{ "id": 4233158, "name": "DANNY'S TOWING 2, INC., DOYLE SUTTON d/b/a DOYLE'S GARAGE AND WRECKER, DONNIE SUTTON d/b/a SUTTON AUTOMOTIVE AND WRECKER SERVICE, BRENDA EDWARDS d/b/a B&H TOWING, RAMDOG ENTERPRISES, LLC, JAMES AUTREY d/b/a MOE BANDY, DOMESTIC AUTO, INC., HENRY GRASTY d/b/a GRASTY'S SERVICE CENTER, STEVE MILLER d/b/a RABBIT SKIN WRECKER, THOMAS SUTTON d/b/a ELK TOWING, and CHRIS HIGEL d/b/a ANYTIME TOWING, Plaintiffs v. THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CRIME CONTROL and PUBLIC SAFETY, and its agent, NORTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY PATROL and TROOP G, DISTRICT V, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Danny's Towing 2, Inc. v. North Carolina Department of Crime Control", "decision_date": "2011-07-19", "docket_number": "No. COA10-1498", "first_page": "375", "last_page": "384", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "213 N.C. App. 375" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "672 S.E.2d 687", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642774, 12642775 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/672/0687-01", "/se2d/672/0687-02" ] }, { "cite": "661 S.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641159 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/661/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "632 S.E.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636284 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" }, { "page": "181" }, { "page": "182-83" }, { "page": "181-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/632/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 95", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240022 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4160136 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-253", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "674 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 N.C. App. 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4165853 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/196/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37", "parenthetical": "\"Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2483734 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384", "parenthetical": "\"Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 8554420 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515293 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "830" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12124512 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139-40" }, { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 U.S. 424", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1255416 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" }, { "page": "446", "parenthetical": "holding that rules which are \"genuinely responsive to safety concerns\" are exempted from preemption" }, { "page": "442" }, { "page": "446" }, { "page": "442" }, { "page": "446" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/536/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 F.3d 1040", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11200116 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1045-46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/219/1040-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 941, "char_count": 22479, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.470291726553117e-08, "percentile": 0.3987271072560601 }, "sha256": "a6e47032163ace98a8bf22e89cddb4e674bc6635005b61a223fe328bb7b7c436", "simhash": "1:ca8e460a31068d38", "word_count": 3579 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:51:58.983312+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge THIGPEN concur." ], "parties": [ "DANNY\u2019S TOWING 2, INC., DOYLE SUTTON d/b/a DOYLE\u2019S GARAGE AND WRECKER, DONNIE SUTTON d/b/a SUTTON AUTOMOTIVE AND WRECKER SERVICE, BRENDA EDWARDS d/b/a B&H TOWING, RAMDOG ENTERPRISES, LLC, JAMES AUTREY d/b/a MOE BANDY, DOMESTIC AUTO, INC., HENRY GRASTY d/b/a GRASTY'S SERVICE CENTER, STEVE MILLER d/b/a RABBIT SKIN WRECKER, THOMAS SUTTON d/b/a ELK TOWING, and CHRIS HIGEL d/b/a ANYTIME TOWING, Plaintiffs v. THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CRIME CONTROL and PUBLIC SAFETY, and its agent, NORTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY PATROL and TROOP G, DISTRICT V, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEPHENS, Judge.