{ "id": 4233609, "name": "RICHARD STEINER and wife TINA STEINER, Plaintiffs v. WINDROW ESTATES HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Steiner v. Windrow Estates Home Owners Ass'n", "decision_date": "2011-07-19", "docket_number": "No. COA10-865", "first_page": "454", "last_page": "468", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "213 N.C. App. 454" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "611 S.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632651, 12632652, 12632653 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/611/0416-01", "/se2d/611/0416-02", "/se2d/611/0416-03" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3795617, 3796867, 3801443, 3801157, 12632651, 12632653, 12632655, 3799888, 12632657, 12632656, 3803351, 3797305 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0322-02", "/nc/359/0322-05", "/nc/359/0322-01", "/nc/359/0322-07", "/se2d/611/0416-01", "/se2d/611/0416-03", "/se2d/611/0417-02", "/nc/359/0322-04", "/se2d/611/0418-01", "/se2d/611/0417-03", "/nc/359/0322-03", "/nc/359/0322-06" ] }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 686", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562583 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822-23" }, { "page": "822-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 N.C. App. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525741 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599" }, { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/58/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 S.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779", "parenthetical": "\"If the granting of summary judgment can be sustained on any grounds, it should be affirmed on appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2482580 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428", "parenthetical": "\"If the granting of summary judgment can be sustained on any grounds, it should be affirmed on appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "696 S.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "827" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 U.S. 611", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11734946 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" }, { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/402/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184", "parenthetical": "affirming the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of property owners rather than the property owner's association because the covenants provided \"no sufficient basis for the court to decree enforcement of the assessments\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 N.C. App. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550227 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297", "parenthetical": "affirming the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of property owners rather than the property owner's association because the covenants provided \"no sufficient basis for the court to decree enforcement of the assessments\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/48/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 707", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 11, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712-13", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "713", "parenthetical": "citation, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. App. 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4168794 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479-80", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/198/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "605 S.E.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 N.C. App. 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8412646 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/167/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-253", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1144, "char_count": 33245, "ocr_confidence": 0.733, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.087085966315723e-08, "percentile": 0.378361248088209 }, "sha256": "225b65874ebdfc007e5321e7055db0ad4418e0e7c4815bcd207b2681707f1b07", "simhash": "1:1d799e6a221f4dfd", "word_count": 5408 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:51:58.983312+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "RICHARD STEINER and wife TINA STEINER, Plaintiffs v. WINDROW ESTATES HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nDefendant appeals a summary judgment order in a declaratory judgment action which determined that plaintiffs could keep the goats, Fred and Barney, on their property. For the following reasons, we affirm.