{ "id": 4278013, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: D.B.", "name_abbreviation": "In re D.B.", "decision_date": "2011-08-16", "docket_number": "No. COA10-1476", "first_page": "489", "last_page": "498", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "214 N.C. App. 489" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "656 S.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640369 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/656/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "624 S.E.2d 369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634832, 12634830, 12634831 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/624/0369-03", "/se2d/624/0369-01", "/se2d/624/0369-02" ] }, { "cite": "612 S.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632818 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "605 S.E.2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232", "parenthetical": "remanding for correction of clerical error where box marked \" 'pled guilty' \" was erroneously checked on judgment and charges had actually been submitted to jury" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 N.C. App. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8411020 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230", "parenthetical": "remanding for correction of clerical error where box marked \" 'pled guilty' \" was erroneously checked on judgment and charges had actually been submitted to jury" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/167/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 S.E.2d 381", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8470490 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 842", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4155675 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 S.E.2d 111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 808", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "535 S.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12123845 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 693", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Jarman, 140 N.C. App. 198, 202, 535 S.E.2d 875, 878 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. App. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4168425 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Jarman, 140 N.C. App. 198, 202, 535 S.E.2d 875, 878 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/198/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 773", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491531, 491824, 491857, 491733, 491544, 491514, 491899, 491549 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0466-03", "/nc/357/0466-04", "/nc/357/0466-08", "/nc/357/0466-05", "/nc/357/0466-07", "/nc/357/0466-02", "/nc/357/0466-01", "/nc/357/0466-06" ] }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 54", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9186188 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3787393, 3794473, 3786572, 3788150, 3787286, 3795577, 3798174, 3794495 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0075-06", "/nc/360/0075-01", "/nc/360/0075-08", "/nc/360/0075-02", "/nc/360/0075-03", "/nc/360/0075-05", "/nc/360/0075-04", "/nc/360/0075-07" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9005009 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 U.S. 177", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 2528582 ], "weight": 12, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187-88" }, { "page": "303-04" }, { "page": "2459" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "304" }, { "page": "2459", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "186" }, { "page": "303" }, { "page": "2458" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/542/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 S. Ct. 1131", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 997", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 1167", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9787808, 9788992, 9789122, 9788188, 9788430, 9788718, 9787538, 9789235, 9788309, 9788053, 9787422, 9787676, 9788565, 9788860, 9787934 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/1167-04", "/us/531/1167-13", "/us/531/1167-14", "/us/531/1167-07", "/us/531/1167-09", "/us/531/1167-11", "/us/531/1167-02", "/us/531/1167-15", "/us/531/1167-08", "/us/531/1167-06", "/us/531/1167-01", "/us/531/1167-03", "/us/531/1167-10", "/us/531/1167-12", "/us/531/1167-05" ] }, { "cite": "536 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685065 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 S.E.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558310 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 S.E.2d 347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 N.C. App. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553017 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/17/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 223", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2537289 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 U.S. 143", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9137003 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" }, { "page": "617" }, { "page": "1922" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/407/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915", "parenthetical": "quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 617, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1922 (1972)" }, { "page": "915" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523524 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693", "parenthetical": "quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 617, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1922 (1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 441", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445-46" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 N.C. App. 