{ "id": 4233823, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WAYNE CARROUTHERS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Carrouthers", "decision_date": "2011-07-19", "docket_number": "No. COA10-1470", "first_page": "384", "last_page": "391", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "213 N.C. App. 384" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "646 S.E.2d 597", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638856 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600", "parenthetical": "\"[D]uring a session of the court a judgment is in fieri, and the court has authority in its sound discretion, prior to expiration of the session, to modify, amend or set aside the judgment.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/646/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "656 S.E.2d 721", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640375 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "727" }, { "page": "727", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/656/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 S.E.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640657 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646", "parenthetical": "quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/658/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 N.C. App. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8185609 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310", "parenthetical": "\"[D]uring a session of the court a judgment is in fieri, and the court has authority in its sound discretion, prior to expiration of the session, to modify, amend or set aside the judgment.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/184/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 F.3d 1356", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9153093 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/388/1356-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 U.S. 408", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11595747 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414", "parenthetical": "\"[D]anger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"[D]anger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/519/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 U.S. 93", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5902037 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he need to detain multiple occupants made the use of handcuffs all the more reasonable.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"[T]he need to detain multiple occupants made the use of handcuffs all the more reasonable.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/544/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 U.S. 385", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11652004 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"It is indisputable that felony drug investigations may frequently\" pose \"a threat of physical violence.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"It is indisputable that felony drug investigations may frequently\" pose \"a threat of physical violence.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/520/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 3d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "974 F.2d 953", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10517916 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "957" }, { "page": "957", "parenthetical": "holding officer's decision to handcuff two of six suspects during an investigatory stop because officers were outnumbered was reasonable" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/974/0953-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 F.3d 903", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 3463808 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907" }, { "page": "907" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/462/0903-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 F.3d 1491", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11944735 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1502" }, { "page": "1507" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/100/1491-01" ] }, { "cite": "924 A.2d 1129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 4111563 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1142" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/399/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156256 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" }, { "page": "708" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "883 F.2d 326", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10528440 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/883/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 221", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11959006 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" }, { "page": "616" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 U.S. 675", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11300009 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" }, { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/470/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 768", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "772" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 N.C. App. 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11434172 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 U.S. 491", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6195479 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500", "parenthetical": "\"[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.\"" }, { "page": "238", "parenthetical": "\"[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/460/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" }, { "page": "906" }, { "page": "19-20" }, { "page": "905", "parenthetical": "holding constitutional validity of further police activity hinges on whether it is \"reasonably related in scope\" to circumstances justifying interference in the first place" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149866 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249", "parenthetical": "quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549311 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 U.S. 643", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1785580 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" }, { "page": "1090" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/367/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2503651 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 S.E.2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8915624 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 781", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784-85" }, { "page": "785" }, { "page": "784", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "784", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N.C. App. