{ "id": 4233839, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALVARO RAFAEL CASTILLO", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Castillo", "decision_date": "2011-07-19", "docket_number": "No. COA10-814", "first_page": "536", "last_page": "545", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "213 N.C. App. 536" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "412", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53878 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 S.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "49", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685069 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "616" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378-79", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660-61", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "886", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2535758 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529763 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0054-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 892, "char_count": 22303, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14040760677553016 }, "sha256": "8f0ff154134ad3b8dc81b621552a0c54f2df9cd58e21078163b49d80d923b544", "simhash": "1:4e0ad7bae60f8de4", "word_count": 3706 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:51:58.983312+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALVARO RAFAEL CASTILLO" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nAlvaro Rafael Castillo (Defendant) was found guilty by a jury on 21 August 2009 of first-degree murder, discharging a weapon on educational property, discharge of a weapon into occupied property, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, two counts of possession of a firearm on educational property, and three counts of possession of a weapon of mass destruction. The trial court arrested judgment on the three counts of possession of a weapon of mass destruction and one count of possession of a weapon on educational property. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder. The trial court imposed a consolidated sentence of twenty-five to thirty-nine months in prison, to run consecutively to Defendant\u2019s life sentence, for: one count of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, discharging a firearm on educational property, discharging a firearm into occupied property, and one count of possession of a weapon on educational property. The trial court also imposed a sentence of twenty-five to thirty-nine months in prison to run consecutively with the above sentences, for the remaining count of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill. Defendant appeals.\nI. Facts\nThe facts of this case are tragic and largely undisputed. Defendant shot and killed his father in their family home in Orange County on 30 August 2006. Defendant then drove to Orange High School (the school) in Hillsborough. Defendant was armed with several homemade pipe bombs, smoke bombs, a sawed-off shotgun, and a rifle. After Defendant arrived at the school, he set off smoke bombs and discharged his rifle into the air. Defendant began to shoot at students who were standing outside of the school. Defendant continued shooting at students and at the fagade of the school building until his rifle jammed. During the shooting, Defendant inflicted non-lethal injuries on two students. A school resource officer, London Ivey (Officer Ivey), along with Barry LeBlanc (Mr. LeBlanc), a teacher and former state trooper, approached Defendant when they realized Defendant\u2019s rifle had jammed. They ordered Defendant to put down his weapons. Defendant complied and was arrested by Officer Ivey.\nThe investigation into Defendant\u2019s actions on 30 August 2006 revealed that Defendant had attempted suicide earlier that year, on 20 April 2006. The evidence presented at trial by Defendant tended to show that he was a mentally unstable young man, who idolized the perpetrators of the Columbine High School shootings in Columbine, Colorado in 1999 (the Columbine shootings). Defendant presented testimony regarding a journal he kept that showed he intended to kill himself with a shotgun on the anniversary of the Columbine shootings.\nDefendant\u2019s father interrupted Defendant\u2019s 20 April 2006 suicide attempt, and Defendant was hospitalized for seven days. Defendant received outpatient psychotherapy until 24 July 2006. At that time, a dispute arose between the two clinics that were treating Defendant. As a result, Defendant received no treatment from 24 July 2006 until the shootings.\nAfter Defendant\u2019s suicide attempt, Defendant began planning a school shooting of his own to mirror the Columbine shootings. Defendant purchased a rifle and ammunition. From 18 June to 20 June 2006, Defendant traveled to Columbine High School with his mother and, during the trip, bought a black trench coat. Defendant\u2019s journal around this time began to contain references to \u201csacrifice of students, sacrifice of family.\u201d Defendant also wrote in his journal: \u201cI might save some children from sin.\u201d At trial, Defendant presented testimony from experts, as well as from his journal, that suggested Defendant considered his father\u2019s murder a sacrifice.\nDefendant stated to the officers who accompanied him to jail after the shootings that he \u201cwas going to save those kids from sex, drugs, pornography, and abusive people like [his] father in their lives[.]\u201d When Defendant\u2019s mother was allowed to visit him in the Central Prison mental hospital after his arrest, she asked him if he had anything to confess. Defendant replied, \u201cwhat do I have to confess about? I didn\u2019t do anything bad. I did the right thing.