{ "id": 4079045, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RAYMOND LORENZO BURKE, JR.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Burke", "decision_date": "2011-06-21", "docket_number": "No. COA10-1084", "first_page": "654", "last_page": "660", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "212 N.C. App. 654" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642288 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "concealed expiration date on the thirty-day tag justified the stop" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/669/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 N.C. App. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4163083 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "concealed expiration date on the thirty-day tag justified the stop" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/194/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-79.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(e)" }, { "page": "(e)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "490 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 605100 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "7" }, { "page": "10", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/490/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 210", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6196728 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" }, { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" }, { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "1994" }, { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549311 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" }, { "page": "441" }, { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" }, { "parenthetical": "where the thirty-day tag was faded out to the point of being illegible, stop was reasonable" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523227 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715" }, { "parenthetical": "where the thirty-day tag was faded out to the point of being illegible, stop was reasonable" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "666 S.E.2d 205", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641846 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208", "parenthetical": "quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/666/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 S.E.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640657 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645" }, { "page": "645", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/658/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 47", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179718 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" }, { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.C. App. 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4160748 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687", "parenthetical": "quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/192/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 L. Ed. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "528 U.S. 119", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9476180 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" }, { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/528/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149866 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" }, { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 804", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918308 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0804-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529089, 2531429, 2529931, 2532669, 2530045 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0166-03", "/nc/334/0166-05", "/nc/334/0166-04", "/nc/334/0166-02", "/nc/334/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" }, { "page": "279", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526070 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" }, { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 605100 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" }, { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/490/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10 (1989)" }, { "page": "70" }, { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549311 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10 (1989)" }, { "page": "441-42" }, { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0437-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 696, "char_count": 15942, "ocr_confidence": 0.731, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.12984791777435672 }, "sha256": "db6de66ba08eda31d0030e0095f7d58f51f0f24d3bbc5962f717020bc15c41af", "simhash": "1:7862211a6634ac4c", "word_count": 2607 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:12:23.503415+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge McCULLOUGH concurs.", "Chief Judge MARTIN dissents with a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RAYMOND LORENZO BURKE, JR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nCharlotte-Mecklenburg Police Officer J.A. Allman (Officer Allman) was on patrol on 16 February 2008 when he observed Raymond Lorenzo Burke, Jr. (Defendant) driving an Infiniti automobile (the vehicle) with a thirty-day license tag. Based on Officer Allman\u2019s previous observation of current 30-day tag numbers being issued at the time, he believed there was a possibility that the thirty-day tag on the vehicle was fictitious, and he stopped Defendant to investigate. After stopping Defendant, Officer Allman asked for Defendant\u2019s registration and informed Defendant of his reason for the stop. When Defendant opened his glove box to retrieve his registration, Officer Allman viewed a handgun in the glove box. Officer Allman asked Defendant to step out of the vehicle. He then arrested Defendant for carrying a concealed weapon. When Officer Allman asked Defendant if Defendant had anything else Officer Allman should know about, Defendant replied that he also had ecstasy and cocaine. Officer Allman searched Defendant and confiscated six ecstasy pills and 1.9 grams of cocaine from Defendant\u2019s left front pocket. Officer Allman then removed the handgun, which was loaded, from the glove box.\nDefendant was indicted on 7 July 2008 for possession of a Schedule I controlled substance (ecstasy), possession of cocaine, and carrying a concealed weapon. Defendant filed a motion to suppress on 12 November 2008, arguing that Officer Allman\u2019s stop of Defendant\u2019s vehicle was illegal because Officer Allman lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop. Defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained by Officer Allman as a result of the stop. Defendant further argued that he was questioned in violation of his Miranda rights, and that the search of his person was unlawful. Defendant\u2019s motion was heard on 9 January 2009. Officer Allman was the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing.\nAt the suppression hearing, Officer Allman specifically testified that: \u201cThe tag on [Defendant\u2019s] car appeared to be old and worn. The [number on the] 30-day tag appeared to be much lower than what was given out at the time. I believed the tag to be fictitious.