{ "id": 4342945, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RAYMUNDO ANTONIO CASTANEDA", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Castaneda", "decision_date": "2011-08-16", "docket_number": "No. COA11-7", "first_page": "144", "last_page": "153", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "215 N.C. App. 144" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 906", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633430 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "912" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0906-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8318957 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "773 N.E.2d 266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11413870 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271", "parenthetical": "concluding that admission of \"interrogators' accusations\" that defendant had lied about not committing crime, \"in the context of the entire statement, did not create a substantial risk of unfair prejudice\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/773/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 So. 3d 1104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 3d", "case_ids": [ 7039966 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1112", "parenthetical": "\"When placed in their proper context, an interrogating detective's statements to a suspect could be understood by a rational jury to be techniques used by law enforcement officers to secure confessions.\" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that, \"[w]hen placed in the context of the entirety of the interrogation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting\" interrogating detectives' accusations that defendant was lying" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so3d/53/1104-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562603 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 176", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796093 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 S.W.3d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 8920330 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" }, { "page": "26-27" }, { "page": "27", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/171/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011 WL 2694434", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "*5" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 Kan. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 3857589 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" }, { "page": "1229" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/279/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 Idaho 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Idaho", "case_ids": [ 1001261 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641", "parenthetical": "concluding that \"officers' comments made during both interrogations indicating that they believed [defendant] was lying were admissible for the purpose of providing context to [defendant's inculpatory answers\"" }, { "page": "455", "parenthetical": "concluding that \"officers' comments made during both interrogations indicating that they believed [defendant] was lying were admissible for the purpose of providing context to [defendant's inculpatory answers\"" }, { "page": "641" }, { "parenthetical": "\"The officers' statements in this case that they believed Cordova was lying were admissible because the comments gave context to Cordova's inculpatory statements, which were relevant to the proceedings.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/137/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 L. Ed. 2d 757", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 Ariz. 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 3423035 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334-35" }, { "page": "120-21" }, { "page": "335" }, { "page": "121", "parenthetical": "upholding admission of officer's accusation that defendant was not being truthful \"[b]ecause [officer]'s accusations were part of an interrogation technique and were not made for the purpose of giving opinion testimony at trial\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/218/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 F.3d 995", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11238090 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1001" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/224/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 S.E.2d 494", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918990 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 884", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "886" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 N.C. App. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521735 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/61/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 216", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "676 S.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" }, { "page": "553", "parenthetical": "\"Because defendant changed his story as a result of these out-of-court statements, it can be properly said that these questions were admitted to show their effect on defendant, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\"" }, { "page": "552" }, { "page": "554" }, { "page": "552", "parenthetical": "finding police statements relevant because \"[t]he circumstances under which [the defendant's] concessions were made were relevant to understanding the concessions themselves and therefore to the subject matter of the case\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. App. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4167356 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87-88" }, { "page": "87" }, { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 N.C. App. 