{ "id": 4233989, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JERRY LEE JONES; STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TINA JONES", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Jones", "decision_date": "2011-06-21", "docket_number": "No. COA10-1202", "first_page": "59", "last_page": "67", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "213 N.C. App. 59" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "673 S.E.2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642971 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753" }, { "page": "752-53" }, { "page": "753" }, { "page": "753" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/673/0751-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 S.E.2d 615", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638420 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/644/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 L. Ed. 2d 496", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "449 U.S. 1035", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11834790, 11835086, 11835185, 11834717, 11834963, 11835479, 11835032, 11835324, 11835421, 11835358, 11835231 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/449/1035-02", "/us/449/1035-05", "/us/449/1035-06", "/us/449/1035-01", "/us/449/1035-03", "/us/449/1035-11", "/us/449/1035-04", "/us/449/1035-08", "/us/449/1035-10", "/us/449/1035-09", "/us/449/1035-07" ] }, { "cite": "267 S.E.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562145, 8562120, 8562096, 8562065, 8562034 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0377-05", "/nc/300/0377-04", "/nc/300/0377-03", "/nc/300/0377-02", "/nc/300/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E.2d 356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N.C. App. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549193 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/45/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 S.E.2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 8", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566363 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 S.E.2d 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552159 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115-166", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "repealed 1981" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220131, 219911, 219981, 219943 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0216-02", "/nc/355/0216-04", "/nc/355/0216-03", "/nc/355/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9377955 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 S.E.2d 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310", "parenthetical": "holding defendant could not complain on appeal that instruction was \"inept or inadequate\" as \"it was in substance the language which defendant incorporated in his request for instructions to the jury\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572769 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735", "parenthetical": "holding defendant could not complain on appeal that instruction was \"inept or inadequate\" as \"it was in substance the language which defendant incorporated in his request for instructions to the jury\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 S.E.2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626738 ], "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E.2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570333 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 Wis. 2d 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8666115 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" }, { "page": "439", "parenthetical": "\"Before the person in control can be prosecuted [for violating compulsory attendance laws], there must be notice to the person in control [of the student], an opportunity for a meeting to resolve the problem, and other possible avenues leading to resolution.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/180/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 S.E.2d 386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388-89", "parenthetical": "\"When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must give the statute its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562180 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 N.C. App. 766", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4165282 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "769" }, { "page": "768-69" }, { "page": "768-69" }, { "page": "768-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/195/0766-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 N.C. App. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8204534 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/183/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 57", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541929 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 L. Ed. 2d 818", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "515 U.S. 1135", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1563969, 1564577, 1564483, 1564008, 1564296, 1564331, 1564174, 1563855, 1564503, 1564049, 1563795, 1563863, 1563768, 1564252, 1564093 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/515/1135-02", "/us/515/1135-14", "/us/515/1135-10", "/us/515/1135-04", "/us/515/1135-15", "/us/515/1135-07", "/us/515/1135-03", "/us/515/1135-09", "/us/515/1135-08", "/us/515/1135-01", "/us/515/1135-12", "/us/515/1135-11", "/us/515/1135-05", "/us/515/1135-06", "/us/515/1135-13" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 211", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556681 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559773 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7879" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867565 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0065-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 869, "char_count": 21609, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.639111038824036e-08, "percentile": 0.45120410494974805 }, "sha256": "21a5c0ab4f146d26cc84d59fdf515b5d89df99940b00f786688b6b4fe29590eb", "simhash": "1:c2e7d160f28f074e", "word_count": 3493 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:51:58.983312+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and McCULLOUGH concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JERRY LEE JONES STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TINA JONES" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.