\u201d The number on Defendant\u2019s thirty-day tag was 14949790. Officer Allman testified that he didn\u2019t \u201crecall\u201d what number range he \u201cwould have found to be an acceptable range.\u201d Officer Allman testified that it was dark, but that he was in a well-lit area and the tag was readable. When questioned about the condition of the tag, Officer Allman testified that though there was ample space available, there was no documentation on the arresting affidavit regarding the tag being old or worn. Officer Allman also did not indicate to Defendant that the tag was dirty or worn. It was not until later, when Officer Allman completed a more detailed report, that he indicated the tag was worn and dirty. Officer Allman testified that he could not recall the level of dirt on the tag. He testified that the only reason given on the arresting affidavit was the \u201clow number\u201d of the tag and that both the number and the condition of the tag contributed to his suspicion, but that \u201cthe number was the most important.\u201d Officer Allman was asked if the tag \u201cwas a proper size, properly placed in a proper location, all of those things?\u201d He answered: \u201cThat\u2019s correct.\u201d Officer Allman testified that the tag was not faded, and that he could read the numbers. The following colloquy occurred at the suppression hearing as Defendant\u2019s counsel questioned Officer Allman:\nQ If the tag had the number that it did, the 14949790 but didn\u2019t have any dirt or wear, would you have still stopped Mr. Burke\u2019s vehicle?\nA Yes.\nQ If the tag had the amount of dirt and wear that you observed and had a number that was consistent with what you are used to seeing at that time, would you have stopped the vehicle just because of the dirt?\nA No.\nQ So but for the number, you wouldn\u2019t have stopped the vehicle?\nA Based on the dirt and wear and the number.\nQ If the number had been what you were used to seeing at that time, you wouldn\u2019t have stopped it.\nA That\u2019s correct.\nQ But you would have stopped it with no dirt or wear at all, if it was clean as a whistle based upon the number that you saw?\nA That\u2019s correct.\nOfficer Allman testified that he observed nothing else suspicious or illegal regarding Defendant\u2019s vehicle or the operation of the vehicle at the time. He also testified there was no specific number range that he would have found acceptable and that there was nothing else out of the ordinary regarding the tag. Despite Officer Allman\u2019s testimony regarding the absence of any other suspicious or illegal activity, when Defendant\u2019s attorney asked: \u201cBut you thought there was a possibility that Mr. Burke\u2019s tag was fictitious?[,]\u201d Officer Allman said, \u201cI wondered about the possibility of the tag being fictitious. That\u2019s correct.\u201d After reviewing Defendant\u2019s documentation of the tag, Officer Allman testified that he found nothing fictitious about the tag.\nIn an order entered 18 August 2009, the trial court denied Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. After the denial of his motion to suppress, Defendant pled guilty to felony possession of a Schedule 1 controlled substance, felony possession of cocaine, and misdemeanor carrying a concealed weapon. Defendant\u2019s charges were consolidated for judgment and Defendant was sentenced on 24 August 2009 to four to five months in prison, which was suspended. Defendant received eighteen months of supervised probation. Defendant expressly reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-979(b), Defendant appeals.\nIn Defendant\u2019s sole argument, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Officer Allman lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a valid stop of Defendant\u2019s vehicle. We agree.\nThe scope of appellate review of a denial of a motion to suppress \u201cis strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge\u2019s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge\u2019s ultimate conclusions of law.\u201d State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982).\nThis Court has previously stated that \u201ca police officer may conduct a brief investigative stop of a vehicle where justified by specific, articulable facts which give rise to a reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct.\u201d State v. Hudson, 103 N.C. App. 708, 715, 407 S.E.2d 583, 586 (1991). Furthermore, this Court has stated that reasonable suspicion must \u201cbe based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training.\u201d State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994). This is not a subjective standard based on the discretion of the officer; it is one that requires \u201cobjective justification to validate the detention or seizure.\u201d INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247, 255 (1984).\nWe \u201cmust consider \u2018the totality of the circumstances \u2014 -the whole picture\u2019 in determining whether a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop exists.\u201d Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441, 446 S.E.2d at 70 (1994) (citation omitted). This objective standard requires that the officer \u201cmust be able to articulate something more than an \u2018inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or \u201chunch.\u201d \u2019 \u201d U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1; 10 (1989) (citation omitted).\nOfficer Allman testified that his basis for the traffic stop was that the numbers on Defendant\u2019s thirty-day tag looked low, based on his recent observations of thirty-day tags. The purportedly \u201clow\u201d number led Officer Allman to \u201cwonder[] about the possibility of the tag being fictitious.\u201d\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-79.1(e) sets out the information that must appear on all temporary tags, and states that the required information must appear \u201cclearly and indelibly on the face of the temporary registration plate or marker.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-79.1(e) (2009). N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-79.1 does not prohibit a temporary tag from being either dirty or worn, so long as the relevant information is legible.\nIn prior cases before our Court where the condition of a thirty-day tag has been the basis for a traffic stop, the issue has been the legibility of the tag. Our Court has held thirty-day tags that were unreadable, or on which parts of the tag were concealed, obstructed, or illegible, justified the officers in those cases stopping the vehicles involved. See, e.g., State v. Branch, 194 N.C. App. 173, 669 S.E.2d 18 (2008) (concealed expiration date on the thirty-day tag justified the stop); Hudson, 103 N.C. App. 708, 407 S.E.2d 583 (1991) (where the thirty-day tag was faded out to the point of being illegible, stop was reasonable).\nIn the case before us, Officer Allman did testify that the thirty-day tag was dirty and worn. However, Officer Allman testified he was able to read the tag without difficulty; the tag was not faded; the information was clearly visible to him; and the information was accurate and proper. Officer Allman\u2019s stated basis for the traffic stop was his erroneous belief that the numbers on the tag were too \u201clow.