{ "id": 4233939, "name": "SANDRA YOST, as Trustee and Beneficiary of the Research Center Trust and CATHERINE CALDWELL, VICKIE KING, and LESLEE KULBA, as Trustees of the Research Center Trust, Plaintiffs, DYNAMIC SYSTEMS, INC., Intervenor Plaintiff v. ROBIN YOST and SUSAN YOST, Individually and in their capacities as Trustees and Trust Protectors of the Research Center Trust, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Yost v. Yost", "decision_date": "2011-07-19", "docket_number": "No. COA10-957", "first_page": "516", "last_page": "526", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "213 N.C. App. 516" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "194 S.E.2d 761", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568976 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 S.E.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491872 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 S.E.2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370", "parenthetical": "citing Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8959861 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671", "parenthetical": "citing Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "698 S.E.2d 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "371 S.E.2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2560558 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 S.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583", "parenthetical": "citing Fortune v. First Union Nat. Bank, 323 N.C. 146, 149, 371 S.E.2d 483, 484 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. App. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8917911 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465", "parenthetical": "citing Fortune v. First Union Nat. Bank, 323 N.C. 146, 149, 371 S.E.2d 483, 484 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/162/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "503 S.E.2d 149", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "153-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11468031 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416", "parenthetical": "\"[Questions of subject matter jurisdiction may properly be raised at any point[.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4779108 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692", "parenthetical": "\"[Questions of subject matter jurisdiction may properly be raised at any point[.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 151", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" }, { "page": "171" }, { "page": "153", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11143552 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0169-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1019, "char_count": 25173, "ocr_confidence": 0.731, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14041146800450527 }, "sha256": "93e902dbdc15bdff56fed24d83755fa6e723e42eaf1785d6427746a332e77600", "simhash": "1:8f2a9e5064ab4cd1", "word_count": 4040 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:51:58.983312+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEELMAN and ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "SANDRA YOST, as Trustee and Beneficiary of the Research Center Trust and CATHERINE CALDWELL, VICKIE KING, and LESLEE KULBA, as Trustees of the Research Center Trust, Plaintiffs, DYNAMIC SYSTEMS, INC., Intervenor Plaintiff v. ROBIN YOST and SUSAN YOST, Individually and in their capacities as Trustees and Trust Protectors of the Research Center Trust, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nSandra Yost, Catherine Caldwell, Vickie King, and Leslee Kulba (together, plaintiffs) and Dynamic Systems, Inc. (DSI) (intervenor plaintiff), appeal from an order for partial summary judgment granted in favor of Robin Yost and Susan Yost (together, defendants). After careful consideration, we affirm the order of the trial court in part and reverse and remand it in part.\nI. Background\nOn 3 March 2005, Charles A. Yost executed a trust agreement establishing the Research Center Trust (Trust), which is the subject of this dispute. Plaintiff Sandra Yost was Charles Yost\u2019s wife, defendant Robin Yost is Charles Yost\u2019s son, and defendant Susan Yost is Charles Yost\u2019s daughter. Charles Yost died shortly after creating the Trust, on 29 March 2005.