{
  "id": 4078923,
  "name": "INTEGON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff v. KELLEY PHILLIPS, TAMMY PHILLIPS, TARRAH KASEY JONES, HAILEE JONES, by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, ANDREW FINK, DONALD BURRELL PRESSLEY, and NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Defendants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Integon National Insurance v. Phillips",
  "decision_date": "2011-06-21",
  "docket_number": "No. COA10-1185",
  "first_page": "623",
  "last_page": "632",
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    {
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        {
          "page": "841",
          "parenthetical": "explaining that in construing \"other insurance\" provisions, \"[t]he key language is the phrase 'with respect to a vehicle you do not own' \""
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          "parenthetical": "\"The word 'you' . . . means the named insured and, if they live together, the named insured's spouse.\""
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          "page": "841",
          "parenthetical": "noting, in construing \"excess\" clause identical to the clauses in this case that the insurer's \"excess clause differentiates on the basis of whether the insured owns, or does not own, the vehicle\""
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      "cite": "612 S.E.2d 428",
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      "cite": "394 S.E.2d 807",
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        {
          "page": "810"
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    {
      "cite": "327 N.C. 419",
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        2494510
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      "cite": "376 S.E.2d 761",
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          "page": "764"
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      "cite": "324 N.C. 221",
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        {
          "page": "120",
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      "cite": "356 N.C. 571",
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        1511376
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      "cite": "341 N.C. 651",
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        793222,
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      "cite": "118 N.C. App. 686",
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        11920692
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        551170,
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          "page": "525",
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          "page": "525",
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        {
          "page": "614",
          "parenthetical": "\"Under North Carolina law, an automobile is not 'owned' within the meaning of an automobile liability insurance policy until the transferee obtains from the transferor a properly executed certificate assigning and warranting title.\""
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        8553403
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        {
          "page": "263"
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    {
      "cite": "539 S.E.2d 274",
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    {
      "cite": "353 N.C. 240",
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        135640
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    {
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        {
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    {
      "cite": "54 N.C. App. 551",
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      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
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        8523988
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        {
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    {
      "cite": "110 N.C. App. 278",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
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        8525372
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    {
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        {
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    {
      "cite": "295 N.C. 500",
      "category": "reporters:state",
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        8564714
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        {
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        {
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    {
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        8563605
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      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
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        {
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    {
