{ "id": 4278188, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TRACEY HARLAN JARVIS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Jarvis", "decision_date": "2011-08-02", "docket_number": "No. COA11-31", "first_page": "84", "last_page": "100", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "214 N.C. App. 84" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "661 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641156 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767", "parenthetical": "\"[S]uperior courts have exclusive, original jurisdiction over \"all criminal actions not assigned to the district court division,\" including felony criminal actions.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/661/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 749", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642320 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "750" }, { "page": "751" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/669/0749-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 S.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638337 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/644/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "656 S.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640369 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/656/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "937 S.W.2d 330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11308404 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "when plea agreement is reached with a defendant who initially agrees to plead guilty, but who subsequently agrees to a plea agreement pursuant to Alford, such action \"eliminates any showing of remorse or taking of responsibility by the appellant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/937/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 S.E.2d 774", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "776" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 N.C. App. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551818 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/48/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 S.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152648 ], "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "703 S.E.2d 151", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "700 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152728 ], "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 F.2d 855", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2166189 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/418/0855-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Idaho 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Idaho", "case_ids": [ 11921581 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "1004", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/127/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Va. App. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Va. App.", "case_ids": [ 1264471 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363", "parenthetical": "\"[A] trial court may consider a defendant's lack of remorse at sentencing, even when the defendant has chosen to enter an Alford plea.\"" }, { "page": "14", "parenthetical": "\"[A] trial court may consider a defendant's lack of remorse at sentencing, even when the defendant has chosen to enter an Alford plea.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/va-app/27/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 N.W.2d 83", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 8931640 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" }, { "page": "85" }, { "page": "86" }, { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/701/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 S.E.2d 224", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152446 ], "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "760-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N.C. App. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4171957 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/200/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685022 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "679 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432", "parenthetical": "citation and internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "432" }, { "page": "434" }, { "page": "434", "parenthetical": "emphases added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. App. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4169223 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367", "parenthetical": "citation and internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "366" }, { "page": "369-70" }, { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/198/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 S.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Kilby, 198 N.C. App. 363, 367, 679 S.E.2d 430, 432 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)" }, { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "italics omitted" }, { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "700 S.E.2d 239", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "700 S.E.2d 42", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 25, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4159774 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13", "parenthetical": "\"[S]uperior courts have exclusive, original jurisdiction over \"all criminal actions not assigned to the district court division,\" including felony criminal actions.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 N.C. App. 