\nThis appeal arises from a challenge to the latest version of the rules governing the North Carolina State Highway Patrol\u2019s wrecker rotation program, a voluntary program that uses private wreckers to tow disabled, seized, wrecked, and abandoned vehicles when a vehicle owner cannot or will not request a towing company. On 22 January 2009, Plaintiffs Danny\u2019s Towing 2, Inc., Doyle Sutton d/b/a Doyle\u2019s Garage and Wrecker, Donnie Sutton d/b/a Sutton Automotive and Wrecker Service, Brenda Edwards d/b/a B&H Towing, Ramdog Enterprises, LLC, James Autrey d/b/a Moe Bandy, Domestic Auto, Inc., Henry Grasty d/b/a Grasty\u2019s Service Center, Steve Miller d/b/a Rabbit Skin Wrecker, Thomas Sutton d/b/a Elk Towing, and Chris Higel d/b/a Anytime Towing (collectively \u201cPlaintiffs\u201d), wrecker services in Haywood County, filed a complaint in Haywood County District Court for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against Defendants the State Department of Crime Control and Public Safety (\u201cthe Department\u201d), the North Carolina Highway Patrol, and three Patrol officers. The complaint targeted the State\u2019s Wrecker Service Regulations, 14A NCAC 09H.0321(a) (\u201cthe rules\u201d), published by the Department in December 2006 and approved by the N.C. Rules Review Commission in March 2007, with an effective date of 18 July 2008.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint sought relief in the form of a declaratory judgment on two questions: whether \u201cthe acts of the Defendants are arbitrary and capricious and violate [the] North Carolina Constitution\u201d and whether the \u201cmethodology employed by the Defendants [in the wrecker rotation program] ... is arbitrary and not consistent with the . . . rules.\u201d Plaintiffs also sought temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctions of the rules.\nIn April 2009, the case was transferred from district to superior court. In June 2009, Defendants moved to dismiss and for partial summary judgment. In February 2010, the three named Highway Patrol officers were dismissed on the basis of public official immunity and Plaintiffs\u2019 claims for monetary damages were also dismissed; Defendants\u2019 motion was otherwise denied. Meanwhile, in the year and a half between the filing of the complaint and the order in this case, the North Carolina General Assembly passed a bill amending 14A NCAC 09H.0321(a), including, inter alia, a requirement that wreckers in the rotation program charge \u201creasonable prices.\u201d At a hearing on 17 May 2010, the parties agreed that six paragraphs of the rules were at issue. The trial court later issued an order enjoining the State from enforcing parts of five of the challenged paragraphs: (1) the requirement that wrecker services have a \u201cland-based telephone line\u201d; (2) the regulation prohibiting a driver with a valid Commercial Drivers License from driving in the rotation until the State receives a certified copy of his driving record; (3) the prohibition against wrecker services acquiring storage liens on freight or wares they were required to remove from a towed vehicle; and (4) the automatic by-pass provision, which allows the State to put a wrecker service at the bottom of the rotation list if it fails to answer a call. Finally, the trial court enjoined the State from setting fees for wrecker services provided through the rotation program. This appeal followed entry of the trial court\u2019s order.\nDiscussion\nOn appeal, Defendants make two arguments: that the trial court (I) exceeded its authority and jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act in reviewing the reasonableness of the rules rather than their legality and (II) erred in enjoining certain portions of the rules as unenforceable. As discussed below, we agree in part and conclude that this matter must be remanded for further proceedings.\nAt the start of the hearing, the trial court expressed confusion over the matters before it:\n... I want to put on the record what we\u2019re about. And I\u2019m not sure I\u2019ve got in front of me what we\u2019re about on all of this.... So somebody needs to tell me what we\u2019re going to . . . put on the record so if the Court of Appeals ever takes a look at this they can kind of figure out halfway what we\u2019ve done.\nThe parties agreed that parts of six paragraphs of the rules were being challenged:\nParagraph 2, under which \u201ca wrecker service must have a full-time business office . . . that is staffed and open during normal business hours of 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.\u201d\nParagraph 3, which requires wrecker services to maintain their own offices, including telephone lines, on their own independently insured property. Their equipment and facilities \u201cmay not be shared with or otherwise located on the property of another wrecker service . . . .\u201d\nParagraph 10, which requires wrecker services to \u201ccharge reasonable fees for services rendered.