      "cite": "226 N.C. 706",
      "category": "reporters:state",
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        8624699
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    "judges": [
      "Judges STEPHENS and ERVIN concur."
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    "parties": [
      "INTEGON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff v. KELLEY PHILLIPS, TAMMY PHILLIPS, TARRAH KASEY JONES, HAILEE JONES, by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, ANDREW FINK, DONALD BURRELL PRESSLEY, and NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Defendants"
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      {
        "text": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.\nDefendant North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Inc. appeals from the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Integon National Insurance Company. After careful review, we reverse.\nFacts\nThis case arises out of a motor vehicle accident occurring on 8 January 2007, in Monroe, North Carolina. At the time of the accident, Tarrah Kasey Jones was driving a 2006 Chevrolet vehicle, with her sister, Hailee Jones, in the passenger seat. The Jones vehicle collided with a 2005 Mercury automobile, driven by Donald Burrell Pressley, in which Mi;. Pressley\u2019s wife, Carolyn Pressley, was a passenger. As a result of the accident, Mrs. Pressley sustained fatal injuries; Mr. Pressley and Hailee Jones were also injured. It is undisputed that Tarrah Jones\u2019 negligence proximately caused the auto accident and the resulting injuries.\nAt the time of the accident, there were two automobile liability insurance policies providing coverage. Farm Bureau issued a policy to Tammy Phillips, Tarrah and Hailee Jones\u2019 mother, carrying bodily injury coverage of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. Tarrah Jones was listed as an additional driver on Mrs. Phillips\u2019 policy. The only vehicle listed on Mrs. Phillips\u2019 policy was a 2005 Honda Civic. The other policy in effect at the time of the accident was issued by Integon to Kelley Phillips, Tarrah and Hailee Jones\u2019 stepfather. This policy carried bodily injury coverage limits of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident. The Integon policy listed a 1999 Buick Century as the only covered vehicle and the only drivers listed on the policy were Mr. and Mrs. Phillips.\nThe 2006 Chevrolet being driven by Tarrah Jones on 8 January 2007 was a rental car owned by Hertz Vehicles, Inc. Mrs. Phillips had rented the car while the listed 2005 Honda Civic was out for repairs.\nClaims for personal injury were filed by Hailee Jones and Mr. Pressley, as well as a wrongful death claim by the estate of Mrs. Pressley. The wrongful death claim was settled, with Farm Bureau contributing its per person limit of $100,000 and Integon paying its per person limit of $50,000. Mr. Pressley also filed a claim to recover for his personal injuries stemming from the 8 January 2007 accident. Mr. Pressley\u2019s claim was settled for $50,000: Farm Bureau paid $33,000 and Integon paid $16,667. As a result of these settlements, Integon has paid $66,667, leaving $33,333 on its per accident coverage to be applied toward the settlement of Hailee Jones\u2019 claim; Farm Bureau has paid $133,333, leaving more than its $100,000 per person coverage limit.\nThe Integon policy issued to Mr. Phillips and the Farm Bureau policy issued to Mrs. Phillips contain identical \u201cOther Insurance\u201d clauses:\nIf there is other applicable liability insurance, we will pay only our share of the loss. Our share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all applicable limits. However, any insurance we provide for a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance.\n(Emphasis added.)\nIntegon filed a declaratory judgment action on 24 August 2009, seeking a declaration that \u201cthe automobile insurance policy issued by [Integon] to Kelley Phillips as named insured provides excess coverage over the primary coverage provided under the automobile insurance policy issued by [Farm Bureau] to Tammy Phillips as named insured for any claims arising from the [8 January 2007] accident[.]\u201d Both Integon and Farm Bureau filed motions for summary judgment in March 2010. After conducting a hearing on 19 April 2010 on the parties\u2019 cross-motions, the trial court entered an order on 8 June 2010 granting Integon\u2019s motion for summary judgment and, consequently, denying Farm Bureau\u2019s motion. Farm Bureau timely appealed to this Court.\nDiscussion\nIn this case, there is no dispute regarding the relevant facts. The sole issue is the proper interpretation(of the personal automobile insurance policies issued by Integon and Farm Bureau. The interpretation and application of insurance policy provisions to undisputed facts is a question of law, appropriately resolved on summary judgment. McGuire v. Draughon, 170 N.C. App. 422, 424 25, 612 S.E.2d 428, 430 (2005); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd\u2019s London v. Hogan, 147 N.C. App. 715, 718, 556 S.E.2d 662, 664 (2001), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 159, 568 S.E.2d 188 (2002).