{ "id": 4078829, "name": "DOUGLAS SINGLETARY, III, Plaintiff v. P & A INVESTMENTS, INC. d/b/a ANDY'S MOBILE HOME AND LAND SALES, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Singletary v. P & A Investments, Inc.", "decision_date": "2011-06-07", "docket_number": "No. COA10-1089", "first_page": "469", "last_page": "481", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "212 N.C. App. 469" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641759 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581", "parenthetical": "notingHayes's holding that the word \"title\" used in section 20-72(b) was intended by the legislature as a synonym for \"ownership\" such that the two words can be used interchangeably" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/665/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-75", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-106", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-1-201", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(29)", "parenthetical": "defining \"purchase\" as a \"taking by sale, lease, discount, negotiation ... or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-401", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 S.E.2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" }, { "page": "216" }, { "page": "216", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522489 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" }, { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 666", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671", "parenthetical": "recognizing that \"[t]he Supreme Court [in Hayes] consistently limited its holding, that the MVA title provisions applied instead of the UCC, to cases involving 'tort law and liability insurance coverage' \"" }, { "page": "671-72" }, { "page": "672" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519308 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9-11" }, { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.C. App. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4160594 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536", "parenthetical": "notingHayes's holding that the word \"title\" used in section 20-72(b) was intended by the legislature as a synonym for \"ownership\" such that the two words can be used interchangeably" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/192/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" }, { "page": "192" }, { "page": "186", "parenthetical": "applying the UCC to resolve conflicting security interests in a consignment transaction involving manufacturer, dealer, lender, and buyer of a recreational vehicle, based, in part, on pre-Code reliance on \"the general law of sales, bailment and entrustment\" in similar transactions" }, { "page": "192" }, { "page": "192" }, { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4685211 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" }, { "page": "162" }, { "page": "151" }, { "page": "161" }, { "page": "161" }, { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-509", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 B.R. 49", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "B.R.", "case_ids": [ 6096743 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51", "parenthetical": "\"It is clear under North Carolina law that a mobile home is a 'motor vehicle' for purposes of the statutes dealing with registration and ownership of motor vehicles.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/174/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(23)", "parenthetical": "defining \"motor vehicle\" as \"[e]very vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle designed to run upon the highways which is pulled by a self-propelled vehicle\"" }, { "page": "(26)" }, { "page": "366" }, { "page": "(26)" }, { "page": "(26)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-107", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 S.E.2d 329", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "noting that \"[a] mobile home is classified by statute as a motor vehicle\" because it \"is designed to be operated upon the highways\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574512 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 762", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523429 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0762-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250", "parenthetical": "citing Peoples Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 103 N.C. App. 762, 407 S.E.2d 251 (1991); King Homes, Inc. v. Bryson, 273 N.C. 84, 159 S.E.2d 329 (1968)" }, { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12127763 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328", "parenthetical": "citing Peoples Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 103 N.C. App. 762, 407 S.E.2d 251 (1991); King Homes, Inc. v. Bryson, 273 N.C. 84, 159 S.E.2d 329 (1968)" }, { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 819", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 727", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553418 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0727-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 S.E.2d 768", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "770", "parenthetical": "\"The sale of a mobile home is a 'transaction in goods.