "169" }, { "page": "165" }, { "page": "165" }, { "page": "169" }, { "page": "169-70", "parenthetical": "using the first two factors of the \"minimum contacts\" test to determine the extent of a defendant's contacts for the purposes of a general jurisdiction analysis" }, { "page": "169", "parenthetical": "stating further that \"[additional factors are 'the location of critical witnesses and material evidence, and the existence of a contract which has a substantial connection with the forum state' \"" }, { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/629/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786" }, { "page": "786-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4734507 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" }, { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388-89", "parenthetical": "noting that specific jurisdiction did not exist where a tire manufacturer was sued for an accident, allegedly caused by defective tires, that occurred in France" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 N.C. App. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4170406 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58", "parenthetical": "noting that specific jurisdiction did not exist where a tire manufacturer was sued for an accident, allegedly caused by defective tires, that occurred in France" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/199/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 S.E.2d 709", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526685 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 S.E.2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11198623 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 S.E.2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218", "parenthetical": "quoting Inspirational Network, Inc. v. Combs, 131 N.C. App. 231, 235, 506 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11080985 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615-16", "parenthetical": "quoting Inspirational Network, Inc. v. Combs, 131 N.C. App. 231, 235, 506 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1998)" }, { "page": "616" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0612-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4159369 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 S.E.2d 167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 N.C. App. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527039 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/94/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 651", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655" }, { "page": "654" }, { "page": "657-58" }, { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524368 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" }, { "page": "630" }, { "page": "634-35" }, { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 812", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8321604 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0812-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" }, { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. App. 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358429 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" }, { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8301263 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" }, { "page": "327" }, { "page": "321-22" }, { "page": "321" }, { "page": "327" }, { "page": "327-28" }, { "page": "327" }, { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0314-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 803, "char_count": 17988, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.12984965532739554 }, "sha256": "cd0ca0cb251f8f50cf1a7b8a2cdca4d472b4457c689a16bbfffed9dd68527c23", "simhash": "1:8fb357ab95cdb95a", "word_count": 2780 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:12:23.503415+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, Robert C. and CALABRIA concur." ], "parties": [ "LEONARDO CORTEZ VITELA, GREGORIO LANDEROS ORTIZ, RAYMUNDO REYES GALINDO, ARTURO SEGOVIA CASTRO, ISIDRO SILVA AMARO AND EFRAIN VASQUEZ FLORES, Plaintiffs v. JOHN A. RICHARDSON, d/b/a J&J AMUSEMENTS, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nLeonardo Cortez Vitela, Gregorio Landeros Ortiz, Raymundo Reyes Galindo, Arturo Segovia Castro, Isidro Silva Amaro, and Efrain Vasquez Flores (together, plaintiffs), appeal from the order of the trial court granting a motion by John A. Richardson (defendant Richardson), d/b/a J&J Amusements (together, defendant), to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. After careful review, we affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nVery few facts are undisputed, and the trial court\u2019s minimal findings provide this Court with little guidance. It appears that the parties agree that defendant Richardson is the owner and operator of defendant business, a mobile carnival called J&J Amusements, based in New Middletown, Ohio. In 2006, defendant applied to the U.S. Department of Labor for temporary certification to employ foreign workers through the H-2B visa program for work beginning in 2007. Defendant\u2019s application included at least one advertisement for positions with J&J Amusements indicating that the carnival would operate in Fayetteville, Lumberton, and Hamlet, North Carolina. A portion of defendant\u2019s application also certified that wages paid would \u201c lequal[] or exceed[] the prevailing wage[,]\u2019 \u201d and that \u201c \u2018[t]he job opportunity\u2019s terms, conditions and occupational environment are not in contrary [sic] to Federal, State or Local law.\u2019 \u201d Plaintiffs are a group of Mexican nationals who assert that they traveled to the United States to work for defendant in 2007 in response to his H2-B recruitment efforts.