{ "id": 4078455, "name": "LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS, DIANON SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiffs v. CINDY CACCURO and LAKEWOOD PATHOLOGY ASSOCIATES, INC. D/B/A PLUS DIAGNOSTICS, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Caccuro", "decision_date": "2011-06-21", "docket_number": "No. COA10-877", "first_page": "564", "last_page": "574", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "212 N.C. App. 564" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "670 S.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642370 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/670/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "611 S.E.2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632622 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182", "parenthetical": "quoting Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 364, 348 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1986)" }, { "page": "183" }, { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/611/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 832", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "834" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916410 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 96", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99", "parenthetical": "quoting Better Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Davis, 120 N.C. App. 498, 501, 462 S.E.2d 832, 834 (1995)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 589", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918770 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594", "parenthetical": "quoting Better Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Davis, 120 N.C. App. 498, 501, 462 S.E.2d 832, 834 (1995)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0589-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 S.E.2d 145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2503554, 2505549, 2506449, 2504725, 2507263 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0343-03", "/nc/332/0343-05", "/nc/332/0343-02", "/nc/332/0343-01", "/nc/332/0343-04" ] }, { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524907 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 S.E.2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3796481 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "600 S.E.2d 881", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "887" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 N.C. App. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8410703 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/166/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 U.S. 462", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6205101 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476", "parenthetical": "quoting Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320, 90 L. Ed. at 104, 66 S. Ct. at 160" }, { "page": "543", "parenthetical": "quoting Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320, 90 L. Ed. at 104, 66 S. Ct. at 160" }, { "page": "2184", "parenthetical": "quoting Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320, 90 L. Ed. at 104, 66 S. Ct. at 160" }, { "page": "477" }, { "page": "543" }, { "page": "2184" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/471/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 848", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "848-49" }, { "page": "849" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12168694 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522161 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 91", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" }, { "page": "93", "parenthetical": "recognizing \"powerful public interest of a forum state in protecting its citizens against out-of-state tortfeasors\" where defendant committed fraud upon North Carolina corporation without physically coming into this State" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 N.C. App. 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527715 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607-08" }, { "page": "608" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/76/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192-94" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525651 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430-33" }, { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 S.E.2d 230", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522505 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 U.S. 286", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11306135 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" }, { "page": "501" }, { "page": "567" }, { "page": "366" }, { "page": "292" }, { "page": "498" }, { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/444/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 U.S. 310", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6157001 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "102", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "158", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "320" }, { "page": "104" }, { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/326/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 S.E.2d 766", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767, 768", "parenthetical": "holding N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4(5) (d) applied