{ "id": 4233741, "name": "ORANGE COUNTY ex rel. DOROTHY CLAYTON (PATTISON), Plaintiff v. JONATHAN LEE HAMILTON, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Orange County ex rel. Clayton v. Hamilton", "decision_date": "2011-07-05", "docket_number": "No. COA11-113", "first_page": "205", "last_page": "211", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "213 N.C. App. 205" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "666 S.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641936 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803" }, { "page": "802" }, { "page": "803" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/666/0800-01" ] }, { "cite": "638 S.E.2d 628", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637403 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/638/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 S.E.2d 19", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635849 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21", "parenthetical": "citing McGee v. McGee, 118 N.C. App. 19, 26, 453 S.E.2d 531, 536, disc. review denied, 340 N.C. 359, 458 S.E.2d 189 (1995)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/630/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "645 S.E.2d 766", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638603, 12638604, 12638605 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/645/0766-01", "/se2d/645/0766-02", "/se2d/645/0766-03" ] }, { "cite": "636 S.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636991 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. St. B. 98 Formal Ethics Op. 13 (July 23, 1999), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 351, 645 S.E.2d 766 (2007" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/636/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633480 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ga. Code Ann. \u00a7 19-6-15", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ga. Code Ann.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(f)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 N.C. App. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4162103 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/193/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.C. App. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8372534 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/181/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S.E.2d 77", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572341 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 S.E.2d 189", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790083, 790182, 790069, 790070, 790172 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0359-05", "/nc/340/0359-02", "/nc/340/0359-01", "/nc/340/0359-03", "/nc/340/0359-04" ] }, { "cite": "453 S.E.2d 531", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916361 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 673", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8302042 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675", "parenthetical": "citing McGee v. McGee, 118 N.C. App. 19, 26, 453 S.E.2d 531, 536, disc. review denied, 340 N.C. 359, 458 S.E.2d 189 (1995)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "610 S.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8471738 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 N.C. App. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550787 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/43/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 S.E.2d 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 N.C. App. 681", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553620 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/9/0681-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237", "parenthetical": "quoting Tate v. Tate, 9 N.C. App. 681, 682-83, 177 S.E.2d 455, 457 (1970)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11218982 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288", "parenthetical": "quoting Tate v. Tate, 9 N.C. App. 681, 682-83, 177 S.E.2d 455, 457 (1970)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 792", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 N.C. App. 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523630 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/54/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" }, { "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566003 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3737632, 3745508, 3738951, 3747377, 3744440 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0351-04", "/nc/361/0351-01", "/nc/361/0351-05", "/nc/361/0351-02", "/nc/361/0351-03" ] }, { "cite": "180 N.C. App. 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8239378 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. St. B. 98 Formal Ethics Op. 13 (July 23, 1999), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 351, 645 S.E.2d 766 (2007" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/180/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8318580 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 784, "char_count": 16697, "ocr_confidence": 0.725, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.6922169990516086e-08, "percentile": 0.2945716140207402 }, "sha256": "44e4c35de557cfa23d6f1247c063570d8a39a98b694db634d4896714fc9bbe99", "simhash": "1:9789426af547e9d4", "word_count": 2737 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:51:58.983312+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge THIGPEN concur." ], "parties": [ "ORANGE COUNTY ex rel. DOROTHY CLAYTON (PATTISON), Plaintiff v. JONATHAN LEE HAMILTON, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEPHENS, Judge.