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4163160 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" }, { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/194/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571060 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564852 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "220 N.C. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11298486 ], "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/220/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 S.E.2d 806", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 N.C. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568279 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/262/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169132 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 N.C. App. 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8203127 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/183/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 842", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4155675 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 S.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 N.C. App. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549069 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/9/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "703 S.E.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(5)" }, { "page": "(la)" }, { "page": "(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "400 U.S. 25", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12045986 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/400/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1155, "char_count": 35537, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.087085966315723e-08, "percentile": 0.3783859599536498 }, "sha256": "c8877064b0fcd1386c63d0097fee35f8e66a691ed66b08a88b1d53f6975fd9de", "simhash": "1:42a8e22b74bf85d4", "word_count": 5759 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:33:33.584356+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge ELMORE concurs.", "Judge STEELMAN concurs in the result." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TRACEY HARLAN JARVIS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge.\nTracey Harlan Jarvis (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals the trial court\u2019s order requiring him to enroll in satellite-based monitoring (\u201cSBM\u201d) for a period of ten years. We vacate and remand the trial court\u2019s order.\nI. BACKGROUND\n\u201cCayla\u201d and \u201cKasey,\u201d defendant\u2019s daughter (collectively, \u201cthe girls\u201d), were the same age and played softball together. Defendant, a close friend of Cayla\u2019s family for more than eight years, was also the girls\u2019 softball coach. Cayla\u2019s mother would frequently drop her off at defendant\u2019s home because of Cayla\u2019s relationship with Kasey, and the girls would spend the night together at defendant\u2019s home.\nDuring the summer and fall of 2006, Cayla began spending time at defendant\u2019s home when Kasey was not present. On 5 January 2007, defendant and Cayla \u201cwere just messing around, sitting on the couch watching a movie\u201d when Cayla \u201creached over and kissed\u201d defendant. Defendant told Cayla that it \u201cwasn\u2019t right\u201d and that if there were \u201cphysical relations\u201d between them, he would \u201cprobably end up in jail.\u201d\nApproximately one week later, defendant and Cayla were watching a movie at defendant\u2019s home when she \u201ckissed him [and] started touching him.\u201d Cayla then performed oral sex on defendant. Defendant \u201cstopped her\u201d and told her they \u201ccouldn\u2019t do that.\u201d Cayla replied that she \u201cunderstood.\u201d Approximately one week after this incident, defendant and Cayla were in defendant\u2019s bed, fully clothed. Cayla began kissing defendant, \u201cand she took off part of her clothes.\u201d Cayla then performed oral sex on him, and defendant did not stop her.\nOn the afternoon of 6 May 2007, defendant and Cayla were at defendant\u2019s home when she performed oral sex on him, and then engaged in intercourse. The next day, 7 May 2007, Cayla\u2019s mother called defendant around noon and told him that an unnamed student at Cayla\u2019s school \u201ctold them something.\u201d The school then called Cayla\u2019s mother and told her to come to the school \u201cright away.\u201d Defendant assumed the unnamed student was Kasey.\nCayla\u2019s mother contacted defendant and asked him if he \u201chad any idea what was going on.\u201d Defendant replied in the negative. He subsequently called Cayla\u2019s mother several times, but she did not answer. Defendant then spoke to Cayla about turning himself into law enforcement. Cayla told him \u201cnot to do it,\u201d but defendant \u201cfelt like this was the right thing to do.\u201d\nOn 7 May 2007, defendant voluntarily drove to the China Grove Police Department, where he spoke with Detective Linda Porter (\u201cDetective Porter\u201d) of the Rowan County Sheriff\u2019s Department (\u201cRCSD\u201d). Detective Porter read defendant his Miranda rights, and defendant signed a form waiving his rights. He then admitted that he performed oral sex on Cayla \u201cthree or four times,\u201d that she performed oral sex on him \u201cabout eight or more [times],\u201d and that they also engaged in intercourse.