{
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  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ex rel. UTILITIES COMMISSION, DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC, GREENCO SOLUTIONS, INC., NORTH CAROLINA MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY NUMBER 1, NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY, ELECTRICITIES OF NORTH CAROLINA, INC., PROGRESS ENERGY CAROLINAS, INC., and THE PUBLIC STAFF OF THE NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION v. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND and NORTH CAROLINA SUSTAINABLE ENERGY ASSOCIATION",
  "name_abbreviation": "State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Environmental Defense Fund",
  "decision_date": "2011-08-02",
  "docket_number": "No. COA11-142",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur."
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    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ex rel. UTILITIES COMMISSION, DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC, GREENCO SOLUTIONS, INC., NORTH CAROLINA MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY NUMBER 1, NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY, ELECTRICITIES OF NORTH CAROLINA, INC., PROGRESS ENERGY CAROLINAS, INC., and THE PUBLIC STAFF OF THE NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION v. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND and NORTH CAROLINA SUSTAINABLE ENERGY ASSOCIATION"
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      {
        "text": "STEELMAN, Judge.\nWhere N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 62-133.8(a)(6) includes \u201cbiomass resource,\u201d among the list of resources qualifying as \u201crenewable energy resources,\u201d the North Carolina Utilities Commission did not err in determining that wood derived from whole trees in primary harvest is a \u201cbiomass resource\u201d and thus a \u201crenewable energy resource\u201d within the meaning of the statute.\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\nNorth Carolina\u2019s Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard (\u201cREPS\u201d), N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 62-133.8(b), requires electric public utilities to meet renewability and efficiency standards beginning in 2012. If a utility does not meet this requirement, the Commission can impose a penalty up to $1,000 for each violation. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 62-310(a); In re Rulemaking Proceeding to Implement Session Law 2007-397, No. E-100, Sub 113, 2008 WL 619061, at *58-61 (N.C.U.C. Feb. 29, 2008) (determining that the Commission can enforce REPS under its general enforcement authority).\nAny electric utility that wants to generate tradable Renewable Energy Certificates (\u201cRECs\u201d), which can be used to comply with REPS, must register its facility as a \u201crenewable energy facility\u201d with the North Carolina Utilities Commission (\u201cCommission\u201d). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 62-133.8(a)(6); 4 N.C. Admin. Code ll.R8-66(b) (2010). Facilities that generate electric power using a \u201crenewable energy resource\u201d are considered renewable energy facilities. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 62-133.8(a)(7). The statute defines \u201crenewable energy resource\u201d to include \u201ca biomass resource, including agricultural waste, animal waste, wood waste, spent pulping liquors, combustible residues, combustible liquids, combustible gases, energy crops, or landfill methane.\u201d \u00a7 62-133.8(a).\nOn 1 March 2010 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (\u201cDuke\u201d) applied to the Commission to register two of its thermal electric generating stations, Buck Steam Station (\u201cBuck\u201d) and Lee Steam Station (\u201cLee\u201d), as renewable energy facilities. Duke had conducted production trials at both stations in which a blend of wood chips and coal was used as fuel.\nThe Commission determined that wood derived from whole trees in primary harvest is a \u201cbiomass resource\u201d and thus a \u201crenewable energy resource\u201d within the meaning of the statute and approved Duke\u2019s applications for the Buck and Lee stations.\nIT. N.C. Gen. Stat.. \u00a7 62-138.8(a)\nAppellants contend that the Commission erred in its conclusion that wood fuel from primary harvest whole trees is a \u201cbiomass resource\u201d and thus a \u201crenewable energy resource\u201d within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 62-133.8(a). We disagree.\nA. Standard of Review\nThe procedure for appeals from final orders or decisions of the Utilities Commission is established by N.C. Gen. Stat. 62-94, et seq. The Court may reverse the Commission\u2019s decision if the appellants\u2019 rights have been prejudiced because the decision was affected by an error of law. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 62-94(b)(4). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 62-94(b) (\u201cthe court shall decide all relevant questions of law [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions\u201d).\nB. Analysis\nWhen construing a statute, the court looks first to its plain meaning, State v. Ward, 364 N.C. 157, 160, 694 S.E.2d 729, 731 (2010), reading words that are not defined by the statute according to their plain meaning as long as it is reasonable to do so, Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 338, 407 S.E.2d 222, 227 (1991). The court must give effect to the plain meaning as long as the statute is clear and unambiguous. State v. Jackson, 353 N.C. 495, 501, 546 S.E.2d 570, 574 (2001).\nThe statute at issue in the instant case is not ambiguous because all wood fuel is encompassed by the meaning of the term \u201cbiomass.\u201d Since the statute does not specifically define \u201cbiomass,\u201d we look to its ordinary meaning. The New Oxford American Dictionary defines \u201cbiomass\u201d as \u201corganic matter used as fuel.\u201d The New Oxford American Dictionary 166 (Elizabeth J. Jewell et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005). A report produced by the North Carolina Biomass Council defines biomass as \u201cany organic matter that is available on a renewable or recurring basis, including agricultural crops and trees, wood and wood wastes and residues, plants (including aquatic plants), grasses, residues, fibers, animal wastes, and segregated municipal waste.\u201d Ben Rich, North Carolina Biomass Council, The North Carolina Biomass Roadmap: Recommendations for Fossil Fuel Displacement through Biomass Utilization 4 (2007), http://www.ncsc.ncsu.edu/bioenergy/docs/NC_Biomass_Roadmap.pdf (emphasis added). The Commission applied the definition from The Biomass Roadmap in considering whether a particular type of fuel is a \u201cbiomass resource.\u201d See In re EPCOR USA North Carolina, LLC, SP-166, Sub 3, 2009 WL 4906554, at *2 (N.C.U.C.).\nAll wood fuel is clearly encompassed by each of these definitions. Not only is wood listed as an example of a biomass in The Biomass Roadmap, wood is also organic and renewable, which are the criteria encompassed by the definitions. Therefore, wood fuel from primary harvest whole trees is a biomass resource within the meaning of the statute.\nAppellants argue that not all biomass is a biomass resource within the meaning of the statute. Appellants advance two theories to support this argument. First, that the list of biomass resources provided in the statute is an exhaustive list; and second, that the doctrine of ejusdem generis limits the term \u201cbiomass resources\u201d so that it only includes biomass material of the same type as the listed resources. The plain meaning of the statute does not support either theory.\nFirst, the language of the statute indicates that the legislature did not intend to limit the term \u201cbiomass resources\u201d to only include the resources listed in the statute. The New Oxford American Dictionary defines the word \u201cincluding\u201d to mean \u201ccontaining as part of the whole being considered.\u201d The New Oxford American Dictionary, supra at 854. Similarly, Black\u2019s Law Dictionary explains, \u201cThe participle including typically indicates a partial list.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 831 (9th ed. 2009). Both of these definitions suggest that a list introduced by the word \u201cincluding\u201d would be illustrative, rather than exhaustive. Moreover, our Supreme Court has indicated that use of the word \u201cincluding\u201d expresses legislative intent to list examples. See N. Carolina Tpk. Auth. v. Pine Island, Inc., 265 N.C. 109, 120, 143 S.E.2d 319, 327 (1965). We hold that the list provided by the legislature is not an exhaustive list of all of the biomass materials included in the broad term \u201cbiomass resources.\u201d\nSecond, the term \u201cbiomass resources\u201d is not limited by the doctrine of ejusdem generis.\n\u201c \u2018[T]he ejusdem generis rule is that where general words follow a designation of particular subjects or things, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the particular designations and as including only things of the same kind, character and nature as those specifically enumerated.\u2019 \u201d\nState v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 244, 176 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1970) (internal citations omitted).