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4171407 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" }, { "page": "419" }, { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/200/0415-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 950, "char_count": 18955, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.221273109503025e-08, "percentile": 0.329518632167358 }, "sha256": "fb136098f4ab0e9715f3bdf96eb655635a8dc6498119fec69bc5e5998593ad00", "simhash": "1:80e9907467260d76", "word_count": 3044 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:51:58.983312+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WAYNE CARROUTHERS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BEASLEY, Judge.\nWayne Carrouthers (Defendant) appeals from the trial court\u2019s order denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained after he was placed in handcuffs by a law enforcement officer in the course of an investigative detention. We affirm.\nOn 29 October 2007, Defendant was indicted for resisting a public officer, sale of cocaine, possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, and attaining habitual felon status, all arising out of his arrest on 14 September 2007.\nOn 29 August 2008, Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained by Agent Robert Huneycutt of the North Carolina Alcohol Law Enforcement Agency (ALE). In his motion, Defendant argued that when he was handcuffed during the stop, an illegal seizure occurred and the investigatory detention was converted to an arrest because a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. On 25 September 2008, the trial court initially agreed and granted Defendant\u2019s motion, concluding that Defendant \u201cwas under arrest\u201d when he \u201cwas handcuffed by Agent Huneycutt\u201d because \u201ca reasonable person would not have felt free to leave.\u201d\nThe State appealed, and on 20 October 2009, this Court reversed the trial court\u2019s order due to its application of an incorrect standard in determining whether Defendant was under arrest at the time he was handcuffed. State v. Carrouthers (Carrouthers I), 200 N.C. App. 415, 420, 683 S.E.2d 781, 784-85 (2009). Holding that the trial court was required to resolve \u201cwhether there existed special circumstances justifying the handcuffing of Defendant as the least intrusive means reasonably necessary to carry out the purpose of the investigatory stop,\u201d we remanded the case for further findings of fact on this question. Id. at 420, 683 S.E.2d at 785.\nWe include below a summary of the evidence discussed in Carrouthers I and a recitation of any additional facts relevant to the specific issue before the trial court on remand.\nOn 14 September 2007, Agent Huneycutt was conducting routine ALE surveillance at an Exxon on the Run convenience store in Charlotte, North Carolina where he had previously made several drug and alcohol arrests. Agent Huneycutt observed a vehicle occupied by three individuals pull into the convenience store lot and park approximately twenty feet away from him. Two females occupied the front seat, and a male later identified as Defendant sat in the back right passenger seat of the car.\nAgent Huneycutt then observed an unknown male walk over to the right rear door of the vehicle, kneel down, and hold out his upturned palm towards Defendant. Defendant\u2019s arm moved three times as if he were counting something out from his left-front pants pocket and into the hand of the unknown male, who \u201cclasped his fist\u201d and walked away. Based on his law enforcement experience, Agent Huneycutt concluded that he had witnessed a hand-to-hand drug transaction between Defendant and the unknown male and then approached Defendant, who was outside of the vehicle at that point. Agent Huneycutt told Defendant what he had seen, and Defendant denied any wrongdoing, claiming that he merely handed a cigarette to the unknown male. Agent Huneycutt then frisked Defendant, though finding no weapons on Defendant\u2019s person, felt a lumpy item in Defendant\u2019s left-front pants pocket. Believing the item to be consistent with narcotics, Agent Huneycutt handcuffed Defendant \u201cfor officer safety\u201d purposes \u201c[b]ecause there [were] two other individuals in the vehicle.\u201d Defendant then admitted \u201cthat he had sold the individual a couple of rocks\u201d and \u201chad some stuff in his pocket.\u201d Agent Huneycutt recovered six individually packaged rocks of crack cocaine from Defendant\u2019s left pocket and placed Defendant under arrest.\nOn 26 February 2010, the trial court heard arguments of counsel as to the remanded issue. The trial court first entered a form order that same day, finding special circumstances did not exist \u201cto justify the handcuffing of Defendant as the least intrusive means reasonably necessary to carry out the purpose of the investigatory stop\u201d and reinstated the earlier suppression order. The trial court, however, later issued detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, thus reversing its earlier decision in a second order entered 1 March 2010. In this superseding order, the trial court concluded \u201cAgent Huneycutt had a reasonably articulable suspicion that a crime was underway,\u201d justifying the investigatory stop. Additionally, the officer \u201ctook steps necessary to protect his personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the stop.\u201d The trial court reasoned that special circumstances justified Agent Huneycutt\u2019s use of handcuffs in the course thereof, namely, \u201c[t]he presence of two other people with Defendant in the vehicle[.]\u201d\nOn 4 June 2010, Defendant entered an Alford plea to sale of cocaine and possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine in exchange for the dismissal of resisting an officer and attaining habitual felon status, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The trial court sentenced Defendant to consecutive prison terms of 17 to 21 months for sale of cocaine and 7 to 9 months for possession with the intent to sell or deliver cocaine. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal.\nIn reviewing the trial court\u2019s order on a motion to suppress, the scope of this Court\u2019s review \u201cis strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge\u2019s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge\u2019s ultimate conclusions of law.