\u201d This paragraph allows the local Highway Patrol District Sergeant to approve price lists submitted to determine if they are \u201creasonable, consistent with fees charged by other Highway Patrol rotation wrecker services within the District and do not exceed the wrecker service\u2019s charges for nonrotation service calls that provide the same service, labor, and conditions.\u201d\nParagraph 22, which requires wrecker service owners to supply the Highway Patrol with certified copies of the driving records of all its drivers.\nParagraph 23, which requires the wrecker services to return personal property stored in or with a towed vehicle, \u201cwhether or not the towing, repair, or storage fee on the vehicle has been or will be paid.\u201d\nParagraph 28, which provides that any wrecker service which does not respond to a call from the Highway Patrol shall be \u201cautomatically by-passed,\u201d or placed at the bottom of the rotation call list.\nPlaintiffs argued that the paragraphs in dispute were preempted by federal law, in that the State can only regulate \u201cmotor carriers of property\u201d under the safety regulatory authority exception. In general, \u201c[federal preemption occurs when: (1) Congress enacts a statute that explicitly preempts state law; (2) state law actually conflicts with federal law; or (3) federal law occupies a legislative field to such an extent that it is reasonable to conclude that Congress left no room for state regulation in that field.\u201d Tocher v. City of Santa Ana, 219 F.3d 1040, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., 536 U.S. 424, 153 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2002). However, the relevant portion of the United States Code, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1), only preempts state and local regulation related to price, route, or service of a motor carrier with respect to the transportation of property. 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1) (2009). It explicitly does not restrict \u201cthe safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.\u201d 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(2)(A); see also City of Columbus, 536 U.S. at 442, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 446 (holding that rules which are \u201cgenuinely responsive to safety concerns\u201d are exempted from preemption).\nPlaintiffs asserted that the challenged sections of the rules do not affect public safety and sought a declaration to that effect, as well as an injunction. Defendants argued that the rules in toto fall within the safety regulatory exception. The order subsequently entered by the trial court enjoined specific parts of five of the six paragraphs challenged:\nParagraph 3, \u201cto the extent that it requires wrecker services to have a land-based telephone line.\u201d It also enjoins application of Paragraph 3 \u201cto the extent that it requires wrecker services to own in fee simple the property upon which its business or storage facilities are located.\u201d\nParagraph 10, \u201cto the extent that it allows the State to set fees.\u201d\nParagraph 22, \u201cto the extent that it prohibits a driver holding a valid Commercial Drivers License from operating a wrecker while waiting on a certified driving record from the Division of Motor Vehicles.\u201d\nParagraph 23, \u201cto the extent that it prohibits wrecker services from acquiring a storage lien over freight and/or wares that have been . . . removed from the [towed vehicle]\u201d and stored by the wrecker service.\nParagraph 28\u2019s automatic by-pass provision, \u201cunless the activity of the wrecker service is unreasonable.\u201d\nPermanent Injunction\nWe first note that the injunctive portion of the order does not set forth the reasons for its issuance as required by statute. Under N.C. Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), \u201c[e]very order granting an injunction ... shall set forth the reasons for its issuance.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 65(d) (2010) (emphasis added). However, \u201can injunctive order which does not state the reasons for its issuance is merely irregular, not void.\u201d Poor Richard\u2019s, Inc. v. Stone, 86 N.C. App. 137, 139-40, 356 S.E.2d 828, 830 (1987), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 322 N.C. 61, 366 S.E.2d 697 (1988). Such irregular orders are properly corrected by a motion made before the trial court and will not be corrected on appeal. Schultz v. Ingram, 38 N.C. App. 422, 426, 248 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1978). Accordingly, even an irregular order is binding until corrected. Id.