\nNorth Carolina courts have followed this explanation of how the doctrine of ejusdem generis should be applied by employing the doctrine when a list of specific terms is followed by a general term. See Liborio v. King, 150 N.C. App. 531, 536-37, 564 S.E.2d 272, 276 (2002) (interpreting the term \u201cmisrepresentation\u201d to be limited to knowing and intentional behavior, where the term followed the terms fraud and deception); Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 87, 331 S.E.2d 682, 687 (1985) (interpreting a provision allowing the court to consider \u201c[a]ny other factor which the court finds to be just and proper\u201d to be limited to economic factors, where the provision followed eleven other provisions having to do with the economy of the marriage); Lee, 277 N.C. at 244, 176 S.E.2d at 774 (interpreting the phrase \u201cor other like weapons\u201d to be limited to automatic or semiautomatic weapons, where the phrase followed a specific list of automatic and semiautomatic weapons).\nThe provision at issue here does not fit the doctrine as described in Lee because the general phrase \u201cbiomass resources\u201d precedes the list of specific examples.\nThis Court has on occasion applied the doctrine to a general term that preceded a list of specific terms. See Knight v. Town of Knightdale, 164 N.C. App. 766, 769-70, 596 S.E.2d 881, 884 (2004) (holding that a zoning ordinance which allows the town to consider \u201cadverse effects expected from the development, including without limitation, stormwater, noise, odor, on and off-street parking, dust, light, smoke and vibration\u201d only permits the town to consider adverse affects that are physical in nature). However, this Court construed the language in Knight narrowly because our Supreme Court has held that limitations and restrictions in zoning ordinances should be interpreted to include only what is clearly within their scope since such limitations interfere with common law property rights. Id. (citing Capricorn Equity Corp. v. Town of Chapel Hill Bd. of Adjustment, 334 N.C. 132, 138-39, 431 S.E.2d 183, 188 (1993)).\nEven assuming arguendo that the doctrine of ejusdem generis can be applied when the general term precedes the specific, the rule would not apply in the instant case because the specific terms do not have a unifying characteristic. \u201cThe rule does not apply to restrict the operation of a general expression where the specific things enumerated have no common characteristic, and differ greatly from one another.\u201d State v. Fenner, 263 N.C. 694, 698, 140 S.E.2d 349, 352 (1965). Appellants argue that the resources fall into one of two categories: waste or intentionally produced energy products. However, these categories do not meet the test established in Fenner because they are very different from each other. See Id. Moreover, we do not find any other characteristic that unifies all of the examples provided by the legislature.\nAny resource that can be considered a biomass because it is organic and renewable is a biomass resource within the plain meaning of the statute. All wood fuel meets these criteria and thus is a \u201cbiomass resource\u201d and a \u201crenewable energy resource.\u201d\nAppellants\u2019 arguments are without merit.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "STEELMAN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "K&L Gates LLP, by Kiran H. Mehta and Molly L. McIntosh, and Duke Energy Corporation In House Counsel, Charles Alexander Castle, for plaintiff-appellees.",
      "Southern Environmental Law Center, by Derb S. Carter and Gudrun Thompson, for intervenor-appellant.",
      "North Carolina Sustainable Energy Association, by Kurt J. Olson, and Michael D. Youth, for defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ex rel. UTILITIES COMMISSION, DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC, GREENCO SOLUTIONS, INC., NORTH CAROLINA MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY NUMBER 1, NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY, ELECTRICITIES OF NORTH CAROLINA, INC., PROGRESS ENERGY CAROLINAS, INC., and THE PUBLIC STAFF OF THE NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION v. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND and NORTH CAROLINA SUSTAINABLE ENERGY ASSOCIATION\nNo. COA11-142\n(Filed 2 August 2011)\nUtilities \u2014 renewable energy facilities \u2014 biomass resource\u2014 renewable energy source\nThe North Carolina Utilities Commission did not err by determining that wood derived from whole trees in primary harvest was a biomass resource, and thus, a renewable energy source within the meaning of N.C.G.S. 62-133.8(b) when it approved two thermal electric generating stations as renewable energy facilities.\nAppeal by appellants from order entered 11 October 2010 by the North Carolina Utilities Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 June 2011.\nK&L Gates LLP, by Kiran H. Mehta and Molly L. McIntosh, and Duke Energy Corporation In House Counsel, Charles Alexander Castle, for plaintiff-appellees.\nSouthern Environmental Law Center, by Derb S. Carter and Gudrun Thompson, for intervenor-appellant.\nNorth Carolina Sustainable Energy Association, by Kurt J. Olson, and Michael D. Youth, for defendant-appellant."
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