{ "id": 4078345, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GEORGE R. WILLIAMSON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Williamson", "decision_date": "2011-06-07", "docket_number": "No. COA10-883", "first_page": "393", "last_page": "400", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "212 N.C. App. 393" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "657 S.E.2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640443, 12640444, 12640445 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0354-01", "/se2d/657/0354-02", "/se2d/657/0354-03" ] }, { "cite": "645 S.E.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638626 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "802" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/645/0798-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 S.E.2d 318", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323", "parenthetical": "\"The State proceeded within the six-month limitation when it made the request for the defendant . . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 N.C. App. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547152 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85", "parenthetical": "\"The State proceeded within the six-month limitation when it made the request for the defendant . . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/34/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150559 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 N.C. App. 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8183983 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/184/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011 WL 1645851", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "weight": 8, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "*1" }, { "page": "*2" }, { "page": "*6" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 S. Ct. 149", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12437703, 12436376, 12436377, 12436378, 12436379, 12436380, 12436381 ], "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/l-ed-2d/178/0259-09", "/l-ed-2d/178/0090-02", "/l-ed-2d/178/0090-03", "/l-ed-2d/178/0090-04", "/l-ed-2d/178/0090-05", "/l-ed-2d/178/0090-06", "/l-ed-2d/178/0090-07" ] }, { "cite": "686 S.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501", "parenthetical": "concluding counsel did not adopt the defendant's motions where counsel made no arguments on the motions and merely stated to the trial court, \" 'The defendant filed some pro se motions. We need rulings on those.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151348 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 S. Ct. 93", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "534 U.S. 838", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9117696, 9117539, 9117635, 9117510, 9117672, 9117610, 9117586, 9117779, 9117492, 9117653, 9117716, 9117559, 9117528, 9117750 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/534/0838-11", "/us/534/0838-04", "/us/534/0838-08", "/us/534/0838-02", "/us/534/0838-10", "/us/534/0838-07", "/us/534/0838-06", "/us/534/0838-14", "/us/534/0838-01", "/us/534/0838-09", "/us/534/0838-12", "/us/534/0838-05", "/us/534/0838-03", "/us/534/0838-13" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721", "parenthetical": "\"Having elected for representation by appointed defense counsel, defendant cannot also file motions on his own behalf or attempt to represent himself.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135728 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61", "parenthetical": "\"Having elected for representation by appointed defense counsel, defendant cannot also file motions on his own behalf or attempt to represent himself.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 S.E.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "837" }, { "page": "837", "parenthetical": "\"The statute provides that following defendant's request the state must proceed within six months 'pursuant to subsection (a),' that is, not to trial but to request a defendant's temporary release for trial . . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563804 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" }, { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "590 S.E.2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "590 S.E.2d 886", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "891", "parenthetical": "affording no deference to the trial court" }, { "page": "891" }, { "page": "889" }, { "page": "890" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. App. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8917842 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453", "parenthetical": "affording no deference to the trial court" }, { "page": "453" }, { "page": "450" }, { "page": "451" }, { "page": "450" }, { "page": "450" }, { "page": "450-51" }, { "page": "453" }, { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/162/0447-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 673, "char_count": 17599, "ocr_confidence": 0.734, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.0011153170616546e-08, "percentile": 0.31468263207623304 }, "sha256": "b97f2bc997635cb2f92aae1df4749819462967cf297d08bfac91a47f0f196d4e", "simhash": "1:afe89464f3e12c85", "word_count": 2915 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:12:23.503415+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEELMAN and STEPHENS concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GEORGE R. WILLIAMSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nGeorge R. Williamson (\u201cDefendant\u201d) appeals from his conviction for assault on a female and argues the trial court erred in denying his Motion and Request for Dismissal. We vacate the Order denying his Motion and remand for a new hearing.\nI. Factual & Procedural History\nOn 4 February 2008, Defendant was indicted for felony assault inflicting serious bodily injury and assault on a female. The indictments stem from an incident that occurred on 12 October 2007, at which time Defendant was on parole from a prior conviction. Consequently, on 30 October 2007, Defendant\u2019s parole was revoked and he was incarcerated at Central Prison in Raleigh, North Carolina. Sometime thereafter, Defendant was transferred to Avery/Mitchell Correctional Facility in Spruce Pine, North Carolina.\nOn 16 April 2008, Defendant wrote to his appointed counsel requesting his attorney file a motion for a speedy trial. Defendant sent a copy of the letter to the Clerk of Superior Court. Nearly one year later, Defendant drafted a \u201cMotion for a Speedy Trial\u201d in which he stated that he had been detained by the Department of Correction for approximately eighteen months awaiting trial; that his first appointed attorney refused to file a motion for a speedy trial; and pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-711, he was requesting \u201ca speedy disposition of the charges pending\u201d against him. Defendant\u2019s \u201cMotion\u201d was dated 9 April 2009 and indicates that Defendant sent copies to his attorney, Shelly Blum, District Attorney Virginia Thompson, and Senior Resident Judge James L. Baker, Jr.\nIn a letter dated 20 April 2009, Judge Baker replied to Defendant stating that he received Defendant\u2019s Motion; that the Motion did not appear to be filed with the Clerk of Superior Court; and that copies of the Motion were sent to the District Attorney and Defendant\u2019s attorney. Judge Baker also stated Defendant\u2019s case was scheduled for 26 May 2009 in Yancey County Administrative Court, at which time any pretrial motions could be made and, if the case was not disposed of at that hearing, a trial date would be set. Finally, Judge Baker stated he was sending copies of his response and Defendant\u2019s Motion to the Clerk of Court, the District Attorney, and to Defendant\u2019s attorney. Both Judge Baker\u2019s letter and Defendant\u2019s Motion were date-stamped 22 April 2009 by the Yancey County Clerk of Superior Court.\nAt the 26 May 2009 Administrative Court hearing, Defendant\u2019s case was scheduled on the trial calendar, but was subsequently continued several times due to older cases taking precedence, the unavailability of an expert witness, and because the victim in the incident for which Defendant was charged with assault was scheduled for an unrelated surgery. The trial was ultimately scheduled for 1 February 2010.\nOn 3 November 2009, Defendant drafted a pro se Motion and Request for Dismissal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-711 for the State\u2019s failure to prosecute and for the denial of Defendant\u2019s right to a speedy trial guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Law of the Land Clause of the North Carolina Constitution; the Motion was filed 9 December 2009.\nDefendant\u2019s trial came on for hearing during the 1 February 2010 Criminal Session of the Yancey County Superior Court, Judge Alan Z. Thornburg presiding. At the start of the hearing, the trial judge asked counsel if there were any pretrial motions to be heard. In response, Defendant\u2019s attorney stated that Defendant filed a \u201cpro se motion for a speedy trial\u201d and a Motion and Request for Dismissal for failure to \u201cgive him a speedy trial,\u201d and that Defendant asked counsel to present evidence on the motions. The trial court permitted Defendant\u2019s attorney to present evidence on the Motion and Request for Dismissal including Defendant\u2019s in-court testimony concerning his incarceration since 30 October 2007 for the alleged assault. The State participated in the hearing on Defendant\u2019s Motion and argued that the Motion should be denied. The District Attorney argued the State responded to Defendant\u2019s \u201cspeedy trial\u201d motion appropriately, noting that Judge Baker replied to Defendant in his 22 April 2009 letter and calendared the trial for an administrative court date: \u201cThe State would contend that we have addressed this as is required by Statute calendaring this trial and has done some [sic] in a timely manner.