\nDefendant, who was thirty-nine years old at the time, was indicted on four counts of statutory sex offense of a person at least six years younger than defendant pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.7A(a). On 16 July 2010, in Rowan County Superior Court, defendant entered a guilty plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), to four counts of taking indecent liberties with a child. The trial court sentenced defendant on each count to a minimum term of thirteen months to a maximum term of sixteen months in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Correction (\u201cNCDOC\u201d), and ordered defendant to serve all sentences consecutively. The trial court then suspended the sentences. Defendant was given a split sentence. He was placed on supervised probation for a period of thirty-six months and, as a special condition of probation, defendant was ordered to serve two consecutive active terms of 120 days in the custody of the NCDOC.\nAfter entering judgment, the trial court determined defendant\u2019s eligibility for SBM, including whether defendant\u2019s conviction was a reportable conviction. A reportable conviction, as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4), means \u201c[a] final conviction for an offense against a minor, a sexually violent offense, or an attempt to commit any of those offenses . . . .\u201d The court found that defendant\u2019s conviction for taking indecent liberties with, a child was a reportable conviction because it was a \u201csexually violent offense\u201d under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(5). Since defendant was placed on probation, the trial court placed certain mandatory special conditions for sex offenders who have been convicted of a reportable conviction. The trial court ordered that, as part of defendant\u2019s special conditions for reportable offenses, defendant had to \u201cabide [by] all conditions of the sex offender control program.\u201d\nThe trial court also found that defendant had not been classified as a sexually violent predator or a recidivist, but determined that defendant\u2019s conviction was an aggravated offense under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(la); that defendant\u2019s conviction involved \u201cthe physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor;\u201d and that, based on the NCDOC\u2019s risk assessment and additional findings, defendant required the highest possible level of supervision and monitoring. The trial court then ordered defendant to enroll in SBM for a period of ten years. Defendant appeals.\nII. INITIAL MATTER\nAs an initial matter, in the trial court\u2019s SBM order, the court found that defendant\u2019s offense was an \u201caggravated offense.\u201d However, our Court has held that the offense of indecent liberties can never be an aggravated offense. State v. Davison, _ N.C. App. _, _, 689 S.E.2d 510, 517 (2009), disc. review denied, _ N.C. _, 703 S.E.2d 738 (2010). Although defendant does not argue that the trial court erred on this matter, \u201c[w]e note ex mero motu that the judgments as entered contain a clerical error.\u201d State v. Barber, 9 N.C. App. 210, 212, 175 S.E.2d 611, 613 (1970). The transcript of defendant\u2019s SBM hearing reflects that the SBM order contained a clerical error:\nTHE COURT: And that the conviction is not an aggravated offense.\n[The State]: The State agrees with that.\n(emphasis added). \u201cWhen, on appeal, a clerical error is discovered in the trial court\u2019s judgment or order, it is appropriate to remand the case to the trial court for correction because of the importance that the record \u2018speak the truth.\u2019 \u201d State v. Smith, 188 N.C. App. 842, 845, 656 S.E.2d 695, 696 (2008) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Therefore, we remand this matter to the trial court for correction of this clerical error.\nIII. JURISDICTION\nDefendant argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order him to enroll in SBM because the State failed to file a written pleading providing notice regarding the basis for SBM, and therefore did not invoke the jurisdiction of the court. We disagree.\nIn the instant case, defendant did not raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction before the trial court. \u201cHowever, a defendant may properly raise this issue at any time, even for the first time on appeal.\u201d State v. Reinhardt, 183 N.C. App. 291, 292, 644 S.E.2d 26, 27 (2007).\n\u201cA trial court must have subject matter jurisdiction over a case in order to act in that case.\u201d Id. \u201cSubject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to deal with the kind of action in question. [] Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred upon the courts by either the North Carolina Constitution or by statute.\u201d Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 667, 353 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987) (internal citation omitted).\nJurisdiction is \u201c[t]he legal power and authority of a court to make a decision that binds the parties to any matter properly brought before it.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 869 (8th ed. 2004). The court must have subject matter jurisdiction, or \u201c[jJurisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought,\u201d in order to decide a case. Id. at 870. \u201cA universal principle as old as the law is that the proceedings of a court without jurisdiction of the subject matter are a nullity.\u201d Burgess v. Gibbs, 262 N.C. 462, 465, 137 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1964).\nThe General Assembly \u201cwithin constitutional limitations, can fix and circumscribe the jurisdiction of the courts of this State.\u201d Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18, 20, 16 S.E.2d 411, 412 (1941). \u201cWhere jurisdiction is statutory and the Legislature requires the Court to exercise its jurisdiction in a certain manner, to follow a certain procedure, or otherwise subjects the Court to certain limitations, an act of the Court beyond these limits is in excess of its jurisdiction.