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4170599 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/199/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "867", "parenthetical": "indictment for larceny from \"Metropolitan YMCA t/d/b/a Hayes-Taylor YMCA Branch\" insufficient" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 N.C. App. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525061 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518", "parenthetical": "indictment for larceny from \"Metropolitan YMCA t/d/b/a Hayes-Taylor YMCA Branch\" insufficient" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/57/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 S.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803" }, { "page": "803" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 788", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240619 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "790" }, { "page": "790" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0788-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 S.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4726404 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 S.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Downing, 313 N.C. 164, 166, 326 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1985)" }, { "page": "273" }, { "page": "274", "parenthetical": "indictment for larceny from \"Parker's Marine\" insufficient" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. App. 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8920012 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Downing, 313 N.C. 164, 166, 326 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/162/0719-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 991, "char_count": 20927, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.827651535968626e-08, "percentile": 0.5334735731697099 }, "sha256": "61a6a76f0673b818b455afd3c7f074d7945dc8a36329eceba71351ce06eb4998", "simhash": "1:834b5d3b7f8eda46", "word_count": 3459 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:33:33.584356+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: D.B." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nD.B., a juvenile, appeals from the trial court\u2019s orders adjudicating him delinquent for committing the offenses of felony breaking and entering, felony larceny pursuant to breaking and entering, and misdemeanor possession of stolen goods. We agree that the petition alleging felony larceny pursuant to breaking and entering was fatally defective because it contained no allegation that the alleged victim, the Crossings Golf Club, was a legal entity capable of owning property. The petition alleging felony larceny pursuant to breaking and entering should, therefore, have been dismissed by the trial court.\nWe also agree with the juvenile\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in admitting evidence obtained by an officer in a search that unlawfully exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence obtained as a result of that search should have been excluded, and because its admission was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we must reverse as to the misdemeanor possession of stolen property offense.\nFacts\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following facts. On 26 December 2009, Officer James Sandoval of the Durham Police Department received a call about an activated burglar alarm at the clubhouse of the Crossings Golf Club in Durham County, North Carolina. Upon arriving at the location, Officers Sandoval and K. Staten observed that a back rear window to the clubhouse was shattered and the door was open. The drawer of the cash register in the pro shop was missing and was later found outside on a grassy area, about 100 feet away from the building. Approximately $12.00 in loose change was missing from that cash register drawer.\nThe officers had secured the building when Officer Staten received a dispatch regarding a suspicious person running from the golf course area, about two blocks away. The dispatch described the suspicious person as a black male wearing a dark-colored hooded sweatshirt, all black clothes, and blue jeans. In response, Officer Sandoval drove toward the location noted in the dispatch. He saw a black male with a dark hooded sweatshirt and blue jeans run through a yard from Oak Grove Parkway toward Brier Haven Drive.\nOfficer Sandoval stopped the individual, later identified as the juvenile. The juvenile was out of breath and sweating profusely. Officer Sandoval asked the juvenile to put his hands on Officer Sandoval\u2019s car, and Officer Sandoval then frisked the juvenile to make sure he did not have any weapons. At some point, when Officer Sandoval was patting down the juvenile, he felt what he perceived to be an identification card in the front pocket of the juvenile\u2019s sweatshirt. He pulled the card out and discovered that it was actually an RBC Centura Visa Card bearing the name Sharon Atkins. Ms. Atkins\u2019 card had been stolen earlier that month. After Officer Sandoval determined that the card was stolen, he placed the juvenile under arrest, put him in the vehicle, and drove back to the clubhouse.\nIn the meantime, Corporal Tammy Schultz had contacted Teresa Easterday, the witness who had made the suspicious person report. Ms. Easterday met Corporal Schultz at the clubhouse and sat in the back of Corporal Schultz\u2019s vehicle so she could not be seen by the juvenile. Officer Sandoval had positioned the juvenile beside his vehicle, about 15 to 20 feet away from Corporal Schultz\u2019s vehicle. With a spotlight shining on the juvenile, Ms. Easterday was able to make a positive identification, based on the juvenile\u2019s clothing, that the juvenile was the person she had seen running away from the golf course.