\u201d\nThe Defendant further testified about his knowledge of the whereabouts of a witness to the 12 October 2007 events on direct examination by his appointed counsel and on cross-examination by the State. The trial court denied Defendant\u2019s Motion for a speedy trial, finding \u201cno grounds for dismissal\u201d and questioned whether there was a separate motion for counsels\u2019 questions regarding attempts to locate a witness. Defendant\u2019s counsel responded there was not a separate motion regarding the availability of the witness; his questions were part of his \u201cevidentiary presentation.\u201d The trial court then proceeded with Defendant\u2019s trial.\nDefendant was found guilty of one count of assault on a female and was sentenced to seventy-five days, with credit for thirty days for time served on the charge prior to his sentencing. The trial court ordered the sentence was to be served at the conclusion of all other sentences Defendant was serving at the time of his sentencing. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.\nOn 6 December 2010, Defendant filed a Motion for Appropriate Relief (\u201cMAR\u201d) pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1415(b)(3). In this Motion, Defendant alleges that his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution would be violated if his motion to dismiss based on an alleged violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-711 was decided without consideration of additional evidence filed with his MAR. Because we vacate the trial court\u2019s Order and remand for a new hearing on Defendant\u2019s Motion and Request for Dismissal, his Motion for Appropriate Relief is moot.\nII. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review\nAs Defendant appeals from the final judgment of a superior court, an appeal lies of right with this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27(b) (2009). We review the trial court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s Motion and Request for Dismissal for errors of law de novo. See State v. Doisey, 162 N.C. App. 447, 453, 590 S.E.2d 886, 891 (2004) (affording no deference to the trial court).\nIII. Analysis\nDefendant\u2019s sole argument on appeal is the trial court erred in' denying his Motion and Request for Dismissal for the State\u2019s failure to comply with his request for a \u201cspeedy trial\u201d pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-711. Before addressing the merits of Defendant\u2019s appeal, we feel it is necessary to clarify the nature of Defendant\u2019s filings in the trial court; this Court addressed similar misinterpretations of section 15A-711 in State v. Doisey, and they bear repeating here. Doisey, 162 N.C. App. at 453, 590 S.E.2d at 891.\nFirst, while N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-711 is sometimes referred to as a \u201cspeedy trial\u201d statute, it is an improper characterization of the statute; the statute does not guarantee a defendant the right to a speedy trial. That right is guaranteed by our state and federal constitutions. Doisey, 162 N.C. App. at 450, 590 S.E.2d at 889. Rather, section 15A-711 provides an imprisoned criminal defendant the right \u201cto formally request that the prosecutor make a written request for his return to the custody of local law enforcement officers in the jurisdiction in which he has other pending charges.\u201d Doisey, 162 N.C. App. at 451, 590 S.E.2d at 890 (explaining N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-711 (2003)). The temporary release of the defendant to the local jurisdiction may not exceed 60 days. Id. at 449, 590 S.E.2d 889. If the prosecutor is properly served with the defendant\u2019s request and fails to make a written request to the custodian of the institution where the defendant is confined within six months from the date the defendant\u2019s request is filed with the clerk of court, the charges pending against the defendant must be dismissed. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-711(a), (c) (2009); Doisey, 162 N.C. App. at 450, 590 S.E.2d at 889.\nThe State\u2019s compliance with section 15A-711 does not require that the defendant\u2019s trial occur within a given timeframe. State v. Dammons, 293 N.C. 263, 267, 237 S.E.2d 834, 837 (1977); Doisey, 162 N.C. App. at 450, 590 S.E.2d at 889. Rather, the State satisfies its statutory duty when the prosecutor timely makes the written request for the transfer of the defendant, \u201cwhether or not the trial actually takes place during the statutory period of six months plus the sixty days temporary release to local law enforcement officials.\u201d Doisey, 162 N.C. App. at 450-51, 590 S.E.2d at 890.