\u201d\nSeveral experts testified at trial that Defendant was unable to distinguish between right and wrong when he shot his father and attacked students at the school. Dr. James Hilkey (Dr. Hilkey), a psychologist who treated Defendant, testified that Defendant believed God had given Defendant signs directing Defendant to behave as he did. Dr. Hilkey testified that Defendant came to believe that his failed suicide attempt was the result of divine intervention, and a signal that God wanted Defendant to end the suffering of other people by sacrificing people. Dr. Hilkey testified that Defendant knew that killing people by shooting them was legally wrong, but that Defendant believed it was morally right.\nHowever, there was also evidence presented at trial that Defendant had a troubled relationship with his father. Dr. Nicole Wolfe (Dr. Wolfe), a psychiatrist at Dorothea Dix Hospital, testified that Defendant was severely mentally ill on 30 August 2006. However, Dr. Wolfe opined that Defendant \u201cwas capable of distinguishing between right and wrong at that time.\u201d Dr. Wolfe testified that Defendant carried out the school shootings because Defendant sought notoriety and \u201cthe people that he was imitating were his idols. He idolized Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold[,]\u201d the shooters involved in the Columbine shootings.\nIn brief, Defendant presented evidence that he: (1) was a very troubled young man, (2) suffered from untreated or poorly treated mental disorders, (3) harbored anger for the world in which he lived, and (4) considered that world to be sinful and offensive. The issue in dispute was not whether Defendant was troubled or had mental disorders, but rather, exactly what the nature of Defendant\u2019s disorders were, and whether the disorders affected Defendant such that he was unable to distinguish right from wrong when he carried out his plans on 30 August 2006.\nII. Jury Instructions\nDefendant first argues that \u201cthe trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury that the insanity defense applies if a defendant believed due to mental illness that his conduct was morally right.\u201d We disagree. Defendant did not request a special instruction at trial; therefore, this argument is limited to plain error review. State v. Collins, 334 N.C. 54, 62, 431 S.E.2d 188, 193 (1993).\nWe note that the trial court instructed the jury pursuant to the pattern jury instructions for the insanity defense. During the charge conference, Defendant did not request an instruction on the meaning of \u201cwrong\u201d in the context of whether he was able to distinguish right from wrong in his . actions on 30 August 2006. Defendant did orally request a special instruction to inform the jury \u201cabout what\u2019s going to happen if they do render a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity!,]\u201d and that would result in Defendant\u2019s being committed to a mental institution. The trial court provided those instructions to the jury in conformity with Defendant\u2019s'request.\nOur Supreme Court has summarized the insanity defense as follows:\nIn North Carolina, in order for a defendant to be exempt from criminal responsibility for an act by reason of insanity, he must prove to the satisfaction of the jury that at the time of the act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason caused by disease or a deficiency of the mind that he was incapable of knowing the nature and quality of his act or, if he did know the nature and quality of his act, that he was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in relation to the act.\nState v. Ingle, 336 N.C. 617, 630, 445 S.E.2d 880, 886 (1994) (citations omitted). In the present case, the trial court gave the following instruction on the insanity defense, which substantially tracks the language in the Pattern Jury Instructions, N.C.P.I. \u2014 Crim. 304.10.\nWhen there is evidence which tends to show that the defendant was legally insane at the time of the alleged offense, you will consider this evidence only if you find that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the things about which I have already instructed you. Even if the State does prove each of these things beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant would nevertheless be not guilty if he was legally insane at the time of the alleged offense. I instruct you that sanity or soundness of mind is the natural and normal condition of people. Therefore, everyone is presumed sane until the contrary is made to appear.\nThe test of insanity as a defense is whether the defendant at the time of the alleged offense was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease or deficiency of the mind, as to be incapable of knowing the nature and quality of the act or if he did know this, whether he was by reason of such defect of reason, incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in relation to that act. This defense consists of two things: First, the defendant must have been suffering from a disease or defect of his mind at the time of the alleged offense; second, this disease or defect must have so impaired his mental capacity that he either did not know the nature and quality of the act as he was committing it, or, if he did, that he did not know that this act was wrong.\nOn the other hand, it need not be shown that the defendant lacked mental capacity with respect to all matters. A person may be sane on every subject but one and yet, if his mental disease or defect with respect to that one subject renders him unable to know the nature and quality of the act or to know that the act with which he was charged was wrong, he is not guilty by reason of insanity. Since sanity or soundness of mind is the natural and normal condition of people, everyone is presumed to be sane until the contrary is made to appear. This means that the defendant has the burden of proof on the issue of sanity \u2014 of insanity. However, unlike the State, which must prove all the other elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant need only prove his insanity to your satisfaction; that is, the evidence taken as a whole must satisfy you not beyond a reasonable doubt but simply to your satisfaction that the defendant was insane at the time of the alleged offense.