\nIt is well established that \u201c[a]n insurance policy is a contract to be construed under the rules of law applicable to other written contracts.\u201d Chavis v. Southern Life Ins. Co., 76 N.C. App. 481, 484, 333 S.E.2d 559, 561 (1985), aff\u2019d, 318 N.C. 259, 347 S.E.2d 425 (1986). \u201cAs with all contracts, the object of construing an insurance policy is to arrive at the insurance coverage intended by the parties when the policy was issued.\u201d Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buzz Off Insect Shield, L.L.C., 364 N.C. 1, 9, 692 S.E.2d 605, 612 (2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As the language of the policy \u201cis the clearest indicator of the parties\u2019 intentions [,]\u201d Metropolitan Prop. and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Lindquist, 120 N.C. App. 847, 851, 463 S.E.2d 574, 576 (1995), where the policy is unambiguous, \u201c[i]t must be presumed the parties intended what the language used clearly expresses, and the [policy] must be construed to mean what on its face it purports to mean[,]\u201d Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Hood, 226 N.C. 706, 710, 40 S.E.2d 198, 201 (1946) (internal citations omitted). \u201c [I]t is the duty of the court to construe an insurance policy as it is written, not to rewrite it and thus make a new contract for the parties.\u201d Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 341, 346, 152 S.E.2d 436, 440 (1967).\nWith respect to the policy\u2019s terms, our Supreme Court has explained:\n\u201cWhere a policy defines a term, that definition is to be used. If no definition is given, non-technical words are to be given their meaning in ordinary speech, unless the context clearly indicates another meaning was intended. The various terms of the policy are to be harmoniously construed, and if possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect.\u201d\nGaston County Dyeing Machine Co. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 351 N.C. 293, 299-300, 524 S.E.2d 558, 563 (2000) (quoting Woods v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 295 N.C. 500, 505-06, 246 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1978)).\nUnder the \u201cInsuring Agreement\u201d of the policies\u2019 liability coverage provisions, both Farm Bureau and Integon agree to \u201cpay damages for bodily injury or property damage for which any insured becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident.\u201d For purposes of liability coverage, an \u201cinsured\u201d is defined, in pertinent part, as:\n1. You or any family member for the ownership, maintenance or use of any auto or trailer.\n2. Any person using your covered auto.\nBoth Farm Bureau and Integon agreed at summary judgment, as well as now on appeal, that, under these terms, both policies provide liability coverage for the 8 January 2007 auto accident. The focus of the parties\u2019 dispute is their relative obligations under each policy in light of the policies\u2019 identically worded \u201cOther Insurance\u201d provisions:\nIf there is other applicable liability insurance, we will pay only our share of the loss. Our share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all applicable limits. However, any insurance we provide for a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance.\n(Emphasis added.) See generally Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 110 N.C. App. 278, 282, 429 S.E.2d 406, 409 (1993) (\u201cAn excess clause in an insurance policy \u2018generally provides that if other valid and collectible insurance covers the occurrence in question, the \u201cexcess\u201d policy will provide coverage only for liability above the maximum coverage of the primary policy or policies.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 54 N.C. App. 551, 555, 284 S.E.2d 211, 213 (1981))).\nIn construing \u201cexcess\u201d clauses, this Court has explained that \u201c[wjhere it is impossible to determine which policy provides primary coverage due to identical \u2018excess\u2019 clauses, \u2018the clauses are deemed mutually repugnant and neither . . . will be given effect.\u2019 \u201d Iodice v. Jones, 133 N.C. App. 76, 78, 514 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1999) (quoting N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hilliard, 90 N.C. App. 507, 511, 369 S.E.2d 386, 388 (1988)). Where \u201cexcess\u201d clauses are not given effect due to mutual repugnancy, the claim is \u201cprorated between the two insurers according to their respective policy limits.