\nI. Background\nOn or about 8 May 2009, plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-253 et. seq. seeking a declaration that certain restrictive covenants upon their real property (\u201cProperty\u201d) were not enforceable against them. Plaintiffs alleged that they owned Property in a subdivision known as Windrow Estates, which is subject to \u201ccertain restrictive covenants set forth in the Declaration of Covenants, Reservations, and Restrictions filed with the Mecklenburg County Register of Deeds in Deed Book 3601, Page 373 (\u201cRestrictive Covenants\u201d) . . . .\u201d Plaintiffs further alleged that defendant\nWindrow HOA[, defendant Windrow Estates Home Owners Association, Inc.,] is empowered to enforce the Restrictive Covenants and provide rules and regulations for common properties within Windrow Estates and assess each property owner for upkeep of said common properties.\n6. Windrow Estates is an equestrian community and many property owners within the subdivision pasture and keep horses on their lots and have built stables for the same.\n8. On or about September 17, 2008, the Steiners purchased two male Nigerian Dwarf Goats as pets for themselves and their children and named them Fred and Barney (the \u201cPet Goats\u201d).\n16. On or about April 15, 2009, the Executive Board of the Windrow HOA (the \u201cBoard\u201d), following a hearing regarding the Pet Goats, informed the Steiners that the Board had determined that the Steiners, by keeping the Pet Goats on the Property, were in violation of the Restrictive Covenants, specifically numbers 6 and 9. . . .\n17. Restrictive Covenant 6 states: \u201cNo offensive or noxious activity shall be carried on upon any lot, nor shall anything be done thereon tending to cause embarrassment, discomfort, annoyance, or nuisance to the neighborhood. There shall not be maintained any plants or animals, or device or thing of any sort whose normal activity or existence is in any way noxious, unsightly, unpleasant or of a nature as may diminish or destroy the enjoyment of other property in the neighborhood by the owners thereof; except horses and stables may be maintained, but every effort must be made to reduce the stable odors.\u201d\n18. Restrictive Covenant 9 states: \u201cNo animals, livestock or poultry of any kind shall be raised, bred or kept on any lot except that horses, dogs, cats or other pets may be kept provided they are not kept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purposes, unless allowed by Windrow Estates Property Owners\u2019 Association, and provided that such household pets do not attack horses or horsemen.\u201d\nPlaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment declaring that plaintiffs,\nby keeping the Pet Goats on the Property, are not in violation of the Restrictive Covenants, that the Pet Goats are within the meaning of the \u201cpet\u201d exception within the Restrictive Covenants, and that the Pet Goats\u2019 normal activity or existence is not noxious, unsightly, unpleasant or of a nature as may diminish or destroy the enjoyment of other property in Windrow Estates by the owners thereof].]\nOn 6 July 2009, defendant answered plaintiffs\u2019 complaint and counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment declaring, inter alia,\nthat goats are not permitted to be kept on any Lot under the terms and conditions of the [Restrictive Covenants];\n4. That the Court enter judgment declaring that \u201cgoats\u201d are livestock;\n6. That the Court enter judgment declaration [sic] that the Association was within its discretion in concluding that the maintaining of goats on Plaintiffs\u2019 property violates Paragraphs 6 and 9 of the [Restrictive Covenants].\nOn 21 August 2009, plaintiffs replied to defendant\u2019s counterclaim. On 27 January 2010, plaintiffs and defendant filed motions for summary judgment. On 23 February 2010, the trial court, inter alia, granted plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment and permitted Fred and Barney \u201cto be kept on plaintiffs\u2019 Lot within Windrow Estates.\u201d Defendant appeals.\nII. Standard of Review\nWe first note that although this case is based upon action taken by the Board against plaintiffs pursuant to the Restrictive Covenants of Windrow Estates, it is not an appeal arising from the Board\u2019s decision, but rather is a declaratory judgment action, both as to plaintiffs\u2019 claim and defendant\u2019s counterclaim.\nSummary judgment may be granted in a declaratory judgment proceeding where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law .... On appeal, this Court\u2019s standard of review involves a two-step determination of whether (1) the relevant evidence establishes the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and (2) either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\nProd. Sys., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 167 N.C. App. 601, 604, 605 S.E.2d 663, 665 (2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted); disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 322, 611 S.E.2d 416 (2005).