{ "id": 4343166, "name": "JONATHAN WILLIAMS and wife JAMIE KAUFMAN WILLIAMS, Plaintiffs v. DEVERE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., DAVIS, MARTIN, POWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC., TERRY'S PLUMBING & UTILITIES, INC., and CITY OF THOMASVILLE, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Williams v. Devere Construction Co.", "decision_date": "2011-08-16", "docket_number": "No. COA10-900", "first_page": "135", "last_page": "144", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "215 N.C. App. 135" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "672 S.E.2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642756 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551", "parenthetical": "quoting Wood v. Guilford Cty., 355 N.C. 161, 166, 558 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2002)" }, { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/672/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "643 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638095 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 S.E.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641633 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60", "parenthetical": "\"appeals which present defenses of governmental or sovereign immunity . . . have been held by this Court to be immediately appealable as affecting a substantial right.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/664/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633141 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "631 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636049 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/631/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 S.E.2d 235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 N.C. 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623827 ], "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/218/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111", "parenthetical": "quoting Mack v. Marshall Field & Co., 218 N.C. 697, 700, 12 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1940)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9080247 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343", "parenthetical": "quoting Mack v. Marshall Field & Co., 218 N.C. 697, 700, 12 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1940)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 S.E.2d 362", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572570 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674-75", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "674-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 S.E.2d 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136-37", "parenthetical": "internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571637 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204", "parenthetical": "internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220182 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 N.C. App. 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4164934 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261", "parenthetical": "quoting Wood v. Guilford Cty., 355 N.C. 161, 166, 558 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2002)" }, { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/195/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4691903 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "861", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 N.C. App. 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4170360 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/199/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "695 S.E.2d 91", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153004 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 S.E.2d 169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 N.C. App. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547618 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/6/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300-01" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 N.C. App. 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554581 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/44/0608-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 S.E. 881", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1909, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1909, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 S.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572831 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 567", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" }, { "page": "568" }, { "page": "569" }, { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 748", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523366 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751" }, { "page": "750" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0748-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 S.E.2d 289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 N.C. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626272 ], "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/236/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 75", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "79", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 825", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9132493 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826-27", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "830" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0825-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 S.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.C. App. 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524279 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/117/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3738344 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4159033 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577", "parenthetical": "\"appeals which present defenses of governmental or sovereign immunity . . . have been held by this Court to be immediately appealable as affecting a substantial right.