when bill was sent from defendant's out-of-state office to plaintiff, and check was drawn on plaintiff's North Carolina bank account and mailed to defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524324 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667, 668-69", "parenthetical": "holding N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4(5) (d) applied when bill was sent from defendant's out-of-state office to plaintiff, and check was drawn on plaintiff's North Carolina bank account and mailed to defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 651", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655" }, { "page": "655" }, { "page": "655" }, { "page": "656", "parenthetical": "explaining that North Carolina has legitimate interest in establishment and operation of enterprises and trade within its borders and protection of its residents in making of contracts with persons and agents who enter the State for that purpose" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524368 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 S.E.2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553662 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 S.E.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320", "parenthetical": "quoting Pope v. Pope, 38 N.C. App. 328, 331, 248 S.E.2d 260, 262 (1978)" }, { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11238795 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27", "parenthetical": "quoting Pope v. Pope, 38 N.C. App. 328, 331, 248 S.E.2d 260, 262 (1978)" }, { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 N.C. App. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4163145 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/194/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" }, { "page": "51" }, { "page": "49" }, { "page": "49" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11217279 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140-41" }, { "page": "145" }, { "page": "143" }, { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 S.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527372 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 14, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" }, { "page": "786" }, { "page": "786" }, { "page": "786" }, { "page": "786" }, { "page": "786-87" }, { "page": "787" }, { "page": "787" }, { "page": "787" }, { "page": "787", "parenthetical": "\"Lack of action by defendant in a jurisdiction is not now fatal to the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4734507 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" }, { "page": "365" }, { "page": "366" }, { "page": "367" }, { "page": "367" }, { "page": "367-68" }, { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8472795 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693", "parenthetical": "quoting Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 364, 348 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1986)" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he right of immediate appeal of an adverse ruling as to jurisdiction over the person, under [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-277(b)], is limited to rulings on 'minimum contacts' questions, the subject matter of Rule 12(b)(2).\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571503 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he right of immediate appeal of an adverse ruling as to jurisdiction over the person, under [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-277(b)], is limited to rulings on 'minimum contacts' questions, the subject matter of Rule 12(b)(2).\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(5)(d)" }, { "page": "(5)", "parenthetical": "d" }, { "page": "(5)", "parenthetical": "c" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1104, "char_count": 26636, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.719567370958748e-08, "percentile": 0.2963139935957656 }, "sha256": "c3335c2a0763eb0afa10ec3ab6f601482499f0143517cd61d3dfbf4a816a7a87", "simhash": "1:0bbff5e6304fb75a", "word_count": 4219 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:12:23.503415+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEPHENS and McCULLOUGH concur." ], "parties": [ "LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS, DIANON SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiffs v. CINDY CACCURO and LAKEWOOD PATHOLOGY ASSOCIATES, INC. D/B/A PLUS DIAGNOSTICS, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nDefendant Cindy Caccuro appeals from an order denying her motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because the trial court\u2019s unchallenged findings of fact support its conclusion that (1) the exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies the requirements of our State\u2019s long-arm statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4 (2009), and (2) Caccuro had sufficient minimum contacts with the State to satisfy the requirements of due process, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order.\nFacts\nPlaintiffs Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings (\u201cLabCorp\u201d) and Dianon Systems, Inc., a subsidiary of LabCorp, filed a complaint on 12 June 2009, an amended complaint on 6 October 2009, and a second amended complaint on or about 22 February 2010 against Caccuro, a former LabCorp employee, and Lakewood Pathology Associates, Inc. d/b/a/ PLUS Diagnostics, Caccuro\u2019s new employer. Plaintiffs asserted claims for relief against Caccuro for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, and unfair competition. With respect to PLUS Diagnostics, plaintiffs asserted claims for tortious interference with contract and unfair competition.