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525837 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466", "parenthetical": "\"The sale of a mobile home is a 'transaction in goods.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-105", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)(2001)" }, { "page": "(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 721", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-105(1)(2001)" }, { "page": "723" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9186998 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-105(1)(2001)" }, { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 S.E.2d 511", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 11, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519", "parenthetical": "noting issue of first impression in our Courts" }, { "page": "622-26" }, { "page": "512-14" }, { "page": "626" }, { "page": "514" }, { "page": "523" }, { "page": "640" }, { "page": "524", "parenthetical": "emphases added" }, { "page": "524" }, { "page": "518", "parenthetical": "\"The most basic departure from previous law which is found in the Uniform Commercial Code is the abandonment of the concept of title as a tool for resolving sales problems.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563141 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638-39" }, { "page": "640" }, { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-72", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.C. App. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527276 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 S.E.2d 160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 N.C. App. 623", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11436228 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0623-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-52", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-143", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-104", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-143.9", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(6) and (7)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1178, "char_count": 32195, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.3849617572011903e-08, "percentile": 0.2752691373126387 }, "sha256": "d82e33560bab670e075be11f4fa1be609d37419b8c7f1ac463f930cb49d4acbb", "simhash": "1:9bda57123f6c2dfe", "word_count": 5311 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:12:23.503415+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "DOUGLAS SINGLETARY, III, Plaintiff v. P & A INVESTMENTS, INC. d/b/a ANDY\u2019S MOBILE HOME AND LAND SALES, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BEASLEY, Judge.\nP & A Investments, Inc. d/b/a Andy\u2019s Mobile Home and Land Sales (Defendant) appeals from the trial court\u2019s judgment in favor of Douglas Singletary, III (Plaintiff), concluding that Defendant seller bore the risk of loss at the time a mobile home purchased by Plaintiff was destroyed by fire and awarding Plaintiff damages. Because we conclude that the Uniform Commercial Code-Sales (UCC or Code) is not supplanted by the Motor Vehicle Act (MVA) in this case and that the UCC\u2019s risk of loss provisions therefore govern, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nOn 5 February 2008, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant for breach of contract and deceptive trade practice. A bench trial was held on 1 March 2010, where the matter was tried upon stipulated facts as set forth in a pre-trial order filed in open court that same date. The trial court\u2019s findings mirror the stipulations to which the parties agreed and establish the factual background of the case, as follows.\nThis action arises out of an agreement between the parties for the purchase of a mobile home. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant was engaged in the principal business of selling new and used \u201cmanufactured homes,\u201d and was a \u201cmanufactured home dealer,\u201d as those terms are defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-143.9(6) and (7), respectively. On 15 November 2007, Defendant and Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Inc. (Vanderbilt), acting on behalf of Oakwood Acceptance Corp. (Oakwood), contracted to purchase a 1996 Oakwood mobile home for resale. Oakwood had repossessed the \u201cmanufactured home\u201d under a chattel mortgage or conditional sales contract from the persons who held title. Defendant, Vanderbilt, and Oakwood were all \u201cmerchants\u201d with respect to the sales of manufactured homes under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-104.