\u201d Eudy v. Eudy, 288 N.C. 71, 75, 215 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 290 S.E.2d 653 (1982).\nState v. Wooten, 194 N.C. App. 524, 527, 669 S.E.2d 749, 750 (2008).\n\u201cThe superior court has exclusive, original jurisdiction over all criminal actions n.ot assigned to the district court division by this Article[.J\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-271(a) (2010); see also State v. Corbett, 191 N.C. App. 1, 13, 661 S.E.2d 759, 767 (2008) (\u201c[S]uperior courts have exclusive, original jurisdiction over \u201call criminal actions not assigned to the district court division,\u201d including felony criminal actions.\u201d) (Elmore, J., dissenting). The North Carolina General Statutes confer power upon the superior court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A, which sets out the procedures to be employed by the sentencing court, to categorize those convicted of reportable offenses and to determine eligibility of such newly convicted persons for enrollment in SBM when the trial court imposes a suspended sentence. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A (2010). After an offender has been convicted of a reportable offense as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4), the State\nshall present to the court any evidence that (i) the offender has been classified as a sexually violent predator pursuant to G.S. 14-208.20, (ii) the offender is a recidivist, (iii) the conviction offense was an aggravated offense, (iv) the conviction offense was a violation of G.S. 14-27.2A or G.S. 14-27.4A, or (v) the offense involved the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor. The district attorney shall have no discretion to withhold any evidence required to be submitted to the court pursuant to this subsection.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A(a). The defendant then has the opportunity to present evidence to refute the State\u2019s evidence.\nId.\nAfter the parties present evidence,\nthe court shall determine whether the offender\u2019s conviction places the offender in one of the categories described in G.S. 14-208.40(a), and if so, shall make a finding of fact of that determination, specifying whether (i) the offender has been classified as a sexually violent predator pursuant to G.S. 14-208.20, (ii) the offender is a recidivist, (iii) the conviction offense was an aggravated offense, (iv) the conviction offense was a violation of G.S. 14-27.2A or G.S. 14-27.4A, or (v) the offense involved the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A(b).\nIf the court finds that the offender committed an offense that involved the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor, that the offense is not an aggravated offense or a violation of G.S. 14-27.2A or G.S. 14-27.4A and the offender is not a recidivist, the court shall order that the [NCDOC] do a risk assessment of the offender. The [NCDOC] shall have a minimum of 30 days, but not more than 60 days, to complete the risk assessment of the offender and report the results to the court.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A(d).\nUpon receipt of a risk assessment from the [NCDOC] pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, the court shall determine whether, based on the [NCDOC\u2019s] risk assessment, the offender requires the highest possible level of supervision and monitoring. If the court determines that the offender does require the highest possible level of supervision and monitoring, the court shall order the offender to enroll in a satellite-based monitoring program for a period of time to be specified by the court.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A(e). Therefore, our General Assembly devised a separate procedure for determining eligibility for SBM and clearly granted the Superior Courts subject matter jurisdiction to conduct these determinations pursuant to specific statutory procedures.\nIn the instant case, the Superior Court had jurisdiction over defendant\u2019s Alford plea to four felony counts of taking indecent liberties with a minor, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-271(a). The trial court then sentenced defendant immediately following the entry of his Alford plea. Since defendant received a suspended sentence, the court determined defendant\u2019s eligibility for SBM.\nThe court determined that defendant was convicted of a reportable offense. The State then presented evidence in the form of testimony by Detective Porter and Cayla\u2019s mother to show that defendant\u2019s offense \u201cinvolved the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A(a). The State also submitted, without objection, a \u201cSTATIC-99,\u201d an assessment prepared by the NCDOC which indicated that defendant presented a \u201clow risk for re-offending.\u201d Defendant had the opportunity to present evidence to refute the State\u2019s evidence, but did not present any evidence. The trial court then determined that defendant\u2019s offense \u201cinvolved the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A(b). The trial court then considered the STATIC-99 and the testimony of the witnesses, determined that defendant required the highest possible level of monitoring, and ordered that defendant be subjected to SBM for a period of ten years. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A(e). These facts show that the trial court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A and followed the proper hearing procedures in assessing defendant\u2019s eligibility for SBM. Defendant\u2019s issue on appeal is overruled.\nIV. DUE PROCESS\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred by ordering him to enroll in SBM without providing any notice of the ground upon which the State sought to subject him to SBM, in violation of his constitutional due process guarantees. We disagree.