{ "id": 4078862, "name": "In the Matter of: A.J. M.-B", "name_abbreviation": "In re A.J. M.-B", "decision_date": "2011-06-21", "docket_number": "No. COA10-1350", "first_page": "586", "last_page": "596", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "212 N.C. App. 586" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "668 S.E.2d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642233 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/668/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "663 S.E.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641562 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870" }, { "page": "870" }, { "page": "870" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/663/0866-01" ] }, { "cite": "601 S.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631663 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538", "parenthetical": "\"]a]ppealable final orders include 'fa]ny order of disposition after an adjudication that a juvenile is delinquent or undisciplined.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/601/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "694 S.E.2d 753", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153021 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.E.2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632", "parenthetical": "quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S.Ct. at 1379, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 261" }, { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135935 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209", "parenthetical": "quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S.Ct. at 1379, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 261" }, { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 346", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11357050 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 325", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12122945 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "308", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 U.S. 266", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9508406 ], "weight": 14, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268" }, { "page": "259" }, { "page": "260" }, { "page": "270" }, { "page": "260", "parenthetical": "internal quotation and citation omitted" }, { "page": "272" }, { "page": "261" }, { "page": "273" }, { "page": "262" }, { "page": "272-73" }, { "page": "261-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/529/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 S.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374", "parenthetical": "internal quotation and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8955191 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212", "parenthetical": "internal quotation and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" }, { "page": "905" }, { "page": "21" }, { "page": "906" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 S.E.2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779", "parenthetical": "quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 905 (1968)" }, { "page": "779" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570136 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706", "parenthetical": "quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 905 (1968)" }, { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 282", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 N.C. App. 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549484 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/32/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 N.C. App. 670", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4161479 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/193/0670-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 S.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "905" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562301 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4160078 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489" }, { "page": "489" }, { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 S.E.2d 606", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-223 (2001); 2 N.C.P.I.-Crim. 230.30 (1999)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8955618 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-223 (2001); 2 N.C.P.I.-Crim. 230.30 (1999)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-223", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 815", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "819", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11435150 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 S.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 N.C. App. 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4165942 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/196/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 S.E.2d 66", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67", "parenthetical": "\"D.M.B. . . . appeals his 27 November 2007 adjudication and disposition . . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 N.C. App. 775", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4166522 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "776", "parenthetical": "\"D.M.B. . . . appeals his 27 November 2007 adjudication and disposition . . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/196/0775-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 N.C. App. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8411266 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277", "parenthetical": "\"]a]ppealable final orders include 'fa]ny order of disposition after an adjudication that a juvenile is delinquent or undisciplined.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/166/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "797" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 N.C. App. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523493 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/57/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "685 S.E.2d 117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Taylor, 57 N.C. App. 213, 214, 290 S.E.2d 797, 797 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 905, "char_count": 23289, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.343491648654732e-08, "percentile": 0.48099039750966177 }, "sha256": "6ffb2f96190825fa4350ee448c49c6a4ad996cd16c1e57ccd953079f08b90865", "simhash": "1:0de7b678733f5c60", "word_count": 3822 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:12:23.503415+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ERVIN and THIGPEN concur." ], "parties": [ "In the Matter of: A.J. M.-B." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge.\nA.J. M.-B. (\u201cAndy\u201d) appeals the trial court\u2019s Juvenile Orders dismissing the case of resisting a public officer and ordering Andy\u2019s commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (\u201cDJJDP\u201d) for placement in a youth development center. We reverse in part and affirm in part.\nI. BACKGROUND\nAndy was adjudicated delinquent on two counts of breaking and entering and two counts of larceny after breaking and entering. On 25 June 2008, the trial court ordered a Level 2 disposition for Andy. As part of the disposition, Andy was required to cooperate with placement in a wilderness program or any out-of-home placement deemed necessary by the treatment team. Andy was also placed on supervised probation for twelve months. Andy was required, by the conditions of his probation, to remain on good behavior, to attend school regularly, and not to violate any laws.\nOn 5 December 2008, the trial court adjudicated Andy delinquent on a charge of simple assault. As a result, the trial court revoked Andy\u2019s probation and ordered him committed to the DJJDP for placement in a youth development center for a minimum period of six months, and thereafter, for an indefinite period. On 23 December 2009, Andy was released from the youth development center and placed on post-release supervision.\nOn 20 January 2010, Andy was charged with resisting a public officer. Andy\u2019s case was heard on 5 March 2010 in Cabarrus County District Court. At the adjudication hearing, Andy did not present any evidence. At the close of all of the evidence, Andy moved to dismiss the charge of resisting a public officer, and the trial court denied the motion. The trial court then adjudicated Andy delinquent for resisting a public officer. That same day, Kelly Stoy, a juvenile court counselor, filed a Motion for Review and asked the trial court to revoke Andy\u2019s post-release supervision. The trial court continued Andy\u2019s case for disposition.\nOn 30 April 2010, the trial court found that after Andy was placed on post-release supervision, he \u201ccommitted another offense, missed school without an excuse, and was suspended for the remainder of the school year.\u201d During disposition, the trial court dismissed the case of resisting a public officer because, according to the court, it would serve \u201cno useful purpose\u201d since Andy had violated the terms of his post-release supervision. The trial court ordered Andy\u2019s commitment to the DJJDP for placement in a youth development center for a minimum of ninety (90) days and, thereafter, a period not to exceed his 18th birthday. Andy appeals.\nII. INITIAL MATTER\nAs an initial matter, we address whether Andy\u2019s appeal is properly before us. At disposition, Andy orally entered notice of appeal. However, since the trial court dismissed the case of resisting a public officer, the exact nature of Andy\u2019s appeal to this Court is unclear. Acknowledging these circumstances, on 14 December 2010, Andy filed a petition for writ of certiorari, asking this Court to hear the merits of his appeal from the adjudication order.\n\u201c \u2018An adjudication of delinquency is not a final order\u2019 \u201d and is therefore not appealable. In re M.L.T.H., \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, \u2014, 685 S.E.2d 117, 121 (2009) (quoting In re Taylor, 57 N.C. App. 213, 214, 290 S.E.2d 797, 797 (1982)); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2602. In juvenile delinquency cases, appeal may only be taken from final orders, including an \u201corder of disposition after an adjudication that a juvenile is delinquent].]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2602 (2009). See also In re A.L., 166 N.C. App. 276, 277, 601 S.E.2d 538, 538 (2004) (\u201c]a]ppealable final orders include \u2018fa]ny order of disposition after an adjudication that a juvenile is delinquent or undisciplined.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2602 (2003) (emphasis added)).\nAt a disposition hearing, \u201c]t]he court may dismiss the case].]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2501(d) (2009). Generally, when a juvenile appeals a final disposition order, he also effectively appeals the underlying adjudication order. See generally In re D.M.B., 196 N.C. App. 775, 776, 676 S.E.2d 66, 67 (2009) (\u201cD.M.B. . . . appeals his 27 November 2007 adjudication and disposition . . . .\u201d). The reason for also appealing the adjudication order is because \u201c]t]he delinquency history level for a delinquent juvenile is determined by calculating the sum of the points assigned to each of the juvenile\u2019s prior adjudications and to the juvenile\u2019s probation status].]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2507 (a) (2009) (emphasis added).\nIn the instant case, on 30 April 2010, the trial court entered a disposition and commitment order ordering Andy\u2019s commitment to the DJJDP for placement in a youth development center. On the same day, the trial court entered a separate order, dismissing the case of resisting a public officer. The trial court stated:\nGiven that the juvenile is returning to a youth development center for violating the terms of his post-release supervision, further action regarding the resisting a public officer [charge] would serve no useful purpose. As a disposition on the March 5, 2010 adjudication, the court does hereby dismiss the case of resisting a public officer.\nTherefore, although the trial court dismissed the case of resisting a public officer, the adjudication order was not dismissed. The only way to appeal the adjudication of a case that was dismissed is to appeal the final order of disposition. Therefore, Andy\u2019s appeal is properly before us, and his writ of certiorari is denied.