\nPlaintiffs alleged in their second amended complaint that, from February 2006 through November 2008, Caccuro worked for LabCorp as a Special Development Executive (\u201cSDE\u201d). In this capacity, she was responsible for developing new accounts and servicing existing accounts in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and the surrounding areas. According to the second amended complaint, Caccuro, during her employment, developed relationships with LabCorp customers and had access to LabCorp\u2019s highly confidential and proprietary information, including customer lists, pricing, marketing practices, methods of operation, and the needs and requirements of LabCorp\u2019s customers.\nPlaintiffs alleged that after Caccuro terminated her employment in November 2008, she went to work for PLUS Diagnostics, a direct competitor of LabCoip, and violated the terms of the Non-Solicitation/ Confidentiality Agreement (\u201cNon-Solicitation Agreement\u201d) she had executed with LabCorp. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that Caccuro had unlawfully retained confidential and proprietary materials belonging to LabCorp and had solicited the business of a particular LabCorp customer for whom she had primary responsibility while a LabCorp employee.\nPlaintiffs further alleged that on or about 2 June 2009, Caccuro called LabCorp\u2019s client services office, falsely represented herself as being a customer of LabCorp, and provided the customer\u2019s LabCorp account number in order to obtain confidential LabCorp information relating to that customer that she could then use to solicit the customer\u2019s business for her new employer. Plaintiffs asserted that Caccuro was acting on behalf of PLUS Diagnostics when she violated the terms of the Non-Solicitation Agreement and that she and PLUS Diagnostics \u201cfraudulently sought LabCorp\u2019s confidential information to gain an unfair competitive advantage for the benefit of PLUS Diagnostics and to the detriment of LabCorp.\u201d\nIn response to the complaint and first amended complaint, both Caccuro, a Pennsylvania resident, and PLUS Diagnostics, a nonresident corporation, filed joint motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). After plaintiffs filed the second amended complaint, only Caccuro filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied Caccuro\u2019s motion to dismiss, finding that jurisdiction over Caccuro is proper pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-75.4(5)(c), (d), and (e) and comports with due process requirements. Caccuro appealed from that order to this Court.\nDiscussion\nAlthough the order denying Caccuro\u2019s motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order, her appeal of the trial court\u2019s Rule 12(b)(2) decision is proper under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-277(b) (2003). See Love v. Moore, 305 N.C. 575, 581, 291 S.E.2d 141, 146 (1982) (\u201c[T]he right of immediate appeal of an adverse ruling as to jurisdiction over the person, under [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-277(b)], is limited to rulings on \u2018minimum contacts\u2019 questions, the subject matter of Rule 12(b)(2).\u201d).\n\u201cA two-step analysis applies in determining whether a North Carolina court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: \u2018First, the transaction must fall within the language of the State\u2019s \u201clong-arm\u201d statute. Second, the exercise of jurisdiction must not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.\u2019 \u201d Banc of Am. Secs. LLC v. Evergreen Int\u2019l Aviation, Inc., 169 N.C. App. 690, 693, 611 S.E.2d 179, 182 (2005) (quoting Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 364, 348 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1986)). It is well established that the long-arm statute is \u201cto be liberally construed in favor of finding personal jurisdiction, subject only to due process considerations.\u201d Dataflow Cos. v. Hutto, 114 N.C. App. 209, 212, 441 S.E.2d 580, 582 (1994).\nWhen this Court reviews a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, it considers \u201c \u2018whether the findings of fact by the trial court are supported by competent evidence in the record ....\u2019\u201d Banc of Am., 169 N.C. App. at 694, 611 S.E.2d at 183 (quoting Replacements, Ltd. v. MidweSterling, 133 N.C. App. 139, 140-41, 515 S.E.2d 46, 48 (1999)). The trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are subject to de novo review. Cambridge Homes of N.C. Ltd. P\u2019ship v. Hyundai Constr., Inc., 194 N.C. App. 407, 417, 670 S.E.2d 290, 298 (2008). Since Caccuro does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings, the only question is whether the findings support the court\u2019s conclusions of law.\nI. Long-Arm Statute\nWe first address Caccuro\u2019s contention that the court erred in determining that jurisdiction is proper under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-75.4(5)(d), the subsection of the long-arm statute that provides:\nA court of this State having jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction over a person served in an action pursuant to Rule 4(j), Rule 4(jl), or Rule 4Q3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure under any of the following circumstances:\n(5) Local Services, Goods or Contracts. \u2014 In any action which:\nd. Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value shipped from this State by the plaintiff to the defendant on his order or direction[.]\nThe trial court found and Caccuro does not dispute that during Caccuro\u2019s employment with LabCorp, plaintiffs made money payments to Caccuro by sending checks to her. There is no question that these checks constituted \u201ca \u2018thing of value\u2019 within the meaning of the long-arm statute.\u201d Hiwassee Stables, Inc. v. Cunningham, 135 N.C. App. 24, 27, 519 S.E.2d 317, 320 (1999) (quoting Pope v. Pope, 38 N.C. App. 328, 331, 248 S.E.2d 260, 262 (1978)).\nThe question in this case is whether those \u201cthings of value\u201d were sent from North Carolina at Caccuro\u2019s request. Caccuro insists that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-75.4(5)(d) is inapplicable because she did not specifically direct that plaintiffs send the checks from North Carolina. This Court, however, rejected that argument in Cherry Bekaert & Holland v. Brown, 99 N.C. App. 626, 394 S.E.2d 651 (1990).\nThe defendant in Cherry Bekaert withdrew from the plaintiff\u2019s partnership in North Carolina, moved to Alabama, and demanded money owed to him. Id. at 631, 394 S.E.2d at 655. In support of his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the defendant argued that the plaintiff could have chosen to pay him from accounts in states other than North Carolina, but that the plaintiff \u2014 and not the defendant \u2014 chose to use a North Carolina account. Id. at 630, 394 S.E.2d at 655. According to the defendant, \u201ca strict interpretation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-75.4(5)(d) . . . would require personal jurisdiction only if defendant\u2019s \u2018order or direction\u2019 specifies that plaintiff ship from this state a thing of value.\u201d Id. at 631, 394 S.E.2d at 655.\nThis Court rejected the defendant\u2019s argument as \u201cuntenable in light of our courts\u2019 policy of liberally and broadly construing statutory jurisdictional requirements in favor of finding personal jurisdiction.\u201d Id. The Court held that \u201c[b]ecause defendant directed plaintiff to send his monies to him in Alabama and plaintiff distributed the money from North Carolina, the money paid is \u2018shipped from this State by the plaintiff to . . . defendant on his order or direction.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-75.4(5)(d)). In other words, under Cherry Bekaert, all that is required to satisfy N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-75.4(5)(d) is that a defendant demanded money from the plaintiff and the plaintiff paid the money from North Carolina.\nAccording to the trial court\u2019s unchallenged findings of fact in this case, Caccuro chose to enter into a Non-Solicitation Agreement and two Compensation Plans providing for her receipt of compensation payments' from LabCorp. Under Cherry Bekaert, because Caccuro contracted to receive compensation from LabCorp and directed LabCorp to send her checks to her out of state, and LabCorp distributed the checks from North Carolina, the checks were \u201c \u2018shipped from this State by the plaintiff to . . . defendant on his order or direction.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-75.4(5)(d)).\nWe, therefore, hold that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact adequately support its conclusion that personal jurisdiction over Caccuro is proper under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-75.4(5)(d). See Hiwassee Stables, 135 N.C. App. at 27, 519 S.E.2d at 320 (holding N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4(5)(d) applied when \u201cdefendants directed plaintiffs to send payment due them to Florida, and plaintiffs distributed the payment from North Carolina ... in the form of a check drawn on a bank in this state\u201d); ETR Corp. v. Wilson Welding Serv., Inc., 96 N.C. App. 666, 667, 668-69, 386 S.E.2d 766, 767, 768 (1990) (holding N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4(5) (d) applied when bill was sent from defendant\u2019s out-of-state office to plaintiff, and check was drawn on plaintiff\u2019s North Carolina bank account and mailed to defendant). Consequently, we need not address Caccuro\u2019s arguments regarding N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-75.4(5) (c) or (e).\nII. Minimum Contacts\nOur inquiry now turns to whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies the requirements of due process. Under the due process clause, there must exist \u201ccertain minimum contacts [between the non-resident defendant and the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u201d Int\u2019l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted).\nAs our Supreme Court has stated, \u201c[i]n each case, there must be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; the unilateral activity within the forum state of others who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant will not suffice.\u201d Tom Togs, 318 N.C. at 365, 348 S.E.2d at 786. Instead, the \u201crelationship between the defendant and the forum must be \u2018such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 501, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567 (1980)).