{ "id": 4278446, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. NICHOLAS BRADY HEIEN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Heien", "decision_date": "2011-08-16", "docket_number": "No. COA11-52", "first_page": "515", "last_page": "522", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "214 N.C. App. 515" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639301 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "904", "parenthetical": "holding that an officer's mistaken belief that the defendant was speeding was not an objectively reasonable purpose for a traffic stop" }, { "page": "904" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0902-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20429", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538925 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "\"It is presumed that the legislature intended each portion to be given full effect and did not intend any provision to be mere surplusage\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567833 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556", "parenthetical": "\"It is presumed that the legislature intended each portion to be given full effect and did not intend any provision to be mere surplusage\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461", "parenthetical": "\"statutes dealing with the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569012 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430-31", "parenthetical": "\"statutes dealing with the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307411 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 S.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565402 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-183.3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(g)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(g)" }, { "page": "(g)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8155044 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127-28", "parenthetical": "holding that an officer's mistaken belief that the defendant was speeding was not an objectively reasonable purpose for a traffic stop" }, { "page": "127-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "495-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 N.C. App. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4170375 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "239-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/199/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 599", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12121399 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 S.E.2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735-36", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8915624 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0129-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 732, "char_count": 18023, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.406216480626941e-08, "percentile": 0.3964406805184395 }, "sha256": "da1edf94bb711b229db7b460bcd4d35417b75b5a1f82a2254044f02e168b9aee", "simhash": "1:a99da064b77e66f2", "word_count": 2955 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:33:33.584356+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ERVIN and McCULLOUGH concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. NICHOLAS BRADY HEIEN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nNicholas Brady Heien (Defendant) pled guilty to attempted trafficking in cocaine by transporting and by possession on 26 May 2010. The trial court determined Defendant\u2019s prior record level to be a Level I, and sentenced Defendant to two consecutive prison terms of ten months to twelve months. Defendant appeals.\nSergeant Matt Darisse (Sergeant Darisse), of the Surry County Sheriff\u2019s Office, testified that he was \u201cconducting criminal interdiction\u201d on Interstate Highway 77 (1-77) when he observed a passing vehicle (the vehicle) driven by a man who appeared to be \u201cstiff and nervous.\u201d Sergeant Darisse pulled onto 1-77, \u201cobserved the driving of the vehicle, and noticed that [the] vehicle approachjed] a slower moving vehicle, applied] its brakes[,] and [that] the right side brake light was out.\u201d Sergeant Darisse testified that, upon observing that the vehicle\u2019s right brake light was out, he \u201cput [his] blue lights on to pull the vehicle over.\u201d\nWhen Sergeant Darisse approached the vehicle, he told the driver, Maynor Javier Vasquez (Mr. Vasquez), that he had been \u201cpulled . . . over for the brake light being out\u201d and asked Mr. Vasquez to produce his driver\u2019s license and registration. Defendant, the only passenger, was lying in the back seat of the vehicle. Because Mr. Vasquez appeared nervous and was slow to produce the requested documents, Sergeant Darisse asked Mr. Vasquez to step out of the vehicle and wait between the vehicle and Sergeant Darisse\u2019s patrol car while Sergeant Darisse checked Mr. Vasquez\u2019s license and registration.\nDeputy Mark Ward (Deputy Ward), of the Surry County Sheriff's Office, arrived to assist Sergeant Darisse with the traffic stop. Deputy Ward briefly questioned Defendant about where Defendant and Mr. Vasquez were going. Defendant told Deputy Ward they were driving to Kentucky. Mr. Vasquez had already told Sergeant Darisse that he and Defendant were driving to West Virginia. Sergeant Darisse gave Mr. Vasquez a warning ticket for an improperly functioning brake light and returned Mr. Vasquez\u2019s license and registration. Sergeant Darisse testified that, at that point, Mr. Vasquez was free to leave. However, upon Sergeant Darisse\u2019s request, Mr. Vasquez consented to additional questioning. Sergeant Darisse asked Mr. Vasquez if he had any contraband in the vehicle. Mr. Vasquez replied that he did not. Sergeant Darisse then asked Mr. Vasquez if he could search the vehicle. Mr. Vasquez replied that, because the vehicle belonged to Defendant, Sergeant Darisse would have to ask Defendant.