\nDefendants Jerry Lee Jones and Tina Jones appeal their convictions for failing to cause their daughter \u201cP.J.\u201d to attend school, in violation of North Carolina\u2019s Compulsory Attendance Law (\u201cCAL\u201d), N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 115C-378 to 383 (2009). Defendants primarily contend that the trial court erred in denying their respective motions to dismiss the charge for insufficient evidence. We conclude, however, that the State presented substantial evidence of each element of the offense, and, therefore, the court properly submitted the charge against each defendant to the jury. Accordingly, we find no error.\nFacts\nThe State\u2019s evidence at trial tended to establish the following facts: Mr. and Mrs. Jones are the biological parents of P.J. At the start of the 2008-09 school year, P.J. was 14 years old and entered the 9th grade at North Buncombe High School in the Buncombe County school system. After her family moved, P.J. transferred in September 2008 to T.C. Roberson High School, which is also in the Buncombe County school system.\nOn 17 November 2008, Rob Weinkle, T.C. Roberson\u2019s principal, sent defendants a letter notifying them that the school\u2019s attendance records showed that P.J. had accumulated three or more unexcused absences (\u201cthree-day letter\u201d). The letter also advised defendants that they were \u201cresponsible for [their] child\u2019s school attendance\u201d under CAL, that they may be \u201cprosecuted in a criminal action if [their] child\u2019s unlawful absences continue[d],\u201d and that they \u201cshould contact [their] child\u2019s counselor or administrator ... to discuss this matter.\u201d Mr. Weinkle mailed an identical letter on 2 February 2009, notifying defendants that P.J. had accumulated six or more unexcused absences (\u201csix-day letter\u201d).\nOn 3 February 2009, Mrs. Jones took P.J. to Access Family Services (\u201cAFS\u201d), a community support agency, for a clinical assessment. The assessment, performed by J.C. Cagle, diagnosed P.J. with \u201c[c]onduct disorder with adolescent onset and intermittent explosive disorder.\u201d Lori Siemens, an AFS case manager, and Steven Luke, a mental health counselor, were assigned to work with P.J. and her family. Ms. Siemens was permitted to accompany P.J. to school on several occasions in order to observe her behavior and to help her \u201clearn how to deal\u201d with her anger and anxiety issues. Mr. Luke also discussed with a school administrator implementing a plan to \u201chelp [P.J.] cope in school[.]\u201d\nOn 25 February 2009, after P.J. had accumulated 10 unexcused absences, Mr. Weinkle sent defendants a third letter informing them that they were in violation of CAL, that they could be prosecuted for the violation, and that a conference had been scheduled for 10 March 2009 to address P.J.\u2019s lack of attendance (\u201c10-day conference\u201d). The 10-day conference was held on 13 March 2009 at T.C. Roberson; Mr. Jones, Mrs. Jones, P.J., and Ms. Siemens attended the conference as well as assistant principal Janet Greenhoe, drop-out specialist Jill Castelloe, at-risk counselor Anna Hubbell, and 9th grade counselor Natalie Anderson. During the conference, school administrators agreed to develop a new schedule for P.J., make accommodations for materials to be provided in her classrooms, set up a \u201ctime-out plan\u201d for her, and recommend P.J. as a candidate for the \u201cPASS program.\u201d Ultimately, P.J. accumulated 21 unexcused absences during the 2008-09 school year.\nAfter the 10-day conference, defendants were charged with failure to cause attendance based on complaints filed by Mr. Weinkle on 18 March 2009. Defendants were initially tried and convicted in Buncombe County District Court. On appeal to Buncombe County Superior Court, defendants\u2019 cases were consolidated for a trial de novo. Defendants moved to dismiss their respective charges at trial and the court denied the motions. The jury found defendants guilty of violating the school attendance law and the trial court sentenced defendants each to 45 days in the Buncombe County jail, suspended the sentences, and imposed 18 months of supervised probation as well as a $500.00 fine. Both defendants timely appeal to this Court.\nI\nDefendants first contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions to dismiss the charge for insufficient evidence. A defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss should be denied if there is substantial evidence: (1) of each essential element of the offense charged and (2) of defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator of the offense. State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996). \u201cSubstantial evidence\u201d is that amount of relevant evidence that a \u201creasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 7879, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). When considering the issue of substantial evidence, the trial court must view all of the evidence presented \u201cin the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any contradictions in its favor.