\nThe United States Supreme Court has recognized two bases for finding sufficient minimum contacts: specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction exists when \u201cthe controversy arises out of the defendant\u2019s contacts with the forum state.\u201d Id. at 366, 348 S.E.2d at 786. General jurisdiction may be asserted over a defendant \u201ceven if the cause of action is unrelated to defendant\u2019s activities in the forum as long as there are sufficient \u2018continuous and systematic\u2019 contacts between defendant and the forum state.\u201d Replacements, 133 N.C. App. at 145, 515 S.E.2d at 51 (quoting Fraser v. Littlejohn, 96 N.C. App. 377, 383, 386 S.E.2d 230, 234 (1989)). General jurisdiction is not at issue in this case. Specific jurisdiction is the only possible basis for finding minimum contacts here.\nWith respect to specific jurisdiction, \u201cthe relationship among the defendant, the forum state, and the cause of action is the essential foundation for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction.\u201d Tom Togs, 318 N.C. at 366, 348 S.E.2d at 786. Our courts consider the following factors in determining whether minimum contacts exist: (1) the quantity of the contacts, (2) the nature and quality of the contacts, (3) the source and connection of the cause of action to the contacts, (4) the interest of the forum state, and (5) the convenience to the parties. Replacements, 133 N.C. App. at 143, 515 S.E.2d at 49.\n\u201cAlthough a contractual relationship between a North Carolina resident and an out-of-state party alone does not automatically establish the necessary minimum contacts with this State, nevertheless, a single contract may be a sufficient basis for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction if it has a substantial connection with this State.\u201d Tom Togs, 318 N.C. at 367, 348 S.E.2d at 786. In Tom Togs, the Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence of a substantial connection with this State when (1) \u201cthe defendant made an offer to plaintiff whom defendant knew to be located in North Carolina,\u201d (2) the \u201c[pjlaintiff accepted the offer in North Carolina,\u201d and (3) the \u201c[defendant was . . . aware that the contract was going to be substantially performed in this State.\u201d Id., 348 S.E.2d at 786-87. Based on this evidence, the Court ruled that the \u201cdefendant purposefully availed itself of the protection and benefits of [North Carolina\u2019s] laws.\u201d Id., 348 S.E.2d at 787.\nIn this case, the trial court made the following unchallenged findings of fact pertinent to specific jurisdiction. Caccuro chose to enter into employment contracts with LabCorp, a corporation with its headquarters, research centers, laboratories, and patient service centers all located in North Carolina., The corporate Human Resources Division and National Sales Administration, Corporate Payroll, and other corporate offices related to Caccuro\u2019s employment were all located in Burlington, North Carolina. As a LabCorp SDE, Caccuro was trained to sell and was responsible for selling medical laboratory testing \u2014 testing that was to be performed exclusively in North Carolina laboratories. In other words, Caccuro was selling North Carolina services.\nCaccuro entered into not one but three agreements with LabCorp: the Non-Solicitation Agreement and the two Compensation Plans. As the trial court found, each of these agreements \u201ccontemplated continuing obligations between Caccuro and LabCorp\u2019s North Carolina headquarters and were performed in substantial part in North Carolina.\u201d Pursuant to the Non-Solicitation Agreement, Caccuro\u2019s employment was administered from North Carolina. Both of the Compensation Plans signed by Caccuro directed that the plans be sent to the National Sales Administration in North Carolina. In addition, under the agreements, Caccuro received employee benefits and technical marketing assistance that were administered from LabCorp\u2019s North Carolina headquarters.\nWith respect to compensation, Caccuro received at least 100 checks for base salary and incentive compensation that were drawn from LabCorp\u2019s North Carolina bank account. The checks and Caccuro\u2019s W-2 forms list North Carolina addresses for LabCorp. In addition to compensation checks, Caccuro received business and expense reimbursement on checks drawn on LabCorp\u2019s North Carolina account.\nCaccuro also had the benefit of a company-provided vehicle, which was coordinated through the Corporate Fleet Department in North Carolina. Caccuro was allowed to use the vehicle not only for business purposes, but also for personal use in exchange for a $75.00 per month deduction from her paycheck by Corporate Payroll in North Carolina. She, in essence, was paying for part of the vehicle in North Carolina. Insurance on the vehicle was obtained by the Corporate Risk Management Department also located in North Carolina.\nAs for communications, during her employment, Caccuro made at least three phone calls to LabCorp\u2019s Information Technology Service Desk in North Carolina. She also sent a fax to LabCorp headquarters in North Carolina.\nWe further observe that the lawsuit arises directly out of one of the contracts that had a substantial connection with this State, the Non-Solicitation Agreement. Plaintiffs allege that Caccuro breached that Agreement \u2014 an agreement Caccuro knew was being administered in North Carolina and would result in benefits to Caccuro being provided from North Carolina.