\u201d Hilliard, 90 N.C. App. at 511, 369 S.E.2d at 389; accord Hlasnick v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 136 N.C. App. 320, 330, 524 S.E.2d 386, 393 (\u201cWhere ... the \u2018other insurance\u2019 clauses in the policies are mutually repugnant, the claims will be prorated.\u201d), aff\u2019d in part and disc. review improvidently allowed in part, 353 N.C. 240, 539 S.E.2d 274 (2000). Thus, in this case, \u201cif the identically worded \u2018excess\u2019 clauses in the [Farm Bureau] and [Integon] policies prevent a determination of which policy provides primary [liability] coverage, a pro rata allocation of [liability] coverage ... is appropriate.\u201d Iodice, 133 N.C. App. at 78, 514 S.E.2d at 293.\nIn making the primary-excess coverage determination, the operative language in the \u201cexcess\u201d clause is the phrase \u201cvehicle you do not own.\u201d See Sitzman v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 182 N.C. App. 259, 262, 641 S.E.2d 838, 841 (2007) (explaining that in construing \u201cother insurance\u201d provisions, \u201c[t]he key language is the phrase \u2018with respect to a vehicle you do not own\u2019 \u201d). The policies define the term \u201cyou\u201d as:\n1. The \u201cnamed insured\u201d shown in the Declarations; and\n2. The spouse if a resident of the same household.\nAs Mrs. Phillips is the named insured on the Farm Bureau policy and Mr. Phillips is the named insured on the Integon policy, and each is the resident spouse of the other, they are the \u201cyou[s]\u201d referred to in the \u201cexcess\u201d clauses. See id. (\u201cThe word \u2018you\u2019 . . . means the named insured and, if they live together, the named insured\u2019s spouse.\u201d).\nThe policies also provide identical definitions for an \u201cowned\u201d vehicle:\nFor the purpose of this policy, a private passenger type auto, pickup or van shall be deemed to be owned by a person if leased:\n1. Under a written agreement to that person; and\n2. For a continuous period of at least 6 months.\nIn addition to the policies\u2019 definition, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01(26) (2009) provides that a vehicle is owned by the \u201cperson holding the legal title to a vehicle .. . .\u201d See also Gaddy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 32 N.C. App. 714, 716, 233 S.E.2d 613, 614 (1977) (\u201cUnder North Carolina law, an automobile is not \u2018owned\u2019 within the meaning of an automobile liability insurance policy until the transferee obtains from the transferor a properly executed certificate assigning and warranting title.\u201d).\nIt is undisputed in this case that Hertz, the rental agency from which Mrs. Phillips rented the 2006 Chevrolet, holds legal title to the vehicle and that neither Mr. Phillips nor Mrs. Phillips have any ownership interest in the rental car. Thus, according to the plain language of the Farm Bureau and Integon policies, the rental car is not an \u201cown[ed]\u201d vehicle for purposes of the \u201cexcess\u201d clauses. See Strickland v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 133 N.C. App. 71, 75, 514 S.E.2d 304, 305 (1999) (rejecting argument, for purposes of applying an exclusion from liability coverage, that \u201csince the rental car was a substitute for an owned vehicle, it must be considered owned by [the insured]\u201d).\nAppellees nonetheless contend that the Farm Burean policy provides primary coverage because the Hertz rental car \u201cwas a temporary substitute for the 2005 Honda, making the Hertz rental vehicle a \u2018covered auto\u2019 under the Farm Bureau policy.\u201d Appellees misinterpret the policies. There does not appear to be any dispute that the Hertz rental car was a \u201ctemporary substitute\u201d for Mrs. Phillips\u2019 listed 2005 Honda Civic and thus qualifies as a \u201ccovered auto\u201d under the Farm Bureau policy, which defines a \u201ccovered auto,\u201d in pertinent part, as:\nAny auto or trailer not owned by you while used as a temporary substitute for any other vehicle described in this definition which is out of normal use because of its:\na. breakdown;\nb. repair;\nc. servicing;\nd. loss; or\ne. destruction.\n(Second and third emphasis added.) Indeed, Farm Bureau, in its appellate brief, concedes that \u201cMrs. Phillips rented th[e] [2006 Chevrolet] to temporarily replace the 2005 Honda Civic vehicle covered under the Farm Bureau policy, as that vehicle was out of use due to repair.\u201d Farm Bureau\u2019s policy\u2019s \u201cexcess\u201d clause, however, does not differentiate between primary and excess coverage based on whether the vehicle at issue is a \u201ccovered auto,\u201d but, rather, whether the vehicle is \u201cown[ed]\u201d by the named insured or his or her resident spouse. See Sitzman, 182 N.C. App. at 263, 641 S.E.2d at 841 (noting, in construing \u201cexcess\u201d clause identical to the clauses in this case that the insurer\u2019s \u201cexcess clause differentiates on the basis of whether the insured owns, or does not own, the vehicle\u201d). Thus the determinative factor under these policies is ownership of the vehicle, not its status as a covered auto.