\u201d State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). When \u201cthe trial court\u2019s findings of fact are not challenged on appeal, they are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.\u201d State v. Roberson, 163 N.C. App. 129, 132, 592 S.E.2d 733, 735-36 (2004). However, this Court will review the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law de novo to verify that its ruling was correct. State v. Mahaley, 332 N.C. 583, 592-93, 423 S.E.2d 58, 64 (1992).\nDefendant contends the trial court erroneously concluded that \u201cthe mere presence of two other people in the car, while [he] was standing outside the car, was a special circumstance that justified , handcuffing [Defendant] as the least intrusive means reasonably necessary to carry out a stop to investigate a suspected nonviolent crime.\u201d\n\u201c[T]he Fourth Amendment\u2019s right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth [Amendment].\u201d Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1090 (1961); see also State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 69 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause, protects \u201cagainst unreasonable searches and seizures\u201d and \u201capplies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory detentions[.]\u201d). As noted in Carrouthers I, there are generally two ways in which a person can be \u201cseized\u201d for Fourth Amendment purposes: (1) by arrest, which requires a showing of probable cause; or (2) by investigatory detention, which must rest on a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Carrouthers I, 200 N.C. App. at 419, 683 S.E.2d at 784 (citations omitted). On remand, the trial court addressed the second scenario, known as the \u201cTerry stop,\u201d where a law enforcement officer is permitted to \u201cinitiate a brief stop and frisk of an individual if there are \u2018specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.\u2019 \u201d State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 249, 658 S.E.2d 643, 646 (2008) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968)).\nStill, a valid initial investigatory stop does not shield the officers\u2019 subsequent actions from scrutiny, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905 (holding constitutional validity of further police activity hinges on whether it is \u201creasonably related in scope\u201d to circumstances justifying interference in the first place); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238 (1983) (\u201c[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.\u201d). The seizure may become a de facto arrest if an officer exceeds the scope of a permissible investigatory stop, see State v. Milien, 144 N.C. App. 335, 340, 548 S.E.2d 768, 772 (2001) (\u201cWhere the duration or nature of the intrusion exceeds the permissible scope, a court may determine that the seizure constituted a de facto arrest that must be justified by probable cause, even in the absence of a formal arrest.\u201d (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 615 (1985))). While officers are \u201cauthorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the [investigative] stop[,]\u201d United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 616 (1985), \u201c[t]he characteristics of the investigatory stop, including its length, the methods used, and any search performed, should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to effectuate the purpose of the stop\u201d in order to keep the detention within permissible bounds and prevent the same from becoming a defacto arrest. Carrouthers I, 200 N.C. App. at 419, 683 S.E.2d at 784 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nTo be sure, \u201c[b]rief, even if complete, deprivations of a suspect\u2019s liberty do not convert a stop and frisk into an arrest so long as the methods of restraint used are reasonable to the circumstances.\u201d United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 1989). In fact, as this Court noted in State v. Campbell, 188 N.C. App. 701, 656 S.E.2d 721 (2008),\n\u201cthe permissible scope of a Terry stop has expanded in the past few decades, allowing police officers to neutralize dangerous suspects during an investigative detention using measures of force such as placing handcuffs on suspects, placing the suspect in the back of police cruisers, drawing weapons, and other forms of force typically used during an arrest.\u201d\nCampbell, 188 N.C. App. at 709, 656 S.E.2d at 727 (quoting Longshore v. State, 924 A.2d 1129, 1142 (Md. 2007)); see also United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th Cir. 1996) (\u201c[U]se of firearms, handcuffs, and other forceful techniques does not necessarily transform a Terry detention into a full custodial arrest \u2014 for which probable cause is required \u2014 when the circumstances reasonably warrant such measures.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\nIn Campbell, this Court addressed the use of handcuffs during a Terry stop and held that the officers\u2019 handcuffing of the defendant was reasonable \u201cto maintain the status quo\u201d of the situation. Campbell, 188 N.C. App. at 708, 656 S.E.2d at 727 (internal quotation marks omitted). We cited cases from other jurisdictions for examples of instances during which \u201chandcuffs were permitted in investigative detentions\u201d in those circuits. See Id. (citing United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 907 (8th Cir. 2006)). In Martinez, the Eighth Circuit held \u201cthat use of handcuffs can be a reasonable precaution during a Terry stop to protect [officers\u2019] safety and maintain the status quo\u201d and noted the Court\u2019s earlier conclusion in United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1992), \u201cthat cuffing of suspects during [a] Terry stop where suspects outnumbered officers and where officers were concerned for safety was reasonably necessary to achieve purposes of Terry stop.\u201d Martinez, 462 F.3d at 907. Another court has observed various \u201c[circumstances in which handcuffing has been determined to be reasonably necessary for the detention,\u201d including when:\n(1) the suspect is uncooperative; (2) the officer has information the suspect is currently armed; (3) the officer has information the suspect is about to commit a violent crime; (4) the detention closely follows a violent crime by a person matching the suspect\u2019s description and/or vehicle; (5) the suspect acts in a manner raising a reasonable possibility of danger or flight; or (6) the suspects outnumber the officers.\nPeople v. Stier, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 77, 82 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).