\nOn or about 17 November 2007, Plaintiff entered into a written contract with Defendant for the sale of the same mobile home and paid the purchase price in full. Although the certificate of title, together with appropriate documentation that would authorize the issuance of a certificate title in the name of any party to whom Defendant sold the mobile home, had not yet been received by Defendant from Vanderbilt, Defendant represented to Plaintiff that it did indeed have the right and authority to sell him the home. In the course of negotiations, Defendant proposed a contractual provision requiring it to relocate the mobile home from its existing location to Plaintiffs property, but Plaintiff ultimately declined the inclusion of such provision. Instead, Plaintiff elected to purchase and accept the mobile home \u201cAs is where is,\u201d as reflected in the sales contract, rather than bear additional costs for Defendant\u2019s assumption of the delivery responsibility. While Defendant failed to attach a separate \u201cNotice of Cancellation\u201d to the contract in duplicate, as required for manufactured home purchase agreements by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-143.21A(c), the requisite \u201cright to cancel\u201d statutory language did appear in the contract itself and provided that Plaintiff had three business days after signing the agreement to cancel his mobile home purchase.\nFollowing the execution of the sales contract, on 19 November 2007 Defendant paid Vanderbilt the purchase price of the mobile home in accord with their 15 November agreement, and Plaintiff undertook efforts to arrange for the home to be broken down and moved from its location. Notwithstanding findings that it was located upon a third party\u2019s property in North Carolina, and removal of the home\u2019s brick and masonry underpinnings was required prior to any relocation thereof, the trial court found that it could be detached from the land without material harm to either the mobile home or the real property. As of midnight on 21 November 2007, the third business day following the execution of the agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant, neither party had expressed any intention to cancel the sale. Moreover, Plaintiff had at no time advised Defendant of any inability to obtain insurance on the home, nor had he requested Defendant\u2019s assistance in that regard. In fact, the only communication between the parties from the date of sale through 21 November 2007 was a telephone call on 20 November 2007, during which Plaintiff reported experiencing some difficulties with the owner of the property upon which the mobile home was located while Plaintiff\u2019s crew was taking down the underpinning and readying the home for relocation to Plaintiff\u2019s property.\nOn 22 November 2007, the mobile home was destroyed by fire, and in a telephone conference initiated by Plaintiff the following day, Defendant was informed of the occurrence. Plaintiff demanded return of the funds he had paid Defendant for the purchase of the mobile home, but Defendant refused. Where Defendant had come into possession of the certificate of title to the mobile home and the appropriate documentation for transfer to Plaintiff shortly after 27 November 2007, Defendant diligently requested that Plaintiff cooperate in having the certificate of title issued in Plaintiffs name. Plaintiff, however, refused to provide Defendant with either a driver\u2019s license or identification card number, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-52(a), and the trial court found that the failure to have a certificate of title to the mobile home issued in Plaintiff\u2019s name is the result of Plaintiff\u2019s own refusal to cooperate with Defendant in causing the same to be issued.\nThe trial court concluded that Defendant did not commit an unfair or deceptive trade practice but awarded $22,000, the purchase price of the mobile home in damages to Plaintiff plus interest, based on its conclusion that at the time of the mobile home\u2019s destruction, the risk of loss fell on Defendant. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in its conclusion of law that Plaintiff did not bear the risk of loss sustained to the mobile home and in its judgment in favor of Plaintiff.\nOur standard of review for a judgment following a bench trial, in which the trial court sits without a jury, \u201cis whether there is competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings of fact and whether the findings support the conclusions of law and ensuing judgment.\u201d Sessler v. Marsh, 144 N.C. App. 623, 628, 551 S.E.2d 160, 163 (2001) (citation omitted). \u201cFindings of fact by the trial court in a non-jury trial have the force and effect of a jury verdict and are conclusive on appeal if there is evidence to support those findings. A trial court\u2019s conclusions of law, however, are reviewable de novo.\u201d Shear v. Stevens Building Co., 107 N.C. App. 154, 160, 418 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1992) (internal citation omitted). Here, Defendant does not challenge any of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact \u2014 which, in any event, were based entirely on the parties\u2019 stipulations. Thus, the sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly concluded that Plaintiff was not responsible for the destruction of the mobile home because the risk of loss remained upon Defendant.