\nAs neither Mr. Phillips nor Mrs. Phillips owned the Hertz rental car, the Farm Bureau policy provides excess liability coverage with respect to Hailee Jones\u2019 personal injury claim. Similarly, under the terms of Integon\u2019s identically worded \u201cexcess\u201d clause, it purports to provide primary coverage. Nevertheless, relying on this Court\u2019s holding in Iodice, appellees argue that identical \u201cexcess\u201d clauses \u201care not always mutually repugnant.\u201d In Iodice, 133 N.C. App. at 78, 514 S.E.2d at 293, this Court held that \u201cidentically worded\u201d excess clauses were not mutually repugnant because they \u201cd[id] not have identical meanings . ...\u201d In reaching this conclusion, the Iodice Court reasoned:\nBecause \u201cyou\u201d is expressly defined as the named insured and spouse, the Nationwide \u201cexcess\u201d clause reads: \u201c[A]ny insurance we provide with respect to a vehicle [Penney] do[es] not own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance.\u201d It follows that Nationwide\u2019s UIM coverage is not \u201cexcess\u201d over other collectible insurance (and is, therefore, primary), because the vehicle in which the accident occurred is owned by Penney. The GEICO \u201cexcess\u201d clause reads: \u201c[A]ny insurance we provide with respect to a vehicle [Iodice\u2019s mother] do[es] not own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance.\u201d It follows that GEICO\u2019s UIM coverage is \u201cexcess\u201d (and is, therefore, secondary), because the vehicle in which the accident occurred is not owned by Iodice\u2019s mother. Accordingly, Nationwide provides primary UIM coverage in this case.\nId. at 78-79, 514 S.E.2d at 293.\nHere, in contrast to Iodice, the Farm Bureau and Integon policies have \u201cidentical meanings.\u201d As the \u201cyou\u201d referenced in the policies is defined as the named insured or his or her resident spouse, the Farm Bureau excess clause reads: \u201c[A]ny insurance we provide for a vehicle [Mrs. Phillips or her spouse, Mr. Phillips,] do not own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance.\u201d Similarly, the Integon excess clause provides: \u201c[A]ny insurance we provide for a vehicle [Mr. Phillips or his spouse, Mrs. Phillips,] do not own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance.\u201d Since neither Mr. Phillips nor Mrs. Phillips owned the Hertz rental car, the Farm Bureau and Integon policies, unlike the policies at issue in Iodice, have identical meanings when applied to the facts in this case.\nDue to the \u201cexcess\u201d clauses being identically worded, it is \u201cimpossible ... to determine which policy is primary,\u201d and thus the \u201cexcess\u201d clauses must be deemed mutually repugnant, with neither clause being given effect. Aetna Cas. and Surety Co., 110 N.C. App. at 282, 429 S.E.2d at 409; accord Alliance Mutual Ins. Co. v. N.Y. Central Ins. Co., 70 N.C. App. 140, 142, 318 S.E.2d 524, 525 (1984) (\u201cWhere, as here, the excess insurance clauses are identical in language, we do not see how we can hold the coverage of either company is primary or excess.\u201d). As a result, the claim must be \u201cprorated between the two insurers according to their respective policy limits.\u201d Hilliard, 90 N.C. App. at 511, 369 S.E.2d at 389; see N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bost, 126 N.C. App. 42, 52, 483 S.E.2d 452, 459 (\u201cBoth policies have \u2018Other Insurance\u2019 provisions which are identical, and therefore, the provisions nullify each other, leaving Farm Bureau and defendant Allstate to share the Ezzelle settlement on a pro rata basis.\u201d), disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 138, 492 S.E.2d 25 (1997); Onley v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 118 N.C. App. 686, 690, 456 S.E.2d 882, 884 (holding identical \u201cexcess\u201d clauses were \u201cmutually repugnant\u201d and thus neither could be given effect with regard to UIM benefits; both policies stated that coverage provided with respect to vehicle not owned by insured was excess over any other collectible insurance), disc. review denied, 341 N.C. 651, 462 S.E.2d 514 (1995); Alliance Mutual Ins. Co., 70 N.C. App. at 142, 318 S.E.2d at 525 (\u201cWhen... neither policy is primary or excess, we must hold that the [\u201cexcess\u201d] clauses are mutually repugnant and the coverage must be prorated.\u201d).\nAppellees further argue that the \u201cpurpose behind North Carolina\u2019s Financial Responsibility Act \u2014 to compensate innocent victims\u201d \u2014 is \u201cbest served if this Court upholds the ruling of the Trial Court.\u201d The Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act (\u201cFRA\u201d), N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 20-279.1 through -279.39 (2009), \u201cis remedial in nature and is \u2018to be liberally construed\u2019 \u201d in order to accomplish its \u201c \u2018avowed purpose\u2019 \u201d of \u201c \u2018compensate[ing] the innocent victims of financially irresponsible motorists.