\nSecond, although requests for the prosecutor\u2019s compliance with section 15A-711 are sometimes styled as \u201cmotions\u201d for a \u201cspeedy trial,\u201d the statute does not authorize a defendant to submit a motion to the trial court. Id. at 451,590 S.E.2d at 890 (\u201c[N.C. Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 15A-711(c) does not require a defendant to, e.g., \u2018apply to the trial court\u2019 or \u2018file a motion seeking\u2019 that the prosecutor comply with the statute.\u201d). Nor does the statute authorize the trial court to enter an order pursuant to a defendant\u2019s request. Id. Accordingly, Defendant\u2019s 22 April 2009 \u201cmotion for a speedy trial\u201d is not a motion, but a request for the prosecutor\u2019s compliance with the statute. Subsequent to his request, Defendant filed a pro se Motion and Request for Dismissal on 9 December 2009, citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-711, and claiming the District Attorney failed to comply with the statute.\nA. Counsel\u2019s Adoption of Defendant\u2019s Pro Se Motion\nIn response to Defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the charges against him, the State cites our Supreme Court\u2019s decision in State v. Grooms and argues that Defendant had no right to file a pro se motion while he was represented by appointed counsel. 353 N.C. 50, 61, 540 S.E.2d 713, 721 (2000) (\u201cHaving elected for representation by appointed defense counsel, defendant cannot also file motions on his own behalf or attempt to represent himself.\u201d) cert. denied, 534 U.S. 838, 122 S. Ct. 93 (2001). When Defendant submitted his 22 April 2009 request for a speedy trial and his 9 December 2009 Motion and Request for Dismissal, he was represented by counsel. Defendant argues, however, that his attorney adopted his pro se motion when his attorney presented evidence to the trial court in support of the Motion. We agree with Defendant\u2019s argument.\nWhile the State also cites State v. Williams, 363 N.C. 689, 686 S.E.2d 493 (2009), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 131 S. Ct. 149 (2010), in which our Supreme Court rejected a similar argument, we find the present case distinguishable. In Williams, our Supreme Court rejected the defendant\u2019s argument that the prohibition against filing pro se motions while represented by counsel did not apply in that case because his counsel \u201cadopted\u201d the motions. Williams, 363 N.C. at 700, 686 S.E.2d at 501 (concluding counsel did not adopt the defendant\u2019s motions where counsel made no arguments on the motions and merely stated to the trial court, \u201c \u2018The defendant filed some pro se motions. We need rulings on those.\u2019 \u201d).\nWe conclude the facts of the instant case are more aligned with this Court\u2019s recent decision in State v. Howell, No. 10-476, \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, \u2014 S.E.2d \u2014, 2011 WL 1645851 (May 3, 2011). In Howell, the defendant, while represented by counsel, filed a request pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-711 and, subsequently, a pro se Motion and Request for Dismissal for the State\u2019s failure to comply with his request for a speedy trial. Id. at \u2014, \u2014 S.E.2d at \u2014, 2011 WL 1645851 at *1. At trial, the defendant\u2019s counsel and the State made arguments concerning N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-711 and the defendant\u2019s right to a speedy trial under the state and federal constitutions, and the trial court granted the motion. Id. On appeal, the State argued the trial court should not have addressed the motion because the defendant was represented by counsel. Id. In rejecting the State\u2019s argument, we noted that \u201c[njowhere in Williams or Grooms does our Supreme Court state that a trial court cannot consider a motion filed by a defendant personally when the defendant is represented by counsel, only that it is not error for the trial court to refuse to do so.\u201d Id. at \u2014, \u2014 S.E.2d at \u2014, 2011 WL 1645851 at *2.\nIn the present case, Defendant filed a Motion and Request for Dismissal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-711, the trial court addressed the Motion, and Defendant\u2019s counsel and the State presented arguments on the merits of the Motion. Accordingly, we reject the State\u2019s argument. The trial court did not err in addressing Defendant\u2019s Motion.