\nProcedural History\nThis matter arises out of a child support dispute between Defendant Jonathan Hamilton and Plaintiff Orange County ex rel. Dorothy Clayton Pattison (\u201cPattison\u201d). Defendant and Pattison are the parents of a minor child born 12 November 2003 but were never married. On 22 March 2004, Defendant entered into a Voluntary Support Agreement to provide support for the child, agreeing to pay $245.00 per month and to provide health insurance. In 2006, Defendant agreed to increase, the payments to $500.00 per month, plus $100.00 per month to pay down an arrearage totaling $4,400.00. In 2009, the Orange County Child Support Enforcement (\u201cOCCSE\u201d) office, on behalf of Pattison, sought another increase, based on the child\u2019s increased needs and Defendant\u2019s increased income. In November 2009, the court increased Defendant\u2019s payments to $711.00 per month plus $25.00 per month toward an arrearage totaling $1,100.00. In December 2009, the OCCSE filed a Notice of Income Withholding with Defendant\u2019s employer. In April 2010, Defendant sought a downward modification of child support, a change of venue, and reinstatement of direct child support payments to avoid the consequences of his employer\u2019s delayed payments to the State\u2019s Centralized Collections office. The trial court heard the matter on 9 June 2010.\nThe trial court took oral testimony, and then asked Defendant and Plaintiff to submit written summaries and proposed orders on the child support modification request. On 11 June 2010, Defendant\u2019s counsel submitted his letter and proposed order to the trial court, and copied the other counsel of record. On 16 June 2010, the \u00d3CCSE, through Plaintiff\u2019s counsel, submitted a letter and proposed order to the trial court, also copying opposing counsel. The trial court signed Plaintiff\u2019s proposed order on 27 July 2010 and filed the order on 11 August 2010. Defendant appealed to this Court.\nAfter filing the agreed-upon Record on Appeal, Defendant sought to supplement the Record pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(c), but the supplement was stricken by order of this Court after Plaintiff filed a Motion for Sanctions. Plaintiff later submitted a Rule 9(b)(5)(a) supplement, which included copies of the letters and proposed orders submitted to the trial court. Those letters and orders were absent from the Record on Appeal as originally submitted by Defendant. Defendant moved for sanctions on 16 May 2011. After careful review of Plaintiff\u2019s supplement and Defendant\u2019s motion, we agree with Plaintiff that the materials in Plaintiff\u2019s supplement are necessary for Plaintiff\u2019s response to arguments raised in Defendant\u2019s brief. Therefore, we deny Defendant\u2019s motion.\nDiscussion\nOn appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s order was the fruit of ex parte communication with Plaintiff\u2019s counsel. He also argues that the trial court erred by entering the order out of session and by denying Defendant\u2019s request for change of venue. Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion for downward modification of child support was not supported by the evidence. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order.\nEx Parte Communication\nDefendant first argues that the trial court improperly considered ex parte communication with Plaintiff\u2019s counsel in using counsel\u2019s proposed order as the final order in the case and relying on counsel\u2019s argument to deny Defendant\u2019s request for change of venue. We disagree.\nThis Court has previously held that proposed orders submitted to the trial court are proper for the court to request, and consider. \u201cNothing in [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 58] or common practice precludes the trial court from directing the prevailing party to draft an order on its behalf. Instead \u2018[s]imilar procedures are routine in civil eases[.]\u2019 \u201d In re J.B., 172 N.C. App. 1, 25, 616 S.E.2d 264, 279 (2005) (citations omitted).\nDefendant\u2019s efforts to paint Plaintiff\u2019s counsel\u2019s proposed order as improper ex parte communication also flies in the face of North Carolina State Bar Formal Ethics Opinion 13, which addresses \u201cwhether a lawyer [may] communicate in writing with a judge or other judicial official about a proceeding that is pending before the judge or judicial officialf.]\u201d Dunn v. Canoy, 180 N.C. App. 30, 45, 636 S.E.2d 243, 253 (2006) (citing N.C. St. B. 98 Formal Ethics Op. 13 (July 23, 1999), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 351, 645 S.E.2d 766 (2007). That opinion \u201cacknowledges that a broad reading of the applicable ethics rules would permit \u2018unlimited written communications\u2019 so long as a copy is simultaneously provided to the other parties and the communication is not \u2018prejudicial to the administration of justice.\u2019 \u201d Id. The opinion goes on to note that \u201c[t]o avoid the appearance of improper influence upon a tribunal, informal written communications with a judge . . . should be limited\u201d to four types, including, inter alia, written communications, such as a proposed order or legal memo prepared pursuant to the court\u2019s instructions, and written communications sent to the tribunal \u201cwith the consent of the opposing lawyer.\u201d Id.\nIn the instant case, the allegedly improper ex parte communication was requested at the hearing by the trial court. It was also requested of both parties\u2019 counsel. Although Defendant now claims that the trial court\u2019s request for submission of proposed orders was made \u201cover Defendant\u2019s objection,\u201d our review of the transcript indicates that although Defendant\u2019s trial counsel remarked, \u201cmy client really hates the written thing [submitting the letter and proposed order],\u201d he did not formally object.