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 S.E.2d 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"appeals which present defenses of governmental or sovereign immunity . . . have been held by this Court to be immediately appealable as affecting a substantial right.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"appeals which present defenses of governmental or sovereign immunity . . . have been held by this Court to be immediately appealable as affecting a substantial right.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "477 S.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867594 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 S.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917864 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 789", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11653071 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8435867 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 S.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239233 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" }, { "page": "380" }, { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12129791 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 770", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "773" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150845 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 S.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155801 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3795905 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629835 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "698 S.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40", "parenthetical": "quoting Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152680 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311", "parenthetical": "quoting Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0306-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 967, "char_count": 21101, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14738581284082586 }, "sha256": "faddfcc02d0ba9253cb1619bf7ea0f4ffee491f121dda35b84484082b68edaaa", "simhash": "1:a3a9d6ee14ed0cba", "word_count": 3362 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:49:09.394868+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "JONATHAN WILLIAMS and wife JAMIE KAUFMAN WILLIAMS, Plaintiffs v. DEVERE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., DAVIS, MARTIN, POWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC., TERRY\u2019S PLUMBING & UTILITIES, INC., and CITY OF THOMASVILLE, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nBecause there exists an issue as to whether or not defendant City of Thomasville was engaged in a proprietary function that would make it subject to tort liability, we reverse the trial court\u2019s conclusion that defendant City of Thomasville was engaged in a governmental function and thereby entitled to governmental immunity. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo defendant City of Thomasville is not entitled to a defense of governmental immunity, we hold plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claim must fail because plaintiffs fail to allege what duty or control defendant City of Thomasville, located in Davidson County, was to exercise in the construction and establishment of the new Randolph County school sewer system. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the negligence claim against City of Thomasville pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).\nPlaintiffs Jonathan Williams and Jamie Kaufman Williams are residents of Randolph County. On 10 August 2009, a sewer line backed up and sewage flowed back through the sewer line connected to a house owned by plaintiffs; sewage spilled from the toilets, bathtubs, and showers onto the flooring of the first floor, down through the walls, basement ceiling, and into the heating and cooling ducts causing substantial damage to the house. On 30 December 2009, plaintiffs filed a negligence complaint against defendants DeVere Construction Company, Inc.; Davis, Martin, Powell & Associates, Inc.; Terry\u2019s Plumbing & Utilities, Inc.; and City of Thomasville.\nDevere Construction Co. served as general contractor for the construction of a new Randolph County school in the City of Trinity. Plaintiffs alleged that City of Thomasville, located in adjacent Davidson County, \u201cwas involved in the process of construction of the sewer system for [the] new school... in preparation for taking over operation and control of said sewer system.\u201d On 25 January and 18 February 2010, defendant City of Thomasville filed a motion and amended motion, respectively, to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 claim as to them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). City of Thomasville contended that it was immune from suit for torts committed by its officers or employees while performing governmental functions based on the doctrine of governmental immunity. A hearing on the motion was set for 1 March 2010.\nOn 1 March 2010, plaintiffs filed subpoenas for Kelly Craver, City of Thomasville City Manager, and Morgan Huffman, City of Thomasville Director of Public Services. City of Thomasville filed objections and a motion to quash plaintiffs\u2019 subpoenas. On 15 March 2010, the trial court entered an order granting City of Thomasville\u2019s motion to quash plaintiffs\u2019 witness subpoenas, under Rule 45(c)(5), and ordered that plaintiffs\u2019 claim against City of Thomasville be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs appeal.\nOn appeal, plaintiffs question whether the trial court erred by (I) quashing plaintiffs\u2019 subpoenas; dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 complaint pursuant to (II) 12(b)(1); and (III) 12(b)(6).\nBefore we reach plaintiffs\u2019 arguments, we consider whether plaintiffs\u2019 interlocutory appeal is properly before this Court.