\nAt issue here is the process for electing successor trustees under the trust agreement. Article V of the Trust Agreement sets out the process by which trustees and successor trustees are appointed and elected. Article V states, in relevant part:\nAt all times, the Trustees should make every effort to have nine Trustees while any of my family members is serving as a Trustee, and to have seven Trustees while none of my family members is serving as a Trustee. After my incapacity or death, that group of Trustees shall be composed, and shall elect their own successors, as follows:\nA. My wife, SANDRA T. YOST, and my son, ROBIN W. YOST, and my daughter, SUSAN Y. CARSWELL [now Yost], shall each be a Trustee as long as each, respectively, is living and not incapacitated. At least two Trustees shall be officers or directors of Dynamic Systems, Inc., or its corporate successor, as the business that provides the financial support for the trust purposes. At least two Trustees shall be members of the scientific community, not necessarily local, who are independent of the business and the Yost family and who have an active interest and participation in research and experimentation.\nB. Except for the three family members named above, each Trustee shall serve for a term of three years. If a Trustee ceases to serve for any reason prior to the expiration of his or her term, then a successor shall be elected to serve until the expiration of such predecessor Trustee\u2019s term. Trustees may serve multiple and consecutive terms without limitation, if so elected^ for as long as they are willing and able to uphold the purposes of the trust.\nC. Successor Trustees shall be nominated by any then-serving Trustee, and must be approved by at least two-thirds of the then-serving Trustees (excluding any Trustees who are then-serving but whose terms will be ending and whose successors are being selected). It shall be the responsibility of the Trustees to locate, interview, and approve successor Trustees within a period of not longer than six months after a vacancy occurs.\nBefore his death, Charles Yost appointed nine trustees, including Sandra, Robin, and Susan Yost. As the two representatives of DSI, Charles Yost appointed plaintiff Caldwell and Mimi Chang. As the other four directors, Charles Yost appointed plaintiff Leslee Kulba, Richard Hull, Yusef Fahmy, and Charles Tolley. On 28 July 2006, Tolley stepped down and Rebecca Bruce replaced him. On 20 April 2007, Chang stepped down and plaintiff King replaced her.\nOn 8 December 2006, defendant Robin Yost gave notice of his resignation as a trustee. In his letter, he wrote, \u201cI do not feel my role as a trustee furthers the business of the trust. Also as I see potential conflict of interest by being both a trustee and beneficiary.\u201d However, on 10 December 2007, defendant Robin Yost gave notice of his return as a trustee.\nOn 25 January 2008, the trustees held their annual meeting, and all nine trustees attended, including defendant Robin Yost, who was reinstated as a trustee at the beginning of the meeting. In addition, John Kelso, Charles Yost\u2019s attorney and one of three designated trust protectors, also attended. The terms of the six non-Yost-family trustees would expire in March 2008, so the nomination and approval of successor trustees was on the agenda for the annual meeting. However, the trustees never approved successor trustees because defendants introduced amendments to the trust agreement that would significantly alter the number and makeup of the board of trustees, disrupting the meeting.\nOn 12 November 2008, plaintiffs Sandra Yost, Caldwell, King, and Kulba sued defendants, seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from acting as trustees and trust protectors during the pendency of the action, a declaratory judgment voiding any actions taken by defendants as trustees or trust protectors since 25 January 2008, and an amendment to the trust agreement. The complaint also alleged that defendants had breached their fiduciary duties under the trust agreement and had committed constructive fraud.\nOn 16 January 2009, defendants answered, alleging three affirmative defenses, including standing. Defendants alleged that plaintiffs Caldwell, King, and Kulba lacked standing-to bring any action regarding the Trust because their terms had expired in March 2008. Defendants also counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment construing the language in the trust agreement with respect to the selection of successor trustees for the Trust.\nOn 18 March 2009, DSI moved to intervene as a plaintiff. On 4 May 2009, the trial court allowed DSI\u2019s motion, and DSI became an intervenor plaintiff. On 9 May 2009, DSI filed its own complaint against defendants. Like the original plaintiffs, DSI sought an injunction and declaratory judgment as well as amendment of the trust agreement. In addition, DSI sought the removal of defendants as trust protectors and an affirmation or reinstatement of the six non-family trustees until successor trustees have been nominated and approved.\nOn 19 February 2010, defendants moved for partial summary judgment. Defendants sought a summary judgment declaring \u201c[t]he meaning of the language of Article V. C. [sic] [of the trust agreement] with respect to the selection of successor trustees,\u201d and who the current trustees are. Plaintiffs also moved for partial summary judgment.