\nHere, the order does not state the reasons for its issuance, beyond a bare statement that portions of the rules which the court did not enjoin are \u201creasonable and enforceable as written.\u201d Despite this failure to comply with our Rules of Civil Procedure, we consider the injunction on its merits and, for reasons which follow, we vacate in their entirety the injunctive terms of the trial court\u2019s order.\nIn Ramey v. Easley, a case considering the previous version of the wrecker rotation service rules, the plaintiff\nwas removed from the Wrecker Rotation Services List for failing to: (1) respond to at least 75% of the calls made to him by the Highway Patrol; (2) maintain a current Department of Transportation inspection sticker on his large wrecker; and (3) have proper cables installed on his wreckers.\n.. . .[The p]laintiff sought a declaratory judgment for the wrecker rotation regulations to be declared illegal. He assert[ed that] federal law preempt[ed] the Highway Patrol\u2019s ability to establish regulations for private wrecker companies to be included on its Wrecker Rotation Services List.\nRamey v. Easley, 178 N.C. App. 197, 198, 632 S.E.2d 178, 179 (2006). In that case, we held that\n[i]n the interest of public safety, the Highway Patrol has delegated authority to promulgate regulations setting forth the requirements a private wrecker service must meet in order to be included and remain on the Highway Patrol\u2019s Wrecker Rotation Services List. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-184; N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-188. The challenged regulations clearly relate to public highway safety. The trial court did not err in denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment.\nId. at 201, 632 S.E.2d at 181. Specifically, we held that\n[the] thirty-two conditions a private wrecker service must . . . comply with in order to be included and remain on the Wrecker Rotation Services List [such as] (1) maintaining] legally required lighting and other safety equipment to protect the public; (2) removing] all debris from the highway prior to leaving the collision scene; (3) maintain [ing] a full-time office within the Rotation Wrecker Zone; (4) consistently responding] to calls in a timely manner; (5) imposing] reasonable charges for work performed; [] (6) securing] all personal property at the scene of a collision to the extent possible; [] (7) preserving] personal property in a towed vehicle [; (8) maintaining a specific type and amount of insurance coverage and equipment] and prohibiting] persons with convictions for certain crimes from being included on the rotation list.... are \u201cgenuinely responsive to safety concerns.\u201d City of Columbus, 536 U.S. at 442, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 446.\n[Thus], the Highway Patrol\u2019s [regulations] fall within the \u201csafety regulatory authority\u201d exception set forth in 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(2)(A), and are not preempted by federal law.\nId. at 203-04, 632 S.E.2d at 182-83. Thus, this Court has already determined that wrecker service rotation rules requiring a timely response to calls and imposing reasonable fees fall into the public safety regulatory exception. Further, our review of the record indicates that Paragraph 23 in the 2010 version of the rules considered here is virtually identical to Paragraph 22 of the version considered and approved in Ramey. We are bound by Ramey, and, therefore, the trial court\u2019s injunction as to Paragraphs 10 (reasonable fee requirement), 23 (return of personal property), and 28 (automatic by-pass provision) is vacated. See In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) (\u201cWhere a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court.\u201d).\nFurther, the order purports to enjoin Paragraph 3 to the extent it \u201crequires wrecker services to have a land-based telephone line\u201d and \u201cto own in fee simple the property upon which its business or storage facilities are located.\u201d However, Plaintiffs did not argue in their complaint, affidavits, or at the hearing that they were being subjected to such requirements. Indeed, our review reveals that Paragraph 3 of the rules contains neither the phrase \u201cland-based\u201d nor \u201cfee simple.\u201d We see no possible interpretation of Paragraph 3 (or Paragraph 2, the portion of the rules which actually requires someone at the wrecker service be able to accept telephone calls from the Patrol) which would require land-based, as opposed to cellular, telephones or ownership of a wrecker service\u2019s premises in fee simple. Instead, Paragraph 3 is virtually identical to Paragraph 2 of the version of the rules considered and approved in Ramey, and we vacate this portion of the injunction as well.