\nIn cases where a defendant has been newly convicted of a reportable conviction, placed on probation and, as a condition of probation, was incarcerated, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A applies. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B(b) requires that if an offender falls into one of the categories described in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a), the NCDOC must provide him notice of the hearing date and the NCDOC\u2019s determination with respect to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B(b) (2010). The notice provisions found in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B(b) are merely notice provisions to protect the due process rights of offenders who are not currently incarcerated. Wooten, 194 N.C. App. at 528, 669 S.E.2d at 751. However, the instant case is not governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B, but by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A, because defendant was placed on probation and, as a condition of probation, was incarcerated for 120 days.\n\u201cAccording to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.6(5), the offense of taking indecent liberties with a child in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-202.1 is defined as a \u2018sexually violent offense,\u2019 which is a reportable conviction under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.6(4).\u201d State v. May, _ N.C. App. _, _, 700 S.E.2d 42, 44 (2010). When defendant entered an Alford plea to four counts of taking indecent liberties with a minor, he was newly convicted of a reportable conviction. The district attorney requested that the trial court consider SBM during the sentencing phase. The trial court was required to make findings regarding whether defendant was eligible for enrollment in SBM. Therefore, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A was the applicable statute for determining defendant\u2019s eligibility for enrollment in SBM and the time period of his enrollment.\nSince defendant was placed on probation and, as a condition of his probation, was incarcerated for 120 days, his eligibility for SBM was determined by the trial court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A, not'N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B. Therefore, neither the NCDOC nor the trial court was responsible for any type of notice regarding defendant\u2019s eligibility.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A requires that an offender convicted of a reportable conviction has the opportunity to be heard during the sentencing phase. After the State presents evidence necessary to prove that the defendant qualifies for SBM enrollment, then the defendant has the opportunity to present evidence to refute the State\u2019s evidence.' N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A(a). Based on the presentation of all the evidence at this hearing, the trial court determines whether defendant\u2019s conviction renders him eligible for SBM enrollment, and the period of time for his enrollment. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A(b).\nIn the instant case, the trial court accepted defendant\u2019s Alford plea and entered judgment for defendant\u2019s convictions for four counts of taking indecent liberties with a child. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A, the trial court sentenced defendant for the convictions and determined the effect of the convictions on his eligibility for SBM. During this portion of the proceeding, the State presented testimony from Detective Porter and Cayla\u2019s mother, and heard arguments of counsel. Defendant had the opportunity to present evidence to refute the State\u2019s evidence but did not present any evidence. Therefore, the trial court properly followed the procedures in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40A, and did not violate defendant\u2019s constitutional due process rights. Defendant\u2019s issue on appeal is overruled.\nV. ABUSE OF A MINOR\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred by determining that his conviction for indecent liberties involved the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor because, by its elements, indecent liberties does not require any abuse of a minor. We disagree.\n\u201c[S]ince the offense of solicitation to take an indecent liberty with a minor inherently \u2018involves\u2019 the \u2018physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor,\u2019 we conclude that the trial court did not err by concluding that [defendant was subject to enrollment in SBM pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a)(2).\u201d State v. Cowan, _ N.C. App. _, _, 700 S.E.2d 239, 247 (2010). Therefore, defendant\u2019s issue on appeal is overruled.\nVI. LEVEL OF SUPERVISION AND MONITORING\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred by determining that he required the highest possible level of supervision and monitoring although the NCDOC risk assessment classified him as a low risk for reoffending, and the trial court\u2019s additional findings did not support a conclusion that defendant, who had no previous criminal record, was a high risk for reoffending. We agree.\nA. Standard of Review\nOn appeal from an SBM order, \u201cwe review the trial court\u2019s findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by competent record evidence, and we review the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law for legal accuracy and to ensure that those conclusions reflect a correct application of law to the facts found.