\nIII. MOTION TO DISMISS\nAndy argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of resisting a public officer at his adjudication hearing. We agree.\n\u201cWe review a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo\u201d In re S.M.S., 196 N.C. App. 170, 171, 675 S.E.2d 44, 45 (2009) (citation omitted). \u201cWhere the juvenile moves to dismiss, the trial court must determine \u2018whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, . . . and (2) of [juvenile\u2019s] being the perpetrator of such offense.\u2019 \u201d In re Heil, 145 N.C. App. 24, 28, 550 S.E.2d 815, 819 (2001) (quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)).\nA. Resisting a Public Officer\n\u201cIf any person shall willfully and unlawfully resist, delay or obstruct a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his office, he shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-223 (2009).\n[T]he elements of [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-223] are as follows:\n1) that the victim was a public officer;\n2) that the [juvenile] knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the victim was a public officer;\n3) that the victim was discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his office;\n4) that the [juvenile] resisted, delayed, or obstructed the victim in discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his office; and\n5) that the [juvenile] acted willfully and unlawfully, that is inten tionally and without justification or excuse.\nState v. Dammons, 159 N.C. App. 284, 294, 583 S.E.2d 606, 612 (2003) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-223 (2001); 2 N.C.P.I.\u2014Crim. 230.30 (1999)). In the instant case, the parties do not dispute that there was substantial evidence of the first, second, and fourth elements of the offense.\n\u201cThe third element of the offense presupposes lawful conduct of the officer in discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his office.\u201d State v. Sinclair, 191 N.C. App. 485, 489, 663 S.E.2d 866, 870 (2008). \u201cDecisions of this Court recognize the right to resist illegal conduct of an officer.\u201d State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 512, 173 S.E.2d 897, 905 (1970). Flight from a lawful stop may provide probable cause to arrest an individual for violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-223. State v. Washington, 193 N.C. App. 670, 668 S.E.2d 622 (2008). However, flight from an unlawful stop cannot be used to establish probable cause for an arrest. State v. Williams, 32 N.C. App. 204, 231 S.E.2d 282 (1977).\nB. Investigatory Stops\n\u201cAs the starting point in our analysis, we first determine whether the encounter between [Andy] and [the officer] was consensual or whether [the officer] was attempting to effectuate an investigatory stop.\u201d Sinclair, 191 N.C. App. at 489, 663 S.E.2d at 870. In the instant case, the State concedes that the officer, Officer Michael Price (\u201cOfficer Price\u201d) of the Concord Police Department, was attempting an investigatory stop.\nAn investigatory stop is lawful and proper as long as the officer\u2019s actions are both \u201c \u2018justified at its inception, and... reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.\u2019 \u201d State v. Thompson, 296 N.C. 703, 706, 252 S.E.2d 776, 779 (1979) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 905 (1968)). \u201cBefore a law enforcement officer can conduct a brief investigatory stop, \u2018the officer must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.\u2019 \u201d Washington, 193 N.C. App. at 682, 668 S.E.2d at 629 (quoting State v. McArn, 159 N.C. App. 209, 212, 582 S.E.2d 371, 374 (2003) (internal quotation and citation omitted)).\nThe standard set forth in Terry for testing the conduct of law enforcement officers in effecting a warrantless \u201cseizure\u201d of an individual is that \u201cthe police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.\u201d\nThompson, 296 N.C. at 706, 252 S.E.2d at 779 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906). Therefore, in order to determine whether Officer Price lawfully discharged or attempted to discharge a duty of his office, we must determine whether he had reasonable suspicion to stop Andy.\nC. Reasonable Suspicion\n1. Anonymous Tip Identifying a Particular Person\nThe instant case is similar to Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2000). In J.L., there was also an anonymous caller who called law enforcement to express concern about a young person possessing a firearm. However, in J.L., the caller identified the person carrying the gun as \u201ca young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt... carrying a gun.\u201d Id. at 268, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 259. When the officers in J.L. approached a group of black males at a bus stop and observed the defendant in a plaid shirt, they frisked the defendant and seized a gun from his pocket without observing anything suspicious. Id. The Supreme Court found that, in J.L.,\nthe anonymous tip, with nothing more, did not constitute a reasonable suspicion and therefore did not justify the subsequent frisk of defendant. The Court reasoned that \u201cunlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated, \u2018an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant\u2019s basis of knowledge or veracity.\u2019 \u201d [J.L., 529 U.S.] at 270, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 260 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 308 (1990) (citations omitted)).\nIn re D.D., 146 N.C. App. 309, 322-23, 554 S.E.2d 346, 355 (2001).\nIn the instant case, at 1:00 p.m. on 20 January 2010, an anonymous caller reported to law enforcement \u201ctwo juveniles in Charlie district. . . walking, supposedly with a shotgun or a rifle\u201d in \u201can open field behind a residence.\u201d A dispatcher relayed the information to Officer Price, who exited his patrol vehicle and proceeded to an open field behind the residence, \u201cabout forty feet from where the initial call was called in.