\nHere, based on the totality of the circumstances, Agent Huneycutt\u2019s placement of Defendant in handcuffs was likewise reasonable. The trial court\u2019s order contains several findings of fact particularly relevant to the question posed on remand, including the following: Defendant does not challenge any of the trial court\u2019s findings. Thus, there is no dispute that Agent Huneycutt witnessed Defendant engage in a drug transaction or that he subsequently felt an item consistent with narcotics upon frisking Defendant, corroborating his suspicion that Defendant was involved in various drug crimes at the time. These circumstances presented a possible threat of physical violence \u2014 despite the fact that no weapon was discovered on Defendant\u2019s person during the pat down \u2014 as courts have often \u201cencountered . . . links between drugs and violence.\u201d Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 391 & n.2, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615, 622 & n.2 (1997) (\u201cIt is indisputable that felony drug investigations may frequently\u201d pose \u201ca threat of physical violence.\u201d).\n5. Agent Huneycutt observed a teal Hyundai occupied by three people pull into the gas station and park facing away from the store at gas pumps located in front of and to the right of Agent Huneycutt\u2019s car.\n12. Agent Huneycutt concluded, based on his training and experience, that what he observed [when Defendant appeared to be placing something into the hand of an unknown individual who was kneeling beside Defendant\u2019s passenger door] was a hand-to-hand drug transaction. He got out of his car, called CharlotteMecklenburg Police for back-up, and walked toward Mr. Carrouthers to investigate.\n13. Before Agent Huneycutt got out of his car, the unknown individual immediately turned, clenched his fist, and walked away from the teal car.\n18. In response to Agent Huneycutt\u2019s assertions, Mr. Carrouthers replied that he had given the unknown individual a cigarette.\n19. Because Defendant wore baggy clothes, an oversized shirt and pants of a heavy fabric, Agent Huneycutt feared that he may have been concealing a weapon. He conducted a \u201cTerry frisk\u201d and felt what he believed to be a lumpy plastic bag in Mr. Carrouthers\u2019 pocket which was consistent with contraband.\n20. No weapon was found on Mr. Carrouthers, but Agent Huneycutt handcuffed him for officer safety due to the presence of two other people in the Hyundai.\nMoreover, it is indisputable that there were two other individuals in the car when Agent Huneycutt approached Defendant; Agent Huneycutt thus believed the situation warranted additional police assistance because he was outnumbered three to one when he placed Defendant in handcuffs. See Miller, 974 F.2d at 957 (holding officer\u2019s decision to handcuff two of six suspects during an investigatory stop because officers were outnumbered was reasonable); see also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, \u2014 (2005) (\u201c[T]he need to detain multiple occupants made the use of handcuffs all the more reasonable.\u201d); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, - (1997) (\u201c[D]anger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car.\u201d). Several courts have held that a circumstance in which the suspects outnumber the officers is a factor that weighs in favor of the use of handcuffs during a temporary detention as reasonably necessary. See, e.g., United States v. Maddox, 388 F.3d 1356, 1367 (10th Cir. 2004); Shareef, 100 F.3d at 1507. Accordingly, it was reasonable for Agent Huneycutt to handcuff Defendant as a permissible safety measure after the frisk gave him further reason to believe a drug crime had just occurred and where he was outnumbered by the suspects, three to one, and backup had not yet arrived.\nIn light of the circumstances detailed above, the trial court properly concluded that the two individuals in the car constituted a special circumstance that justified handcuffing the Defendant. Thus, this safety-related detainment did not escalate the Terry stop into an arrest and we affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nAffirmed.\nJudges McGEE and STROUD concur.\n. Defendant\u2019s surname is spelled differently in various court documents and orders filed in this matter. Although the case names in the opinions of this Court are to be derived from the last order or judgment of the trial court within the record \u2014 the judgment and commitment order in this case \u2014 and the subject judgment identifies Defendant as Wayne Carrothers, our previous opinion in this case is captioned State v. Carrouthers, 200 N.C. App. 415, 683 S.E.2d 781 (2009), and we maintain the same spelling here for consistency.\n. While Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress and the initial order entered thereon are not included in the record on appeal, they constitute the basis for an earlier appeal in this case and are part of the record in COA09-31.\n. Neither party challenges the trial court\u2019s reversal of its 26 February order, but we underscore that the judge was indeed entitled to modify her own order where court was still in session. See State v. Mead, 184 N.C. App. 306, 310, 646 S.E.2d 597, 600 (2007) (\u201c[D]uring a session of the court a judgment is in fieri, and the court has authority in its sound discretion, prior to expiration of the session, to modify, amend or set aside the judgment.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)).", "type": "majority", "author": "BEASLEY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Marc Bernstein, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WAYNE CARROUTHERS\nNo. COA10-1470\n(Filed 19 July 2011)\nSearch and Seizure\u2014 handcuffed defendant \u2014 special circumstance \u2014 safety-related detainment \u2014 stop not arrest\u2014 motion to suppress properly denied\nThe trial court did not err in a resisting a public officer, sale of cocaine, possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, and attaining habitual felon case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence obtained after he was placed in handcuffs by a law enforcement officer. The trial court properly concluded that a special circumstance justified handcuffing defendant and, thus, this safety-related detainment did not escalate the Terry stop into an arrest.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 4 June 2010 by Judge Yvonne Mims Evans in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 April 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Marc Bernstein, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0384-01", "first_page_order": 394, "last_page_order": 401 }