\nOn 25 May 2010, following a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting partial summary judgment in favor of defendants. The trial court defined the issues before it as follows:\n(i) the interpretation of Article V.C. of the Research Center Trust (hereinafter the \u201cTrust\u201d) regarding which trustees were entitled to approve successor trustees of the Trust; (ii) who the current trustees are of the Trust with the right to approve successor trustees; and (iii) whether any genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether, as a result of alleged breaches of fiduciary and trustee duties by the Defendants, any of the non-family trustees who were serving in January 2008 are currently entitled to act in any capacity or for any purpose as trustees of the trust[.]\nThe trial court \u201cdetermined from the four corners of the Trust document that Article V.C. intends that the three Yost family member trustees (Sandra Yost, Robin Yost and Susan Yost) were the only trustees who were intended to ever be able to approve successor trustees.\u201d The court also \u201cdetermined that, as a necessary result of the foregoing ruling, the three Yost family member trustees ... are the current trustees ... of the Trust with the right to approve successor trustees.\u201d Finally, the trial court determined that it was unnecessary to reach the third issue. The trial court decreed \u201c[t]hat Article V.C. of the Trust shall be interpreted to mean that the three Yost family member trustees are the only trustees who are ever able to approve successor trustees.\u201d The trial court also ordered the Yost family member trustees to \u201cfirst nominate and approve successors for all of the six non-family trustee positions, and those nine trustees shall thereafter be entitled to engage in other Trust businessf.]\u201d\nLater that day, plaintiffs moved to stay the effect of the order of partial summary judgment, which the trial court denied. Plaintiffs appealed. This Court granted a petition for writ of supersedeas, staying the order of partial summary judgment pending the outcome of this appeal.\nII. Interlocutory Appeal\nAs a preliminary matter, we note that the order of partial summary judgment is interlocutory, and, ordinarily, there is no right of appeal from an interlocutory order. CBP Resources of N.C., Inc. v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 134 N.C. App. 169, 170, 517 S.E.2d 151, 153 (1999). However, an interlocutory order may be immediately appealed \u201c(1) if the order is final as to some but not all of the claims or parties and the trial court certifies there is no just reason to delay the appeal pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b) or (2) if the trial court\u2019s decision deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review.\u201d Id. at 171, 517 S.E.2d at 153 (quotations and citations omitted). Here, the trial court properly certified the case for immediate appeal. Accordingly, we review the merits of plaintiffs\u2019 appeal.\nIII. Arguments\nA. Standing\nDefendants argue that intevenor plaintiff DSI and plaintiffs Caldwell, King, and Kulba lack standing to bring claims against them. See Forsyth County Bd. of Social Services v. Division of Social Services, 317 N.C. 689, 692, 346 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1986) (\u201c[Questions of subject matter jurisdiction may properly be raised at any point[.]\u201d). As this is another preliminary legal issue, we resolve it before addressing the substance of plaintiffs\u2019 appeal.\nDefendants argue that DSI lacks standing to prosecute the four causes of action alleged in its complaint because DSI has no injury to redress against the Trust or its trustees. This presents the unusual situation of trust property suing the trustees. This Court has followed the rule set out in the Restatement and other jurisdictions that \u201conly beneficiaries have standing to sue to enforce a trust.\u201d Scott v. United Carolina Bank, 130 N.C. App. 426, 433, 503 S.E.2d 149, 154 (1998) (citations omitted); see Restatement (Second) of Trusts, \u00a7 200 (\u201cNo one except a beneficiary or one suing on his behalf can maintain a suit against the trustee to enforce the trust or to enjoin redress for a breach of trust.\u201d). \u201cA beneficiary is one for whose benefit a trust directly and specifically provides. A person who incidentally benefits from the performance of the trust, but who is not a beneficiary of the trust, cannot maintain a suit to enforce the trust.\u201d Scott, 130 N.C. App. at 432, 503 S.E.2d at 153-54 (quoting and citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts, \u00a7 126 and \u00a7 200, cmt. e). Here, the trust agreement names four trust beneficiaries: Sandra Yost, Robin Yost, Susan Yost, and Sunlight Foundation, Inc. DSI is not named as a beneficiary. Accordingly, DSI does not have standing to sue the trustees to enforce the Trust, which is the essence of DSI\u2019s complaint and the basis for this appeal. Accordingly, we do not consider intervenor plaintiff DSI\u2019s arguments on appeal.