\u201d Our standard of review requires \u201ca minimal level of objective justification\u201d in order for an investigatory stop to be legal. State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 442, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994).\nIn the case before us, it is undisputed that Officer Allman did not observe anything illegal about Defendant\u2019s thirty-day tag. Temporary tags are made of paper, and may quickly become dirty and worn due to common conditions of the weather and the roads. It is not unreasonable to expect law enforcement officers to be familiar with the laws they are charged to enforce. In the present case, we hold that a \u201creasonable officer\u201d would not have formed a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, based upon the observation of a thirty-day tag on which all relevant information was clearly legible, merely because he \u201cwondered about the possibility\u201d that the tag might be fictitious. In the present case, Officer Allman was unable \u201cto articulate something more than an \u2018inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or \u201chunch.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 10 (citation omitted). We must, therefore, reverse the trial court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress and vacate the judgment in this matter.\nReversed and judgment vacated.\nJudge McCULLOUGH concurs.\nChief Judge MARTIN dissents with a separate opinion.\n. The arresting officer in this appeal is identified as \u201cJoshua Amond\u201d in the hearing transcript of the motion to suppress and as \u201cJ.A. Allman\u201d in the indictments and order denying the motion to suppress. In this opinion, we will refer to him as Officer J.A. Allman.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." }, { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge,\ndissenting.\nI respectfully dissent. As the majority recognizes, \u201c[i]t is well-settled law that a police officer may make a brief investigative stop of a vehicle if justified by specific, articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.\u201d State v. Holmes, 109 N.C. App. 615, 619, 428 S.E.2d 277, 279 (internal quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, 334 N.C. 166, 432 S.E.2d 367 (1993). While I agree that, in order to establish a constitutional basis for a warrantless investigatory stop, the law requires \u201csomething more than an \u2018unparticularized suspicion or hunch,\u2019 \u201d State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 442, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10 (1989)), appeal after remand, 120 N.C. App. 804, 463 S.E.2d 802 (1995), it is also true that \u201c[t]he only requirement is a minimal level of objective justification....\u201d Id. (emphasis added). This is so because \u201c[reasonable suspicion is a \u2018less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.\u2019 \u201d State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (emphasis added) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000)), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 172 L. Ed. 2d 198 (2008). Thus, while \u201cthe requisite degree of suspicion [for an investigatory stop] must be high enough \u2018to assure that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field,\u2019 \u201d State v. Murray, 192 N.C. App. 684, 687, 666 S.E.2d 205, 208 (2008) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362 (1979)), and an investigatory stop of a vehicle \u201cmust be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training,\u201d the prevailing law requires that such facts and inferences need only establish a \u201cminimal level of objective justification\u201d for an investigatory stop to be constitutional. See Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441-42, 446 S.E.2d at 70. With these guiding principles in mind, I believe the trial court\u2019s unchallenged findings of fact are sufficient to establish that it was more than an \u201cunparticularized suspicion or hunch\u201d that caused Officer Allman to make an investigatory stop of defendant\u2019s vehicle. See id. at 442, 446 S.E.2d at 70 (internal quotation marks omitted).\nAs the majority recognizes, Officer Allman did not have any difficulty reading the information on the thirty-day tag affixed to defendant\u2019s vehicle and testified that the temporary tag was dirty and worn. However, the officer also testified that visible dirt and wear were not the primary reasons that he stopped defendant\u2019s vehicle. Rather, it was Officer Allman\u2019s undisputed testimony that, because the number on defendant\u2019s temporary tag seemed to be \u201cmuch lower\u201d than those numbers he had observed on other temporary tags during the course of his regular daily patrols, the officer \u201cbelieved the tag to be fictitious.\u201d Therefore, in light of the \u201cless demanding standard\u201d that need be met to establish a constitutional basis for a warrantless investigative stop, see Barnard, 362 N.C. at 247, 658 S.E.2d at 645 (internal quotation marks omitted), I am persuaded that Officer Allman\u2019s specific concern \u2014 that the numbering on the temporary tag affixed to defendant\u2019s vehicle was atypical and inconsistent with other temporary tags he observed during the course of his daily patrols \u2014 when \u201cviewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer,\u201d see Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441, 446 S.E.2d at 70, was sufficient to establish \u201ca reasonable or founded suspicion\u201d to justify \u201ca limited investigative seizure\u201d of defendant\u2019s vehicle that would allow the officer to verify that the tag affixed to defendant\u2019s automobile was valid. See Holmes, 109 N.C. App. at 619, 428 S.E.2d at 279 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). For these reasons, I would conclude that the trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.", "type": "dissent", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Martin T. McCracken, for the State.", "The Wright Law Firm of Charlotte, PLLC, by Roderick M. Wright, Jr., for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RAYMOND LORENZO BURKE, JR.\nNo. COA10-1084\n(Filed 21 June 2011)\nSearch and Seizure\u2014 traffic stop \u2014 lack of reasonable suspicion\nThe trial court erred in a drugs and carrying a concealed weapon case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence based on lack of reasonable suspicion to conduct a valid stop of defendant\u2019s vehicle where the stop was merely based on the possibility that a thirty-day tag was fictitious.\nChief Judge, MARTIN, dissenting.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 24 August 2009 by Judge Theodore S. Royster in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 March 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Martin T. McCracken, for the State.\nThe Wright Law Firm of Charlotte, PLLC, by Roderick M. Wright, Jr., for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0654-01", "first_page_order": 664, "last_page_order": 670 }