\nFinally, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s injunction of Paragraph 22 \u201cto the extent that it prohibits a driver holding a valid Commercial Drivers License from operating a wrecker while waiting on a certified driving record from the Division of Motor Vehicles\u201d must be vacated because ensuring proper licensure is a matter \u201cgenuinely responsive to safety concerns.\u201d City of Columbus, 536 U.S. at 442, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 446.\nDeclaratory Judgment\nWe next consider the order as a declaratory judgment. As noted above, the majority of the language in the order can only be construed as a permanent injunction. However, in paragraphs 2 through 8, the order\u2019s language enjoining specific portions of the challenged rules is followed by a \u201cdeclaration\u201d that \u201c[a] 11 other provisions of [the relevant rule section] are reasonable and enforceable as written.\u201d\n\u201cThe Declaratory Judgment Act, [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 1-253 et seq., affords an appropriate procedure for alleviating uncertainty in the interpretation of written instruments. . . .\u201d Hejl v. Hood, Hargett & Associates, Inc., 196 N.C. App. 299, 302, 674 S.E.2d 425, 427 (2009) (citation omitted). Such declarations \u201cmay be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-253 (2009). \u201cThe trial court\u2019s declaratory judgment need not be in any particular form so long as it actually decides the issues in controversy.\u201d Poor Richard\u2019s, Inc., 86 N.C. App. at 139, 356 S.E.2d at 830 (citing 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments, \u00a7\u00a7 158, 161 (1956)). However, the trial court\u2019s judgment should clearly declare the rights of the parties and effectively dispose of the dispute. Id.; see also 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments \u00a7 158, at 262 (2001) (\u201cIn awarding declaratory relief, the court generally should make a full and complete declaration . . .\u201d).\n\u201cThe standard of review, in declaratory judgment actions where the trial court decides questions of fact is whether the trial court\u2019s findings are supported by any competent evidence. Where the findings are supported by competent evidence, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal.\u201d Cross v. Capital Transaction Grp., Inc., 191 N.C. App. 115, 117, 661 S.E.2d 778, 780 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 124, 672 S.E.2d 687 (2009). \u201c \u2018However, the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Browning v. Helff 136 N.C. App. 420, 423, 524 S.E.2d 95, 98 (2000)).\nHere, the trial court\u2019s order states that the parties have agreed that the only uncertainty to be alleviated is the \u201clegality\u201d of various portions of the rules. Our review of the hearing transcript affirms this assertion. Plaintiffs\u2019 arguments at the hearing were focused entirely on whether Defendants had the authority to enact the challenged portions of the rules pursuant to the safety regulatory authority exception. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the challenged sections of the rules are federally preempted because they do not affect public safety, a legal determination. Thus, because there were no factual disputes and the trial court made no findings of fact, we review the order de novo.\nWe conclude that the trial court failed to clearly declare the rights of the parties and effectively dispose of the dispute by making \u201ca full and complete declaration.\u201d Importantly, the order fails to directly address the questions raised by Plaintiffs in their complaint and at the declaratory judgment hearing: whether \u201cthe acts of [] Defendants are arbitrary and capricious and violate [the] North Carolina Constitution,\u201d whether the \u201cmethodology employed by [] Defendants [in the wrecker rotation program] ... is arbitrary and not consistent with the . . . rules,\u201d and whether the challenged portions of the wrecker rotation rules are federally preempted because they are not related to public safety and, thus, fail to fall within the safety regulatory authority exception. As the trial court acknowledged in its order, these issues are questions of law, not fact.\nAs previously discussed, however, the order enjoins specific portions of the rules and then declares the remainder \u201creasonable and enforceable as written.