\nOn 22 May 2009, plaintiffs filed a class action against defendant in Wake County Superior Court alleging that defendant Richardson both overworked and underpaid plaintiffs in violation of state and federal labor laws. Defendant thereafter filed a motion, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule 12(b)(3), to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. In an affidavit supporting the motion, defendant Richardson confirmed that he hired some Mexican nationals through the H2-B program to work for him in the 2007 season, but stated also that he was unable to \u201cdetermine whether these specific plaintiffs ever worked for me.\u201d Defendant Richardson further stated that the Mexican nationals he hired in 2007 only worked for him for \u201ca short period at the start of the season while [the carnival] operated in states other than North Carolina,\u201d and that they \u201cleft abruptly before they ever worked in North Carolina.\u201d These latter statements directly contradicted the plaintiffs\u2019 assertion, made in their complaint upon information and belief, that plaintiffs began work for defendant in North Carolina.\nPlaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss which included several exhibits purporting to demonstrate the extent of defendant\u2019s contacts with North Carolina. Those exhibits included websites reflecting defendant\u2019s participation in North Carolina fairs in 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2009; North Carolina Department of Labor ride inspections and advance location notice forms from 2009; websites showing that defendant purchased worker\u2019s compensation insurance in North Carolina in 2007 and 2010; and Department of Labor records showing both that defendant\u2019s carnival was inspected at various locations in North Carolina between 17 May 2007 and 7 June 2007 and that the carnival was to operate in Lincoln, Catawba, and Surry Counties in May and June 2007.\nAfter, considering the motions of both parties and the supporting documents proffered by each, the trial court rendered its opinion as follows:\n[This court] concludes that neither party resides in North Carolina and therefore Wake County is not the appropriate venue, that there is speculation as to whether the cause of action arose in North Carolina and whether any of the Plaintiffs ever worked in North Carolina, and that accordingly any minimum contacts with the State of North Carolina for purposes of personal jurisdiction over Defendant in this matter is too speculative, and that the Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and inappropriate venue should be granted.\nPlaintiffs timely appealed.\nII. DISCUSSION\nPlaintiffs claim that the trial court\u2019s determinations of improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction were erroneous as a matter of law. Because we conclude that the trial court\u2019s grant of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss was proper on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction, we do not reach plaintiffs\u2019 contentions concerning the propriety of the trial court\u2019s venue determination.\nOur Courts apply a tworprong test to determine the existence of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. Deer Corp. v. Carter, 177 N.C. App. 314, 326, 629 S.E.2d 159, 168 (2006). \u201cFirst, we must determine if a basis for jurisdiction exists under the North Carolina \u2018long-arm\u2019 statute, and second, whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant will comport with the constitutional standards of due process.\u201d Id. (citing Cameron-Brown Co. v. Daves, 83 N.C. App. 281, 283, 350 S.E.2d 111, 113 (1986)). If we determine that due process would not be satisfied if jurisdiction were exercised over a particular defendant, \u201cwe need not address the question of whether jurisdiction exists under our \u2018long-arm\u2019 statute.\u201d Id.\nThe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is satisfied where either specific or general jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil matter exists in the courts of a forum state. Havey v. Valentine, 172 N.C. App. 812, 814-15, 616 S.E.2d 642, 646 (2005). Specific jurisdiction exists where, first, a defendant has certain minimum contacts with a given forum so that traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are not offended by a court\u2019s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant in that forum, Cherry Bekaert & Holland v. Brown, 99 N.C. App. 626, 632, 394 S.E.2d 651, 655 (1990), and, second, where the cause of action against the defendant was related to or arose from the defendant\u2019s activities within the forum. Deer Corp., 177 N.C. App. at 327, 629 S.E.2d at 169. General jurisdiction exists where a defendant\u2019s contacts with a forum state are so \u201ccontinuous and systematic\u201d as to allow a court sitting in that forum to exercise personal jurisdiction over that defendant regardless of the nature of a plaintiff\u2019s cause of action. Id.\nWe review the trial court\u2019s conclusion that neither type of jurisdiction exists in the instant case de novo. Id., 177 N.C. App. at 321-22, 629 S.E.2d at 165. We will, however, defer to the trial court\u2019s findings of facts so long as they are supported by competent evidence. Id., 177 N.C. App. at 321, 629 S.E.2d at 165. Here, the trial court made informal findings of fact that neither of the parties resided in North Carolina, and that speculation existed as to whether plaintiffs ever worked in North Carolina. Neither of these findings is necessarily dispositive of defendant\u2019s claim of lack of jurisdiction. \u201cHowever, when there is no request of the trial court to make [specific] findings, \u2018we presume that the judge found facts sufficient to support the judgment.