\nIn making this determination, you must consider all of the evidence before you which has any tendency to throw any light on the mental condition of the defendant, including lay testimony reciting irrational or rational behavior of the defendant before, during or after the alleged offense; opinion testimony by lay and expert witnesses or other evidence admitted. None of these things are conclusive, but all are circumstances to be considered by you in reaching your decision. If you are not satisfied as to the insanity of the defendant, the defendant is presumed to be sane; and you would find the defendant guilty.\nDefendant argues that the term \u201cwrong\u201d as used in our State\u2019s body of law governing the defense of insanity means \u201cmoral wrong\u201d and not \u201clegal wrong\u201d or \u201cillegality.\u201d Defendant contends that, despite his failure to request a special instruction on the issue, the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury that the \u201cinsanity defense would apply if [Defendant] believed that his conduct was morally right, even if he understood that it was legally wrong.\u201d However, assuming, without deciding, that Defendant was entitled to a special instruction on the meaning of the term \u201cwrong,\u201d we conclude that the trial court\u2019s failure to provide such an instruction was not plain error.\nIn adopting the plain error rule for North Carolina, our Supreme Court noted the following:\nThe adoption of the \u201cplain error\u201d rule does not mean that every failure to give a proper instruction mandates reversal regardless of the defendant\u2019s failure to object at trial. To hold so would negate Rule 10(b)(2) which is not the intent or purpose of the \u201cplain error\u201d rule. The purpose of Rule 10(b)(2) is to encourage the parties to inform the trial court of errors in its instructions so that it can correct the instructions and cure any potential errors before the jury deliberates on the case and thereby eliminate the need for a new trial. Indeed, even when the \u201cplain error\u201d rule is applied, \u201c[i]t is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court.\u201d\nIn deciding whether a defect in the jury instruction constitutes \u201cplain error,\u201d the appellate court must examine the entire record and determine if the instructional error had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding of guilt.\nState v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660-61, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378-79 (1983) (citations omitted). \u201c \u2018In order to prevail under a plain error analysis, defendant must establish . . . that \u201cabsent the error, the jury probably would have reached a different result.\u201d \u2019 \u201d State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600, 616, 536 S.E.2d 36, 49 (2000) (citations omitted).\nDefendant states that \u201cthere was uncontested evidence that [Defendant] knew that his acts were legally wrong.\u201d However, Defendant asserts \u201cthat there was also uncontested evidence that. . . he believed that God wanted him to kill his father and [the] students.\u201d Defendant also asserts that \u201c [i]t is highly probable that the jurors would have found [Defendant] not guilty by reason of insanity if the trial court had instructed them that \u2018wrong\u2019 means \u2018morally wrong.\u2019 \u201d\nReviewing the theories of the case presented by the State and Defendant during trial, we find the issue of whether Defendant was able to distinguish moral right and wrong was clearly presented. For example, during his closing argument concerning insanity, Defendant\u2019s counsel argued as follows:\nThe fact that someone knows something is wrong legally or is against the law doesn\u2019t mean that they don\u2019t appreciate or know that it is morally wrong.\nIn other words, a person can commit an act that they know is against the law; but if they believe because they feel they are responding to a higher power, a higher calling, if they feel that that is the right thing to do, then the fact that they know it\u2019s against the law doesn\u2019t mean that that person can\u2019t be insane. So I think we need to \u2014 there has been a lot of talk about, well, you know, he spent this effort, you know. He went out there and he \u2014 he sawed this gun off, and he knew that was against law. Well, yeah. He knew it was against the law.\nDid he know that killing people or shooting at people was against the law? We are not contending, and that\u2019s not part of \u2014 and has never been \u2014 -a part of this defense, that he didn\u2019t know that it was against the law. But still \u2014 because of his mental illness and his delusional thinking, he felt convinced that this was the right thing to do.\nLikewise, the State argued that the jury was to, consider Defendant\u2019s actions and knowledge of legality and illegality to determine \u201cwhether [Defendant] was, by reason of such defect of reason, incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong.\u201d The State suggested that Defendant\u2019s knowledge of legality and illegality was \u201csome evidence that [he] can work through the process of right and wrong that we might call moral right and wrong.\u201d While Defendant contends there was uncontested evidence that he believed God commanded him to kill, the State argued that Defendant\u2019s actions suggested otherwise and that Defendant was, instead, motivated by the same notoriety generated by the Columbine shootings.\nBased on the theories involved in the present case, the question presented to the jury was whether, despite Defendant\u2019s knowledge that his intended actions were illegal, he took those actions under a delusion that he was doing so at God\u2019s command, thereby rendering him unable to distinguish between right and wrong. Thus, the theories presented to the jury directed the jury to focus on whether Defendant could distinguish right and wrong, not legality and illegality. Had the jury been given the instruction Defendant now advocates, the jury would have been required to determine the same issue: whether Defendant was under a delusion that God commanded him to kill his father and carry out a school shooting at Orange High School. We hold that, on these facts, the \u201cwrongness\u201d about which the jury was directed and instructed throughout the trial was clear; therefore, Defendant has not shown \u201c \u2018that \u201cabsent the [assumed] error, the jury probably would have reached a different result.