\u201d\nState v. Green, _ N.C. App. _, _, 710 S.E.2d 292, 294 (2011) (quoting State v. Kilby, 198 N.C. App. 363, 367, 679 S.E.2d 430, 432 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). \u201cThe trial court\u2019s \u2018findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.\u2019 \u201d Kilby, 198 N.C. App. at 366, 679 S.E.2d at 432 (quoting State v. Brewington, 352 N.C. 489, 498, 532 S.E.2d 496, 501 (2000)).\nB. Facts of Defendant\u2019s Offenses\nDefendant contends that the trial court erred by considering the facts of his offenses when it determined that he required the highest possible level of supervision and monitoring.\n\u201cThis Court has previously held that a DOC risk assessment of \u2018moderate,\u2019 without more, is insufficient to support the finding that a defendant requires the highest possible level of supervision and monitoring.\u201d Green, _ N.C. App. at _, 710 S.E.2d at 294 (italics omitted) (quoting Kilby, 198 N.C. App. at 369-70, 679 S.E.2d at 434). However if the NCDOC determines that a defendant is a \u201cmoderate\u201d risk to reoffend, but the trial court determines he requires the highest possible level of supervision and monitoring, the trial court is required to make additional findings based on competent record evidence to support its findings. Id at _, 710 S.E.2d at 294 (citing State v. Morrow, 200 N.C. App. 123, 130-34, 683 S.E.2d 754, 760-62 (2009), aff\u2019d per curiam, 364 N.C. 424, 700 S.E.2d 224 (2010)). Furthermore, in Green, our Court held that \u201cthe trial court may properly consider evidence of the factual context of a defendant\u2019s convictionfs] when making additional findings as to the level of supervision required of a defendant convicted of an offense involving the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor.\u201d Id. at _, 710 S.E.2d at 295. Therefore, defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court improperly considered the facts of his offenses when it concluded that he required the highest level of supervision and monitoring is overruled.\nC. Findings of Fact\nIn the instant case, the State submitted the \u201cSTATIC-99,\u201d which indicated that defendant presented a \u201clow risk for re-offending.\u201d The State then presented the testimony of Detective Porter and Cayla\u2019s mother. (T pp. 22-37) After entering judgment, the trial court made the following additional findings of fact:\n1. That the defendant took advantage of his position of trust noting that the victim looked upon him as a father figure.\n2. That the defendant took advantage of the victim\u2019s vulnerability when at the time the victim had a strained relationship with her father and looked to the defendant for support and comfort.\n3. That the court notes the defendant\u2019s Alford plea indicated no remorse. That the defendant did not take responsibility for his actions. That by means of Alford plea, the defendant did what was in his best interest.\n4. That the offenses occurred when other children were present in the defendant\u2019s home.\nThe testimony of Detective Porter and Cayla\u2019s mother was competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s first two findings of fact. However, the State did not present any evidence to support the fourth finding. Therefore, it is unsupported by competent evidence and does not support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that defendant \u201crequire [d] the highest possible level of supervision and monitoring.\u201d\nDefendant argues that the trial court punished him for entering an Alford plea when it required him to submit to the highest possible level of supervision and monitoring. Since this is an issue of first impression for our Court, we turn to other jurisdictions for guidance.\nIn State v. Knight, the defendant entered an Alford plea to charges of one count of third-degree sexual abuse, one count of lascivious acts with a child, and four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, for his actions with underage teen girls. 701 N.W.2d 83, 84 (Iowa 2005). At the defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing, the State introduced evidence of the circumstances surrounding the crimes. Id. at 85. At the hearing, the trial court stated:\n\u201cAnd as I listen to [you], your comments indicate one thing and that is a lack of remorse. You have done an excellent job pointing out certain factors which are important to the Court\u2019s sentence, but other than your admission of guilt \u2014 which is perhaps a sign of remorse. At least you admitted that you were guilty of three offenses. There\u2019s no apology. There\u2019s no sign of remorse here whatsoever.\u201d\nId. at 86. The trial court then sentenced the defendant to consecutive terms of incarceration, citing as one of its reasons, \u201cThird, as I\u2019ve indicated, there has been no remorse shown by you.\u201d Id.\nOn appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court used his \u201c \u2018Alford plea and refusal to admit guilt or express remorse to enhance his sentence.\u2019 \u201d Id. The Iowa Supreme Court noted:\nIt is apparent from the judge\u2019s comments that the judge did not know that [the defendant] had entered an Alford plea, as the court referenced [his] \u201cadmission of guilt\u201d as \u201cperhaps a sign of remorse.\u201d (The sentencing judge had not presided at the plea hearing.) In addition, the court commented, \u201cAt least you admitted that you were guilty of three offenses.\u201d Clearly, the court did not consider the defendant\u2019s Alford plea or his refusal to admit guilt as a sentencing factor, as the court mistakenly believed the defendant had admitted his guilt earlier when he entered a guilty plea.