\nIn Century Data Systems, Inc. v. McDonald, 109 N.C. App. 425, 430-33, 428 S.E.2d 190, 192-94 (1993), even though the four defendant employees had either worked in or visited North Carolina as part of their employment with the plaintiff, this Court focused not on their prior physical presence in North Carolina, but on the fact that the defendants had entered into employment contracts with the plaintiff in North Carolina, and the lawsuit arose out of the defendants\u2019 violation of their covenants not to compete.\nThe Court in Century Data Systems observed that \u201c \u2018[i]n light of modern business practices, the quantity, or even the absence of actual physical contacts with the forum state, merely constitutes a factor to be considered and is not of controlling weight.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 433, 428 S.E.2d at 194 (quoting Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Barnett, 76 N.C. App. 605, 607-08, 334 S.E.2d 91, 93 (1985)). Not only had the defendants in Century Data Systems entered into contracts with the plaintiff in North Carolina, but, as in this case, \u201c[t]he cause of action arose directly out of [defendants\u2019] activities for which [they were] compensated by [the plaintiff].\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Tire King of Greensboro, Inc., 80 N.C. App. 129, 133, 341 S.E.2d 65, 68 (1986)).\nThe defendants in Century Data Systems entered into contracts with a North Carolina-based company under which they were compensated for their sales and service of the plaintiff\u2019s products outside of North Carolina and were provided payroll services out of plaintiff\u2019s North Carolina office. Id. at 431-32, 428 S.E.2d at 194. The Court also pointed out that the defendants \u201crelied on plaintiff\u2019s North Carolina offices for training, meetings, issuance of pay checks, receipt of purchase orders and even shipment of goods.\u201d Id. at 433, 428 S.E.2d at 194. According to the Court, each of the defendants \u201cwas engaged in an ongoing relationship with the plaintiff,\u201d a North Carolina company. Id. In light of Century Data Systems, we hold that, given the trial court\u2019s findings of fact in this case, the trial court did not err in determining that Caccuro had the necessary minimum contacts with this State.\nCaccuro argues, however, that she had no more contacts with North Carolina than those held insufficient to comport with due process in Curvcraft, Inc. v. J.C.F. & Assocs., 84 N.C. App. 450, 352 S.E.2d 848 (1987). In Curvcraft, the defendant was a Maryland corporation that acted as a distributor for the North Carolina-based plaintiff for about four months. Id. at 450-51, 352 S.E.2d at 848-49. The services to be performed under the contract were to occur outside North Carolina, and the defendant\u2019s only contacts with North Carolina were phone calls, three shipments of office chairs from the plaintiff in North Carolina to the defendant, and the receipt of a single commission check. Id. at 452, 352 S.E.2d at 849.\nHere, by contrast, the parties\u2019 contractual relationship lasted nearly three years, Caccuro sold laboratory testing that was performed in North Carolina, and at least 100 checks were sent from LabCorp in North Carolina to Caccuro, in addition to all the other contacts found by the trial court. Curvcraft is not analogous.\nNext, we note that even when the trial court concludes that a defendant has \u201cpurposefully established minimum contacts within the forum State,\u201d the court must also consider those contacts \u201cin light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with \u2018fair play and substantial justice.\u2019 \u201d Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 543, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (1985) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320, 90 L. Ed. at 104, 66 S. Ct. at 160). In making this determination, our courts have considered (1) the interest of North Carolina and (2) the convenience of the forum to the parties. Replacements, 133 N.C. App. at 143, 515 S.E.2d at 49. See also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 543, 105 S. Ct. at 2184 (noting that courts should consider \u201c \u2018the forum State\u2019s interest in adjudicating the dispute\u2019 \u201d and \u201c \u2018the plaintiff\u2019s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief\u2019 \u201d (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 498, 100 S. Ct. at 564)).\nWith respect to North Carolina\u2019s interest, \u201c \u2018[i]t is generally conceded that a state has a \u201cmanifest interest\u201d in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors.\u2019 \u201d Century Data Sys., 109 N.C. App. at 433, 428 S.E.2d at 194 (quoting Tom Togs, 318 N.C. at 367, 348 S.E.2d at 787). \u201cThis principle holds true where . . . defendants are alleged to have purposefully violated their contracts to engage in open competition with the plaintiff.\u201d Id. at 433-34, 428 S.E.2d at 194. See also Cherry Bekaert, 99 N.C. App. at 633, 394 S.E.2d at 656 (explaining that North Carolina has legitimate interest in establishment and operation of enterprises and trade within its borders and protection of its residents in making of contracts with persons and agents who enter the State for that purpose); Ciba-Geigy Corp., 76 N.C. App. at 608, 334 S.E.2d at 93 (recognizing \u201cpowerful public interest of a forum state in protecting its citizens against out-of-state tortfeasors\u201d where defendant committed fraud upon North Carolina corporation without physically coming into this State).