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Cummings, 352 N.C. at 616, 536 S.E.2d at 49 (citations omitted). Absent a request from Defendant for a special jury instruction about the particular definition of wrong, the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to provide an unrequested instruction on the definition of wrong.\nIII. Closing Arguments\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to a statement made by the State during its closing argument. However, in reviewing the transcript, we do not find that Defendant actually made any objection, nor that he obtained a ruling. We first note that Defendant filed notice of appeal on 24 August 2009. Therefore, this appeal is subject to the version of the Rules of Appellate Procedure in effect on 24 August 2009. The Rules of Appellate Procedure were revised, effective 1 October 2009. We therefore apply the prior 2009 version of the rules. See N.C.R. App. P. 10. N.C. Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b)(1) (2009) provided:\nIn order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context. It is also necessary for the complaining party to obtain a ruling upon the party\u2019s request, objection, or motion. Any such question that was properly preserved for review by action of counsel taken during the course of proceedings in the trial tribunal by objection noted or which by rule or law was deemed preserved or taken without any such action, may be made the basis of an assignment of error presented on appeal.\nIn the present case, the State\u2019s closing argument contained the following:\nThe issue is: Does the mental illness rise to the level of insanity or did the mental illness rise to the level that it affected specific intent? And that\u2019s the diminished capacity argument that you are going to hear about. So that\u2019s something you really haven\u2019t heard a lot about until now, but you will have to consider that as to the first degree murder and the assaults because those have elements of specific intent in them.\nBut- \u2014 so the defense in his case, they are faced with the dilemma. You know what the defendant has been thinking about. You know about all these plans. You know about all these preparations. So a factual defense just isn\u2019t going to work. So where do you go next? Well, obviously because the defendant did have mental illness the next place to go is-\u2014\n[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, may we approach?\nThe Court: Yes.\n(A bench conference was held off the record and out of the hearing of the jury)\n[The State]: So anyway, so the defense \u2014 they have got a dilemma here. You are not going to have a factual defense in this case. It\u2019s going to come down to a mental health defense of some type.\nDefendant contends that we may infer that he actually made an objection during this time; he further contends that \u201c[although the trial court did not announce its ruling about the objection after the bench conference, the [State\u2019s] immediate repetition of [its] argument made it clear that the court had overruled the objection.\u201d However, Defendant cites no authority for his contention that we may infer a ruling. We find no reason to infer from the transcript that Defendant, when his attorney asked to approach the bench, made an objection during the exchange quoted above. Moreover, even had Defendant made an objection, the record does not reflect a ruling thereon.\n\u201cWhere there is no objection, \u2018the standard of review to determine whether the trial court should have intervened ex mero mo tu is whether the allegedly improper argument was so prejudicial and grossly improper as to interfere with defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial.\u2019 \u201d State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 673, 483 S.E.2d 396, 412 (1997) (citation omitted). In light of the \u201cwide latitude accorded counsel in closing argument\u201d and the substantial and largely unchallenged evidence presented in this case, \u201cwe cannot conclude that the argument at issue meets this test.\u201d Id. at 673-74, 483 S.E.2d at 412 (citation omitted). Defendant\u2019s argument is therefore overruled.\nNo error.\nJudges BRYANT and BEASLEY concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General John G. Barnwell and Assistant Attorney General Derrick C. Mertz, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALVARO RAFAEL CASTILLO\nNo. COA10-814\n(Filed 19 July 2011)\n1. Criminal Law\u2014 jury instruction \u2014 insanity defense\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a first-degree murder and assault case by failing to instruct the jury that the insanity defense applied if defendant believed due to mental illness that his conduct was morally right. Defendant failed to request a special instruction or show that absent the alleged error, the jury probably would have reached a different result.\n2. Criminal Law\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 mental illness\u2014 failure to intervene ex mero motu\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder and assault case by failing to intervene ex mero motu during the State\u2019s closing argument regarding defendant\u2019s mental illness in light of the wide latitude accorded counsel in closing argument and the substantial and largely unchallenged evidence.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgments entered 21 August 2009 by Judge R. Allen Baddour, Jr. in Superior Court, Orange County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 February 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General John G. Barnwell and Assistant Attorney General Derrick C. Mertz, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0536-01", "first_page_order": 546, "last_page_order": 555 }