{ "id": 4233126, "name": "MICHAEL STEPHENS v. SAMANTHA STEPHENS (NOW COLVILLE)", "name_abbreviation": "Stephens v. Stephens", "decision_date": "2011-07-19", "docket_number": "No. COA10-943", "first_page": "495", "last_page": "505", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "213 N.C. App. 495" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 567", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4683884 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 135, 140, 530 S.E.2d 576, 579 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8915820 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158", "parenthetical": "quoting Evans v. Evans, 138 N.C. App. 135, 140, 530 S.E.2d 576, 579 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 675", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679" }, { "page": "679" }, { "page": "679" }, { "page": "679" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.C. App. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 8527399 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/94/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564905 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 79", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11080722 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" }, { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 95", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240022 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559773 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 S.E.2d 898", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 10, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "903" }, { "page": "904" }, { "page": "902" }, { "page": "905", "parenthetical": "Orr, J., concurring" }, { "page": "906" }, { "page": "900" }, { "page": "906", "parenthetical": "Orr, J., concurring" }, { "page": "903" }, { "page": "906", "parenthetical": "Orr, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659910 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" }, { "page": "628" }, { "page": "624" }, { "page": "630" }, { "page": "620" }, { "page": "631" }, { "page": "624" }, { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 11, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253", "parenthetical": "citing Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 625, 501 S.E.2d 898, 903 (1998)" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "255-56" }, { "page": "256" }, { "page": "256" }, { "page": "257" }, { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491698 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474", "parenthetical": "citing Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 625, 501 S.E.2d 898, 903 (1998)" }, { "page": "475" }, { "page": "475" }, { "page": "475" }, { "page": "478" }, { "page": "479" }, { "page": "479" }, { "page": "481" }, { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0471-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1083, "char_count": 27014, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.384671799603068e-07, "percentile": 0.6412342958991045 }, "sha256": "14d0c35b7f2190cbfd55a1885ec7bbe914a4f14547fcf04ff5203b41d3d13108", "simhash": "1:89ead06670c5be66", "word_count": 4337 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:51:58.983312+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "MICHAEL STEPHENS v. SAMANTHA STEPHENS (NOW COLVILLE)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nSamantha Stephens (\u201cDefendant\u201d) appeals from a Custody Order vesting primary custody of Defendant\u2019s two minor children with their Plaintiff-father. Defendant argues the trial court erred in granting Plaintiff\u2019s Motion to Modify Custody. We disagree and affirm the Order.\nI. Factual and Procedural History\nMichael Stevens (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019) and Defendant married on 10 April 1998. During the marriage, Plaintiff and Defendant had two children. Plaintiff and Defendant separated on 9 November 2003 and divorced on 20 January 2005.\nIn October 2005, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Child Custody Plaintiff and Defendant reached an agreement regarding custody of the children, represented by a Consent Order filed 5 December 2006. The Consent Order affirmed that both parties \u201care fit and proper persons for the custodial roles assigned.\u201d The Consent Order vested primary physical custody of the two children with the Defendant and secondary physical custody with the Plaintiff. The present case originates from the trial court\u2019s 19 January 2010 Order modifying this original custody agreement.