\u201d Officer Price was joined by two other officers, but they did not observe anyone in the field. The other officers then directed Officer Price to look to his right. When Officer Price looked to his right, he observed two juveniles \u201cpop their heads out of the wood line\u201d and look at him. However, neither of the juveniles was carrying firearms.\nWhen Officer Price called out to the juveniles to stop, they \u201cturned to the right and ran to the right around the [residence].\u201d As Officer Price approached the residence, an unidentified female was standing outside. Officer Price testified that she asked him, \u201cAre you looking for the two juveniles?\u201d When Officer Price replied in the affirmative, the female told him that she observed two juveniles run down the road.\nThe Supreme Court in J.L. found that \u201can anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant\u2019s basis of knowledge or veracity.\u201d 529 U.S. at 270, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 260 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Therefore, information regarding a specific person possessing a gun, without observing anything suspicious, did not provide reasonable suspicion to justify the frisk of the defendant. In the instant case, the anonymous tip alone, without more evidence, also did not establish reasonable suspicion. Therefore, since the State did not present sufficient specific, articulable facts to warrant the stop, Andy\u2019s subsequent detention and arrest were not justified.\n2. Knowledge of Concealed Criminal Activity\n[Reasonable suspicion does not arise merely from the fact that the individual met the description given to the officers. As the Court stated in J.L.,\nan accurate description of a subject\u2019s readily observable location and appearance is of course reliable in this limited sense: It will help the police correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse. Such a tip, however, does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.\nState v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 209, 539 S.E.2d 625, 632 (2000) (quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S.Ct. at 1379, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 261).\nAt the 5 March 2010 juvenile hearing, Officer Price testified as follows:\nQ. [the State]. What was the description of the juveniles you were looking for?\nA. [Officer Price]. I\u2019m not exactly sure exactly what the description was. I don\u2019t \u2014 right now, but they said two juveniles in the area of the field behind the house we got the call at.\nQ. But you had a description at the time?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And did [Andy] match that description?\nA. Yes.\nAndy\u2019s counsel requested that Officer Price\u2019s testimony be stricken since he could not provide the court with a description of the juveniles. The court overruled the objection. On cross-examination, Andy\u2019s counsel engaged in the following colloquy with Officer Price:\nQ. Officer, did you take the call from \u2014 about these juveniles?\nA. Excuse me?\nQ. Did you speak to the caller about these juveniles?\nA. No, I did not.\nQ. Do you know who the caller was?\nA. No.\nQ. Do you know if this was a source that the department had relied upon in previous cases?\nA. No.\nQ. When you first saw [Andy] here, did you see a rifle or shotgun?\nA. No.\nQ. Thank you, sir.\nAndy\u2019s counsel then argued to the court that \u201c[a]ll you have here ... is a case where multiple officers ... are out here on an anonymous phone call about a rifle and a shotgun.\u201d He further argued that the officers saw two juveniles looking at them, but that there was no testimony that they looked frightened or that they looked suspicious in any way, and they were not even in the field but were apparently near the field. Furthermore, Officer Price did not see Andy in the field, nor did he observe Andy carrying a firearm of any type, and the anonymous tipster had no knowledge of concealed criminal activity. See Hughes, 353 N.C. at 209, 539 S.E.2d at 632.\nThe Supreme Court suggested in J.L. that there may be \u201ccircumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even without a showing of reliability.\u201d 529 U.S. at 273, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 262. However, the Court expressly held that a mere allegation that a person is carrying a firearm, without more, is insufficient to justify such an exception to the rule that officers must have reasonable suspicion before conducting an investigatory stop. Id. at 272-73, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 261-62.\nIn the instant case, the description of the juveniles\u2019 location merely helped to identify them. Such a tip, however, did not show that the tipster had knowledge of concealed criminal activity. There is no evidence in the record showing circumstances under which the danger alleged by the anonymous tipster \u2014 that two juveniles walking and carrying a firearm \u2014 justified Andy\u2019s subsequent detention without a showing that the tipster had knowledge of concealed criminal activity.\nD. Insufficient Evidence\nReasonable suspicion requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality. The State\u2019s evidence, regarding the anonymous tip or Andy\u2019s actions at the time of the stop, was not sufficient to indicate any reliability as to the criminal activity alleged in the anonymous tip. The anonymous tip and subsequent corroboration by Officer Price merely established the reliability of the tip to identify a \u201cdeterminate person.\u201d Since there were insufficient indicia of reliability as to any criminal activity by Andy established through the tip or subsequent corroboration by Officer Price, the State presented insufficient evidence that Officer Price acted lawfully \u201cin discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his office.\u201d Sinclair, 191 N.C. App. at 489, 663 S.E.2d at 870. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court\u2019s denial of Andy\u2019s motion to dismiss, and reverse the trial court\u2019s 5 March 2010 order adjudicating him delinquent for the charge of resisting a public officer.