\u2019 \u201d Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pennington, 356 N.C. 571, 573, 573 S.E.2d 118, 120 (2002) (quoting Sutton v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 325 N.C. 259, 265, 382 S.E.2d 759, 763 (1989)). This goal, our Supreme Court has explained, \u201cis best served when the statute is interpreted to provide the innocent victim with the fullest possible protection.\u201d Proctor v. N. C. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 324 N.C. 221, 225, 376 S.E.2d 761, 764 (1989). Thus, to effectuate FRA\u2019s purpose, \u201cwhen the terms of [a] policy conflict with the statute, the provisions of the statute will prevail.\u201d Wilson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 327 N.C. 419, 424, 394 S.E.2d 807, 810 (1990).\nAppellees, however, do not suggest that any provisions of the policies at issue here are in conflict with the FRA \u2014 indeed, in all material respects, the Farm Bureau and Integon policies are identical and have been approved by the North Carolina Rate Bureau. Rather, appellees simply contend that any holding reversing the trial court is inconsistent with the purpose of the FRA because \u201c[a] finding that the Farm Bureau policy is primary and the Integon policy excess provides a more complete recovery for Hailee Jones.\u201d While we certainly sympathize with appellees\u2019 position, the policies do not conflict with the provisions of the FRA, and this Court is not free to rewrite the parties\u2019 policies. Allstate Ins. Co., 269 N.C. at 346, 152 S.E.2d at 440.\nAlthough the trial court did not explicitly conclude that Farm Bureau\u2019s policy provided primary liability coverage over Integon\u2019s excess coverage, that determination is implicit in the trial court\u2019s granting Integon\u2019s motion for summary judgment. As Farm Bureau\u2019s policy does not provide primary coverage for Hailee Jones\u2019 personal injury claim, but, rather, the claim must be prorated according to the limits specified in the policies, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Integon. Accordingly, we are bound to reverse the trial court\u2019s summary judgment order.\nReversed.\nJudges STEPHENS and ERVIN concur.\n. We note that defendants Donald Burrell Pressley, Kelley Phillips, Tammy Phillips, Tarrah Kasey Jones, and Hailee Jones, through her guardian ad litem, Andrew Fink, joined with Integon (\u201cappellees\u201d) in filing a \u201cjoint appellees\u2019 \u201d brief with this Court.\n. The Farm Bureau and Integon insurance policies are identical in all material respects. Unless specified otherwise, all quotations in this opinion reflect the language of both policies.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Bennett & Guthrie, P.L.L.C., by Rodney A. Guthrie and Roberta B. King, for plaintiff-appellee Integon National Insurance Company.",
      "McAngus, Goudelock & Cowrie, P.L.L.C., by John T. Jeffries and James D. McAlister, for defendant-appellant North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Inc.",
      "Fink & Hayes, P.L.L.G., by Andrew Fink, for Andrew Fink, guardian ad litem for defendant-appellee Hailee Jones."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "INTEGON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff v. KELLEY PHILLIPS, TAMMY PHILLIPS, TARRAH KASEY JONES, HAILEE JONES, by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, ANDREW FINK, DONALD BURRELL PRESSLEY, and NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Defendants\nNo. COA10-1185\n(Filed 21 June 2011)\nInsurance\u2014 motor vehicles \u2014 identical excess clauses\nThe trial court erred in a declaratory judgment action arising out of a motor vehicle accident by granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff insurance company. Defendant insurance company\u2019s policy did not provide primary coverage for the personal injury claim, but instead, the claim was prorated between the two insurers according to the limits specified in the policies because the \u201cexcess\u201d clauses of both companies were identically worded and deemed mutually repugnant.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 8 June 2010 by Judge Mark E. Klass in Union County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 March 2011.\nBennett & Guthrie, P.L.L.C., by Rodney A. Guthrie and Roberta B. King, for plaintiff-appellee Integon National Insurance Company.\nMcAngus, Goudelock & Cowrie, P.L.L.C., by John T. Jeffries and James D. McAlister, for defendant-appellant North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Inc.\nFink & Hayes, P.L.L.G., by Andrew Fink, for Andrew Fink, guardian ad litem for defendant-appellee Hailee Jones."
  },
  "file_name": "0623-01",
  "first_page_order": 633,
  "last_page_order": 642
}