\nDefendants argue that plaintiffs Caldwell, King, and Kulba lack standing because they are no longer trustees \u2014 their terms having expired automatically in March 2008. An exception to the rule above, that only a beneficiary can sue to enforce a trust, is that one co-trustee has standing to sue another co-trustee \u201cto compel him to perform his duties under the trust, or to enjoin him from committing a breach of trust, or to compel him to redress a breach of trust committed by him.\u201d Id., \u00a7 200, cmt. e. Although this rule is found only in the Restatement, not in our caselaw, \u201cour Supreme Court has recognized the Restatement (Second) of Trusts as persuasive authority.\u201d Slaughter v. Swicegood, 162 N.C. App. 457, 465, 591 S.E.2d 577, 583 (2004) (citing Fortune v. First Union Nat. Bank, 323 N.C. 146, 149, 371 S.E.2d 483, 484 (1988)). In addition, the official comment to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 36C-10-1001, \u201cRemedies for breach of trust,\u201d states that \u201c[b]eneficiaries and cotrustees have standing to bring a petition to remedy a breach of trust.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 36C-10-1001, cmt. (2009). Again, the essence of these plaintiffs\u2019 complaint is that defendants breached their duties as trustees and violated the trust agreement, so, as co-trustees, they would have standing to sue their fellow trustees to enforce the Trust. Defendants argue that, because these plaintiffs\u2019 terms automatically terminated in March 2008, they are no longer co-trustees and thus have no standing. However, whether defendants wrongly prevented plaintiffs from renewing their trusteeships is part of the current controversy. Holding that that these plaintiffs lack standing because their terms ended in March 2008 presumes the answer to the question before us on appeal. Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiffs Caldwell, King, and Kulba have standing to maintain this appeal.\nB. Grant of Defendants\u2019 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment\nPlaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by granting defendants\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment because the trial court misinterpreted Article V.C. of the trust agreement. We disagree.\nWe review an order of partial summary judgment de novo. DeRossett v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, - N.C. App. -, -, 698 S.E.2d 455, 458 (2010). Summary judgment is appropriate \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [a] party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2009).\nWhen reviewing a trial court\u2019s allowance of a summary judgment motion, we consider whether, on the basis of materials supplied to the trial court, there was a genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Evidence presented by the parties is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant.\nDavenport v. Cent. Carolina Bank & Trust Co., 161 N.C. App. 666, 671, 589 S.E.2d 367, 370 (2003) (citing Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003)).\n\u201cIn construing the terms of a trust, our responsibility is to ascertain the intent of the settlor and to carry out that intent. . . deriving the settlor\u2019s intent from the language and purpose of the trust, construing the document as a whole.\u201d Id. at 672, 589 S.E.2d 370 (quotations and citation omitted).\nIn determining the intent of a trustor the court is not limited to a determination of what is meant by a particular phrase or word. A trust indenture is but the expression of a settlor\u2019s intention reduced to writing, and it is often necessary to go to the \u201cfour corners\u201d of the instrument in order to gather a full understanding of his intent. That intent is determined by the language he chooses to convey his thoughts, the purposes he seeks to accomplish, and the situation of the other parties to or benefited by the trust.\nDavison v. Duke Univ., 282 N.C. 676, 707, 194 S.E.2d 761, 780 (1973) (quotations and citations omitted).\nHere, the section of the trust agreement at issue, V.C., states that \u201cSuccessor Trustees shall be nominated by any then-serving Trustee, and must be approved by at least two-thirds of the then-serving Trustees (excluding any Trustees who are then-serving but whose terms will be ending and whose successors are being selected).