\nAfter the divorce, Plaintiff married Lauren Ashley Dupree, with whom he now shares a son. Defendant married Billy Colville on 2 July 2005 and separated from Mr. Colville on 2 January 2009. At the time of the trial, Defendant was not yet divorced from Mr. Colville and was not eligible for divorce until January 2010. Defendant previously owned a home but lost the home due to foreclosure in February 2009. For the next several months, Defendant and the children lived in a rented residence in Harnett County. In August or early September 2009, Defendant and the children moved to Durham to live with her fianc\u00e9, Jason Ledbetter. Defendant informed Plaintiff of her intention to move to Durham prior to the actual move. She described it as a temporary move, and told Plaintiff she intended to ultimately move back to the Holly Springs/Fuquay-Varina area in Harnett County. Defendant and her children moved to Mr. Ledbetter\u2019s home because of its larger square footage, which permits each child to have her own bedroom. Plaintiff objected to Defendant\u2019s move to Durham, arguing that the long travel time to and from the children\u2019s school would not be good for the children. At the time of appeal, Defendant still lived with Mr. Ledbetter at his home in' Durham. Mr. Ledbetter made a formal offer to purchase a house in Fuquay-Varina, located approximately 30 minutes from the children\u2019s school. Both the Defendant and Mr. Ledbetter acknowledged at trial that they chose a home in Fuquay-Varina rather than a home closer to the children\u2019s school because the location was more convenient for Mr. Ledbetter\u2019s work. At the time of the trial, Mr. Ledbetter had not yet purchased this house, but the closing was set for 22 December 2009.\nPlaintiff lives in Harnett County and works at Coats-Erwin Middle School as a physical education teacher, athletic director, and coach of the basketball and baseball teams. Plaintiff\u2019s wife owns her own hair salon business. He and his wife both have family in Harnett County. At the time of the trial, Defendant was unemployed.\nSince the Custody Order, Plaintiff has regularly exercised his visitation rights and exercised visitation outside of the court-ordered times, upon agreement with Defendant. According to their teachers, both children are well-adjusted and perform well in school. The children have always attended Harnett County schools. Although they have an extensive record of tardiness and absences from school, they still receive high grades.\nOn 17 September 2009, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Modify Custody. In his Motion, Plaintiff alleged that there has been \u201c[a] substantial change in circumstances\u201d since the entry of the Consent Order. Plaintiff cited, among other things, that Defendant sought to \u201cundermine [him] and alienate [him] from his minor children\u201d and has shown \u201cextreme hostility toward [him] and his present wife ... in the presence of the minor children.\u201d Plaintiff further alleged that Defendant routinely used visitation with the children as leverage, put the children in the middle of arguments between Plaintiff and Defendant, and sought to undermine the relationship of Plaintiff and Plaintiffs wife with his children. A hearing on Plaintiffs Motion was held in Harnett County Domestic Relations Court. On 19 January 2010 the trial court entered an Order granting Plaintiffs request for a change of custody.\nThe trial court\u2019s findings of fact describe Defendant\u2019s ongoing course of conduct of hostility towards Plaintiff, which has been detrimental to the children\u2019s emotional well-being.\nThis course of conduct was demonstrated by numerous text messages, emails and MySpace postings made by the Defendant to and about the Plaintiff and his current wife, which were derogatory, demeaning and profane. All of these writings were introduced into evidence and are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein in support of the findings contained within this Order.\n[] The Court reviewed the aforementioned documentary evidence, which indicated the Defendant\u2019s failure to give consideration to the Plaintiff\u2019s input on decisions about the minor children, which affected their overall welfare.\nThe Order contained extensive illustrations of Defendant\u2019s \u201cextreme hostility,\u201d which are described in detail below.\nBased on its findings, the trial court concluded there was a substantial chance in circumstances that had impacted the welfare of the children and necessitated a modification of the 5 December 2006 Custody Order. Accordingly, the trial court determined it was in the best interest of the children to award primary physical custody of the children to the Plaintiff and secondary physical custody of the children to the Defendant. Defendant timely entered notice of appeal.\nII. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review\nThis Court has jurisdiction to hear the instant appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27(b) (2009). \u201cWhen reviewing a trial court\u2019s decision to grant or deny a motion for the modification of an existing child custody order, the appellate courts must examine the trial court\u2019s findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence.\u201d Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 474, 586 S.E.2d 250, 253 (2003) (citing Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 625, 501 S.E.2d 898, 903 (1998)). \u201cSubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). Additionally, if the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, the Court of Appeals must determine whether the facts support the conclusions of law. Shipman, 357 N.C. at 475, 586 S.E.2d at 254 (citing Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 628, 501 S.E.2d at 904). The trial court is vested with broad discretion in child custody matters. Id. at 474, 586 S.E.2d at 253 (citing Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 624, 501 S.E.2d at 902). The trial court\u2019s conclusions of law receive de novo review. Browning v. Helff, 136 N.C. App. 420, 423, 524 S.E.2d 95, 98 (2000).