\nUnder North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54,\n[A]ny order . . . which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties and shall not then be subject to review either by appeal or otherwise except as expressly provided by these rules or other statutes.\nN.C. R. Civil P. 54(b) (2009). \u201cAn interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.\u201d Stanford v. Paris, 364 N.C. 306, 311, 698 S.E.2d 37, 40 (2010) (quoting Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)).\nAs a general rule, interlocutory orders are not immediately appealable. Davis v. Davis, 360 N.C. 518, 524, 631 S.E.2d 114, 119 (2006). However, \u201cimmediate appeal of interlocutory orders and judgments is available in at least two instances\u201d: when the trial court certifies, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay of the appeal; and when the interlocutory order affects a substantial right under N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 1-277(a) and 7A-27(d)(1). Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 161-62, 522 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1999).\nTurner v. Hammocks Beach Corp., 363 N.C. 555, 558, 681 S.E.2d 770, 773 (2009). Where the trial court does not certify the order pursuant to Rule 54(b), the first avenue is not available to the appellant. Jefferys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 379, 444 S.E.2d 252, 253 (1994). Pursuant to the second avenue, \u201cthe appellant has the burden of showing this Court that the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be jeopardized absent a review prior to a final determination on the merits.\u201d Id. at 380, 444 S.E.2d at 254. This Court has held that appeals from interlocutory orders raising issues of governmental or sovereign immunity affect a substantial right sufficient to warrant immediate appellate review. Price v. Davis, 132 N.C. App. 556, 558-59, 512 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1999); see, e.g., Hines v. Yates, 171 N.C. App. 150, 614 S.E.2d 385 (2005); Derwort v. Polk County, 129 N.C. App. 789, 501 S.E.2d 379 (1998); Hedrick v. Rains, 121 N.C. App. 466, 466 S.E.2d 281, aff\u2019d, 344 N.C. 729, 477 S.E.2d 171 (1996).\nHere, plaintiffs appeal from an order quashing their witness subpoenas and dismissing their negligence claim against City of Thomasville pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The trial court\u2019s stated basis for the dismissal was that \u201cthe doctrine of governmental immunity applies to plaintiffs\u2019 allegations against defendant City...[,] defendant City has not waived its governmental immunity . . . [, and] defendant City\u2019s Motions to dismiss shall be and hereby are granted . . . .\u201d These grounds are sufficient to warrant immediate appellate review. See Price, 132 N.C. App. 558-59, 512 S.E.2d 785; see also Murray v. County of Person, 191 N.C. App. 575, 577, 664 S.E.2d 58, 60 (2008) (\u201cappeals which present defenses of governmental or sovereign immunity . . . have been held by this Court to be immediately appealable as affecting a substantial right.\u201d (citations omitted)). Therefore, we review plaintiffs\u2019 appeal.\nBecause the issues presented by plaintiffs in arguments II and III are determinative, our opinion addresses only the arguments corresponding to those issues.\nII\nPlaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant City\u2019s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). Plaintiff argues that defendant City is not' entitled to governmental immunity because (A) it waived its governmental immunity with the purchase of liability insurance and (B), in the alternative, because defendant City\u2019s involvement in the process of construction of the sewer system was a proprietary function. Though the record is undeveloped as to whether City of Thomasville was engaged in a proprietary function, plaintiffs\u2019 allegations are sufficient to warrant further review in the determination of whether governmental immunity is applicable.\n\u201cWe review Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo and may consider matters outside the pleadings.\u201d Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 271, 643 S.E.2d 566, 570 (2007) (citations omitted).\n\u201cUnder the doctrine of governmental immunity ... a municipality is not liable for the torts of its officers and employees if the torts are committed while they are performing a governmental function.\u201d Gregory v. City of Kings Mountain, 117 N.C. App. 99, 101, 450 S.E.2d 349, 352 (1994) (citation omitted). \u201cApplication of the doctrine depends upon whether the activity out of which the tort arises is properly characterized as \u2018governmental\u2019 or \u2018proprietary\u2019 in nature.\u201d Bostic Packaging, Inc. v. City of Monroe, 149 N.C. App. 825, 826-27, 562 S.E.2d 75, 77 (2002) (citation omitted).\nA municipal corporation is dual in character and exercises two classes of powers \u2014 governmental and proprietary. It has a twofold existence \u2014 one as a governmental agency, the other as a private corporation.\nAny activity of the municipality which is discretionary, political, legislative, or public in nature and performed for the public good in behalf of the State rather than for itself comes within the class of governmental functions. When, however, the activity is commercial or chiefly for the private advantage of the compact community, it is private or proprietary.\nIn either event it must be for a public purpose or public use.\nSo then, generally speaking, the distinction is this: If the undertaking of the municipality is one in which only a governmental agency could engage, it is governmental in nature. It is proprietary and \u201cprivate\u201d when any corporation, individual, or group of individuals could do the same thing. Since, in either event, the undertaking must be for a public purpose, any proprietary enterprise must, of necessity, at least incidentally promote or protect the general health, safety, security or general welfare of the residents of the municipality.