\nThe positive identification was communicated to Officer Sandoval, who then read the juvenile his Juvenile Miranda Rights. The juvenile followed along with the reading of the Juvenile Miranda Rights and checked on the form that he understood these rights. The juvenile also checked that he wished to answer questions without a lawyer, parent, or guardian present. In response to Officer Sandoval\u2019s questions, the juvenile gave his name and birth date, indicating he was 15 years old at the time. The juvenile then told Officer Sandoval that he was having a bad day, that he had left a friend\u2019s house and crossed through the golf course, and that he had the \u201curge to bust out the window with the chair.\u201d After that, the juvenile refused to answer any more questions. Officer Sandoval then retrieved the loose change from the juvenile\u2019s pockets, which totaled approximately $7.00.\nOn 28 January 2010, two juvenile petitions were filed against the juvenile, alleging delinquency in that he had committed felony breaking and entering, felony larceny pursuant to breaking and entering, and misdemeanor possession of property stolen from Ms. Atkins. Following the adjudication hearing, the trial court entered orders adjudicating the juvenile delinquent of felony breaking and entering, felony larceny pursuant to breaking and entering, and misdemeanor possession of the property stolen from Ms. Atkins. The trial court entered a disposition order finding the juvenile to be a Level 2 offender and ordering that he be placed on 12 months probation and pay $85.00 in restitution \u2014 the cost to repair the broken window at the clubhouse. The juvenile timely appealed to this Court.\nI\nThe juvenile first contends that the juvenile petition alleging felony larceny pursuant to breaking and entering was fatally defective and should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The petition alleged that the juvenile \u201cdid unlawfully, willfully and feloniously steal, take and carry away U.S. Currency from a cash register drawer\u201d which was \u201cthe personal property of The Crossings Golf Club.\u201d The petition does not allege that the Crossings Golf Club is a corporation or other legal entity capable of owning property.\n\u201c \u2018To be sufficient, an indictment for larceny must allege the owner or person in lawful possession of the stolen property.\u2019 \u201d State v. Phillips, 162 N.C. App. 719, 720, 592 S.E.2d 272, 273 (2004) (quoting State v. Downing, 313 N.C. 164, 166, 326 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1985)). \u201cIf the entity named in the indictment is not a person, it must be alleged \u2018that the victim was a legal entity capable of owning property[.]\u2019 \u201d Id. at 721, 592 S.E.2d at 273 (quoting State v. Woody, 132 N.C. App. 788, 790, 513 S.E.2d 801, 803 (1999)). \u201c \u2018An indictment that insufficiently alleges the identity of the victim is fatally defective Id. (quoting Woody, 132 N.C. App. at 790, 513 S.E.2d at 803). See, e.g., id., 592 S.E.2d at 274 (indictment for larceny from \u201cParker\u2019s Marine\u201d insufficient); State v. Perkins, 57 N.C. App. 516, 518, 291 S.E.2d 865, 867 (1982) (indictment for larceny from \u201cMetropolitan YMCA t/d/b/a Hayes-Taylor YMCA Branch\u201d insufficient).\nSince the petition in this case does not allege that the Crossings Golf Club is a corporation or other legal entity capable of owning property, we hold \u2014 and the State concedes \u2014 that the petition was fatally defective. We must, therefore, vacate the adjudication and disposition as to the offense of felony larceny pursuant to breaking and entering. In re M.S., 199 N.C. App. 260, 267, 681 S.E.2d 441, 445-46 (2009).\nII\nThe juvenile next argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to testimony regarding evidence found in his pocket\u2014 Ms. Atkins\u2019 RBC Centura Visa card \u2014 because Officer Sandoval\u2019s search exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk and was, therefore, unconstitutional. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that an officer may conduct a pat-down search to determine whether the person is carrying a weapon. \u201c \u2018The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.\u2019 \u201d State v. Beveridge, 112 N.C. App. 688, 693, 436 S.E.2d 912, 915 (1993) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 617, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1922 (1972)), aff\u2019d per curiam, 336 N.C. 601, 444 S.E.2d 223 (1994).\n\u201cIf a search goes beyond the bounds justifiable in determining that the suspect is armed, then any evidence found as a result of such a search will be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, if, \u201c \u2018in the conduct of the limited weapons search, contraband or evidence of a crime is of necessity exposed, the officer is not required by the Fourth Amendment to disregard such contraband or evidence of crime.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 694, 436 S.E.2d at 915 (quoting State v. Streeter, 17 N.C. App. 48, 50, 193 S.E.2d 347, 348 (1972), aff'd, 283 N.C. 203, 195 S.E.2d 502 (1973)).\nHere, at trial, during a voir dire examination, Officer Sandoval testified that after he stopped the juvenile, he performed a Terry frisk of the juvenile to check for weapons. Once he determined the juvenile had no weapons, he did not consider him to be a threat. The following exchange then occurred between defense counsel and Officer Sandoval:\nQ When you patted this individual down and found no weapons, you went through his pockets?\nTHE WITNESS: I asked him if he had any identification.\nQ Did he indicate whether he did have I.D.?\nA He didn\u2019t answer me.\nQ So you went into his pockets?\nA I felt what would be what I perceived to be an identification card in his front left pocket.\nQ And when you felt what you thought was an I.D. card despite him not answering your question as to whether he had identification, you didn\u2019t think that was a weapon did you?\nA No.