\nIII. Analysis\nOn appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in granting the Motion to Modify Custody. Specifically, Defendant argues there was no change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the children. Additionally, Defendant argues that a modification of the original custody order is not in the best interest of the children. We disagree.\nIn granting the Motion to Modify Custody, the trial court must have first appropriately concluded that there was a substantial change in circumstances and that the change affected the welfare of the minor child or children. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.7 (2009); Shipman, 357 N.C. at 475, 586 S.E.2d at 254. It must then determine whether a modification of custody is within the best interests of the children. Shipman, 357 N.C. at 475, 586 S.E.2d at 254. If we find substantial evidence supports these conclusions, we must affirm the trial court\u2019s decision to modify an existing custody agreement absent a finding the trial court\u2019s order was the product of a \u201cmanifest abuse of discretion.\u201d Metz v. Metz, 138 N.C. App. 538, 541, 530 S.E.2d 79, 81 (2000).\nA. Substantial Change in Circumstances\nFirst, Defendant argues there is insufficient evidence showing a substantial change in circumstances that affected the welfare of her two children. We do not agree.\nWhen a trial court modifies a custody order, the requisite change in circumstances cannot be \u201cinconsequential\u201d or \u201cminor,\u201d but rather must significantly affect the welfare of the children. Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 630, 501 S.E.2d at 905 (Orr, J., concurring). \u201cBy this, we mean that the changes are of the type which normally or usually affect a child\u2019s well-being \u2014 not a change that either does not affect the child or only tangentially affects the child\u2019s welfare.\u201d Id. The trial court need not determine whether the effects of the substantial change in circumstances were adverse or beneficial, \u201cbut only that the substantial change affects the welfare of the child.\u201d Id. at 630, 501 S.E.2d at 906.\nUnless the effect of the change on the children is \u201cself-evident,\u201d the trial court must find sufficient evidence of a nexus between the change in circumstances and the welfare of the children. Shipman, 357 N.C. at 478, 586 S.E.2d at 255-56. The moving party maintains the burden of proving a substantial change in circumstances exists that affects the welfare of the children. Tucker v. Tucker, 288 N.C. 81, 87, 216 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1975).\nA substantial change in circumstances that affects the welfare of the children can occur when a parent demonstrates anger and hostility in front of the children and attempts to frustrate the relationship between the children and the other parent. Correll v. Allen, 94 N.C. App. 464, 471, 380 S.E.2d 580, 585 (1989). Additionally, although interference alone is not enough to merit a change in the custody order, \u201cwhere \u2018interference [with visitation] becomes so pervasive as to harm the child\u2019s close relationship with the noncustodial parent,\u2019 \u201d it may warrant a change in custody. Shipman, 357 N.C. at 479, 586 S.E.2d at 256 (quoting Woncik v. Woncik, 82 N.C. App. 244, 248, 346 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1986)) (alteration in original).\nIn the present case, as noted in finding of fact 7, the evidence displays \u201ca substantial change in circumstances that [has] impacted the welfare of the minor children in such a manner that makes it appropriate for the Court to modify the previous Custody Order in this matter.\u201d The trial court described in finding of fact 7(a) that \u201cDefendant has engaged in a course of conduct that demonstrates hostility towards the Plaintiff that has occurred in front of the minor children and is otherwise detrimental for the minor children to know about as it relates to their ability to remain emotionally secure and bonded to both parties.\u201d Since the entry of the original custody order, the record is replete with evidence that Defendant repeatedly sought to \u201cdeliberately [] belittle the [father] in the mind of his child,\u201d Woncik, 82 N.C. App. at 249, 346 S.E.2d at 280, and commonly interfered with Plaintiffs visitation. In fact, substantial evidence supports the trial court\u2019s finding that \u201c[t]he conduct engaged by the Defendant towards the Plaintiff and his present wife threatens to undermine and alienate the Plaintiff as well as the Plaintiff\u2019s [sic] wife from the minor children without justification or provocation.\u201d Several examples illustrate the nature of Defendant\u2019s ongoing hostile conduct.\nFor instance, the trial court\u2019s finding of fact 6(e) and (f) describe how on 7 May 2007, Plaintiff called the police after Defendant appeared at his residence and initiated a verbal altercation. Plaintiff testified that when the police officer, Officer Morris, arrived, Defendant had already left the scene, but was talking to Plaintiff on the telephone. Officer Morris testified that while on the phone Defendant accused Plaintiff\u2019s wife of sexually abusing the children. The police report describes that Officer Morris \u201cwas left with the clear impression that the suspect [Defendant] was making false allegations about the abuse because of the victim\u2019s relationship with Lauren Dupree.