\nIII. Restrictive Covenants\nBoth plaintiffs and defendant argue that there is no issue of fact, but that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in concluding that (1) Fred and Barney are \u201chousehold pets\u201d pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Restrictive Covenants, and (2) the Board abused its discretion in determining Fred and Barney are a nuisance pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Restrictive Covenants.\nWe first review the principles that guide our analysis of restrictive covenants. The word covenant means a binding agreement or compact benefitting both covenanting parties. Covenants accompanying the purchase of real property are contracts which create private incorporeal rights, meaning non-possessory rights held by the seller, a third-party, or a group of people, to use or limit the use of the purchased property. Judicial enforcement of a covenant will occur as it would in an action for enforcement of any other valid contractual relationship. Thus, judicial enforcement of a restrictive covenant is appropriate at the summary judgment stage unless a material issue of fact exists as to the validity of the contract, the effect of the covenant on the unimpaired enjoyment of the estate, or the existence of a provision that is contrary to the public interest.\n[W]hile the intentions of the parties to restrictive covenants ordinarily control the construction of the covenants, such covenants are not favored by the law, and they will be strictly construed to the end that all ambiguities will be resolved in favor of the unrestrained use of land. The rule of strict construction is grounded in sound considerations of public policy: It is in the best interests of society that the free and unrestricted use and enjoyment of land be encouraged to its fullest extent.\nThe law looks with disfavor upon covenants restricting the free use of property. As a consequence, the law declares that nothing can be read into a restrictive covenant enlarging its meaning beyond what its language plainly and unmistakably imports.\nCovenants restricting the use of property are to be strictly construed against limitation on use, and will not be enforced unless clear and unambiguous. This is in accord with general principles of contract law, that the terms of a contract must be sufficiently definite that a court can enforce them. Accordingly, courts will not enforce restrictive covenants that are so vague that they do not provide guidance to the court.\n... Unless the covenants set out a specialized meaning, the language of a restrictive covenant is interpreted by using its ordinary meaning.\nWein II, LLC v. Porter, 198 N.C. App. 472, 479-80, 683 S.E.2d 707, 712-13 (2009) (emphasis added) (citations, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted).\nA. Paragraph 9 of the Restrictive Covenants\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred in concluding Fred and Barney are \u201chousehold pets\u201d pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Restrictive Covenants. Regarding paragraph 9 of the Restrictive Covenants the trial court determined that\n4. Plaintiffs\u2019 Nigerian Dwarf goats respectively named Fred and Barney (\u201cNigerian Dwarfs\u201d) are Plaintiffs\u2019 household pets;\n5. Plaintiffs\u2019 Nigerian Dwarfs are not livestock;\n6. Because the Nigerian Dwarfs are not livestock and are household pets, Plaintiffs, by keeping the Nigerian Dwarfs on their Lot, are not in violation of Paragraph 9 of the [Restrictive Covenants.]\nParagraph 9 of the Restrictive Covenants provides:\nNo animals, livestock or poultry of any kind shall be raised, bred or kept on any lot except that horses, dogs, cats or other pets may be kept provided they are not kept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purposes, unless allowed by Windrow Estates Property Owners\u2019 Association, and provided that such household pets do not attack horses or horsemen.\nDefendant\u2019s arguments on appeal primarily focus on the meaning and interpretation of the words \u201clivestock[,]\u201d \u201cpets[,]\u201d and \u201chousehold pets[,]\u201d and the purpose and intent of the Restrictive Covenants. As the Restrictive Covenants do not define any of these words, we must use the \u201cordinary meaning\u201d of the words. See id. at 480, 683 S.E.2d at 713. \u201cLivestock\u201d is defined as \u201canimals kept or raised for use or pleasure; esp : farm animals kept for use and profit[.]\u201d Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 728 (11th ed. 2003). Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary defines a \u201cpet,\u201d inter alia, as \u201ca domesticated animal kept for pleasure rather than utility[,]\u201d Id. at 926. Thus, the distinguishing feature between \u201clivestock\u201d and a \u201cpet\u201d is that \u201clivestock\u201d is primarily \u201ckept for use and profit\u201d while a \u201cpet\u201d is \u201ckept for pleasure[.]\u201d Id. at 728, 926.