\nB. Trial Court\u2019s Denial of Defendant\u2019s Motion\nNext, the State argues Defendant is not entitled to relief under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-711, because the State complied with the statute by making written requests to the Department of Correction to have Defendant transferred to the local authorities for his trial. In support of this argument, the State refers to \u201cnumerous writs\u201d included in the amended record. A review of the record reveals one Application and Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum that is dated within the six-month time period after Defendant\u2019s 22 April 2009 request pursuant to section 15A-711. That writ is dated 23 April 2009 \u2014 the day after Defendant\u2019s request was filed \u2014 but the Writ is not date-stamped by the clerk of court. See N.C. R. App. P. 9(b)(3) (2011) (\u201cEvery pleading, motion, affidavit, or other paper included in the record on appeal shall show the date on which it was filed ....\u201d). While this Court has noted, on at least one occasion, that Rule 9(b)(3) does not require a date-stamp on \u201ceach paper\u201d in the record, the record in that case contained an affidavit in which the affiant averred to the date on which the paper in question was filed. In re S.J.M., 184 N.C. App. 42, 49, 645 S.E.2d 798, 802, (2007), aff'd, 362 N.C. 230, 657 S.E.2d 354 (2008). The record in the present case contains no such evidence. In fact, we find no reference in the transcript to the 23 April 2009 writ.\nDuring the hearing on the Motion, the District Attorney argued the State complied with section 15A-711 by scheduling Defendant\u2019s case on the administrative calendar. The calendaring of Defendant\u2019s case, however, is not sufficient to comply with the statute. See Dammons, 293 N.C. at 267, 237 S.E.2d at 837 (\u201cThe statute provides that following defendant\u2019s request the state must proceed within six months \u2018pursuant to subsection (a),\u2019 that is, not to trial but to request a defendant\u2019s temporary release for trial . . . .\u201d) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-711(c)); State v. Turner, 34 N.C. App. 78, 85, 237 S.E.2d 318, 323 (1977) (\u201cThe State proceeded within the six-month limitation when it made the request for the defendant . . . .\u201d). Rather, \u201c[t]he appropriate inquiry upon a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with G.S. \u00a7 15A-711 is whether the prosecutor made a written request for defendant\u2019s transfer to a local law enforcement facility within six months after defendant files his request.\u201d Doisey, 162 N.C. App. at 453, 590 S.E.2d at 891. Because the record in the present case is void of any evidence the trial court made the proper inquiry in response to Defendant\u2019s Motion, we must vacate the trial court\u2019s Order and remand for a new hearing on the Motion. See Howell, \u2014 N.C. App. at \u2014, \u2014 S.E.2d. at \u2014, 2011 WL 1645851 at *6 (vacating order and remanding to trial court due to trial court\u2019s incomplete analysis on the defendant\u2019s motion and request to dismiss for State\u2019s failure to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-711); Doisey, 162 N.C. App. at 453, 590 S.E.2d at 891 (reversing and remanding for same).\nIV. Conclusion\nIn sum, we conclude the trial court did not err in considering Defendant\u2019s Motion and Request for Dismissal for the State\u2019s alleged failure to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-711. The record, however, is void of any evidence the trial court made the appropriate inquiry in consideration of Defendant\u2019s Motion. Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s Order denying Defendant\u2019s Motion and Request for Dismissal is vacated and we remand for a new hearing on the Motion.\nVacated and remanded.\nJudges STEELMAN and STEPHENS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General 'Mabel Y Bullock, for the State.", "Faith S. Bushnaqfor defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GEORGE R. WILLIAMSON\nNo. COA10-883\n(Filed 7 June 2011)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 motion for appropriate relief \u2014 mootness\nDefendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14A-1415(b)(3) in an assault on a female case was moot because the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court\u2019s order and remanded for a new hearing on defendant\u2019s motion and request for dismissal.\n2. Constitutional Law\u2014 right to speedy trial \u2014 trial court\u2019s failure to make proper inquiry\nThe trial court erred in an assault on a female case by denying defendant\u2019s motion for dismissal based on the State\u2019s failure to comply with his request for a speedy trial under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-711. The record was void of any evidence that the trial court made the appropriate inquiry in consideration of defendant's motion. The order was vacated and remanded for a new hearing on the motion.\nAppeal by Defendant from Judgment entered 4 February 2010 by Judge Alan Z. Thornburg in Yancey County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 December 2010.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General 'Mabel Y Bullock, for the State.\nFaith S. Bushnaqfor defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0393-01", "first_page_order": 403, "last_page_order": 410 }