\u2019 \u201d Cherry Bekaert & Holland, 99 N.C. App. at 630, 394 S.E.2d at 654 (quoting Church v. Carter, 94 N.C. App. 286, 289, 380 S.E.2d 167, 169 (1989)). No such request was made in this case. Therefore, \u201c[if the] presumed findings are supported by competent evidence in the record, [they] are conclusive on appeal, notwithstanding other evidence in the record to the contrary.\u201d Id. (citation omitted).\nA. Lack of general jurisdiction\nThe trial court correctly determined that defendant\u2019s contacts with North Carolina are insufficient to establish general jurisdiction over defendant. The extent of a defendant\u2019s contacts with this State \u201cmust be determined \u2019by a careful scrutiny of the particular facts of each case.\u2019 \u201d Deer Corp., 177 N.C. App. at 327, 629 S.E.2d at 169 (quoting Cameron-Brown Co., 83 N.C. App. at 284, 350 S.E.2d at 114). The presence of sufficient contacts is determined \u201cnot by using a mechanical formula or rule of thumb [,] but by ascertaining what is fair and reasonable under the circumstances.\u201d Rossetto USA, Inc. v. Greensky Financial, LLC, 191 N.C. App. 196, 200, 662 S.E.2d 909, 913 (2008) (citation omitted). In determining whether general jurisdiction exists, the factors considered in determining the existence of specific jurisdiction are useful guideposts. See Deer Corp., 177 N.C. App. at 327-28, 629 S.E.2d at 169-70 (using the first two factors of the \u201cminimum contacts\u201d test to determine the extent of a defendant\u2019s contacts for the purposes of a general jurisdiction analysis). Such factors include \u201c(1) [the] quantity of the contacts between defendant and the forum state, [and] (2) [the] quality and nature of the contacts].]\u201d Id., 177 N.C. App. at 327, 629 S.E.2d at 169 (stating further that \u201c[additional factors are \u2018the location of critical witnesses and material evidence, and the existence of a contract which has a substantial connection with the forum state\u2019 \u201d).\nAs to the quantity and quality of defendant\u2019s contacts with North Carolina, plaintiffs produced evidence in opposition to defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss indicating that defendant has operated his mobile carnival in this state in 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2009. In each instance, defendant appears to have operated in North Carolina for no more than a few weeks. Defendant also submitted to the Department of Labor\u2019s inspections and regulations for the purposes of operating his carnival in state. Finally, defendant purchased worker\u2019s compensation insurance in North Carolina in 2007 and 2010. The trial court concluded that these contacts were insufficient to establish general jurisdiction, and we agree.\nPlaintiffs contend that the facts of this case are analogous to the facts presented to this Court in Cherry Bekaert & Holland. In that case, this Court concluded that the defendant, a certified public accountant formerly employed by a North Carolina accountant partnership had contacts that were continuous and systematic to justify the trial court\u2019s exercise of general jurisdiction over him. Cherry Bekaert & Holland, 99 N.C. App. at 634-35, 394 S.E.2d at 657-58. The defendant\u2019s contacts in that case, however, were both quantitatively and qualitatively greater than the contacts of defendant; there, at the time that suit was filed against him, the defendant actively participated in the management of a resident North Carolina business. Id., 99 N.C. App. at 634, 394 S.E.2d at 657. That defendant \u201creturned to North Carolina for yearly corporate meetings, participated in partnership management decisions as managing partner of the Mobile [, Alabama,] office, consulted by telephone and corresponded with plaintiff in North Carolina concerning business matters on a continuous and prolonged basis.\u201d Id. Defendant on the other hand, carries on no substantial activity in North Carolina when his carnival is not operating here, meaning that, for the vast majority of a given year, defendant\u2019s contacts with North Carolina are virtually non-existent.\nThis case more closely resembles the case of Deer Corp: there, we held that a defendant who returned telephone calls to a prospective employee in North Carolina, relayed an offer of employment to that employee in North Carolina, and visited North Carolina a number of times over several years to conduct employee training sessions, wrap-up meetings, and one international sales meeting lacked the continuous and systematic contacts necessary for an exercise of general jurisdiction. 177 N.C. App. at 328, 629 S.E.2d at 169. As was the case in Deer Corp., defendant\u2019s visits to North Carolina are brief, and constitute a small part of his carnival operation during carnival season. For these reasons, we agree with the trial court that North Carolina courts lack general jurisdiction over Mr. Richardson.\nB. Lack of specific jurisdiction\nHaving decided that defendant\u2019s contacts are not sufficient to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction over him, we must determine whether plaintiffs\u2019 cause of action is sufficiently related to the contacts he does have with North Carolina to warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction. We conclude that any such relation is lacking.\nPlaintiffs alleged in their complaint that they began work for defendant in North Carolina. Defendant Richardson, in an affidavit supporting his motion to dismiss, asserted that plaintiffs abandoned the carnival before it arrived in North Carolina. In the face of those assertions, the trial court found plaintiffs\u2019 statements as to their work in North Carolina \u201ctoo speculative\u201d to support the exercise of jurisdiction.