\nPlaintiff contended before the trial court, as he does on appeal, that the legal result obtained from application of various UCC provisions is overridden by the North Carolina Motor Vehicle Act, specifically N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-72 thereof, as set forth in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hayes, 276 N.C. 620, 174 S.E.2d 511 (1970). It is Plaintiffs position that the MVA governs the sales transaction and that no ownership of, title to, or interest in the mobile home passed to him before its destruction because the requirements of Hayes had not been met. His contention is that under Hayes and the MVA\u2019s title transfer provisions, ownership of the mobile home remained with the seller at the time of its destruction, and thus, Defendant bore the loss thereof. Defendant, however, argues that our Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Hayes is inapposite to the facts of this case and that any conflict that may arise between the applicability of section 20-72 and the UCC, in which the MVA\u2019s specific provision would govern, is not present in the case at bar. Accordingly, the UCC\u2019s risk of loss provisions, as applied to the parties\u2019 agreement, shifted the risk of loss from Defendant merchant-seller to Plaintiff upon the execution of the sales contract. For the following reasons, we agree with Defendant that the issue here, involving risk of loss, is controlled by and resolved through application of the UCC.\nAs an initial matter, before attempting to resolve any conflict between the UCC and MVA, we must determine whether the mobile home sale at issue here comes within the general scope of the UCC in the first place. Where the sales provisions in Article 2 of the UCC apply to \u201ctransactions in goods,\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-102 (2009), the law traditionally \u201ctreats a mobile home not as an improvement to real property but as a good, defined and controlled by the UCC as something \u2018movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale,\u2019 \u201d Hensley v. Ray\u2019s Motor Co. of Forest City, Inc., 158 N.C. App. 261, 264, 580 S.E.2d 721, 723 (2003) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-105(1)(2001)); see also Reece v. Homette Corp., 110 N.C. App. 462, 466, 429 S.E.2d 768, 770 (1993) (\u201cThe sale of a mobile home is a \u2018transaction in goods.\u2019 \u201d).\nFor example, this Court determined a mobile home was a good, the sale of which was controlled as a transaction under the UCC. Alberti v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 329 N.C. 727, 732, 407 S.E.2d 819, 822 (1991). Moreover, we have \u201cnotefd] that prior decisions of this Court and our Supreme Court have classified a mobile home as a \u2018motor vehicle\u2019 for purposes of interpreting the application of our motor vehicle laws to mobile homes.\u201d Hughes v. Young, 115 N.C. App. 325, 328, 444 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1994) (citing Peoples Sav. & Loan Ass\u2019n v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 103 N.C. App. 762, 407 S.E.2d 251 (1991); King Homes, Inc. v. Bryson, 273 N.C. 84, 159 S.E.2d 329 (1968)).\nHensley, 158 N.C. App. at 264, 580 S.E.2d at 723. Indeed, we have acknowledged that mobile homes can be considered realty where a plaintiff shows: (1) that the home was annexed to land with the intent that it be permanent; or (2) demonstrates that circumstances surrounding the association between the land and the mobile home or the relationship between various parties claiming an interest in the item otherwise justifies treating the mobile home as realty affixed to the land. Id. at 264, 580 S.E.2d at 723-24 (citing Hughes, 115 N.C. App. at 328, 444 S.E.2d at 250). Our determination on the permanence of the mobile home in this case is also guided by the latter portion of the UCC\u2019s definition of \u201cgoods,\u201d which includes \u201cother identified things attached to realty as described in the section on goods to be severed from realty.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-105(1) (2009). The referenced section provides that when, pursuant to a contract for the sale apart from land, the buyer (or the seller for that matter) is to sever an item attached to realty and is capable of doing so without material harm thereto, that item is a good under the UCC, \u201cand the parties can by identification effect a present sale before severance.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-107(2) (2009); see also id. cmt. (\u201c[I]tems affixed to real property which can be removed without injury to the realty are treated as goods by this subsection of the UCC even though attached at the time the contract is made and without regard to which party (buyer or seller) is to make the severance[,]\u201d and \u201c[w]hether an item is to be deemed \u2018real\u2019 or \u2018personal\u2019 property (\u2018goods\u2019) will be determined under the Code by its potential for severability without injury to the realty to which it is attached and not upon the more difficult determination of whether the item is a \u2018fixture.\u2019 \u201d).\nHere, although Plaintiff argues on appeal that \u201cthe subject matter of this action concerns the purported sale of a mobile home that had been permanently attached to realty with a brick foundation,\u201d the parties have stipulated that \u201cthe mobile home was located upon the real property in the State of North Carolina of a third party but could be removed therefrom without material harm to either the mobile home or the real property.