\nWe also disagree with the defendant. . . that the sentencing court penalized [him] for not apologizing. In reading the court\u2019s comments in their entirety, it is clear the court was concerned with the defendant\u2019s lack of remorse and mentioned an apology as simply one way in which the defendant could have expressed remorse.\nId. The court then held that \u201ca defendant\u2019s lack of remorse may be considered even when the defendant professes his innocence by entry of an Alford plea.\u201d Id. at 89. See also Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 357, 363, 499 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1998) (\u201c[A] trial court may consider a defendant\u2019s lack of remorse at sentencing, even when the defendant has chosen to enter an Alford plea.\u201d).\nAlthough an Alford plea allows a 'defendant to plead guilty amid assertions of innocence, it does not require a court to accept those assertions. The sentencing court may, of necessity, consider a broad range of information, including the evidence of the crime, the defendant\u2019s criminal history and the demeanor of the defendant, including the presence or absence of remorse. Such considerations play an important role in the court\u2019s determination of the rehabilitative potential of the defendant.\nState v. Howry, 127 Idaho 94, 96, 896 P.2d 1002, 1004 (1995) (emphasis added). See also Bryan H. Ward, A Plea Best Not Taken: Why Criminal Defendants Should Avoid the Alford Plea, 68 MO. L. REV. 913 (2003) (discussing the effects of Alford pleas at sentencing). \u201cPersons plead guilty for many reasons \u2014 pangs of conscience, remorse, desire to get the ordeal over with, a hope for leniency and other innumerable reasons, including a natural and deliberate choice of attempting to avoid a worse fate and to forestall the prosecution of additional charges.\u201d Ford v. United States, 418 F.2d 855, 859 (8th Cir. 1969) (emphasis added).\nIn the instant case, at defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing, Detective Porter testified as follows:\nQ. [the State]. And did you have an opportunity to talk to [defendant]?\nA. [Detective Porter]. I did.\nQ. When was it that you had an opportunity to talk to the defendant?\nA. May the 7th, 2007.\nQ. How did it come to be that the two of you were in each other\u2019s presence?\nA. [He] had gone to the China Grove police department to turn himself in. He said he thought we were looking for him.\nQ. Okay. Were you looking for him?\nA. We were going to, not right at that minute. We were actually already working on the case, and we were going to get to that. But since he came to us, we just went ahead and went with that.\nQ. All right. And why were you looking for the defendant?\nA. Because we were investigating him for the sex offense with [Cayla],\nQ. Where did you first meet the defendant?\nA. China Grove police department.\nQ. And do you know how the defendant arrived at the police department?\nA. I think he drove his self [sic] there.\nQ. He wasn\u2019t escorted by law enforcement there?\nA. No. He went to turn his self [sic] in.\nQ. Do you know what he said to you when you first made contact with him?\nA. I have a statement.\nDetective Porter then read defendant\u2019s statement in open court. On cross-examination, Detective Porter testified as follows:\nQ. [Defendant\u2019s counsel]. Okay. As far as [defendant] is concerned on sentencing for this matter, he basically drove himself and forced people to talk to him. And this was a man that was remorseful and trying to give a confession; correct?\nA. He knew we were looking for him or going to be looking for him, and he turned his self [sic] in. That\u2019s correct.\nWhen the court heard arguments from counsel regarding SBM, the State told the court:\nNumber three, his Alford plea, Your Honor. Despite the fact that he confessed to [Detective] Porter, his attorneys want to stand up and tell you how remorseful he is, he didn\u2019t even plead guilty. He pled Alford, that it was in his best interest. It shows lack of remorse, despite what his attorneys said, another reason why he should be monitored.\nAfter a brief recess, the court stated, \u201cYou were correct in saying that the Alford plea shows no remorse.\u201d The court then concluded that defendant required the highest possible level of monitoring. The court then stated, \u201cThe Court notes specifically the Alford plea as being one in which the defendant indicated no remorse whatsoever for anything that he did, that he simply accepted responsibility for an offense which he believed to be in his best interest.\u201d\nBased upon these facts, it is unclear to this Court whether the trial court found that defendant\u2019s Alford plea itself showed a lack of remorse, or whether defendant\u2019s actions showed a lack of remorse. While we have not found any authority holding that the former is permissible, the latter is allowed under the rationale of Knight, Smith, and Howry. Therefore, the trial court\u2019s finding regarding defendant\u2019s lack of remorse is unsupported by competent evidence and does not support the court\u2019s conclusion that defendant required the highest possible level of supervision and monitoring.\nSince only two of the trial court\u2019s findings are supported by competent evidence \u201cwhich could support findings of fact which could lead to a conclusion that \u2018the defendant requires the highest possible level of supervision and monitoring,\u2019 ... it would be proper to remand this case to the trial court to consider the evidence and make additional findings[.]\u201d Kilby, 198 N.C. App. at 370, 679 S.E.2d at 434 (emphases added). Therefore, on remand the trial court may consider evidence regarding whether defendant\u2019s actions showed remorse, and must determine whether its findings support a conclusion that defendant \u201crequires the highest possible level of supervision and monitoring.