\nBecause our statutes and case law clearly allow for the common trial court practice of requesting parties to prepare orders, and because copies of the\u2019orders here were provided to Defendant via his trial counsel, we overrule Defendant\u2019s argument.\nEntry of Order Out of Session\nDefendant next argues that the trial court\u2019s order was improperly entered out of session. We disagree.\nRule 6(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides:\nThe period of time provided for the doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by the continued existence or expiration of a session of court. The continued existence or expiration of a session of court in no way affects the power of the court to do any act or take any proceeding, but no issue of fact shall be submitted to a jury out of session.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 6(c) (2009). In Feibus & Co. v. Godley Constr. Co., our Supreme Court interpreted Rule 6(c) broadly when it affirmed a judge\u2019s order, written out of term, at his home, outside the district. 301 N.C. 294, 305, 271 S.E.2d 385, 392 (1980). The Court explained that:\nRule 6(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the expiration of a session of court has no effect on the court\u2019s power \u2018to do any act or take any proceeding.\u2019 This rule clearly allows a written order to be signed out of term, especially when such an act merely documents a decision made and announced before the expiration of the term.\nId. (internal citation omitted).\nFurther, under Rule 58, the signing and entry of judgment out of term or session is expressly allowed \u201cunless an express objection to such action was made on the record prior to the end of the term or session at which the matter was heard.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 58 (2009). Here, no such objection was made by Defendant at trial and entry of the order out of session was proper. Accordingly, we overrule this argument.\nChange of Venue\nDefendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a change of venue. Specifically, he contends the trial court erred in \u201cconcluding that Defendant\u2019s legal residence was Orange County when the address where Ms. [Pattison] receives some of her mail does not establish her legal residence for purposes of determining proper venue in a child support enforcement case.\u201d We are not persuaded.\nRulings on motions for change of venue are \u201cwithin the sound discretion of the trial judge and... not subject to reversal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.\u201d Holland v. Gryder, 54 N.C. App. 490, 491, 283 S.E.2d 792, 793 (1981).\nIn child support and custody cases, the original trial court \u201cretains jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts and is the only proper court to bring an action for the modification of an order establishing custody and support.\u201d Brooker v. Brooker, 133 N.C. App. 285, 288, 515 S.E.2d 234, 237 (1999) (quoting Tate v. Tate, 9 N.C. App. 681, 682-83, 177 S.E.2d 455, 457 (1970)). In child support and custody cases, \u201c [i]t is elementary law that the residence of the parties at the time of the institution of the action is controlling, and venue is not affected by a subsequent change of residence of the parties.\u201d Bass v. Bass, 43 N.C. App. 212, 215, 258 S.E.2d 391, 393 (1979).\nHere, the original child custody and support action began in Orange County, where Pattison then resided with her father. She has since moved a number of times, and currently resides in Wake County, in the town of Wake Forest. The trial court was within its discretion to determine that Pattison\u2019s permanent mailing address remains her legal address. For these reasons, we overrule Defendant\u2019s argument regarding change of venue.\nDenial of Motion for Downward Modification\nFinally, Defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s denial of his Motion for a Downward Modification of Child Support was not supported by the evidence. Contrary to the order, Defendant argues, there had been a substantial and material change of circumstances warranting a downward modification. In particular, Defendant argues that Pattison\u2019s income should have been calculated to include child support she receives for her three other children from a later marriage, and that the trial court erred in failing to give him credit for the cost of medical insurance coverage he carried for his child. We disagree.\nWe review a trial court\u2019s child support orders for abuse of discretion. Holland v. Holland, 169 N.C. App. 564, 567, 610 S.E.2d 231, 233 (2005) (internal citations omitted). \u201c[A]n order of a court of this State for support of a minor child may be modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by either party.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.7(a) (2009). Modification of child support is a two-step process. \u201cA trial court \u2018must first determine a substantial change of circumstances has taken place; only then does it proceed to apply the [North Carolina Child Support] Guidelines to calculate the applicable amount of support.\u2019 \u201d Armstrong v. Droessler, 177 N.C. App. 673, 675, 630 S.E.2d 19, 21 (2006) (citing McGee v. McGee, 118 N.C. App. 19, 26, 453 S.E.2d 531, 536, disc. review denied, 340 N.C. 359, 458 S.E.2d 189 (1995)). The party seeking modification \u201cassume(s) the burden of showing that circumstances (have) changed.\u201d Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 237, 158 S.E.2d 77, 79 (1967). If the party seeking the modification fails to convince the court that there has indeed been a substantial change in circumstances since the last order, then the court has no authority to modify the order. Lewis v. Lewis, 181 N.C. App. 114, 120, 638 S.E.2d 628, 632 (2007).\nHere, Defendant cites Pattison\u2019s child support payments for her three children from a later marriage as evidence of a substantial change in her income, or \u201ccircumstances.