\u201d While the trial court likewise acknowledged that the home was affixed by brick and masonry underpinning, it found, as reflected by the parties\u2019 mutual recognition, that severance of the mobile home was achievable without harm to the realty. Where the sales contract clearly contemplated Plaintiff-buyer\u2019s removal of the mobile home from the property upon which it was located, and his severance thereof could be done without subjecting the realty to any material harm, the mobile home comes within the Code\u2019s definition of a \u201cgood.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s only argument concerning permanence is that the mobile home had a brick foundation, but the trial court\u2019s finding that Plaintiff undertook removal of the brick and masonry underpinning and arranged for the mobile home to be broken down and relocated further indicates that the home was indeed movable at the time of the parties\u2019 agreement. Thus, consistent with our general view that mobile homes are goods, and in light of the trial court\u2019s findings regarding the severability and relocation of the home in question by Plaintiff, we conclude that it was not part of the real estate but, rather, personal property and a \u201cgood\u201d under the UCC.\nHaving established that the Code\u2019s Article 2 sales provisions do indeed apply, and where both the UCC and MVA deal with the transfer of vehicle ownership, we must determine which statutory compilation will resolve the risk of loss issue in this case. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01(23) (2009) (defining \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d as \u201c[e]very vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle designed to run upon the highways which is pulled by a self-propelled vehicle\u201d); Bryson, 273 N.C. at 88-89, 159 S.E.2d at 332 (noting that \u201c[a] mobile home is classified by statute as a motor vehicle\u201d because it \u201cis designed to be operated upon the highways\u201d); see also In re Meade, 174 B.R. 49, 51 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1994) (\u201cIt is clear under North Carolina law that a mobile home is a \u2018motor vehicle\u2019 for purposes of the statutes dealing with registration and ownership of motor vehicles.\u201d). The MVA provides, in pertinent part:\nIn order to assign or transfer title or interest in any motor vehicle registered under the provisions of this Article, the owner shall execute in the presence of a person authorized to administer oaths an assignment and warranty of title on the reverse of the certificate of title in form approved by the Division, including in such assignment the name and address of the transferee; and no title to any motor vehicle shall pass or vest until such assignment is executed and the motor vehicle delivered to the transferee....\nAny person transferring title or interest in a motor vehicle shall deliver the certificate of title duly assigned in accordance with the foregoing provision to the transferee at the time of delivering the vehicle....\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-72(b) (2009). North Carolina\u2019s adaptation of the UCC \u201cabolishes the traditional \u2018property passage\u2019 or \u2018title\u2019 approach as regards the question of who bears the risk of loss,\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-509 (Commentary) (2009), and states that, if the contract does not provide.for the seller\u2019s shipment of the goods by carrier or a bailee\u2019s holding of the goods for delivery without being moved, and the seller is a merchant, \u201cthe risk of loss passes to the buyer on his receipt of the goods if the seller is a merchant; otherwise the risk passes to the buyer on tender of delivery.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-509(3) (2009).\nThe potential for conflict between the transfer of ownership provisions in the MVA and the overlapping subject matter covered by the UCC was first addressed in Hayes. See Hayes, 267 N.C. at 632, 174 S.E.2d at 519 (noting issue of first impression in our Courts). Our Supreme Court in Hayes was called upon to resolve which of two insurance companies-one providing a \u201cnon-owner\u2019s\u201d policy and the other, an \u201cowner\u2019s\u201d policy-afforded liability coverage for an automobile accident. See id. at 622-26, 174 S.E.2d at 512-14. To answer the question, the Court had to fix the date upon which the purchaser of the vehicle acquired an ownership interest therein, which occurred at an earlier point in time under the UCC than under the MVA. Id. at 626, 174 S.E.2d at 514. Where \u201cHayes dealt with a situation in which the rights of parties not privy to the sales transaction itself, hinged on the time when legal title to the vehicle passed,\u201d American Clipper Corp. v. Howerton, 311 N.C. 151, 161, 316 S.E.2d 186, 192 (1984), the Court applied the \u201cpublic regulations\u201d of the MVA over the conflicting title transfer provisions of the UCC, a \u201cprivate law,\u201d explaining:\nThe [UCC], in general, covers transactions in personal property and is particularly related to negotiable instruments, bills of lading and sales in general. The [MVA] is concerned only with the automobile and although the word \u201cautomobile\u201d comes within the general term of \u201cgoods,\u201d automobiles are a special class of goods which have long been heavily regulated by public regulatory acts. In this connection, the official comment to section 25-2-401 seems to say that the [UCC] makes no attempt to set a specific line of interpretation where a public regulation is involved, but that in case a court should decide to apply this private law definition and reasoning to its public regulation, that there should be a clear and concise definitional basis for so doing. Such comment leads to the conclusion that the sales act, a private law, is not necessarily applicable to public regulations unless the court chooses to make it so.