\n1. Livestock\nDefendant contends that \u201c[t]he [Restrictive Covenants] at issue ha[ve] a specific restriction on livestock, which includes goats.\u201d Defendant then directs our attention to legal definitions of \u201clivestocki,]\u201d including the Matthews Town Ordinance. However, legal definitions of \u201clivestock\u201d are not controlling in our analysis; here, the Restrictive Covenants did not provide a definition of the word \u201clivestock[,]\u201d nor did the Restrictive Covenants refer to or incorporate any legal definitions such as the Matthews Town Ordinance, and thus we are bound by the \u201cordinary meaning\u201d of the word. See Wein, II, at 480, 683 S.E.2d at 713. Id. If the drafters of the Restrictive Covenants intended to use the definition of \u201clivestock\u201d as provided by the Town of Matthews they could have simply drafted this into the Restrictive Covenants. \u201c[N]othing can be read into a restrictive covenant enlarging its meaning beyond what its language plainly and unmistakably imports [,]\u201d and therefore we consider the \u201cordinary meaning\u201d of the word \u201clivestock[.]\u201d Id.\nThe facts regarding Fred and Barney and their relationship to plaintiffs are not disputed by defendant. Mrs. Tina Steiner\u2019s affidavit states as follows:\n8. In 2008, I was diagnosed with melanoma, a form of skin cancer. I began undergoing treatment for the cancer. During this time, I was also being treated and under medical supervision for heart disease and was later diagnosed [with] asthma.\n9. As a result of the stress emanating from these medical conditions and events in my personal life, as well as the advice of my physician, I decided to buy comfort pets to help me cope and aid in my recovery.\n10. After much research, I decided to purchase Dwarf Nigerian Goats as comfort pets that could be kept in the same area as my horses and were known to adapt well and live in close confines with horses.\n11. On or about September 17, 2008, Richard and I purchased two male Nigerian Dwarf Goats as pets for myself and our children from Peach Tree Farms (\u201cPeach Tree\u201d) in Oakboro, North Carolina. Peach Tree Farms breeds and raises registered Nigerian Dwarf Goats for sale solely as pets.\n12. My family and I named the two Nigerian Dwarfs Fred and Barney, respectively.\n13. When we purchased Fred and Barney from Peach Tree, they had already been neutered and disbudded, i.e., their horns had been removed. As Fred and Barney have been neutered, they are unable to breed and, as males, they do not produce any milk. Moreover, there is no market for their meat in the United States. Fred and Barney do not, and cannot, serve any commercial purpose other than resale. We purchased Fred and Barney solely as pets and for our enjoyment.\n15. Since bringing Fred and Barney home from Peach Tree, we have kept them on our Property. Fred and Barney primarily stay in the corralled area where we keep the horses.\n17. Fred and Barney are treated much like our family\u2019s pet dogs and interact with our family in a very similar manner. Fred and Barney are very affectionate, gentle, and make great companions. Much like our family\u2019s dogs, Fred and Barney walk on a leash in our yard, sit in our laps, follow us around in their enclosure and in the yard, tug at our clothes to be petted or to jump in our arms, swing with us on our outdoor swing, retrieve their brush and bring it to us to be brushed, retrieve and bring back balls when thrown, travel in a dog carrier placed in our car when taken to the vet, play with my kids, beg for treats, and answer and come to us when we call their respective names of Fred or Barney.\n18. Fred and Barney, together, while at our Property, slept in an \u201cIgloo Dog House\u201d of medium size that is placed within the stable of the Property. When it was cold at night, I took blankets and tucked them in and/or put coats on them to protect them from the cold air.\n19. I regularly buy items from local pet stores for Fred and Barney, including their leashes, collars, brushes, treats, bedding, dog house, and medicines.\n20. I have developed a love and bond with Fred and Barney that is as strong as or stronger than that which I have had with any other pet. Fred and Barney are always affectionate with me and appear excited to see me. They provide me comfort no matter how badly I feel or how much stress I am enduring at any given time. Fred and Barney have allowed me to better deal with my various medical conditions and the stresses that result from my health and personal challenges.\n21. Fred and Barney are well behaved and interact well with people and other animals. Our friends, neighbors, and other children regularly petted and played with Fred and Barney when visiting our home. My children play with Fred and Barney and I have never had a concern about Fred or Barney harming my children. Fred and Barney have never caused harm or attempted to cause harm to our horses or any neighborhood pets, including the occasional wayward dog or passing horse.