\u201d\nVIL CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST SBM\nDefendant argues that ordering him to submit to SBM violated his constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy and free from cruel and unusual punishment. We disagree.\nIn State v. Bowditch, our Supreme Court rejected a defendant\u2019s argument that requiring him to enroll in SBM violated his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. 364 N.C. 335, 700 S.E.2d 1, stay denied, _ N.C. _, 703 S.E.2d 151 (2010). Similarly, in State v. Wagoner, _ N.C. App. _, 683 S.E.2d 391 (2009), aff\u2019d per curiam, 364 N.C. 422, 700 S.E.2d 222 (2010), our courts rejected a defendant\u2019s argument that requiring him to enroll in SBM violated the Eighth Amendment\u2019s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. To accept defendant\u2019s arguments in the instant case, \u201cwe would have to overrule our Supreme Court which we do not have the power to do.\u201d State v. Porter, 48 N.C. App. 565, 570, 269 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1980).\nVIII. CONCLUSION\nThe trial court\u2019s order requiring defendant to enroll in SBM for a period of ten years is vacated and remanded.\nVacated and remanded.\nJudge ELMORE concurs.\nJudge STEELMAN concurs in the result.\n. We use pseudonyms to protect the identity of the victim and for ease of reading.\n. The parties do not dispute that Cayla was under the age of sixteen at the time of the offenses. Therefore, we will not identify her age in order to further protect her identity.\n. Cf. State v. Williams, - N.C. App. -, -, 700 S.E.2d 774, 776 (2010) (\u201cDefendant\u2019s conviction [for taking indecent liberties with a child] did not involve abuse of a minor, as that phrase is defined in Article 27A of Chapter 14, such that the trial court should not have found that Defendant\u2019s conviction \u2018did involve the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor.\u2019 \u201d).\n. But see State v. Williams, 937 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo. App. 1996) (when plea agreement is reached with a defendant who initially agrees to plead guilty, but who subsequently agrees to a plea agreement pursuant to Alford, such action \u201celiminates any showing of remorse or taking of responsibility by the appellant\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Peter A. Regulski, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Andrew DeSimone, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TRACEY HARLAN JARVIS\nNo. COA11-31\n(Filed 2 August 2011)\n1. Satellite-Based Monitoring \u2014 clerical error \u2014 remanded for correction\nA satellite-based monitoring order was remanded for correction of a clerical error where the transcript of the hearing reflected the judge saying that the conviction (indecent liberties) was not an aggravated offense while the order found that the offense was aggravated.\n2. Satellite-Based Monitoring \u2014 subject matter jurisdiction\u2014 statutory provisions\nThe trial court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction in ordering satellite-based monitoring (SBM) despite defendant\u2019s contention that the State failed to file a written pleading providing notice of the basis for the SBM. The General Assembly has devised a separate procedure for determining eligibility for SBM and clearly granted the superior courts subject matter jurisdiction to conduct these determinations pursuant to specific statutory procedures.\n3. Satellite-Based Monitoring \u2014 notice\u2014no constitutional violation\nThere was no constitutional due process violation in ordering defendant to enroll in satellite-based monitoring (SBM) without providing notice of the grounds where defendant was placed on probation with a condition that he be incarcerated for 120 days. His eligibility for SBM was determined by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.40A, not N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.40b, and neither the Department of Correction nor the trial court was responsible for any type of notice about eligibility for SBM.\n4. Satellite-Based Monitoring \u2014 indecent liberties \u2014 physical, mental, or sexual abuse of minor\nThe trial court did not err when ordering an indecent liberties defendant to submit to satellite-based monitoring by finding that defendant\u2019s conviction involved the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor.\n5. Satellite-Based Monitoring \u2014 low risk \u2014 highest level of monitoring\nThe trial court did not err when ordering defendant to submit to satellite-based monitoring by determining that defendant required the highest possible level of supervision and monitoring, even though the risk assessment classified defendant as a low risk for reoffending. However, it was not clear whether the trial court found that defendant\u2019s Alford plea itself showed a lack of remorse or whether defendant\u2019s actions showed a lack of remorse and the case was remanded for additional findings.\n6. Satellite-Based Monitoring \u2014 double jeopardy and cruel and unusnal punishment \u2014 no violation\nThere was no violation of defendant\u2019s right to be free from double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment in ordering that defendant submit to satellite-based monitoring.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 16 July 2010 by Judge John L. Holshouser, Jr., in Rowan County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 May 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Peter A. Regulski, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Andrew DeSimone, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0084-01", "first_page_order": 94, "last_page_order": 110 }