\nHayes, 276 N.C. at 638-39, 174 S.E.2d at 523. Where section 20-72(b) of the MVA contains \u201cspecific, definite, and comprehensive terms concerning the transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle,\u201d Hayes concluded that \u201cfor purposes of tort law and liability insurance coverage,\u201d the later-enacted UCC \u201cdo[es] not override the earlier Motor Vehicle statutes relating [thereto].\u201d Id. at 640, 174 S.E.2d at 524 (emphases added); see also Batts v. Lumberman\u2019s Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 192 N.C. App. 533, 536, 665 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2008) (notingHayes\u2019s holding that the word \u201ctitle\u201d used in section 20-72(b) was intended by the legislature as a synonym for \u201cownership\u201d such that the two words can be used interchangeably). Thus,\nfor purposes of tort law and liability insurance coverage, no ownership passes to the purchaser of a motor vehicle which requires registration under the [MVA] until (1) the owner executes, in the presence of a person authorized to administer oaths, an assignment and warranty of title on the reverse of the certificate of title, including the name and address of the transferee, (2) there is an actual or constructive deliveiy of the motor vehicle, and (3) the duly assigned certificate of title is delivered to the transferee.\nHayes, 276 N.C. at 640, 174 S.E.2d at 524. We acknowledge that this explicit limitation to tort and liability insurance \u201cleft open the question whether the MVA, as opposed to the UCC, would control in all circumstances.\u201d American Clipper, 311 N.C. at 162, 316 S.E.2d at 192. We conclude, however, that Plaintiffs attempt to extend Hayes to govern our risk of loss analysis here is not supported by our case law.\nPlaintiffs proposition that \u201c[n]o ownership, title, or interest\u201d passed to him as the purchaser of the mobile home because the comprehensive terms provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-72(b) had not been met might be germane to our analysis if tort law or liability insurance coverage were implicated. But see N. C. National Bank v. Robinson, 78 N.C. App. 1, 336 S.E.2d 666 (1985) (declining to apply the MVA even where the cause of action was the tort of wrongful conversion because the dispute primarily involved, \u201cnot an automobile accident case,\u201d but, rather, security interest and entrustment issues arising out of \u201ca business transaction in which the policies underlying the private UCC law [were] fully implicated\u201d). The fact that the Hayes Court expressly limited its holding to these circumstances has been emphasized by our courts on several occasions. See, e.g., id. at 9, 336 S.E.2d at 671 (recognizing that \u201c[t]he Supreme Court [in Hayes] consistently limited its holding, that the MVA title provisions applied instead of the UCC, to cases involving \u2018tort law and liability insurance coverage\u2019 \u201d); Roseboro Ford, Inc. v. Bass, 77 N.C. App. 363, 366, 335 S.E.2d 214, 216 (1985) (emphasizing this limitation of Hayes and concluding that while, \u201cas between vendor and vendee, . . . the vendee does not acquire \u2018valid owner\u2019s liability insurance\u2019 \u201d until the vendor transfers or assigns legal title to the vendee, neither \u201cHayes [n]or the general rule concerning liability insurance . . . controlling on the [issue] of collision insurance coverage here\u201d). While none of our cases distinguishing Hayes address the exact risk of loss issue here \u2014 most deal with conflicting security interests and have applied Article 9 of the UCC over the ownership requirements of the MVA \u2014 various principles articulated therein, often citing Hayes itself, support our view that the UCC\u2019s sales provisions control the instant dispute. See, e.g., American Clipper, 311 N.C. at 151, 316 S.E.2d at 186 (applying the UCC to resolve conflicting security interests in a consignment transaction involving manufacturer, dealer, lender, and buyer of a recreational vehicle, based, in part, on pre-Code reliance on \u201cthe general law of sales, bailment and entrustment\u201d in similar transactions).\nOur Supreme Court in American Clipper revisited its earlier opinion in Hayes and explained that Hayes did acknowledge the waning importance of title under the UCC, see American Clipper, 311 N.C. at 161, 316 S.E.2d at 192; see also Hayes, 276 N.C. at 632, 174 S.E.2d at 518 (\u201cThe most basic departure from previous law which is found in the Uniform Commercial Code is the abandonment of the concept of title as a tool for resolving sales problems.