\u201d (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs argue that this language means that trustees whose terms are expiring participate in the approval of successor trustees for every open trustee position except their own. In other words, if there are nine trustees and six of their terms are expiring, two-thirds of eight of the trustees must approve the successor trustee for the ninth trustee\u2019s position. The trial court\u2019s interpretation, however, is that all trustees whose terms are expiring cannot participate in the approval of successor trustees. In the scenario above, only two-thirds of the three trustees whose terms are not expiring need to approve each successor trustee. The plain language of this section supports the trial court\u2019s interpretation. The use of the plural \u201cTrustees\u201d rather than the singular \u201cTrustee\u201d in the parenthetical encompasses all trustees whose terms are ending, not just one trustee whose term is ending and whose successor is being voted on.\nThe purposes of the Trust, as set out in the trust agreement, are not inconsistent with the trial court\u2019s interpretation of Section V.C. Article IV of the Trust sets out the purposes of the Trust. The text of Article IV follows in its entirety:\nFollowing is a statement of the purposes for which this trust has been created. I intend that the Trustees shall administer the trust in furtherance of these purposes, and that any disagreement regarding the trust administration or interpretation shall be resolved by reference to this statement of the trust purposes.\nA. Yost Family. To provide for the welfare of my wife and children during their lifetimes by providing them with the right to reside on the property in Madison County that has heretofore been owned by my wife and me, and within reasonable limitations to use such property to pursue their personal interests; and to provide them with support to ensure adequate healthcare and a reasonable standard of living similar to the standard that they presently enjoy.\nB. Research. To enable the nonprofit scientific and educational activities of the Sunlight Foundation, Inc., independent of any profit-motivated or political bias; and within or outside of the Foundation to encourage continuous and continual research efforts, provided that no efforts or assets shall be for imposing or destructive purposes. In particular, the trust should encourage individual research in the natural and physical sciences, in all phases, including study, conjecture, experimentation, observation, analysis, evaluation, and the pursuit of knowledge and understanding, provided that the motive for all of the foregoing is compatible with natural ecological balances and peaceful human coexistence.\nC. Business. To continue and develop the operation of Dynamic Systems, Inc. (\u201cDSI\u201d) and Electric Spacecraft, Inc. (\u201cESI\u201d) as profitable businesses primarily as a means of supporting the other trust purposes described in this Article; and to ensure good wages, benefits, and working conditions for the employees of those businesses; and to uphold and even improve the business\u2019 high standards for quality, products, customer service, and integrity in business practices.\nD. Continuation of Purposes. To manage the property, stock, and other trust assets in a way that will allow this trust and its purposes to continue intact into the future, throughout and beyond the lifetimes of my wife and children; and to ensure that people and organizations involved with the trust, either as Trustees or contributors or otherwise, understand and share the educational and research goals described herein.\nNothing in the articulated purposes of the Trust contradicts our plain language reading of Section V.C. It is, however, evident from the articulated purposes that Charles Yost intended to provide for his family and that the continued operation and development of DSI was a \u201cmeans of supporting the other trust purposes,\u201d including providing for the Yost family. The practical effect of our interpretation of Section V.C. is that only the three Yost trustees can approve successor trustees. Plaintiffs argue that giving the Yost family so much control over the Trust violates Charles Yost\u2019s intent, but it is apparent to us that Charles Yost intended to keep his family deeply involved with the Trust.\nThe paramount importance of the Yost family to Charles Yost, as grantor, is evident throughout the trust agreement: Sandra, Robin, and Susan Yost are trustees for the duration of their lifetimes; the Yosts cannot be removed as trustees; the Yosts are three of the four named beneficiaries of the Trust; although the Yost trustees \u201cshall have no special voting rights, ... it is [Charles Yost\u2019s] intent that all Trustees shall give special consideration to the requests and concerns of the Yost family, consistent with the trust\u2019s stated purposes\u201d; in the event of the Trust\u2019s failure, seventy-five percent of the trust property will be distributed to the three Yosts; and Robin and Susan Yost were appointed to be two of the three trust protectors, meaning they had the power to amend the trust agreement.\nIt is possible for the three Yost trustees to stagger their appointments of successor trustees so that their terms do not all expire at the same time, which would resolve the practical objection raised by plaintiffs. It also appears possible for the trust protectors to amend the trust agreement to change Section V.C. or to establish staggered terms for trustees.