\u201d While this construction might permit a logical inference that the enjoined portions are \u201cunreasonable and unenforceable as written,\u201d this was not the issue before the trial court. Whether rules are \u201creasonable\u201d does not resolve the question of whether they are federally preempted, a determination which requires an analysis of whether the challenged rules relate to public highway safety. Ramey, 178 N.C. App. at 202, 632 S.E.2d at 181-82. However, as discussed above, this Court\u2019s decision in Ramey precludes the trial court from reconsidering whether these portions of the rules are federally preempted. Moreover, the trial court\u2019s determination regarding the \u201creasonableness\u201d of the rules also failed to resolve the question of whether they are being implemented in a manner that is arbitrary. Because the trial court failed to decide this issue in controversy, we remand for it to do so.\nConclusion\nIn sum, we vacate the order to the extent it purports to enjoin portions of paragraphs 3, 10, 22, 23 and 28. On remand, the trial court may not revisit the question of federal preemption as to these or any other rules controlled by Ramey. Instead, on remand, the trial court shall decide the issue of whether Defendants are implementing and applying the wrecker rotation service rules in an arbitrary manner.\nVACATED IN PART; REMANDED IN PART.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge THIGPEN concur.\n. This plaintiff is listed in the original complaint as d/b/a Grasty\u2019s Servicenter, while the trial court\u2019s order lists it as d/b/a Grasty\u2019s Service Center.\n. The rule amendments at issue in the complaint had been stayed by the trial court a month earlier, on 29 December 2008, in proceedings related to another case.\n. Plaintiffs originally challenged the version of the rules effective in 2008. In 2010, the rules were amended again to incorporate the new \u201creasonable fees\u201d requirement passed by the General Assembly. The 2010 version of the rules was discussed at the hearing and referenced in the trial court\u2019s order.\n. Paragraph 3 states, in pertinent part: \u201cWrecker service facilities and equipment, including vehicles, office, telephone lines, office equipment and storage facilities may not be shared with or otherwise located on the property of another wrecker service and must be independently insured. Vehicles towed at the request of the Patrol must be placed in the storage owned and operated by the wrecker service on the rotation list.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "STEPHENS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Hal F. Askins and Assistant Attorney General Tamara Zmuda, for Defendants.", "McLean Law Firm, P.A., by Russell L. McLean, III, for Plaintiffs." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DANNY\u2019S TOWING 2, INC., DOYLE SUTTON d/b/a DOYLE\u2019S GARAGE AND WRECKER, DONNIE SUTTON d/b/a SUTTON AUTOMOTIVE AND WRECKER SERVICE, BRENDA EDWARDS d/b/a B&H TOWING, RAMDOG ENTERPRISES, LLC, JAMES AUTREY d/b/a MOE BANDY, DOMESTIC AUTO, INC., HENRY GRASTY d/b/a GRASTY'S SERVICE CENTER, STEVE MILLER d/b/a RABBIT SKIN WRECKER, THOMAS SUTTON d/b/a ELK TOWING, and CHRIS HIGEL d/b/a ANYTIME TOWING, Plaintiffs v. THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CRIME CONTROL and PUBLIC SAFETY, and its agent, NORTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY PATROL and TROOP G, DISTRICT V, Defendants\nNo. COA10-1498\n(Filed 19 July 2011)\n1. Injunctions\u2014 State Highway Patrol\u2019s wrecker rotation program \u2014 bases of injunction not adequate\nThe trial court erred in an injunctive relief case by enjoining certain portions of the rules governing the North Carolina State Highway Patrol\u2019s wrecker rotation program as unenforceable. The order of injunction did not state the reasons for its issuance, beyond a bare statement that portions of the rules which the court did not enjoin were reasonable and enforceable as written.\n2. Declaratory Judgments\u2014 North Carolina State Highway Patrol\u2019s wrecker rotation \u2014 declaration of parties\u2019 rights\u2014 incomplete\nThe trial court erred in a declaratory judgment case by failing to clearly declare the rights of the parties and effectively dispose of the dispute concerning the rules governing the North Carolina State Highway Patrol\u2019s wrecker rotation. Because the trial court failed to make a full and complete declaration, the matter was remanded.\nAppeal by Defendants from order issued 14 July 2010 and entered 19 July 2010 by Judge C. Philip Ginn in Haywood County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 June 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Hal F. Askins and Assistant Attorney General Tamara Zmuda, for Defendants.\nMcLean Law Firm, P.A., by Russell L. McLean, III, for Plaintiffs." }, "file_name": "0375-01", "first_page_order": 385, "last_page_order": 394 }