\u201d Officer Morris notified a detective of the accusation, and told Defendant to come to the police station to make a formal report of the alleged abuse, but Defendant refused to do so. Defendant testified that she informed Officer Morris that she might report her allegation to the sheriff\u2019s office rather than the local police department; nevertheless, she never made any such report. Officer Morris also testified that when \u201cthe adult dr guardian of a victim . . . just, all of a sudden, changes their mind and says, \u2018No, we\u2019re not going to pursue this,\u2019 and it\u2019s in the heat of the moment kind of thing, it tends to lead me to believe... that [the] allegation didn\u2019t exist to start with.\u201d Following her accusations, Defendant texted Plaintiff a message stating, \u201cHee hee hee! U r a f[ \u2014 ]n idiot!\u201d Additionally, Officer Morris testified that he heard Defendant tell the children that they could no longer visit Plaintiff\u2019s house because it was not their home. At trial, Defendant acknowledged the facts of the incident but denied making an accusation of sexual abuse, despite Officer Morris\u2019 testimony to the contrary.\nIn finding of fact 6(k), the trial court describes how in July 2007, Defendant \u201copenly and publicly berated both the Plaintiff and his current wife and used profanity\u201d at a Harnett Regional Theater Production involving one of the children. Plaintiffs wife testified that Defendant verbally accosted and cursed at her and Plaintiff in front of a crowd of people. Despite this harassment at his child\u2019s play, the trial court found \u201c[n] either the Plaintiff nor his present wife responded to the Defendant but instead entered the theater to watch the minor child in her performance.\u201d\nThe trial court\u2019s finding of fact 6(r) describes how on 2 September 2007, after his visitation with his children, Plaintiff and his wife returned the children to Defendant\u2019s residence. Plaintiff testified that his wife remained in the car, while Plaintiff walked the children to Defendant\u2019s house. Defendant, in the presence of the children, confronted Plaintiff\u2019s wife, called her a \u201cwhore,\u201d and threatened to call the police if Plaintiff ever brought her on Defendant\u2019s property again. Plaintiff described a similar event on 5 September 2007, where after another visitation, Plaintiff returned the children to Defendant\u2019s home. Although Plaintiff\u2019s wife remained in the car parked on the public street, Defendant \u2014 again in the presence of the children\u2014 yelled obscenities at Plaintiff\u2019s wife and attempted to enter the car.\nIn finding of fact 6(h), the trial court describes an instance where in April 2008, Plaintiff began planning a vacation with his daughters to Disney World and asked Defendant if he could take the children on this trip. After learning of Plaintiff\u2019s vacation plans, Defendant took the children to Disney World a month before Plaintiff\u2019s scheduled trip. Upon her return, Defendant posted a message on her MySpace page that read \u201cI TOOK THE GIRLS TO DISNEY WORLD ... FIRST!!!\u201d After Defendant\u2019s trip with the children, she texted the Plaintiff: \u201cCareful . . . girls don\u2019t give a damn about going to disney, & I certainly dont owe you any favors!\u201d\nPlaintiff also testified that in May 2008, Defendant informed one of the children that Plaintiff\u2019s wife was pregnant. This was not true, and as a result Plaintiff had to explain the situation to his daughter when she inquired about the issue. Furthermore, Plaintiff described at trial how at the end of the summer of 2008, Defendant initiated an argument with Plaintiff in front of the children. In this instance, Defendant had allowed Plaintiff extra visitation time with the children. Defendant, during the visitation, informed Plaintiff that she wanted to pick up the children a day early to visit their grandmother. Upon hearing this, one child wanted to stay with Plaintiff rather than leave with Defendant. Plaintiff informed the child prior to Defendant\u2019s arrival that while she was always welcome at Plaintiff\u2019s house, she had to follow the decisions regarding visitation made by P1a.int.iff and Defendant. When Defendant arrived, she initiated an argument with Plaintiff in front of the children when the one child expressed that she wanted to stay with Plaintiff. Both children witnessed portions of the argument, and at least one child began to cry.\nAs described in finding of fact 6(v), Defendant\u2019s move to Durham from Harnett County also constitutes a substantial change in circumstances that affects the welfare of her children. Generally, North Carolina case law has held that although a change in residence is not a per se substantial change in circumstances justifying modification of a custody order, \u201c [i]f. . . the relocation is detrimental to the child\u2019s welfare, the change in residence of the custodial parent is a substantial change in circumstances and supports a modification of custody.