\u201d State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995). \u201cWhether [the] evidence presented constitutes substantial evidence is a question of law for the court[,]\u201d State v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231, 236, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991), \u201cwhich this Court reviews de novo,\u201d State v. Bagley, 183 N.C. App. 514, 523, 644 S.E.2d 615, 621 (2007).\nDefendants were charged with failing to cause attendance under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-378, which provides in pertinent part:\n(e) The principal or the principal\u2019s designee shall notify the parent, guardian, or custodian of his or her child\u2019s excessive absences after the child has accumulated three unexcused absences in a school year. After not more than six unexcused absences, the principal or the principal\u2019s designee shall notify the parent, guardian, or custodian by mail that he or she may be in violation of the Compulsory Attendance Law and may be prosecuted if the absences cannot be justified under the established attendance policies of the State and local boards of education. Once the parents are notified, the school attendance counselor shall work with the child and the child\u2019s family to analyze the causes of the absences and determine steps, including adjustment of the school program or obtaining supplemental services, to eliminate the problem. The attendance counselor may request that a law enforcement officer accompany him or her if the attendance counselor believes that a home visit is necessary.\n(f) After 10 accumulated unexcused absences in a school year, the principal or the principal\u2019s designee shall review any report or investigation prepared under G.S. 115C-381 and shall confer with the student and the student\u2019s parent, guardian, or custodian, if possible, to determine whether the parent, guardian, or custodian has received notification pursuant to this section and made a good faith effort to comply with the law. If the principal or the principal\u2019s designee determines that the parent, guardian, or custodian has not made a good faith effort to comply with the law, the principal shall notify the district attorney and the director of social services of the county where the child resides. If the principal or the principal\u2019s designee determines that the parent, guardian, or custodian has made a good faith effort to comply with the law, the principal may file a complaint with the juvenile court counselor pursuant to Chapter 7B of the General Statutes that the child is habitually absent from school without a valid excuse. Upon receiving notification by the principal or the principal\u2019s designee, the director of social services shall determine whether to undertake an investigation under G.S. 7B-302.\n(g) Documentation that demonstrates that the parents, guardian, or custodian were notified and that the child has accumulated 10 absences which cannot be justified under the established attendance policies of the local board shall constitute prima facie evidence that the child\u2019s parent, guardian, or custodian is responsible for the absences.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-378(e)-(g).\nThis Court has held that \u201cthe procedures set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-378 requiring that the schools take certain steps prior to causing a warrant to be issued\u201d establish the six \u201celements of the offense.\u201d State v. Frady, 195 N.C. App. 766, 769, 673 S.E.2d 751, 753 (2009). Thus, the elements of failure to cause attendance are: (1) that the defendant was a parent, guardian, or custodian of a school-age child; (2) that the child was enrolled in a North Carolina public school or an approved non-public school during the specified school year; (3) that the school\u2019s principal or the principal\u2019s designee notified the defendant of the child\u2019s absences from school after the child accumulated three unexcused absences during the specified school year; (4) that after not more than six unexcused absences, the defendant was notified by mail that he or she may be in violation of CAL and that he or she may be prosecuted if the absences cannot be justified under established school board policies; (5) that after the defendant has been notified, the school attendance counselor worked with or attempted to work with the child and the defendant to analyze the causes of the absences and determine steps to eliminate the problem; and (6) that during the specified school year, the child accumulated at least 10 unexcused absences, that the defendant was notified of the 10 unexcused absences, and that the 10 unexcused absences cannot be justified under established school board policies. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-378(e)-(f); Frady, 195 N.C. App. at 768-69, 673 S.E.2d at 752-53.\nDefendants argue that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of the fourth and fifth elements. With respect to the fourth element, defendants contend that P.J.\u2019s school did not comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-378(e)\u2019s second notice requirement as \u201c[t]he State\u2019s evidence showed that the school did not send the \u2018six-day letter\u2019 to P.J.\u2019s home until after the child had already accumulated eight unexcused absences.\u201d The State argues that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-378(e)\u2019s notification-by-mail requirement applies only to notice of the parent\u2019s possible violation of and potential prosecution under CAL, not to notification of the child\u2019s sixth unexcused absence. We agree with the State\u2019s position.\nThe plain language of the statute provides in pertinent part: \u201cAfter not more than six unexcused absences, the principal or the principal\u2019s designee shall notify the parent, guardian, or custodian by mail that he or she may be in violation of the Compulsory Attendance Law and may be prosecuted if the absences cannot be justified under the established attendance policies of the State and local boards of education.