\n\u201cWhere unverified allegations in the complaint meet plaintiff\u2019s initial burden of proving the existence of jurisdiction ... and [the] defendant [does] not contradict plaintiff\u2019s allegations in their sworn affidavit, such allegations are accepted as true and deemed controlling\u201d .... However, where, as in this case, defendants submit some form of evidence to counter plaintiffs\u2019 allegations, those allegations can no longer be taken as true or controlling and plaintiffs cannot rest on the allegations of the complaint.\nBruggeman v. Meditrust Acquisition Co., 138 N.C. App. 612, 615-16, 532 S.E.2d 215, 218 (2000) (quoting Inspirational Network, Inc. v. Combs, 131 N.C. App. 231, 235, 506 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1998)). A plaintiff\u2019s burden of demonstrating prima facie grounds for personal jurisdiction under such circumstances can be satisfied only where some form of evidence in the record supports the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id,., 138 N.C. App. at 616, 532 S.E.2d at 218 (citing Liberty Finance Co. v. North Augusta Computer Store, 100 N.C. App. 279, 395 S.E.2d 709 (1990)).\nIn response to defendant\u2019s motion and affidavit, plaintiffs filed a brief containing evidence concerning defendant\u2019s contacts with North Carolina, including evidence that defendant operated the carnival in North Carolina in 2007. None of this evidence, however, contradicts defendant Richardson\u2019s assertion that plaintiffs ceased working for him prior to the carnival\u2019s arrival in North Carolina. We presume that the trial court\u2019s finding that plaintiffs\u2019 contentions were \u201ctoo speculative\u201d amounts to a finding that plaintiffs did not work in North Carolina. This presumed finding is supported by the record.\nIf, as the trial court found, plaintiffs never worked in North Carolina, defendant\u2019s alleged misbehaviors do not arise from or relate to his contacts with this State. See Brown v. Meter, 199 N.C. App. 50, 58, 681 S.E.2d 382, 388-89 (2009) (noting that specific jurisdiction did not exist where a tire manufacturer was sued for an accident, allegedly caused by defective tires, that occurred in France). Specific jurisdiction is, therefore, lacking.\nPlaintiffs contend, however, that personal jurisdiction might still be properly exercised over defendant because plaintiffs\u2019 causes of action relate to the breach of an employment contract that has a substantial relation to North Carolina. \u201cAlthough a contractual relationship between a North Carolina resident and an out-of-state party alone does not automatically establish the necessary minimum contacts with this State, nevertheless, a single contract may be a sufficient basis for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction.\u201d Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 367, 348 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1986).\nPlaintiffs rely on defendant\u2019s application and advertisements for H2-B workers and, specifically, on the references to North Carolina \u2018 contained therein as conclusive proof that defendant and plaintiffs formed a binding employment contract with a substantial connection to this state. We cannot agree with plaintiffs\u2019 view.\nIn Tom Togs, Inc., for example, this Court that held a contract had a substantial connection with this state where an out-of-state defendant contacted the plaintiff in North Carolina to instigate contract negotiations and where the contract was to be substantially performed in North Carolina. Id., 318 N.C. at 367, 348 S.E.2d at 786-87. By contrast, plaintiffs in the instant case are not North Carolina residents, and only a small portion of the work they were employed to perform was scheduled to take place in North Carolina. For these reasons, we hold that specific jurisdiction has not been shown to exist in this case.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nBecause plaintiffs\u2019 allegations against defendant did not arise out of defendant\u2019s connection to this state, and because defendant\u2019s contacts with this state are not continuous and systematic in a manner sufficient to justify the exertion of general jurisdiction over his person, the order of the trial court granting defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges HUNTER, Robert C. and CALABRIA concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "North Carolina Justice Center, by Carol L. Brooke and Clermont Fraser, for plaintiffs.", "Ross & Van Sickle, PLLC, by R. Matthew Van Sickle and C. Thomas Ross, for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LEONARDO CORTEZ VITELA, GREGORIO LANDEROS ORTIZ, RAYMUNDO REYES GALINDO, ARTURO SEGOVIA CASTRO, ISIDRO SILVA AMARO AND EFRAIN VASQUEZ FLORES, Plaintiffs v. JOHN A. RICHARDSON, d/b/a J&J AMUSEMENTS, Defendant\nNo. COA10-693\n(Filed 7 June 2011)\nJurisdiction\u2014 personal jurisdiction \u2014 lack of continuous and systematic contacts\nThe trial court did not err in a class action alleging overwork and underpayment in violation of state and federal labor laws by granting non-resident defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs\u2019 allegations did not arise out of defendant\u2019s connection to this state, and defendant\u2019s contacts with this state were not continuous and systematic in a matter sufficient to justify the exertion of general jurisdiction.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from order entered 29 February 2010 by Judge Michael R. Morgan in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 December 2010.\nNorth Carolina Justice Center, by Carol L. Brooke and Clermont Fraser, for plaintiffs.\nRoss & Van Sickle, PLLC, by R. Matthew Van Sickle and C. Thomas Ross, for defendant." }, "file_name": "0378-01", "first_page_order": 388, "last_page_order": 395 }