\u201d Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, 107 N.C. App. 71, 79, 418 S.E.2d 675, 679 (1992), overruled on other grounds, Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 620, 501 S.E.2d at 900. In the present case, the trial court\u2019s finding of fact 6(x) notes that the children, who formerly lived nearby their school, now faced a fifty mile (one hour) drive each way to school every day. The trial court also found that although Defendant and Plaintiff had previously agreed to allow Plaintiff extra visitation with his children on some weeks, Defendant ended this extra visitation after her move to Durham. Plaintiff testified that he did not feel the long daily commute was beneficial for the children. Aside from the commute to and from school, the children would also face the same commute for extra-curricular activities in which they participate, including dance and cheerleading.\nWe conclude these events provide substantial evidence to support the trial court\u2019s determination that Defendant\u2019s actions have interfered with Plaintiff\u2019s visitation of his children and frustrated their relationship. In doing so, Defendant has demonstrated a \u201cdisregard for the best interests of the children], warranting a change in custody.\u201d Shipman, 357 N.C. at 479, 586 S.E.2d at 256 (quoting Woncik, 82 N.C. App. at 248, 346 S.E.2d at 279).\nDefendant counters this evidence by arguing that both children are well-adjusted and the conduct described by the trial court is no longer an \u201congoing . . . course of conduct.\u201d Defendant notes the trial court made no findings of emotional or behavior problems with the children. In fact, the trial court noted in finding of fact 6(ww)-6(yy) that the children have loving relationships with their parents and their parents\u2019 significant others and are also performing well in school. Nevertheless, the trial court \u201cneed not wait for any adverse effects on the child to manifest themselves before the court can alter custody.\u201d Dreyer v. Smith, 163 N.C. App. 155, 158, 592 S.E.2d 594, 596 (2004) (quoting Evans v. Evans, 138 N.C. App. 135, 140, 530 S.E.2d 576, 579 (2000)). \u201cIt is neither \u2018necessary nor desirable to wait until the child is actually harmed to make a change\u2019 in custody.\u201d RamirezBarker, 107 N.C. App. at 78, 418 S.E.2d, at 679 (quoting Domingues v. Johnson, 323 Md. 486, 500, 593 A.2d 1133, 1139 (1991)). In the present case, even if the children have not yet been actually harmed by Defendant\u2019s actions, the Court need not wait until the substantial change in circumstances causes such harm. The trial court thus did not err in determining that there was a substantial change in circumstances that affects the children.\nB. Best Interest of the Children\nDefendant next argues that a modification of the previous custody order is not in the best interest of her children. We disagree.\n\u201cAs long as there is competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings, its determination as to the child\u2019s best interests cannot be upset absent a manifest abuse of discretion.\u201d Metz, 138 N.C. App. at 541, 530 S.E.2d at 81. Under an abuse of discretion standard, we must \u201cdetermine whether a decision is manifestly unsupported by reason, or so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d Mark Group Int\u2019l, Inc. v. Still, 151 N.C. App. 565, 566, 566 S.E.2d 160, 161 (2002). In the present case, Defendant has neither argued nor presented evidence that the trial court abused its discretion.\nIn determining the best interest of the children, neither party bears the burden of proof. Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 631, 501 S.E.2d at 906 (Orr, J., concurring) (citing Ramirez-Barker, 107 N.C. App. at 78, 418 S.E.2d at 679). Rather, \u201cany evidence which is competent and relevant to a showing of the best interest of that child must be heard and considered by the trial court.\u201d Id. Indeed, \u201c[t]he \u2018best interest\u2019 question is thus more inquisitorial in nature than adversarial,\u201d Ramirez-Barker, 107 N.C. App. at 78, 418 S.E.2d at 679, and a lack of specificity of facts underlying the trial court\u2019s decision could necessitate a reversal of the modification order. Shipman, 357 N.C. at 481, 586 S.E.2d at 257. As previously discussed, \u201ctrial courts are vested with broad discretion in child custody matters.\u201d Id. at 474, 586 S.E.2d at 253 (citing Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 624, 501 S.E.2d at 903).\nAs described in finding of fact 8 of the present case, substantial evidence demonstrates that \u201cit is in the best interest of the minor children that their primary care, custody and control be awarded to the Plaintiff with secondary care, custody and control being vested with the Defendant.\u201d At trial, testimony was presented that Defendant has faced periods of depression where she did not properly take care of the children. Defendant\u2019s ex-husband, Mr. Colville, testified that Defendant would sleep for extensive periods of time and sometimes neglected to feed the children.\nAs described in the trial court\u2019s finding of fact 6(hh), \u201cDefendant would often times fail to take one child to school of the other child was sick.