\nSergeant Darisse asked Defendant, who was still lying in the back seat, for consent to search the vehicle. Defendant consented to a search and exited the vehicle. Sergeant Darisse\u2019s search of the vehicle revealed cocaine.\nDefendant filed a motion to suppress dated 21 January 2010 and an amended motion to suppress dated 4 March 2010, both of which the trial court denied in an order dated 25 March 2010. Defendant entered pleas of guilty to charges of attempted trafficking in cocaine by transportation and by possession, but Defendant reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari which was granted by our Court on 14 September 2010.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred by concluding that Sergeant Darisse\u2019s initial stop of the vehicle \u201cwas constitutional, as [Sergeant] Darisse had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the . . . vehicle and the driver were violating the laws of this State by operating a motor vehicle without a properly functioning brake light.\u201d\nGenerally, an appellate court\u2019s review of a trial court\u2019s order on a motion to suppress \u201cis strictly limited to a determination of whether its findings are supported by competent evidence, and in turn, whether the findings support the trial court\u2019s ultimate conclusion.\u201d Where, however, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are not challenged on appeal, they are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.\nState v. Roberson, 163 N.C. App. 129, 132, 592 S.E.2d 733, 735-36 (2004) (citations omitted). \u201c[C]onclusions of law drawn from the fundings of fact are . . . reviewable de novo.\u201d Huyck Corp. v. Town of Wake Forest, 86 N.C. App. 13, 15, 356 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1987) (citations omitted).\n\u201cA law enforcement officer may stop and briefly detain a vehicle and its occupants if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.\u201d State v. Jackson, 199 N.C. App. 236, 241, 681 S.E.2d 492, 496 (2009) (citation omitted). However, an officer\u2019s determination regarding potential criminal activity must be objectively reasonable, and an officer\u2019s mistaken belief that a defendant has committed a traffic violation is not an objectively reasonable justification for a traffic stop. See State v. McLamb, 186 N.C. App. 124, 127-28, 649 S.E.2d 902, 904 (2007) (holding that an officer\u2019s mistaken belief that the defendant was speeding was not an objectively reasonable purpose for a traffic stop). A passenger in a vehicle which is stopped by a law enforcement officer is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and may accordingly challenge the constitutionality of the initial stop. See Jackson, 199 N.C. App. at 239-41, 681 S.E.2d at 495-96.\nIn the present case, the trial court made an unchallenged finding of fact that Sergeant Darisse\u2019s initial stop of the vehicle was based Upon his observation that \u201cthe right brake light of the vehicle [did] not . . . function as the left brake light of the vehicle came on as the . . . vehicle slowed.\u201d Defendant argues that Sergeant Darisse did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle because the stop was based upon the mistaken belief that the malfunctioning brake light constituted a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129(g). The State, however, argues that Sergeant Darisse had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle because the malfunctioning brake light constituted a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129(d) and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-183.3. Based on the language of the statutes, we hold that the malfunction of a single brake light, where a vehicle has at least one functioning brake light, is not a violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-129(g), N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-129(d), or N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-183.3. '\nIn matters of statutory construction, our primary task is to ensure that the purpose of the legislature, the legislative intent, is accomplished. Hunt v. Reinsurance Facility, 302 N.C. 274, 288, 275 S.E.2d 399, 405 (1981). Legislative purpose is first ascertained from the plain words of the statute. See Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990). Moreover, we are guided by the structure of the statute and certain canons of statutory construction. See, e.g., Media, Inc. v. McDowell County, 304 N.C. 427, 430-31, 284 S.E.2d 457, 461 (1981) (\u201cstatutes dealing with the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia\u201d); Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 302 N.C. 550, 556, 276 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1981) (\u201cIt is presumed that the legislature intended each portion to be given full effect and did not intend any provision to be mere surplusage\u201d).\nElectric Supply Co. v. Swain Electric Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991).\nI. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129(g)\nDefendant contends that Sergeant Darisse mistakenly believed that the malfunctioning brake light constituted.a violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-129(g), which states:\n(g) No person shall sell or operate on the highways of the State any motor vehicle, motorcycle or motor-driven cycle, manufactured after December 31, 1955, unless it shall be equipped with a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle. The stop lamp shall display a red or amber light visible from a distance of not less than 100 feet to the rear in normal sunlight, and shall be actuated upon application of the service (foot) brake. The stop lamp may be incorporated into a unit with one or more other rear lamps.