\nMrs. Steiner\u2019s affidavit demonstrates that she viewed and treated her goats as pets rather than as livestock. See generally Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary at 728, 926. Mrs. Steiner attested: Fred and Barney were purchased as \u201ccomfort pets[;]\u201d have no \u201ccommercial purpose other than resale [;]\u201d \u201cFred and Barney are treated much like [the] family\u2019s pet dogs and interact with [the] family in a very similar manner[;]\u201d Mrs. Steiner has \u201ca love and bond with Fred and Barney that is as strong as or stronger than that which [she] ha[s] had with any other pet.\u201d Again, Fred and Barney\u2019s relationship to plaintiffs is not disputed. There is thus no genuine issue of fact as to Fred and Barney\u2019s relationship to plaintiffs. As it is undisputed that Fred and Barney were kept for pleasure rather than for profit or utility, they are pets and not livestock under paragraph 9 of the Restrictive Covenants. See id.\n2. Household Pets\nDefendant next contends that because \u201cthe goats are not kept in the house, but instead outside with [the] horses .... [they] are not household pets.\u201d We first note that the word \u201chousehold\u201d may be either a noun or an adjective; see id. at 602, here it is used as an adjective, modifying the word \u201cpet.\u201d While Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary does not define \u201chousehold pet,\u201d it does define \u201chousehold\u201d as an adjective in pertinent part as \u201cof or relating to a household : DOMESTIC[.]\u201d Td. at 602. Thus, the adjective definition of \u201chousehold\u201d requires that one consider the noun definition of \u201chousehold.\u201d See id. \u201cHousehold\u201d as a noun is defined as \u201cthose who dwell under the same roof and compose a family; also : a social unit composed of those living together in the same dwelling[.]\u201d Id. Therefore, when we put all of the relevant definitions together, we see that a \u201chousehold pet\u201d is \u201ca domesticated animal kept for pleasure\u201d \u201cof or relating to a\u201d \u201cfamily . . . [or] social unit [who live] together in the same dwelling!.]\u201d See id. at 602, 926.\nDespite defendant\u2019s argument, we do not find the fact that the goats do not literally live inside the house to be dispositive of the issue. First, the \u201cordinary meaning\u201d of the adjective \u201chousehold\u201d requires that something be \u201cof or relating to\u201d the household, not actually inside of the house. See Wein, II at 480, 683 S.E.2d at 713; Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary at 602. This definition is consistent with a practical and commonsense understanding of the term \u201chousehold pet.\u201d Many pet owners keep their dogs in a pen in the backyard and do not permit them into the house; many pet owners have a cat which lives outside and may more often than not be found wandering in a neighbor\u2019s yard rather than its own, yet these animals are most certainly considered \u201chousehold pets\u201d by their respective owners. Fred and Barney \u201cwalk on a leash in [the Steiners\u2019] yard];]\u201d follow [the Steiners] around in their enclosure and in the yard[;]\u201d and sleep \u201cin an \u2018Igloo Dog House\u2019 of medium size that is placed within the stable of the Property.\u201d Again, defendants do not challenge the facts as to Fred and Barney\u2019s living conditions and relationship to the plaintiffs. We conclude that there is no issue of material fact that Fred and Barney are \u201chousehold pets\u201d within the meaning of paragraph 9 of the Restrictive Covenants. Had the drafters of the Restrictive Covenants wished to limit the definition of \u201chousehold pets\u201d to animals more traditionally considered as pets, such as dogs and cats, they certainly may have done so; instead the Restrictive Covenants expands the variety of animals which may be considered as pets by allowing for \u201cother pets[,]\u201d which in this instance includes the goats Fred and Barney.\n3. Purpose and Intent of the Restrictive Covenants\nLastly, as to paragraph 9 of the Restrictive Covenants, defendant contends that \u201c[t]he [p]urpose and [i]ntent of the [Restrictive Covenants] is [l]imited to [t]wo [h]orses [a]nd an [e]questrian [c]ommunity, [n]ot a [f]arm.\u201d\nNot only do[] the [Restrictive Covenants] contain a restriction on livestock and other outside animals, it also restricts the number of horses an Owner is permitted to have on the lot. When reading this limitation in conjunction with the nuisance provision in Paragraph 6 and the pet provision in Paragraph 9, the intent of the [Restrictive Covenants] is to limit the odors, as well as the numbers and types of pets in the community.