\u201d As Plaintiff testified, this resulted in a significant number of absences from school for both children.\nAdditionally, Mr. Colville testified that Defendant routinely skipped work and seldom reported her own absences to her work, reflecting a lack of stability that is not in the best interest of the children. The trial court noted in finding of fact 6(ii) that \u201cDefendant was allowed to resign from her employment from Coats/Erwin Elementary School in light of the fact that she had, on occasion, failed to appear for work without notice or phone call to the school to justify her absences and that she was absent in excess of thirty (30) days of her employment during the 2008/2009 school year.\u201d Defendant\u2019s supervisor, Principal Howard, testified at trial that Defendant\u2019s excessive unreported absences directly contributed to her resignation from Coats/Erwin Elementary School. Specifically, Principal Howard mentioned that between the beginning of 2008 and 3 April 2008, Defendant missed 45-and-a-half days of work, including three-and-a-half consecutive weeks between March and April of 2008 which led to her resignation. The trial court\u2019s finding of fact 6(oo), supported by trial testimony, notes that at the time of the trial, Defendant was unemployed and not seeking employment.\nFurthermore, Defendant\u2019s numerous instances of vulgar communication and hostile interactions with Plaintiff in front of their children, described supra, directly reflect on Defendant\u2019s emotional instability and volatility. Given the trial court\u2019s \u201cbroad discretion in child custody matters,\u201d Shipman, 357 N.C. at 474, 586 S.E.2d at 253, we find this evidence to be \u201ccompetent and relevant to a showing of the best interest\u201d of these children. Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 631, 501 S.E.2d at 906 (Orr, J., concurring) (quoting In re Shue, 311 N.C. 586, 597, 319 S.E.2d 567, 574 (1984)).\nPlaintiff, on the other hand, has moved into a new home where the children have friends in the local neighborhood. As described in trial court\u2019s findings of fact 6(uu), (w), (ww) and (ccc) both Plaintiff and his wife have family in the area who help take care of the children, and the children generally have a strong loving relationship with Plaintiff, his wife, and their half-brother. At trial, Plaintiffs wife testified that her parents, sister, aunts, uncles, and Plaintiffs mother live nearby and take a role in helping to take care of Plaintiffs children.\nThe trial court\u2019s findings of fact 6(pp) through (rr) note that Plaintiff has maintained a job with the Harnett County School System throughout the duration of these proceedings and has, since the entry of the original Custody Order, obtained his Masters in School Administration. Plaintiff testified that he has maintained steady employment throughout the custody proceedings and has taken steps to advance his career. Additionally, neither \u201cPlaintiff nor his present wife have any plans to relocate themselves away from the Harnett County area and have no plans to remove the children from the Coats School District where they have consistently attended.\u201d We conclude there was substantial evidence to support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that a modification of the previous custody order was in the best interest of the children.\nIV. Conclusion\nWe conclude there was substantial evidence before the trial court to support its conclusion that there was a substantial change in circumstances that affected the welfare of the children. We also conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a modification of the original custody order was in the children\u2019s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s Order.\nAffirmed.\nJudges CALABRIA and STROUD concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jones and Jones, P.L.L.C., by Cecil B. Jones for Plaintiffappellee.", "McLeod & Harrop, by Donald E. Harrop, Jr., for Defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MICHAEL STEPHENS v. SAMANTHA STEPHENS (NOW COLVILLE)\nNo. COA10-943\n(Filed 19 July 2011)\n1. Child Custody and Support\u2014 modification \u2014 substantial change in circumstances\nThe trial court did not err in a child custody modification case by concluding a substantial change in circumstances affected the welfare of the children. Even if the children have not yet been actually harmed by defendant\u2019s actions, the court does not have to wait until the substantial change causes harm.\n2. Child Custody and Support \u2014 modification\u2014best interests of child\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding there was substantial evidence that modification of a previous child custody order was in the best interests of the children.\nAppeal by Defendant from Judgment entered 19 January 2010 by Judge Robert W. Bryant, Jr., in Harnett County Domestic Relations Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 February 2011.\nJones and Jones, P.L.L.C., by Cecil B. Jones for Plaintiffappellee.\nMcLeod & Harrop, by Donald E. Harrop, Jr., for Defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0495-01", "first_page_order": 505, "last_page_order": 515 }