\nBritt v. City of Wilmington, 236 N.C. 446, 450-51, 73 S.E.2d 289, 293 (1952). \u201cOur courts have long noted that drawing the line between municipal operations which are proprietary and subject to tort liability versus operations which are governmental and immune from such liability is a difficult task.\u201d Pulliam v. City of Greensboro, 103 N.C. App. 748, 751, 407 S.E.2d 567, 568 (1991). \u201cThe \u2018application of the [governmental-proprietary distinction] to given factual situations has resulted in irreconcilable splits of authority and confusion as to what functions are governmental and what functions are proprietary.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 186 S.E.2d 897 (1972)). Historically, the establishment, construction, and maintenance of a sewer system by a municipality for its residents was a governmental function entitling the municipality to immunity from negligence claims. E.g., Metz v. City of Asheville, 150 N.C. 613, 748, 64 S.E. 881 (1909); Roach v. City of Lenoir, 44 N.C. App. 608, 610, 261 S.E.2d 299, 300-01 (1980); McCombs v. City of Asheboro, 6 N.C. App. 234, 240, 170 S.E.2d 169, 173 (1969). In more recent cases before this Court, recognizing the development of municipal sewer services provided by privately owned public utility companies, we have declined to grant immunity on the sole basis that sewer service was provided by a municipality. Pulliam, 103 N.C. App. 748, 407 S.E.2d 567. As a result, the plaintiffs may establish that a municipality was engaged in a proprietary function stripping it of governmental immunity. Bostic Packing, Inc., 149 N.C. App. 825, 562 S.E.2d 75.\nA\nAcknowledging the trial court\u2019s conclusion \u201c[t]hat the doctrine of governmental immunity applies to plaintiffs\u2019 allegations against defendant City[,]\u201d plaintiffs argue that City of Thomasville nonetheless waived its immunity with the purchase of liability insurance.\n\u201c[W]here a municipality engages in a governmental function, governmental immunity is applicable, and a city may waive its immunity from civil tort liability by purchasing liability insurance.\u201d Gregory, 117 N.C. App. at 103, 450 S.E.2d at 352 (citing N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-485 (1987)). Pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 160A-485, \u201c[a]ny city is authorized to waive its immunity from civil liability in tort by the act of purchasing liability insurance. . . . Immunity shall be waived only to the extent that the city is indemnified by the insurance contract from tort liability.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-485(a) (2009) (emphasis added).\nDuring the period 1 July 2009 to 1 July 2010, defendant City was insured by the Interlocal Risk Financing Fund of North Carolina, a Property and Liability Insurance Trust administered by the North Carolina League of Municipalities. The policy indemnifies City of Thomasville against \u201cthose sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as compensatory damages because of . . . \u2018property damage\u2019 . . . .\u201d However, the policy specifically excludes from coverage contractual liability.\n1. Exclusions\nThis insurance does not apply to:\nb. Contractual Liability\n\u201cBodily injury\u201d or \u201cproperty damage\u201d for which the insured is obligated to pay damages by reason of the assumption of liability in a contract or agreement. This exclusion does not apply to liability for damages:\n(1) That the insured would have in the absence of the contract of agreement; or\n(2) Assumed in a contract or agreement that is an \u201cinsured contract\u201d, provided the \u201cbodily injury\u201d or \u201cproperty damage\u201d occurs subsequent to the execution of the contract or agreement.\nCity of Thomasville\u2019s indemnification hinges on whether in its contract with the City of Trinity to provide sewer service it assumed liability. However, this contract is not a part of the Record. Thus, we cannot determine at this pleading stage what contractual liability was assumed by City of Thomasville, or whether City of Thomasville waived its governmental immunity with the purchase of applicable liability insurance.\nB\nIn the alternative, plaintiffs argue that City of Thomasville\u2019s operation of the City of Trinity\u2019s sewage system was a proprietary function affording no governmental or sovereign immunity.\nIn Pulliam, the plaintiffs contended that the defendant City of Greensboro\u2019s operation of its main sewer line was a proprietary function and that the defendant city was not entitled to governmental immunity. Pulliam, 103 N.C. App. at 750, 407 S.E.2d at 568. In 1991, privately owned public utilities provided sewer service to four North Carolina municipalities and eighty-eight privately owned public utilities provided sewer service to non-municipal areas. Id. at 753, 407 S.E.2d at 569. In discussing the provision of public enterprises by privately owned public utilities, the Pulliam Court reasoned that \u201cit seem[ed] to be an accepted practice in North Carolina for cities and towns to compete with private enterprise by the ownership and operation of these public enterprises recognized by the General Assembly.\u201d Id. With these considerations in mind, the Court held that the defendant City was not immune from tort liability in the operation of its sewer system. Id. at 754, 407 S.E.2d at 570.\nHere, City of Thomasville concedes that it \u201chas a contract for the operation and maintenance of the City of Trinity\u2019s sewer system .. . .\u201d Though the agreement is not a part of the record, the record provides sufficient grounds to raise an issue as to whether City of Thomasville was engaged in a proprietary function. However, because we affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for negligence, see infra, the last issue we review herein is dispositive of plaintiffs\u2019 appeal.\nIll\nLastly, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting defendant City\u2019s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which plaintiffs could recover under Rule 12(b)(6). We disagree.\n\u201cAn appellate court conducts a de novo review when considering a trial court\u2019s dismissal of a [claim] under North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).