\u201d), but applied the MVA\u2019s title transfer provisions over the UCC\u2019s general position that the rights and liabilities of the parties to a sales transaction are defined \u201cirrespective of title to the goods,\u201d see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-401 (2009) (\u201cUnless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest and even though a document of title is to be delivered at a different time or place ....\u201d). The Court noted that propriety of the Hayes decision lies in the relationship of the insurance companies involved to the nature of the action, as the situation affected \u201cthe rights of parties not privy to the sales transaction itself.\u201d American Clipper, 311 N.C. at 161, 316 S.E.2d at 192; see also Robinson, 78 N.C. App. at 9-11, 336 S.E.2d at 671-72 (distinguishing Hayes's application of the MVA\u2019s \u201cpublic regulations,\u201d where \u201cthe rights of the parties were directly dependent upon when legal title to a vehicle passed, and neither party had been privy to the actual sale of the vehicle,\u201d from the UCC\u2019s displacement of the MVA \u201cwhen automobiles are used as collateral and are held in inventory for sale\u201d and \u201cissues of security interests and priorities\u201d among parties actually involved in the various transactions are involved).\nWhile neither American Clipper nor Robinson, both applying the UCC on their facts, are sufficiently on point to control the outcome of this case, these principles are instructive. Thus, where this case presents no issue as to tort liability or automobile liability insurance coverage, and deals with the rights and obligations of the parties directly involved in the sales transaction at issue, their obligations \u201crevolve around their relationships as commercial actors.\u201d Robinson, 78 N.C. App. at 10, 336 S.E.2d at 672. As such, this case involves a business transaction which fully implicates the policies underlying the private UCC law. See id. As our predecessor cases observed in the context of motor vehicle security interests, \u201cthe title transfer provisions of the MVA were not designed to resolve the kind of question here presented.\u201d American Clipper, 311 N.C. at 163, 316 S.E.2d at 193. Thus, the UCC, which supplanted traditional concepts of title as affecting the transfer of interest in and ownership of goods, and the sales provisions codified thereunder, properly resolve the risk of loss contest here. Moreover, Plaintiff\u2019s suggestion that, pursuant to Hayes, section 20-72 controls, not only the transfer ownership of motor vehicles, but also the interests therein generally \u2014 a position that is nowhere articulated in Hayes \u2014 is untenable in light of our courts\u2019 several decisions that have distinguished Hayes and analyzed various types of interests in motor vehicles under the UCC.\nThis Court\u2019s decision in Roseboro Ford provides further support for applying the UCC in the particular case where the risk of loss in a motor vehicle sales transaction is at issue. In that case, involving an insurance carrier hoping to avoid its obligations to a purchaser of collision \u2014 not liability-insurance under Hayes' proposition that title to the vehicle had not been transferred. See Roseboro Ford, 77 N.C. App. 363, 335 S.E.2d 214. Because the \u201ccontroversy [t]here [did] not involve liability insurance coverage,\u201d Hayes did not control to add further conditions to the MVA\u2019s general definition of \u201cowner,\u201d within N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01(26), on the date of the accident. Id. at 366, 335 S.E.2d at 216; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01(26) (2009) (defining \u201cowner\u201d as \u201c[a] person holding the legal title to a vehicle, or in the event a vehicle is the subject of a chattel mortgage or an agreement for the conditional sale or lease thereof or other like agreement, with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement, and with the immediate right of possession vested in the mortgagor, conditional vendee or lessee, said mortgagor, conditional vendee or lessee\u201d).\nAs owner of the vehicle as defined in G.S. 20-4.01(26), [the purchaser] had an insurable interest in the subject matter to be insured. As a general rule, \u201canyone has an insurable interest in property who derives a benefit from its existence or would suffer loss from its destruction.\u201d 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobile Insurance, Section 42 (1980). Pursuant to G.S. 25-2-509(3) risk of loss passes to the buyer upon receipt of the automobile. Bass had obligated himself by contract to comply with the terms of the agreement. Following the accident he could not have simply returned the damaged car and walked away.\nRoseboro Ford, 77 N.C. App. at 367, 335 S.E.2d at 216 (emphasis added).\nSimilarly, Plaintiff in this case was the \u201cowner\u201d of the motor vehicle on the date the mobile home was destroyed by fire, within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01(26). Pursuant to section 25-2-509(3) of the UCC, the risk of loss passed to Plaintiff from the merchant-seller Defendant on Plaintiff\u2019s receipt of the goods or otherwise, on tender of delivery, which occurred simultaneously due to the \u201cas is where is\u201d nature of the parties\u2019 agreement. For, at the time the parties executed the sales agreement, Plaintiff accepted the mobile home at its then-current location, and Defendant concurrently made tender of delivery. Plaintiff thus received delivery of home \u201cas is where is\u201d and obtained possession and control over it. Thus, the risk of loss fell squarely upon Plaintiff when the contract was made. Plaintiff thereupon stood to benefit from the home\u2019s existence or suffer loss from its destruction and, accordingly, had an insurable interest in the mobile home.