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129(g) (2009) (emphasis added). Initially, we note that the language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-129(g) demonstrates that the \u201cstop lamp\u201d required under that statute is synonymous with what is colloquially called a \u201cbrake light.\u201d See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-129(g) (\u201cThe stop lamp . . . shall be actuated upon application of the service (foot) brake.\u201d) Because Sergeant Darisse testified that the vehicle\u2019s \u201cright side brake light was out[,]\u201d and the trial court\u2019s 25 March 2010 order and both parties\u2019 briefs use the term \u201cbrake light,\u201d we will use the terms \u201cbrake light\u201d and \u201cstop lamp\u201d interchangeably. The use of the articles \u201ca\u201d and \u201cthe\u201d before the singular \u201cstop lamp\u201d throughout N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20429(g) clearly conveys that, under the statute, only one stop lamp is required on the rear of a vehicle. Thus, the plain language of subsection (g) requires only one stop lamp on a vehicle.\nIn the present case, the trial court made an uncontested finding of fact that, at the time of the initiation of the traffic stop, \u201cthe left brake light of the vehicle came on as the ... vehicle slowed.\u201d Because the left brake light was functioning properly, there was no violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20429(g) at the time of the initial stop.\nII. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20429(d)\nThe State argues, however, that Sergeant Darisse had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle because the malfunctioning right brake light constituted a violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20429(d), a subsection of the statute that requires \"all originally equipped rear lamps or the equivalent [to be] in good working order[.]\u201d In relevant part, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20429(a) and (d) provide:\n(a) When Vehicles Must Be Equipped. \u2014 Every vehicle upon a highway within this State shall be equipped with lighted . . . rear lamps as required for different classes of vehicles, and subject to exemption with reference to lights on parked vehicles as declared in G.S. 20-134:\n(1) During the period from sunset to sunrise,\n(2) When there is not sufficient light to render clearly discernible any person on the highway at a distance of 400 feet ahead, or\n(4) At any other time when windshield wipers are in use as a result of smoke, fog, rain, sleet, or snow, or when inclement weather or environmental factors severely reduce the ability to clearly discern persons and vehicles on the street and highway at a distance of 500 feet ahead[.]\n(d) Rear Lamps. \u2014 Every motor vehicle ... shall have all originally equipped rear lamps or the equivalent in good working order, which lamps shall exhibit a red light plainly visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of 500 feet to the rear of such vehicle.\nIt is clear from the language of subsections (a) and (d) that the \u201crear lamps\u201d provided for therein are separate and distinct from the \u201cstop lamp\u201d provided for in subsection (g). Rear lamps must be lighted during \u201cthe period from sunset to sunrise,\u201d when \u201cthere is not sufficient light to render clearly discernible any person on the highway at a distance of 400 feet ahead,\u201d and at \u201cany other time when windshield wipers are in use as a result of smoke, fog, rain, sleet, or snow, or when inclement weather or environmental factors severely reduce the ability to clearly discern persons and vehicles on the street and highway at a distance of 500 feet ahead].]\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-129(a)(l), (2) and (4). Additionally, rear lamps must \u201cexhibit a red light plainly visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of 500 feet to the rear of [a] vehicle.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-129(d). From these statutory requirements, it is apparent that the purpose of rear lamps is to make a vehicle more visible to other drivers and pedestrians during times when visibility is otherwise reduced due to nighttime, inclement weather, or similar conditions.\nIn contrast to \u201crear lamps[,]\u201d \u201ca stop lamp\u201d must \u201cdisplay a red or amber light visible from a distance of not less than 100 feet to the rear in normal sunlight, and shall be actuated upon application of the service (foot) brake.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-129(g). From the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-129(g), it is apparent that the purpose of a stop lamp is to notify drivers and pedestrians to the rear of a vehicle that the driver of that vehicle has applied that vehicle\u2019s foot brake and that that vehicle will accordingly reduce speed. Notably, this statutory purpose can be accomplished where a vehicle is equipped with a single stop lamp.\nMoreover, the statutory requirements for rear lamps differ from those of stop lamps in several significant aspects. Unlike rear lamps, which must be lighted at night, during periods of inclement weather, and during other periods of reduced visibility, stop lamps are only required to be lighted \u201cupon application of the service (foot) brake.\u201d See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-129(a); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20429(g). Rear lamps must be \u201cvisible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of 500 feet to the rear of [a] vehicle.