\nDefendant further notes that \u201cwhen reading the Restrictive Covenants as a whole, farm animals such as goats were not intended to be included in the \u2018household pet\u2019 exception.\u201d\nAgain,\nwhile the intentions of the parties to restrictive covenants ordinarily control the construction of the covenants, such covenants are not favored by the law, and they will be strictly construed to the end that all ambiguities will be resolved in favor of the unrestrained use of land. . . . [T]he law declares that nothing can be read into a restrictive covenant enlarging its meaning beyond what its language plainly and unmistakably imports.\nCovenants restricting the use of property are to be strictly construed against limitation on use, and will not be enforced unless clear and unambiguous.\nSee Wein, II at 480, 683 S.E.2d at 713.\nHere, the Restrictive Covenants are so broad as to allow for virtually any animal which may be treated as a \u201chousehold pet\u201d to be kept on the homeowner\u2019s property, so long as the animal is \u201cnot kept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purposes\u201d and does \u201cnot attack horses or horsemen.\u201d If the intent and purpose of the Restrictive Covenants was to prevent goats or other similar animals from being kept on the property, it certainly could have forbidden specific types of animals or provided specific definitions for material terms such as \u201chousehold pets[.]\u201d Instead, the Restrictive Covenants must be construed pursuant to the \u201cordinary meaning\u201d of the words used, id., and under this construction, Fred and Barney are plaintiffs\u2019 household pets. See Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary at 602, 926.\nFurthermore, defendant has not demonstrated how Fred and Barney\u2019s presence inhibits or contradicts the Restrictive Covenants\u2019 stated purpose of \u201ckeeping with the intention of the developer to create an equestrian community[.]\u201d \u201c[E]questrian\u201d is defined as \u201cof, relating to, or featuring horseback riding[.]\u201d Although there is no dispute that horses are specifically allowed by the Restrictive Covenants, and the presence of horses would make the community \u201cequestrian[,]\u201d this term alone does not exclude any other types of animals from the community. In fact, the only types of animals which appear to be categorically excluded by the Restrictive Covenants are those that are \u201ckept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purposes\u201d or may \u201cattack horses or horsemen.\u201d Accordingly, we conclude that pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Restrictive Covenants Fred and Barney are not livestock; they are household pets; and their presence on the Property does not inhibit or contradict the stated intent and purpose of the Restrictive Covenants to establish an \u201cequestrian community[.]\u201d Thus, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for plaintiff as to this issue and declaring that Fred and Barney are household pets and are not livestock, and that as such plaintiffs had not violated paragraph 9 of the Restrictive Covenants. This argument is overruled.\nB. Paragraph 6 of the Restrictive Covenants\nDefendant next contends that the \u201cboard of directors did not abuse its discretion when it determined that plaintiffs-appellees\u2019 goats are a nuisance and therefore violate paragraph & of the [Restrictive Covenants.]\u201d (Original in all caps.) As to paragraph 6 of the Restrictive Covenants the trial court determined:\n7. The Board of Directors abused its discretion in determining that Plaintiffs\u2019 Nigerian Dwarfs are a nuisance and prohibited under Paragraph 6 of the [Restrictive Covenants;]\n8. Because Plaintiffs\u2019 Nigerian Dwarfs are not a nuisance, Plaintiffs, by keeping the Nigerian Dwarfs on their Lot, are not in violation of Paragraph 6 of the [Restrictive Covenants.]\nParagraph 6 provides:\nNo offensive or noxious activity shall be carried on upon any lot, nor shall anything be done thereon tending to cause embarrassment, discomfort, annoyance, or nuisance to the neighborhood. There shall not be maintained any plants or animals, or device or thing of any sort whose normal activity or existence is in any way noxious, dangerous, unsightly, unpleasant or of a nature as may diminish or destroy the enjoyment of other property in the neighborhood by the owners thereof; except that horses and stables may be maintained, but every effort must be made to reduce stable odors.\n(Emphasis added).