{ "id": 4233246, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HEATHER MARIE STEPHENSON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Stephenson", "decision_date": "2011-07-19", "docket_number": "No. COA10-1319", "first_page": "621", "last_page": "625", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "213 N.C. App. 621" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 34", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635555 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" }, { "page": "143" }, { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 537", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "540", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9128716 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437-38", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E.2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568006 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 807", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9441929 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8301029 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" }, { "page": "135" }, { "page": "127" }, { "page": "141" }, { "page": "130" }, { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511319 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" }, { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2533767 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" }, { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-196.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 448, "char_count": 10036, "ocr_confidence": 0.728, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14038424634023064 }, "sha256": "48aa98e68c33b8b6305864f7dd97c35c2014bf0988fe2f3cec37f9717022789c", "simhash": "1:0e67d62e741fee64", "word_count": 1591 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:51:58.983312+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HEATHER MARIE STEPHENSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nOn 4 November 2008, Heather Marie Stephenson (defendant) pled guilty to attempting to traffic in opiates and to forgery, and was sentenced to nineteen to twenty-three months\u2019 imprisonment. This sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on supervised probation for thirty-six months. The terms of defendant\u2019s probation included enrolling in and completing the Potter\u2019s House drug treatment program in Gaston County.\nOn 14 June 2010, a violation report alleged that defendant violated the terms of her probation by failing to complete the Potter\u2019s House program after being discharged for testing positive for cocaine, methadone, opiates, and oxycodone. After a hearing on 1 July 2010, the trial court revoked defendant\u2019s probation and activated her suspended sentence. Defendant was also given a pre-trial confinement credit of fifty-four days. Defendant now appeals.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred by failing to give defendant credit for the time she spent at Potter\u2019s House. She argues that she was entitled to credit against her active sentence under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-196.1. We disagree.\nGeneral Statute \u00a7 15-196.1 provides as follows:\nThe minimum and maximum term of a sentence shall be credited with and diminished by the total amount of time a defendant has spent, committed to or in confinement in any State or local correctional, mental or other institution as a result of the charge that culminated in the sentence. The credit provided shall be calculated from the date custody under the charge commenced and shall include credit for all time spent in custody pending trial, trial de novo, appeal, retrial, or pending parole, probation, or post release supervision revocation hearing: Provided, however, the credit available herein shall not include any time that is credited on the term of a previously imposed sentence to which a defendant is subject.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-196.1 (2009).\n\u201cThe language of section 15-196.1 manifests the legislature\u2019s intention that a defendant be credited with all time defendant was in custody and not at liberty as the result of the charge.\u201d State v. Farris, 336 N.C. 552, 556, 444 S.E.2d 182, 185 (1994). Our Supreme Court addressed section 15-196.l\u2019s application to rehabilitation programs in State v. Hearst, 356 N.C. 132, 567 S.E.2d 124 (2002). In Hearst, the defendant attended the Intensive Motivational Program of Alternative Correctional Treatment (IMPACT) as a special condition of his probation. 356 N.C. at 133, 567 S.E.2d at 126. IMPACT is a residential drug rehabilitation facility operated by the Department of Correction. Id. at 135, 567 S.E.2d at 127. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to a credit against his suspended sentence for the time the defendant was in IMPACT. Id. at 141, 567 S.E.2d at 130. The Court focused its analysis on whether the \u201cdefendant\u2019s time in IMPACT constitute^] confinement under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15-196.1[,]\u201d and concluded that the \u201cdefendant was \u2018in custody and not at liberty\u2019 and therefore was \u2018in confinement\u2019 while at IMPACT.\u201d Id. at 138, 567 S.E.2d at 128 (citing Farris, 336 N.C. at 556, 444 S.E.2d at 185).\nSimilarly, in State v. Lutz, this Court concluded that a defendant was entitled to credit for time spent in the DART-Cherry substance abuse program because he was \u201cin confinement and not at liberty at DART-Cherry.\u201d 177 N.C. App. 140, 144, 628 S.E.2d 34, 36 (2006). This Court\u2019s analysis also focused on the conditions at DART-Cherry and whether they met the definition of \u201cconfinement.\u201d Id. at 143, 628 S.E.2d at 36.\nHowever, although the conditions at Potter\u2019s House were not so different from those at IMPACT or DART-Cherry, the key difference between those programs and Potter\u2019s House is that both IMPACT and DART-Cherry were operated by the Department of Correction. The analysis in Hearst and Lutz focused on the word \u201cconfinement\u201d in the statute, rather than the phrase \u201cin any State or local correctional, mental or other institution,\u201d because both defendants were 'in a State institution, so that portion of the statute was not at issue in either case.