\u201d State Employees Ass\u2019n of N.C., Inc. v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of State Treasurer, 364 N.C. 205, 210, 695 S.E.2d 91, 95 (2010). \u201c \u2018[T]he standard of review is whether as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory.\u2019 \u201d Laster v. Francis, 199 N.C. App. 572, 575, 681 S.E.2d 858, 861 (2009) (citation omitted).\nDismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when one of the following three conditions is satisfied: (1) the complaint on its face reveals that no law supports the plaintiff\u2019s claim; (2) the complaint on its face reveals the absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim; or (3) the complaint discloses some fact that necessarily defeats the plaintiff\u2019s claim. Oates v. JAG, Inc., 314 N.C. 276, 278, 333 S.E.2d 222, 224 (1985).\nSchlieper v. Johnson, 195 N.C. App. 257, 261, 672 S.E.2d 548, 551 (2009) (quoting Wood v. Guilford Cty., 355 N.C. 161, 166, 558 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2002)).\nTo make out a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the defendant\u2019s conduct breached that duty; (3) the breach was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff\u2019s injury; and (4) damages resulted from the injury.\nBostic Packaging, Inc., 149 N.C. App. at 830, 562 S.E.2d at 79 (citation omitted).\n[A] duty is an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another. A legal duty is owed whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position towards another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other.\nEstate of Mullins by Dixon v. Monroe Oil Co., 349 N.C. 196, 204, 505 S.E.2d 131, 136-37 (1998) (internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).\n[A] municipality becomes responsible for maintenance, and liable for injuries resulting from a want of due care in respect to upkeep, of [sewer lines] constructed by third persons when, and only when, they are adopted as a part of its [sewer] system, or the municipality assumes control and management thereof.\nGeo. A. Hormel & Co. v. City of Winston-Salem, 263 N.C. 666, 674-75, 140 S.E.2d 362, 368 (1965) (citation omitted). However, \u201c[i]n the absence of any control of the place and of the work there [is] a corresponding absence of any liability incident thereto. That authority [must] precede[] responsibility[] or control [as] a prerequisite of liability, is a well recognized principle of law as well as of ethics.\u201d Wilkerson v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 151 N.C. App. 332, 343, 566 S.E.2d 104, 111 (2002) (quoting Mack v. Marshall Field & Co., 218 N.C. 697, 700, 12 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1940)).\nHere, plaintiffs allege that \u201cThomasville was involved in the process of construction of the sewage system for the new school being constructed by DeVere in preparation for taking over operation and control of said sewer system . . . .\u201d City of Thomasville\u2019s negligence, plaintiffs\u2019 assert, was its failure to \u201ccommunicate with [defendants Terry\u2019s Plumbing and Davis, Martin, Powell & Associates, Inc.] and properly establish and maintain a procedure for control over the sewage flowing through the sewer system for the new school. . . .\u201d\nBecause plaintiffs fail to assert a duty on the part of City of Thomasville in the construction of the sewer system for the new Randolph County school, they have failed to state a claim for relief. Further, plaintiffs allege that City of Thomasville\u2019s involvement was only \u201cin preparation for taking over operation and control\u201d of the new sewer system; as such, the complaint reveals an absence of facts establishing City of Thomasville\u2019s duty, or conduct constituting a breach of said duty that would proximately cause plaintiffs\u2019 damages. See Schlieper, 195 N.C. App. at 261, 672 S.E.2d at 551; Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 263 N.C. at 674-75, 140 S.E.2d at 368. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie claim of negligence. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 claim against defendant City of Thomasville pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).\nAffirmed.\nJudges McGEE and BEASLEY concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Stone, Bowers, Gray & McDonald, P.A., by Carl W. Gray, for plaintiff-appellants.", "Little & Little, P.L.L.C., by Gathryn M. Little, Esq., for defendant-appellant City of Thomasville." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JONATHAN WILLIAMS and wife JAMIE KAUFMAN WILLIAMS, Plaintiffs v. DEVERE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., DAVIS, MARTIN, POWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC., TERRY\u2019S PLUMBING & UTILITIES, INC., and CITY OF THOMASVILLE, Defendants\nNo. COA10-900\n(Filed 16 August 2011)\n1. Appeal and Error \u2014 appealability\u2014interlocutory orders\u2014 substantial right \u2014 governmental immunity\nPlaintiffs\u2019 appeal from an order quashing their witness subpoenas and dismissing their negligence claim against defendant City was entitled to immediate review because the defense of governmental immunity affected a substantial right.\n2. Negligence \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\u2014 failure to allege duty\nThe trial court did not err in a negligence case by granting defendant City\u2019s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1). Plaintiffs failed to allege a duty or control defendant was required to exercise in the construction and establishment of a new school system sewer.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from judgment entered 3 March 2010 by Judge V. Bradford Long in Randolph County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 January 2011.\nStone, Bowers, Gray & McDonald, P.A., by Carl W. Gray, for plaintiff-appellants.\nLittle & Little, P.L.L.C., by Gathryn M. Little, Esq., for defendant-appellant City of Thomasville." }, "file_name": "0135-01", "first_page_order": 145, "last_page_order": 154 }