\nAccordingly, with one caveat, we agree with the trial court\u2019s interpretation of the trust agreement. That caveat is the trial court\u2019s statement that Sandra, Robin, and Susan Yost \u201cwere the only trustees who were intended to ever be able to approve successor trustees.\u201d This statement reaches too far and is not supported by the trust agreement. Charles Yost specifically intended the Trust to survive his wife and children, and declaring that his wife and children are \u201cthe only trustees who were intended to ever be able to approve successor trustees\u201d is not consistent with this specific intention. Moreover, as explained above, it is possible for other trustees to approve successor trustees by staggering terms or amending the trust agreement or when replacing a trustee who departs before the end of his or her term.\nTherefore, we affirm the order in part and reverse in part, remanding for the sole purpose of removing the language from paragraphs three and eight of the order stating that only the three Yost family member trustees can approve successor trustees.\nC. Denial of Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment\nPlaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion for partial summary judgment, in which they asked the trial court to declare that non-Yost-family trustees can approve successor trustees. For the reasons stated above in III.C., this argument fails.\nIV. Conclusion\nWe affirm the order of partial summary judgment in part, reversing and remanding for the sole purpose of removing the language from paragraphs three and eight of the order stating, that only the three Yost-family-member trustees can approve successor trustees.\nAffirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.\nJudges STEELMAN and ERVIN concur.\n. Pursuant to Section Two of Article XI of the trust agreement, defendants, as two of the three trust protectors, \u2018\u2018have the power to . . . amend th[e] trust agreement in any manner they deem reasonably necessary to fulfill the trust purposes.\u201d Whether the proposed amendments were proper is not currently before this Court.", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roberts & Stevens, RA., by Dennis L. Martin, Jr., and Ann-Patton Homthal, for plaintiffs.", "Patla, Straus, Robinson & Moore, by Richard S. Daniels, for intervenor plaintiff.", "William E. Loose for defendants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SANDRA YOST, as Trustee and Beneficiary of the Research Center Trust and CATHERINE CALDWELL, VICKIE KING, and LESLEE KULBA, as Trustees of the Research Center Trust, Plaintiffs, DYNAMIC SYSTEMS, INC., Intervenor Plaintiff v. ROBIN YOST and SUSAN YOST, Individually and in their capacities as Trustees and Trust Protectors of the Research Center Trust, Defendants\nNo. COA10-957\n(Filed 19 July 2011)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 interlocutory orders and appeals\u2014 partial summary judgment \u2014 certified for immediate appeal\nAn immediate appeal was allowed from a partial summary judgment order where the trial court properly certified the case for immediate appeal.\n2. Trusts\u2014 enforcement of trust provisions \u2014 standing\u2014corporation owned by trust\nA corporation that was owned by a trust did not have standing to sue the trustees to enforce trust provisions concerning successor trustees where it was not the beneficiary of the trust.\n3. Trusts\u2014 successor trustees \u2014 former trustees\u2014 standing\nFormer trustees had standing to bring an action concerning the trust provisions for successor trustees, despite the rule that only beneficiaries and co-trustees have standing to sue to enforce a trust, where a part of the controversy was whether defendants wrongly prevented plaintiffs from renewing their trusteeships.\n4. Trusts\u2014 successor trustees \u2014 trust provisions\nThe trial court did not err in interpreting a trust provision concerning successor trustees and in granting a motion for partial summary judgment. The plain language of the trust provision supported the trial court\u2019s interpretation, which was consistent with the purposes of the trust. The matter was remanded for removal of certain language from the court\u2019s order that reached too far and was not supported by the agreement.\nAppeal by plaintiffs and intervenor plaintiff from order entered 25 May 2010 by Judge Laura J. Bridges in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 January 2011.\nRoberts & Stevens, RA., by Dennis L. Martin, Jr., and Ann-Patton Homthal, for plaintiffs.\nPatla, Straus, Robinson & Moore, by Richard S. Daniels, for intervenor plaintiff.\nWilliam E. Loose for defendants." }, "file_name": "0516-01", "first_page_order": 526, "last_page_order": 536 }