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-378(e) (emphasis added). This provision does not mandate that the school provide written notice by mail of the child\u2019s sixth unexcused absence \u2014 it only requires the school to notify parents by mail on or before the accrual of their child\u2019s sixth unexcused absence that the parents may be in violation of CAL and may be prosecuted if the absences cannot be justified under established school board policies. The clear and unambiguous language of the statute does not support defendants\u2019 argument. See In re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239, 244 S.E.2d 386, 388-89 (1978) (\u201cWhen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must give the statute its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.\u201d).\nAt trial, the trial court admitted the \u201cthree-day letter\u201d from RJ.\u2019s school, dated 17 November 2008, which states in pertinent part: Ms. Greenhoe, an assistant principal at T.C. Roberson, testified that the three-day letter was \u201cgenerate[d]\u201d on 17 November 2008, when P.J. accumulated her third unexcused absence, and mailed to defendants\u2019 home. P.J.\u2019s attendance summary, which also was admitted at trial, indicates that she accumulated her sixth unexcused absence on 15 December 2008 \u2014 roughly a month after the three-day letter was mailed to defendants. This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to permit a reasonable inference that defendants received notification by mail through the 17 November 2008 three-day letter that they were in violation of CAL and could be prosecuted for the violation prior to P.J.\u2019s accumulating her sixth unexcused absence on 15 December 2009. See Frady, 195 N.C. App. at 768-69, 673 S.E.2d at 753 (approving trial court\u2019s jury instructions on elements of failure to cause attendance where instructions on fourth element required State to prove \u201cthat after not more than six unexcused absences, the defendant was further notified that she may be in violation of the North Carolina compulsory school attendance law.\u201d).\nYou are responsible for your child\u2019s school attendance. Under Part I of the North Carolina Compulsory Attendance Law (G.S. 115C-378) you may be prosecuted in a criminal action if your child\u2019s unlawful absences continue. The maximum penalty provided by this statue [sic] upon conviction may be a fine, imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the Judge (G.S. 115C-378).\nIn arguing that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the fifth element, defendants claim that \u201cthe State\u2019s evidence showed that the 10-day conference was . . . the first time that the school had participated in a dialogue with [defendants] about P.J.\u2019s absences and made any attempt to eliminate the problem.\u201d Defendants maintain that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-378(e) and (f) require the State to show that the school worked with the child and the parents to analyze the causes of the child\u2019s absences and determined steps to eliminate the problem prior to the 10-day conference.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-378(e) provides that the school attendance counselor, \u201c[o]nce the parents are notified\u201d that they may be prosecuted for violating CAL, \u201cshall work with the child and the child\u2019s family to analyze the causes of the absences and determine steps, including adjustment of the school program or obtaining supplemental services, to eliminate the problem.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-378(f), in turn, provides that after the child has accumulated 10 unexcused absences, the principal is required to review any reports or investigations prepared by the school\u2019s social worker regarding the lack of attendance and is required to \u201cconfer with the student and the student\u2019s parent, guardian, or custodian, if possible, to determine whether the parent, guardian, or custodian has received notification pursuant to this section and made a good faith effort to comply with the law.\u201d Read together, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-378(e) and (f) establish that the school is required to work with the child and the parents to eliminate the causes of the child\u2019s absences prior to the school\u2019s determination, based on any reports by the school\u2019s social worker and the conference with the child and the parents, as to whether the parents have made a good faith effort to comply with CAL. See generally State v. White, 180 Wis. 2d 203, 218, 509 N.W.2d 434, 439 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (\u201cBefore the person in control can be prosecuted [for violating compulsory attendance laws], there must be notice to the person in control [of the student], an opportunity for a meeting to resolve the problem, and other possible avenues leading to resolution.\u201d).\nViewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence at trial tends to show that P.J.\u2019s school mailed to defendants a three-day letter on 17 November 2008 and a six-day letter on 2 February 2009, notifying defendants that they \u201cshould contact [P.J.]\u2019s counselor or administrator ... to discuss this matter\u201d and that the school \u201cwould like to work with [them] to resolve this problem.\u201d The evidence also shows that the school allowed Ms. Siemens to accompany P.J. to class on multiple occasions for observation and treatment purposes. In addition, Ms. Greenhoe testified that school administrators, including the school\u2019s attendance counselor, called defendants on a \u201cregular basis\u201d to discuss P.J.\u2019s attendance problems, but that they were not \u201cgetting the communication from [P.J.\u2019s] parents to let [them] know what was going on . . . .