\nWe again note the confusion raised by the unusual legal posture of this case as a declaratory judgment action which requested a review of the Board\u2019s discretion and not actually a review of the action of the Board. Yet we need not address defendant\u2019s contentions as we conclude that paragraph 6 of the Restrictive Covenants is void for vagueness. See Property Owner\u2019s Assoc, v. Seifart, 48 N.C. App. 286, 297, 269 S.E.2d 178, 184 (1980) (affirming the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment in favor of property owners rather than the property owner\u2019s association because the covenants provided \u201cno sufficient basis for the court to decree enforcement of the assessments\u201d). In fact,\nthere is little case law addressing the question of what language in a restrictive covenant is void for vagueness, and what language is not. It appears that we have not dealt with this void for vagueness question because our courts usually supply a definition for an undefined term in a covenant rather than void the entire covenant. Unless the covenants set out a specialized meaning, the language of a restrictive covenant is interpreted by using its ordinary meaning.\nWein, II, 198 N.C. App. at 480, 683 S.E.2d at 713 (citation, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted). We are thus left to consider the \u201cordinary meaning\u201d of the words used by paragraph 6. See id.\nHere, paragraph 6 of the Restrictive Covenants focuses on the subjective emotions or feelings of \u201cembarrassment, discomfort, annoyance, or nuisance\u201d experienced by \u201cthe neighborhood.\u201d The definition of things or activities proscribed by paragraph 6 of the Restrictive Covenants is expanded to cover that which \u201cis in any way noxious, dangerous, unsightly, unpleasant or of a nature as may diminish or destroy the enjoyment of other property in the neighborhood by the owners thereof.\u201d We do not think it necessary here to cite specific dictionary definitions of the operative words: embarrassment, discomfort, annoyance, nuisance, noxious, unsightly, and unpleasant; each of these words describes a subjective and personal experience or feeling. Just as beauty is in the eye of the beholder, each of these terms can be defined only from the perspective of the beholder. See generally Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 29 L. Ed. 2d 214, 217 (1971) (\u201cConduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is vague, not in the- sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. As a result, men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.\u201d (citation and quotation marks omitted)). The Restrictive Covenants do not give sufficient guidance or definitions to the aforementioned terms to permit us to make any sort of legal determination as to what they mean or should mean to the Windrow Estates neighborhood. Under paragraph 6 of the Restrictive Covenants, the emotional reaction of annoyance of a property owner could be the basis for making an activity a violation of the covenants; as a practical matter, the Board could prohibit anything which might \u201cannoy\u201d even one resident of the subdivision, such as loud and rambunctious children playing in the yard; use of a noisy power mower to cut the grass; blinking Christmas lights; or any pet who may dig in a neighbor\u2019s flowerbed, bark, leave footprints on a car, or visit the property of another property owner for any reason. Things and activities such as these have certainly at times caused \u201cembarrassment, discomfort, [or] annoyance\u201d to someone or have been viewed as \u201cunsightly, unpleasant or of a nature as may diminish or destroy the enjoyment of other propertyf.]\u201d Certain property owners in Windrow Estates consider Fred and Barney to be annoying, noxious, and unpleasant; plaintiffs consider them adorable and lovable. The Restrictive Covenants as written do not provide sufficient guidance or definitions to permit the Board, or a court, to make any sort of objective determination of who is right, and this is the essence of vagueness.\nDefendant contends that plaintiffs have not properly raised the issue of vagueness on appeal. Although the trial court did not conclude that paragraph 6 of the Restrictive Covenants was void for vagueness and instead based its ruling upon a determination of an abuse of discretion by the Board, we may consider this argument because plaintiffs presented this issue as a ground for summary judgment before the trial court. This Court may consider all the evidence and arguments before the trial court in its de novo review of whether summary judgment is appropriate. See Miller v. First Bank, - N.C. App. -, -, 696 S.E.2d 824, 827 (2010). Although the trial court did not state that vagueness was part of the reason for its ruling, we may affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling for any reason presented before it which is supported by the evidence and law. See generally Shore v. Brown, 324 N.C. 427, 428, 378 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1989) (\u201cIf the granting of summary judgment can be sustained on any grounds, it should be affirmed on appeal.\u201d). Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment as to any issues regarding paragraph 6 of the Restrictive Covenants. This issue is overruled.