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20429(d) (emphasis added). A stop lamp, however, must be \u201cvisible from a distance of not less than 100 feet to the rear [of a vehicle] in normal sunlight[.]\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20429(g) (emphasis added). Finally, there is no required method of actuation for rear lamps, but a stop lamp must be lighted \u201cupon application of the service (foot) brake.\u201d See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20429(a), (d) and (g). Thus, as reflected by statutory requirements applicable to each, rear lamps and a stop lamp are distinct and the requirement for each is intended to serve a separate purpose within the statutory scheme.\nAccordingly, the requirement of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-129(d) that \u201call originally equipped rear lamps or the equivalent [be] in good working order\u201d is applicable only to the rear lamps provided for in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20429(a) and (d). There is no similar requirement, under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20429(g), that all originally equipped stop lamps be in good working order. In the present case, the trial court\u2019s uncontested finding of fact notes that the traffic stop was based upon Sergeant Darisse\u2019s observation that the vehicle\u2019s right brake light malfunctioned. The State\u2019s argument that, because the vehicle\u2019s right brake light malfunctioned, Sergeant Darisse had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20429(d), is without merit.\nIII. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-183.3\nThe State also argues that the malfunctioning brake light constituted a \u201cviolation of the safety inspection requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-183.3[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-183.3 (2009) provides, in relevant part:\n(a) Safety. \u2014 A safety inspection of a motor vehicle consists of an inspection of the following equipment to determine if the vehicle has the equipment required by Part 9 of Article 3 of this Chapter and if the equipment is in a safe operating condition:\n(2) Lights, as required by G.S. 20-129 or G.S. 20-129.1.\nAs explained above, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20429(g) only requires a vehicle to have a single functioning brake light. Moreover, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-129.1 (2009), which provides that \u201c[b]rake lights ... on the rear of a motor vehicle shall have red lenses so that the light displayed is red[,]\u201d does not alter the requirement of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20429(g) that a vehicle be equipped with one brake light. Thus, even assuming that a violation of the inspection requirement statute was possible under the facts of the present case, Sergeant Darisse could not have had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the malfunctioning brake light constituted a violation of that statute.\nIn sum, at the time of the initial stop, there was no violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20429(g), N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20429(d), or N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-183.3. Because the initial stop was based upon Sergeant Darisse\u2019s observation that the right brake light of the vehicle malfunctioned, the justification for the stop was objectively unreasonable, and the stop violated Defendant\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights. See McLamb, 186 N.C. App. at 127-28, 649 S.E.2d at 904. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress and amended motion to suppress.\nWe note that the holding in this case, based upon the present language of the applicable statute, makes it clear that having a single operable brake light is legally sufficient, and that a vehicle having only one operable brake light is not a valid justification for a traffic stop. The statute at issue having been enacted several decades ago, retains an antiquated definition of a stop lamp, not reflecting actual vehicle equipment now included in most automobiles. We are well aware that the role of our courts is to adjudicate the laws as enacted by the General Assembly, and only the General Assembly, as our State\u2019s policy-maker, can modify and update this outdated statutory language.\nWe need not address Defendant\u2019s second argument in light of our holding above. The trial court\u2019s order denying Defendant's motion to suppress and amended motion to suppress is reversed and its judgment is vacated.\nReversed and vacated.\nJudges ERVIN and McCULLOUGH concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General J. Allen Jemigan, for the State.", "Michele Goldman for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. NICHOLAS BRADY HEIEN\nNo. COA11-52\n(Filed 16 August 2011)\nSearch and Seizure \u2014 traffic stop \u2014 one malfunctioning brake light \u2014 no statutory violation\nThe trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence of cocaine possession and transportation where the initial traffic stop was based on a malfunctioning brake light. Vehicles are required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-129(g) to have only one functioning stop lamp or \u201cbrake light,\u201d as did defendant\u2019s vehicle, and there was no violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-129(d) (rear lamps) or 20-183.3 (safety inspections).\nAppeal by Defendant from an order dated 25 March 2010 by Judge Vance Bradford Long and judgments entered 26 May 2010 by Judge A. Moses Massey in Superior Court, Surry County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 May 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General J. Allen Jemigan, for the State.\nMichele Goldman for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0515-01", "first_page_order": 525, "last_page_order": 532 }