\nIn addition, here, as in Tom Togs, 318 N.C. at 367-68, 348 S.E.2d at 787, the parties provided that North Carolina law would apply to any dispute. \u201cWhile choice of law clauses are not determinative of personal jurisdiction, they express the intention of the parties and are a factor in determining whether minimum contacts exist and due process was met.\u201d Tejal Vyas, LLC v. Carriage Park Ltd. P\u2019ship, 166 N.C. App. 34, 41, 600 S.E.2d 881, 887 (2004), aff\u2019d per curiam, 359 N.C. 315, 608 S.E.2d 751 (2005).\nAs for the convenience of the parties, it appears that litigating in North Carolina would not be convenient for Caccuro, but, by the same token, litigation in another state would not be convenient for plaintiffs. The findings of fact do \u201cnot indicate that any one State would be more convenient to all of the parties and witnesses than another.\u201d Banc of Am., 169 N.C. App. at 700, 611 S.E.2d at 186. See Climatological Consulting Corp. v. Trattner, 105 N.C. App. 669, 675, 414 S.E.2d 382, 385 (holding that although three of defendant\u2019s material witnesses were located in Washington, D.C., \u201cthis fact is counterbalanced by the fact that plaintiff\u2019s materials and offices are located here],]\u201d and \u201cNorth Carolina is a convenient forum to determine the rights of the parties\u201d), disc. review denied, 332 N.C. 343, 421 S.E.2d 145 (1992).\nFinally, with respect to the fairness of this State\u2019s exercising jurisdiction, our courts have observed that \u201c [i]t is well settled . . . \u2018that a defendant need not physically enter North Carolina in order for personal jurisdiction to arise.\u2019 \u201d Williamson Produce, Inc. v. Satcher, 122 N.C. App. 589, 594, 471 S.E.2d 96, 99 (1996) (quoting Better Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Davis, 120 N.C. App. 498, 501, 462 S.E.2d 832, 834 (1995)). See also Tom Togs, 318 N.C. at 368, 348 S.E.2d at 787 (\u201cLack of action by defendant in a jurisdiction is not now fatal to the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction.\u201d). Moreover, Caccuro has not \u201cpointed to any disparity between plaintiff[s] and [herself] which might render the exercise of personal jurisdiction over [her] unfair.\u201d Id.\nWe, therefore, hold that the contacts in this case rose to the level satisfying the constitutional minimum under the due process clause necessary in order to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Caccuro. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court denying Caccuro\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nAffirmed.\nJudges STEPHENS and McCULLOUGH concur.\n. In their briefs, the parties state that PLUS Diagnostics agreed to withdraw its jurisdictional challenges in January 2010. PLUS Diagnostics is not aparty to this appeal.\n. We note that although Caccuro argues about specific and general jurisdiction with respect to the application of the long-arm statute, the question of specific or general jurisdiction relates to due process and the minimum contacts analysis.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Patricia T. Bartis and Matthew H. Mall, for plaintiffs-appellees.", "Robinson & Lawing, LLP, by Michael L. Robinson and H. Stephen Robinson; and Winston & Strawn LLP, by William G. Miossi, for defendant-appellant Cindy Caccuro." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS, DIANON SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiffs v. CINDY CACCURO and LAKEWOOD PATHOLOGY ASSOCIATES, INC. D/B/A PLUS DIAGNOSTICS, Defendants\nNo. COA10-877\n(Filed 21 June 2011)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 interlocutory orders and appeals\u2014 personal jurisdiction\nAlthough defendant\u2019s appeal from an order denying her motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction was from an interlocutory order, it was proper under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-277(b).\n2. Jurisdiction\u2014 personal \u2014 long-arm statute\nThe trial court did not err in a breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, and unfair competition case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction based on the long arm statute under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-75.4(5)(d). All that was required to satisfy the statute was that defendant demanded money from plaintiff, and plaintiff paid the money from North Carolina.\n3. Jurisdiction\u2014 minimum contacts \u2014 due process\nThe trial court did not err by concluding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfied the minimum contacts requirement of due process.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 21 April 2010 by Judge J.B. Allen, Jr. in Alamance County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 January 2011.\nParker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Patricia T. Bartis and Matthew H. Mall, for plaintiffs-appellees.\nRobinson & Lawing, LLP, by Michael L. Robinson and H. Stephen Robinson; and Winston & Strawn LLP, by William G. Miossi, for defendant-appellant Cindy Caccuro." }, "file_name": "0564-01", "first_page_order": 574, "last_page_order": 584 }