\u201d Ms. Greenhoe also could not recall defendants ever calling her to explain \u201cwhy [P.J] wasn\u2019t coming to school].]\u201d Moreover, Mr. Luke, with AFS, testified that prior to the 10-day conference he talked with Mr. Morris, the assistant principal at T.C. Roberson assigned to work with P.J.\u2019s grade level, and \u201crecommend[ed] to the school\u201d certain \u201caccommodations\u201d that would help P.J. \u201ccope in th[e] classroom environment].]\u201d This evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that \u201cafter the [d]efendant[s] w[ere] notified, the school attendance counselor worked with or attempted to work with [P.J.] and the [d]efendant[s] to analyze causes of absences and determine steps to eliminate the problem\u201d prior to the 10-day conference. Frady, 195 N.C. App. at 768-69, 673 S.E.2d at 753. The trial court, therefore, properly denied defendants\u2019 respective motions to dismiss.\nII\nDefendants\u2019 only other argument on appeal is that the trial court erred \u201cby failing to instruct the jury that it needed to determine whether [defendants] had made a \u2018good faith effort\u2019 to comply with the compulsory school attendance law ....\u201d Defendants contend that because they did not request that the trial court\u2019s instructions include a \u201cgood faith effort element,\u201d the court\u2019s instructions regarding the elements of the offense should be reviewed for plain error. As the State points out, however, defendants submitted a proposed instruction on the elements of the offense based on Frady and the trial court gave an instruction to the jury that is virtually identical to the one submitted by defendants. It is well established that a defendant who \u201ccauses\u201d or \u201cjoins in causing\u201d the trial court to \u201ccommit error is not in a position to repudiate his action and assign it as ground for a new trial.\u201d State v. Payne, 280 N.C. 170, 171, 185 S.E.2d 101, 102 (1971); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(c) (2009). Under the doctrine of invited error, \u201ca party cannot complain of a charge given at his request, or which is in substance the same as one asked by him . . . .\u201d Sumner v. Sumner, 227 N.C. 610, 613, 44 S.E.2d 40, 41 (1947) (internal citations omitted); see State v. Cook, 263 N.C. 730, 735, 140 S.E.2d 305, 310 (1965) (holding defendant could not complain on appeal that instruction was \u201cinept or inadequate\u201d as \u201cit was in substance the language which defendant incorporated in his request for instructions to the jury\u201d). Moreover, \u201ca defendant who invites error ... waive[s] his right to all appellate review concerning the invited error, including plain error review.\u201d State v. Barber, 147 N.C. App. 69, 74, 554 S.E.2d 413, 416 (2001), disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 216, 560 S.E.2d 141-42 (2002).\nIn any event, this Court, in construing the prior version of CAL, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115-166 (repealed 1981), held that \u201cwillfulness is not contained in G.S. 115-166 as an element of the offense, and we decline to engraft such an element on the statute[,]\u201d noting that \u201c[f]ew convictions, if any, could be obtained ... if parents could merely assert justification for noncompliance in order to avoid criminal liability.\u201d State v. Vietto, 38 N.C. App. 99, 102, 247 S.E.2d 298, 300 (1978), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 297 N.C. 8, 252 S.E.2d 732 (1979); accord State v. Chavis, 45 N.C. App. 438, 443, 263 S.E.2d 356, 359 (\u201cThe offense defined by G.S. 115-166 clearly does not require any specific intent, and ... willfulness is not an element of the offense.\u201d), disc. review denied, 300 N.C. 377, 267 S.E.2d 679, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035, 66 L. Ed. 2d 496 (1980). As there is no element requiring proof of lack of a good faith effort to comply with CAL, the trial court did not commit error, much less plain error, by not instructing the jury on such an element.\nNo Error.\nJudges BRYANT and McCULLOUGH concur.\n. The juvenile's initials are used throughout this opinion to protect the juvenile's privacy.\n. As Mr. and Mrs. Jones present identical arguments on appeal, we address them together.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant-Attorney General Brian R. Berman, for the State.", "Guy J. Lorangerfor defendant-appellant Jerry Lee Jones.", "Peter Wood for defendant-appellant Tina Jones." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JERRY LEE JONES STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TINA JONES\nNo. COA10-1202\n(Filed 21 June 2011)\n1. Schools and Education\u2014 Compulsory Attendance Law\u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 properly denied\nThe trial court did not err in a case involving the violation of the Compulsory Attendance Law by denying defendants\u2019, motions to dismiss the charge for insufficient evidence. The State presented substantial evidence of each element of the offense, and therefore, the court properly submitted the charge against each defendant to the jury.\n2. Schools and Education\u2014 Compulsory Attendance Law\u2014 jury instruction \u2014 lack of good faith \u2014 not an element \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not commit error or plain error in its jury instructions in a case involving the violation of the Compulsory Attendance Law. There is no element requiring proof of lack of a good faith effort.\nAppeal by defendants from judgments entered 26 May 2011 by Judge Laura J. Bridges in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 April 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant-Attorney General Brian R. Berman, for the State.\nGuy J. Lorangerfor defendant-appellant Jerry Lee Jones.\nPeter Wood for defendant-appellant Tina Jones." }, "file_name": "0059-01", "first_page_order": 69, "last_page_order": 77 }