\nIV. REVOCATION OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION\nAndy also argues that the trial court\u2019s order revoking his post-release supervision should be reversed and remanded because \u201c[t]he new adjudication was a significant part of the basis\u201d for revoking his post-release supervision and the trial court dismissed the case of resisting a public officer. We disagree.\nInitially, we note that in the portion of his brief addressing this argument, Andy failed to include \u201ca concise statement of the applicable standard(s) of review for [this] issue[.]\u201d N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2010). Furthermore, he failed to include \u201ccitations of the authorities upon which [he] relies.\u201d Id. Therefore, we dismiss Andy\u2019s argument. Id.\nHowever, even assuming arguendo Andy\u2019s argument is properly presented, the trial court\u2019s revocation of his post-release supervision was proper.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2516 (2009) states, in pertinent part:\n(b) If the court determines by the greater weight of the evidence that the juvenile has violated the terms of post-release supervision, the court may revoke the post-release supervision or make any other disposition authorized by this Subchapter.\n(c) If the court revokes post-release supervision, the juvenile shall be returned to the Department for placement in a youth development center for an indefinite term of at least 90 days\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2516 (2009).\nIn the instant case, there were several conditions for Andy\u2019s post-release supervision. He was required to enroll in school and attend Cabarrus County Schools. In addition, Andy agreed to abide by all of the other terms of his post-release supervision. Furthermore, Andy agreed that if a court found that he violated \u201cone or more\u201d of the terms, he could be returned to a youth development center.\nOn 30 April 2010, the trial court revoked Andy\u2019s post-release supervision because the court found that he \u201cmissed school without an excuse, and was suspended for the remainder of the school year.\u201d Therefore, even though we reverse the trial court\u2019s order adjudicating Andy delinquent for the offense of resisting a public officer, the trial court was only required to find by the greater weight of the evidence that he violated \u201cone or more\u201d of the conditions of his post-supervision release. Andy does not dispute on appeal that the greater weight of the evidence showed that he \u201cmissed school without an excuse\u201d or that he \u201cwas suspended for the remainder of the school year.\u201d \u201cThese findings are unchallenged on appeal and are therefore binding on this Court.\u201d In re D.L.H., 364 N.C. 214, 218, 694 S.E.2d 753, 755 (2010). Furthermore, these findings are sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s revocation of Andy\u2019s post-release supervision. The trial court\u2019s order revoking Andy\u2019s post-supervision release and committing him to the DJJDP for placement in a youth development center for a minimum of ninety (90) days and, thereafter, a period not to exceed his 18th birthday, is affirmed.\nV. CONCLUSION\nThe trial court\u2019s denial of Andy\u2019s motion to dismiss, and the 5 March 2010 adjudication order, are reversed. Even though the trial court dismissed the case of resisting a public officer, under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2507(a), if Andy\u2019s adjudication was not reversed, his case of resisting a public officer would affect his delinquency history level, which is determined by calculating the sum of the points assigned to each of his prior adjudications. The trial court\u2019s 30 April 2010 order revoking Andy\u2019s post-supervision release is affirmed.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part.\nJudges ERVIN and THIGPEN concur.\n. We use a pseudonym to protect the identity of the juvenile and for ease of reading.", "type": "majority", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jonathan D. Shaw, for the State.", "Mary McGullers Reece, for juvenile-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In the Matter of: A.J. M.-B.\nNo. COA10-1350\n(Filed 21 June 2011)\n1. Appeal and Error \u2014 juveniles\u2014underlying charge dismissed\u2014 adjudication not dismissed \u2014 appeal proper\nAn appeal in a juvenile matter was properly before the Court of Appeals where the trial court dismissed a charge of resisting a public officer and ordered commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Although the trial court dismissed the case of resisting a public officer, the adjudication order was not dismissed.\n2. Search and Seizure\u2014 anonymous tip \u2014 assertion of illegality\u2014 reliability\nThe denial of a juvenile\u2019s motion to dismiss a charge of resisting a public officer at the adjudication stage was reversed, along with the resulting adjudication of delinquency, where officers received an anonymous call about two juveniles walking behind a residence in an open field with a shotgun, responding officers saw two juveniles in a wood line but not in the field and not carrying a firearm, and the juveniles ran from the officers. One element of the offense presupposes lawful conduct by the officer and reasonable suspicion requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality. Since there were insufficient indicia of reliability as to any criminal activity by the juvenile, the State presented insufficient evidence that the officer acted lawfully in discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his office.\n3. Probation and Parole\u2014 post-supervision release\u2014 revoked \u2014 violation of condition\nAn order revoking a juvenile\u2019s post-release supervision was affirmed even though the underlying charge, resisting a public officer, was reversed where the juvenile had also violated an unrelated condition of his post-supervision release.\nAppeal by juvenile from orders entered 30 April 2010 by Judge William G. Hamby, Jr. in Cabarrus County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 April 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jonathan D. Shaw, for the State.\nMary McGullers Reece, for juvenile-appellant." }, "file_name": "0586-01", "first_page_order": 596, "last_page_order": 606 }