\nLike the trial court in this case, we conclude that \u201cin any State or local correctional, mental or other institution\u201d means an institution operated by State or local government. This reading is consistent with both the plain language of the statute and Hearst and Lutz. With respect to \u00a7 15-196.1, the words \u201cState or local\u201d modify \u201ccorrectional, mental or other institution,\u201d with \u201cother institution\u201d meaning an institution that is neither correctional nor mental. In our opinion, \u201cother institution\u201d does not mean an institution that is not a \u201cState or local\u201d institution.\nWe conclude that Potter\u2019s House, which was an independent Christian faith-based rehabilitation program and not affiliated with or operated by either a State or local government agency, does not qualify as a \u201cState or local correctional, mental or other institution\u201d under \u00a7 15-196.1. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly declined to give defendant credit against her active sentence for the days she spent at Potter\u2019s House.\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred by abusing its discretion when it failed to make complete proper findings that defendant violated the terms of her probation \u201cwillfully and without valid excuse.\u201d Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion because the transcript does not show that the trial judge found that defendant\u2019s violations were done willfully or without valid excuse. We disagree.\nWe review a trial court\u2019s decision to revoke probation only for \u201cmanifest abuse of discretion.\u201d State v. Tennant, 141 N.C. App. 524, 526, 540 S.E.2d 807, 808 (2000). To revoke a defendant\u2019s probation, the trial court need only find that the defendant has \u201cwillfully violated a valid condition of probation or that the defendant has violated without lawful excuse a valid condition upon which the sentence was suspended.\u201d State v. Hewett, 270 N.C. 348, 353, 154 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1967). \u201cAdditionally, once the State has presented competent evidence establishing a defendant\u2019s failure to comply with the terms of probation, the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate through competent evidence an inability to comply with the terms.\u201d State v. Terry, 149 N.C. App. 434, 437-38, 562 S.E.2d 537, 540 (2002) (citation omitted). \u201cIf the trial court is then reasonably satisfied that the defendant has violated a condition upon which a prior sentence was suspended, it may within its sound discretion revoke the probation.\u201d Id. at 438, 562 S.E.2d at 540 (citation omitted).\nHere, defendant contends that sufficient evidence was presented in the record to show that she was unable to comply with the conditions of her probation and satisfactorily complete the drug treatment program at Potter\u2019s House because she is an addict. However, defendant offers no support for her assertion that drug addiction makes her noncompliance with the terms of probation not willful or is otherwise a lawful excuse. We addressed this issue in an unpublished opinion, concluding that the \u201c[defendant\u2019s explanation [that] he was addicted to drugs is not a lawful excuse for his probation violation.\u201d State v. Green, No. COA 04-1403, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 1241, *4 (filed 5 July 2005) (unpublished). We apply the same rule here and conclude that defendant\u2019s explanation that she was addicted to drugs was not a lawful excuse for her probation violation.\nWe also conclude that the trial court\u2019s findings sufficiently show that defendant violated her probation \u201cwillfully and without valid excuse.\u201d The probation violation report alleged that defendant violated the condition that she enroll and complete the Potter\u2019s House program when she was discharged from the program for testing positive for cocaine, methadone, opiates, and oxycodone. At the 1 July 2010 hearing for this probation violation report, defendant admitted to the alleged violation. Under the \u201cFindings\u201d heading in the judgment, the trial court found that defendant was charged with having violated a specific condition of her probation; that defendant waived a violation hearing and admitted she violated a condition of her probation; and that each violation is, in and of itself, a sufficient basis upon which the trial court should revoke probation and activate the suspended sentence. Therefore, the trial court made proper findings to support revoking defendant\u2019s probation.\nAccordingly, the trial court was within its discretion to find the violations to be willful and without lawful excuse, and we reject defendant\u2019s argument that the trial judge erred by activating her suspended sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nJudges BRYANT and GEER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Mabel Y Bullock, for the State.", "John T. Hall for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HEATHER MARIE STEPHENSON\nNo. COA10-1319\n(Filed 19 July 2011)\n1. Probation and Parole\u2014 activation of sentence \u2014 credit for time served\nThe trial court did not err in a probation revocation hearing by failing to give defendant credit against her active sentence for the time she spent at a faith-based rehabilitation program because it was not affiliated with or operated by either a State or local government agency as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15-196.1.\n2. Probation and Parole\u2014 probation revocation \u2014 findings of fact \u2014 willful and without valid excuse \u2014 drug addiction\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a probation revocation hearing by allegedly failing to make proper findings that defendant violated the terms of her probation willfully and without valid excuse. Defendant offered no support for her assertion that drug addiction made her noncompliance with the terms of probation not willful or otherwise lawfully excused.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 1 July 2010 by Judge Eric L. Levinson in Gaston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 March 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Mabel Y Bullock, for the State.\nJohn T. Hall for defendant." }, "file_name": "0621-01", "first_page_order": 631, "last_page_order": 635 }