\nWe briefly address Plaintiff\u2019s contention that at the time of the parties\u2019 agreement on 17 November 2007, Defendant did not have the right to sell him the mobile home in the first place because it did not pay consideration to Vanderbilt until 19 November 2007 and had not been issued a certificate of title from Oakwood. However, Plaintiffs reliance on the common law of contracts fails to consider the UCC\u2019s effect on that sales agreement, which was also characterized as an \u201cas is/where is\u201d contract. We reject Plaintiffs argument that the date of payment between Defendant and Vanderbilt and delivery of the certificate of title were material to the finality of that transaction, which was specifically described in the closing agreement between Defendant and Vanderbilt as a \u201cclosed\u201d and \u201ccomplete\u201d sale on the \u201ceffective sale date\u201d of \u201cNovember 15, 2007\u201d pursuant to various provisions of the UCC and the MVA. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-1-201(29) (2009) (defining \u201cpurchase\u201d as a \u201ctaking by sale, lease, discount, negotiation ... or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-106(1) (2009) (\u201cA \u2018sale\u2019 consists in the passing of title from the seller to buyer for a price[,]\u201d which, under \u00a7 25-2-401, occurs \u201cat the time and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods.\u201d); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-75 (\u201cWhen the transferee of a vehicle registered under [the MVA] is . . . [a] dealer who is licensed under Article 12 of this Chapter and who holds the vehicle for resale[,]\u201d such as Defendant in this case, \u201cthe transferee shall not be required to register the vehicle nor forward the certificate of title to the Division [of Motor Vehicles] . ...\u201d).\nIn conclusion, we hold that Defendant had the right and authority to sell the mobile home it had purchased from Oakwood/Vanderbilt and that Plaintiff, not Defendant, bore the loss of the mobile home when it was destroyed by fire on 22 November 2007. Thus, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment awarding Plaintiff $22,000 plus interest at the legal rate and direct that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant.\nReversed.\nJudges McGEE and BRYANT concur.\n. While N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-75 excepts a dealer-transferee, such as Defendant in the transaction between it and Vanderbilt, from executing a reassignment and warranty of title to a subsequent transferee \u201cwho has the option of cancelling the transfer of the vehicle within 10 days of delivery of the vehicle\u201d until \u201cthe end of that period,\u201d the three-day cancellation period between Plaintiff and Defendant in this case had expired just prior to the destruction of the mobile home. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-75 (2009). Thus, this section does not alter our analysis.", "type": "majority", "author": "BEASLEY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Carpenter & Flake, PLLC, by Jeffery K. Carpenter, for PlaintiffAppellee.", "Gordon, Hicks and Floyd, P.A., by Charles L. Hicks, Jr., for Defendant-Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DOUGLAS SINGLETARY, III, Plaintiff v. P & A INVESTMENTS, INC. d/b/a ANDY\u2019S MOBILE HOME AND LAND SALES, Defendant\nNo. COA10-1089\n(Filed 7 June 2011)\n1. Uniform Commercial Code\u2014 mobile homes \u2014 goods\u2014not a part of real estate\nMobile homes are generally goods in North Carolina, and, given the trial court\u2019s findings on severability and relocation, the mobile home in this case was personal property under the Uniform Commercial Code and not a part of the real estate.\n2. Uniform Commercial Code\u2014 mobile home \u2014 risk of loss\u2014 controlled by UCC\nThe risk of loss for a mobile home that burned during a sale was controlled by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) rather than the North Carolina Motor Vehicle Act. Under the UCC, plaintiff was the owner of the vehicle when it was destroyed.\n3. Motor Vehicles\u2014 mobile home \u2014 completion of sale \u2014 right to resell\nDefendant had the right to sell plaintiff a mobile home even though defendant had not paid consideration and the certificate of title had not been issued at the time of the agreement between defendant and plaintiff. Plaintiff, not defendant, bore the loss of the mobile home when it burned.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 5 May 2010 by Judge W. Erwin Spainhour in Anson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 February 2011.\nCarpenter & Flake, PLLC, by Jeffery K. Carpenter, for PlaintiffAppellee.\nGordon, Hicks and Floyd, P.A., by Charles L. Hicks, Jr., for Defendant-Appellant." }, "file_name": "0469-01", "first_page_order": 479, "last_page_order": 491 }