\nIV. Conclusion\nIn conclusion, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges BRYANT and BEASLEY concur.\n. A \u201cdomestic animal\u201d is \u201cany of various animals (as the horse or sheep) domesticated so as to live and breed in a tame condition].]\u201d Id. at 371. There is no dispute that Fred and Barney are domesticated animals.\n. We do note the fact that a type of animal could under certain circumstances be classified as \u201clivestock\u201d does not necessarily bar the animal under paragraph 9 of the Restrictive Covenants. Paragraph 9 of the Restrictive Covenants essentially allows any animal which qualifies as a \u201chousehold pet[,]\u201d is \u201cnot kept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purposes,\u201d and does \u201cnot attack horses or horsemen.\u201d\n. Both plaintiffs and defendant cite to Town of Atlantic Beach v. Young, 58 N.C. App. 597, 293 S.E.2d 821 (1982), rev\u2019d and remanded, 307 N.C. 422, 298 S.E.2d 686 (1983), for the definition of \u201chousehold pet.\u201d However, the \u201chousehold pet\u201d test both parties cite is in a Court of Appeals opinion which was reversed by the Supreme Court. See id., 307 N.C. 422, 298 S.E.2d 686; id., 58 N.C. App. at 599, 293 S.E.2d at 822-23. Though the Supreme Court did not explicitly overrule the test, it did overrule this Court on the \u201chousehold pet\u201d issue. See id., 307 N.C. 422, 298 S.E.2d 686. Furthermore, the test enumerated in this Court\u2019s decision uses a dictionary definition, and thus is practically the same analysis we are conducting here. See id., 58 N.C. App. at 599, 293 S.E.2d at 822-23.\n. We find defendant\u2019s argument regarding the \u201codors\u201d produced by two very small goats somewhat perplexing, as very similar and arguably much larger \u201codors\u201d would be produced by two horses, which are specifically allowed by the Restrictive Covenants.\n. There is no allegation that Fred and Barney pose any danger to \u201chorses or horsemen.\u201d In fact, Mrs. Steiner\u2019s affidavit states that she choose Dwarf Nigerian Goats because they \u201cwere known to adapt well and live in close confines with horses.\u201d\n. Defendant\u2019s counterclaim requested a judgment declaring \u201cthat the Association was within its discretion in concluding that the maintaining of goats on Plaintiffs\u2019 property violates Paragraphs 6 and 9 of the [Restrictive Covenants].\u201d\n. We exclude the word \u201cdangerous\u201d from this list of prohibitions from paragraph 6 of the Restrictive Covenants because \u201cdangerous\u201d may be objectively defined and is not based upon an emotion or feeling; however, there is no allegation that Fred and Barney are \u201cdangerous].]\u201d\n. We also note that \u201cnuisance\u201d as used here must be construed using its \u201cordinary meaning\u201d and not a legal definition. See id.\n. We note that the \u201cabuse of discretion\u201d language in the trial court\u2019s order is referring to a review of the Board\u2019s determination that plaintiffs had violated paragraph 6 of the Restrictive Covenants, but as noted above, this is a declaratory judgment action and not a review of the Board\u2019s prior action.", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hamilton Moon Stephens Steele & Martin, PLLC, by M. Aaron Lay, for plaintiff-appellees.", "Sellers, Hinshaw, Ayers, Dortch & Lyons, P.A., by Michelle Price Massingale, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RICHARD STEINER and wife TINA STEINER, Plaintiffs v. WINDROW ESTATES HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Defendant\nNo. COA10-865\n(Filed 19 July 2011)\n1. Animals\u2014 goats \u2014 restrictive covenants \u2014 household pets instead of livestock\nThe trial court did not err in a declaratory judgment action by granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff based on its conclusion that plaintiffs two goats were household pets and not livestock under a neighborhood\u2019s restrictive covenants. The goats were kept for pleasure rather than for profit or utility.\n2. Associations\u2014 restrictive covenants \u2014 nuisance\u2014vague\nA neighborhood\u2019s board of directors abused its discretion by determining that plaintiffs\u2019 goats were a nuisance. The neighborhood\u2019s restrictive covenants did not provide sufficient guidance or definitions to permit any sort of objective determination, and thus, were too vague.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 23 February 2010 by Judge Timothy M. Smith in District Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 December 2010.\nHamilton Moon Stephens Steele & Martin, PLLC, by M. Aaron Lay, for plaintiff-appellees.\nSellers, Hinshaw, Ayers, Dortch & Lyons, P.A., by Michelle Price Massingale, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0454-01", "first_page_order": 464, "last_page_order": 478 }