\u201d He relies on this Court\u2019s holding in New Hanover Child Support Enforcement v. Rains that \u201cthe [North Carolina Child Support] Guidelines do not exclude child support payments from income.\u201d 193 N.C. App. 208, 212, 666 S.E.2d 800, 803 (2008). However, Defendant\u2019s reliance on Rains is incomp\u00edete and misleading. In Rains, the Court notes that child support \u201cincome\u201d may be presumed to be \u201cequal to the basic child support obligation\u201d for the child or children for whom it is received, and therefore must be balanced against those expenses. Id. at 211, 666 S.E.2d at 802. Far from endorsing the use of child support as income, the Court in Rains went so far as to urge the Conference of Chief District Court Judges, which has authority over the Guidelines, to consider the route taken in the majority of other states, which have \u201cexcluded from income child support received for one child when determining the support obligations for another child.\u201d Id. at 213, 666 S.E.2d at 803. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. \u00a7 19-6-15(f)(2) (2007).\nDefendant\u2019s argument that the trial court erred in fading to give him credit for medical insurance coverage purchased for the minor child is similarly unpersuasive. Under North Carolina\u2019s Child Support Guidelines, \u201c[w]hen a child for whom support is being determined is covered by a family policy, only the health insurance premium actually attributable to that child is added. If this amount is not available or cannot be verified, the total cost of the premium is divided by the total number of persons covered by the policy.\u201d N.C. -Child Supp. Guidelines, AOC-A-162 Rev. 10/06, 4. Defendant argues that, per his original child support order in 2004, he has maintained insurance for the child at $130 per month, a sum he believes should be deducted from his child support obligation. However, the trial court determined that Defendant had incurred no additional cost in covering the child on his wife\u2019s health insurance policy, which also covered her son from a previous marriage. No documentation about the insurance, from either side, is included in the Record on Appeal. Moreover, the trial court found that Defendant\u2019s insurance coverage of the child was \u201cunnecessary\u201d because Pattison had been providing coverage for the child on her Blue Cross policy.\nIn the end, both of Defendant\u2019s arguments that a substantial change in circumstance has occurred fall short. Therefore, the order of the trial court is\nAFFIRMED.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge THIGPEN concur.\n. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Contempt, also heard at this hearing, alleging that Defendant had failed to make his child support payment for January, or pay medical expenses in arrears. The trial court found that Defendant had a delinquency in his payments, but the record did not show a pattern of nonpayment rising to the level of willful contempt.\n. The Conference appears to have taken the Court\u2019s advice; the 2011 Child Support Guidelines specifically disallow consideration of \u201cchild support payments received on behalf of a child other than the child for whom support is being sought in the present action.\u201d N.C. Child Supp. Guidelines, AOC-A-162 Rev. 01/11, 2.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEPHENS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Leigh A. Peek,, Esq., Counsel for Orange County Child Support Enforcement, for Plaintiff.", "Jonathan Hamilton, pro se." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ORANGE COUNTY ex rel. DOROTHY CLAYTON (PATTISON), Plaintiff v. JONATHAN LEE HAMILTON, Defendant\nNo. COA11-113\n(Filed 5 July 2011)\n1. Judges\u2014 ex parte communication \u2014 proposed order\nUse of a counsel\u2019s proposed order that was requested by the court as the final order did not constitute an improper ex parte communication.\n2. Civil Procedure\u2014 order entered out of session \u2014 no objection at trial\nThe trial court did not improperly enter an order out of session. Entry of orders out of session is allowed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 6(c), and defendant did not object at trial.\n3. Venue\u2014 motion for change \u2014 denied\u2014use of permanent mailing address as legal address\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for a change of venue in a child support dispute where the original action began in Orange County, defendant was living with her father, she had moved a number of times, and resided in Wake County at the time of the motion. The trial court was within its discretion to determine that her permanent mailing address (Orange County) remained her legal address.\n4. Child Custody and Support\u2014 support for children of later marriage \u2014 no change of circumstances or income\nChild support payments for children of a later marriage did not evidence a substantial change in plaintiff\u2019s circumstances or income.\n5. Child Custody and Support\u2014 health insurance \u2014 no increased cost \u2014 no credit\nThe trial court did not err in a child support dispute by not giving defendant credit for medical insurance purchased for the minor child. Defendant incurred no additional cost in covering the child on his wife\u2019s health insurance policy and defendant\u2019s coverage was unnecessary because plaintiff had been providing coverage.\nAppeal by Defendant from order dated 27 July 2010 and filed 11 August 2010 by Judge Joseph M. Buckner in Orange County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 June 2011.\nLeigh A. Peek,, Esq., Counsel for Orange County Child Support Enforcement, for Plaintiff.\nJonathan Hamilton, pro se." }, "file_name": "0205-01", "first_page_order": 215, "last_page_order": 221 }