\nWhen later asked by the prosecutor why he thought he felt an identification card, Officer Sandoval explained that the object in the juvenile\u2019s pocket \u201cwas small \u2014 it felt plastic, rectangular, kind of what your drivers [sic] license would feel like.\u201d Officer Sandoval further explained:\nA I asked him if this was an identification card and he wouldn\u2019t answer me. And he wouldn\u2019t give me his name so I thought that was an identification card and I wanted to identify him so that\u2019s why I grabbed the card from his pocket.\nQ And what was the purpose of finding out his identity?\nA To see who he is, where he lives and basically to identify what he\u2019s doing in the area and why he\u2019s running.\nFollowing Officer Sandoval\u2019s testimony, defense counsel asked the trial court to exclude the evidence of the RBC Centura Visa card found in the juvenile\u2019s pocket because Officer Sandoval\u2019s search had exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk. The court denied this request, explaining:\nI\u2019ll note the objection and I\u2019m going to overrule the motion to suppress, and I\u2019m going to allow it based on the suspect\u2019s refusal to cooperate by giving his name, by not responding to if he had any I.D.\nIn pursuant [sic] or in conjunction with the Terry frisk the Officer felt what he believed to be identification and after [the juvenile] or whoever the suspect was, was uncooperative I\u2019m going to allow what ever [sic] the Officer found as a result of patting him down.\nIn arguing that the evidence was properly admitted, the State focuses on the purpose of a Terry stop. The juvenile, however, has not contended that the stop or seizure was unconstitutional \u2014 he argues solely that the subsequent pat-down exceeded the scope of a lawful Terry frisk.\nIt is true that \u201c[officers who lawfully stop someone for investigation may ask the person a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to gain information confirming or dispelling the officers\u2019 suspicions that prompted the stop.\u201d State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 239, 536 S.E.2d 1, 9 (2000) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167, 148 L. Ed. 2d 997, 121 S. Ct. 1131 (2001). The State, however, cites no authority for its suggestion that an officer may physically search a person for evidence of his identity in connection with a Terry stop and frisk.\nAlthough the State relies upon Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004), for the proposition that \u201cthe identity of a suspect can significantly impact the safety of an officer,\u201d Hiibel does not address an officer\u2019s using a pat-down to uncover evidence of identification. At issue in Hiibel was whether a Nevada statute requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid Terry stop was consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 187-88, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 303-04, 124 S. Ct. at 2459. The Court determined that because the defendant\u2019s obligation to identify himself arose from a state statute, and because the statute satisfied the Fourth Amendment constitutional standards, \u201c[t]he principles of Terry permitted] a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop.\u201d Id. at 187, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 304, 124 S. Ct. at 2459 (emphasis added).\nWhile many states have enacted \u201cstop and identify\u201d statutes such as the one in Hiibel, North Carolina has not. The State overlooks this crucial distinction. We further note that in Hiibel, the Supreme Court did not hold that an officer could, during the Terry frisk, search for proof of identification as well as weapons. Although the Court did note in passing that officers called to investigate domestic disputes need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation and the threat to their own safety, the Court did not suggest that an officer can use a pat-down to locate an identification card. Id. at 186, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 303, 124 S. Ct. at 2458.\nThe State cites no other authority to support the notion that an officer may search for a person\u2019s identification in order to protect himself, or that an officer who feels what he believes to be an immediately identifiable identification card is free to seize it. Our case law plainly holds to the contrary.\nA Terry frisk may be used only for the purpose of determining whether a suspect is armed, and contraband may be confiscated if it is immediately identifiable to the officer during the frisk. See State v. Shearin, 170 N.C. App. 222, 226, 612 S.E.2d 371, 375-76 (holding scope of Terry search is protective in nature and is limited to search for weapons that may be used against officer, but evidence of contraband, plainly felt during pat-down or frisk, may also be admissible, provided officer \u201chad probable cause to believe that the item was in fact contraband\u201d), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 75, 624 S.E.2d 369 (2005); State v. Martinez, 158 N.C. App. 105, 109, 580 S.E.2d 54, 57-58 (holding officer may conduct pat-down search, for purpose of determining whether person is carrying weapon, when officer is justified in believing individual is armed and presently dangerous; during lawful pat-down search for weapons, if officer discovers contraband, officer may seize item discovered), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 466, 586 S.E.2d 773 (2003).\nSince an identification card is not a weapon or contraband, and there is no other seizure permitted under Terry, Officer Sandoval's removal of the RBC Centura Visa card from the juvenile\u2019s pocket exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk. The trial court thus erred in admitting the RBC Centura Visa card at trial.\nWe cannot conclude that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the card was the only evidence presented by the State tending to show the juvenile possessed property stolen from Ms. Atkins. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(b) (2009) (\u201cA violation of the defendant\u2019s rights under the Constitution of the United States is prejudicial unless the appellate court finds that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden is upon the State to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless.\u201d). Consequently, we must reverse as to the misdemeanor possession of stolen property offense.\nIII\nFinally, the juvenile contends that the adjudication order contains clerical errors in a finding of fact and conclusion of law. A clerical error is \u201c \u2018[a]n error resulting from a minor mistake or inadvertence, [especially] in writing or copying something on the record, and not from judicial reasoning or determination.\u2019 \u201d State v. Lark, 198 N.C. App. 82, 95, 678 S.E.2d 693, 702 (2009) (quoting State v. Jarman, 140 N.C. App. 198, 202, 535 S.E.2d 875, 878 (2000)), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 808, 692 S.E.2d 111 (2010). \u201c \u2018When, on appeal, a clerical error is discovered in the trial court\u2019s judgment or order, it is appropriate to remand the case to the trial court for correction because of the importance that the record speak the truth.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting State v. Smith, 188 N.C. App. 842, 845, 656 S.E.2d 695, 696 (2008)).\nIt is clear \u2014 and the State concedes \u2014 that finding of fact three in the adjudication order contains a clerical error. Finding of fact three states: \u201cThat the Court finds that the State has presented a reasonable factual basis, that the juvenile understands their [sic] right, that the admission was freely made, that the juvenile admits that the they [sic] did in fact commit the allegations as alleged.\u201d The juvenile did not, however, admit any of the alleged offenses. Rather, as the transcript indicates, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the evidence, that the juvenile had committed felony breaking and entering, felony larceny pursuant to felony breaking and entering, and misdemeanor possession of stolen property.\nWe, therefore, remand so that the trial court may correct the adjudication order\u2019s finding of fact three to reflect that the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed the offenses forming the basis for the delinquency adjudication. See State v. Snipes, 168 N.C. App. 525, 534, 608 S.E.2d 381, 387 (2005) (remanding for correction of clerical errors where trial court checked box on judgment and commitment forms indicating that it \u201c \u2018[i]mpose[d] the prison term pursuant to a plea arrangement as to sentence under Article 58 of G.S. Chapter 15A,\u2019 \u201d but record revealed that defendant pled not guilty to each offense); State v. Shelton, 167 N.C. App. 225, 230, 605 S.E.2d 228, 232 (2004) (remanding for correction of clerical error where box marked \u201c \u2018pled guilty\u2019 \u201d was erroneously checked on judgment and charges had actually been submitted to jury).\nThe juvenile further claims that because finding of fact three contains a clerical error, conclusion of law two \u2014 that the juvenile committed a \u201cserious (Class F through I felony or Class Al Misdemeanor)\u201d \u2014 is also a clerical error. This argument is without merit. This conclusion was based on the trial court\u2019s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed two Class H felonies. We have concluded that one of those Class H felonies \u2014 larceny pursuant to breaking and entering \u2014 should have been dismissed. However, the juvenile has made no argument that would disturb the finding that he committed the breaking and entering offense. Therefore, on remand, the trial court does not need to alter conclusion of law two.\nAffirmed in part; vacated in part; reversed and remanded in part.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge ELMORE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jay L. Osborne, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defenders Mary Cook, Kristen L. Todd, and S. Hannah Demeritt, for juvenile-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: D.B.\nNo. COA10-1476\n(Filed 16 August 2011)\n1. Juveniles \u2014 delinquency\u2014felony larceny pursuant to breaking and entering \u2014 indictment insufficient\nThe trial court erred in adjudicating the juvenile defendant delinquent for the offense of felony larceny pursuant to breaking and entering. As the juvenile petition alleging felony larceny pursuant to breaking and entering contained no allegation that the alleged victim was a legal entity capable of owning property, the petition was fatally defective.\n2. Juveniles \u2014 delinquency\u2014unlawful search \u2014 evidence erroneously admitted \u2014 not harmless error\nThe trial court erred in a juvenile delinquency case by admitting evidence obtained by an officer in a search that unlawfully exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk. The evidence obtained as a result of that search should have been excluded, and because its admission was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant\u2019s adjudication of delinquency for the offense of the misdemeanor possession of stolen property was reversed.\n3. Juveniles \u2014 juvenile delinquency order \u2014 clerical error\u2014 remanded\nThe trial court\u2019s order adjudicating defendant delinquent was remanded so that the trial court could correct finding of fact three to reflect that the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed the offenses forming the basis for the delinquency adjudication.\nAppeal by juvenile from orders entered 13 April 2010 by Judge Marcia H. Morey in Durham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 April 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jay L. Osborne, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defenders Mary Cook, Kristen L. Todd, and S. Hannah Demeritt, for juvenile-appellant." }, "file_name": "0489-01", "first_page_order": 499, "last_page_order": 508 }