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550903 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/47/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306215 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571580 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0382-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 950, "char_count": 21957, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.676640983121932e-07, "percentile": 0.6968180384261785 }, "sha256": "e25482b7685dcab57c60b933d6c96c878233625fe0fbea59094b81c62ceaa5d5", "simhash": "1:452966225f88bafb", "word_count": 3459 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:49:09.394868+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STROUD and Robert N. HUNTER, Jr. concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RAYMUNDO ANTONIO CASTANEDA" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.\nDefendant Raymundo Antonio Castaneda appeals his second-degree murder conviction. After careful review, we find no error.\nFacts\nThe State presented evidence tending to establish the following facts at trial: Around 10:00 a.m. on 23 December 2007, several men, including defendant, Silvano Barrera, and a man nicknamed \u201cGota,\u201d were drinking beer at Gota\u2019s apartment in Charlotte, North Carolina. Mois\u00e9s Aguilar came over to Gota\u2019s house later that morning and began drinking beer with the other men. In the afternoon, Barrera asked defendant if he could borrow his grill to cook some steaks and defendant left Got'a's house to go get the grill. When defendant returned with the grill, Barrera asked him to clean it while he went grocery shopping. While Barrera was gone, defendant told Aguilar to clean the grill, which made him angry, and the two men began arguing. Defendant threw a beer can at Aguilar and the two men started pushing each other. Aguilar went outside, defendant stayed inside the apartment, and the two men eventually calmed down.\nAround 3:00 that afternoon, Barrera, who had been at his apartment preparing the food, went to Gota\u2019s apartment and told everyone to come to his house to eat outside. Defendant and Gota arrived at around 4:00 p.m. and Aguilar showed up a few minutes later. When he arrived, Aguilar \u201cstarted saying stuff\u2019 to defendant and continued saying \u201cstuff\u2019 to defendant during the meal. Aguilar then slapped defendant in the face. At this point, defendant \u201cjumped\u201d on Aguilar and the two men began fighting. Although at first Barrera thought defendant was punching Aguilar, when Aguilar fell to the ground on his side, knocking over the grill, Barrera saw that defendant was stabbing him with a kitchen knife. Barrera borrowed a neighbor's telephone and called 911. When someone told defendant that it looked like Aguilar was going to die, defendant fled the scene.\nThe paramedics arrived, found Aguilar pulseless and not breathing, and pronounced him dead at the scene. The autopsy revealed that Aguilar was stabbed eight times in the chest and abdomen and seven times in the back and that Aguilar died as a result of these wounds.\nDefendant was aware, a few days after the incident, that the police were looking for him, but he did not contact the police or turn himself in. Defendant left the state and first went to Charleston, South Carolina, then to Atlanta, Georgia, and finally to Jacksonville, Florida, where he was arrested seven months later, on 31 July 2008. After defendant was apprehended, he was interviewed by CharlotteMecklenburg Police Detectives William Brandon and Miguel Santiago. The interview was videotaped and transcribed.\nDefendant was charged with first-degree murder. Prior to trial, defendant moved to redact portions of the transcript from the interview where the detectives referred to \u201cother witnesses^]\u201d statements about the events surrounding the homicide as well as portions in which the detectives told defendant that his version of events was a \u201clie.\u201d In declining to redact the statements referencing non-testifying third parties, the trial court ruled that the evidence was not being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that the \u201cState w[ould] be prevented from arguing the substance\u201d of these statements, and that it would give a limiting instruction to the jury. The court also refused to redact the detective\u2019s statements that defendant was lying, noting that \u201cofficers are permitted to employ investigative and questioning techniques designed to elicit information from a suspect . . . .\u201d When the challenged evidence was offered during trial, defendant renewed his objection, and the trial court overruled the objection.\nDefendant elected to testify in his defense, explaining that Aguilar had attacked him with the knife and that he had stabbed Aguilar in self-defense. The jury found defendant guilty of second-degree murder and the trial court sentenced defendant to a presumptive-range term of 151 to 191 months imprisonment. Defendant timely appealed to this Court.\nI\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting the transcript of the police interview without redacting the detectives\u2019 \u201cstatements indicating that witnesses saw the defendant pick up a knife and stab the decedent.\u201d During the interview, Detective Brandon told defendant that he did not believe defendant\u2019s story that Aguilar attacked him, saying that \u201cpeople said that... you picked the knife up and you stabbed [Aguilar].\u201d Later, Detective Santiago told defendant that some parts of his story were \u201cnot true\u201d as they did not \u201cmatch\u201d the evidence from the scene.\nA. Hearsay\nDefendant contends that the detectives\u2019 statements referring to what they had been told by non-testifying third parties constituted inadmissible hearsay. The State counters that the detectives\u2019 statements were not offered at trial for the truth of the matter asserted and thus did not constitute hearsay. Rule 801 of the Rules of Evidence defines \u201c[h]earsay\u201d as \u201ca statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d N.C. R. Evid. 801(c). Consequently, as the State correctly points out, \u201c[o]ut-of-court statements offered for purposes other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted are not considered hearsay.\u201d State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 409, 508 S.E.2d 496, 513 (1998). In particular, statements of one person to another to explain subsequent actions taken by the person to whom the statements were made are admissible as non-hearsay evidence. State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 282, 289 S.E.2d 48, 56 (1990). \u201cThe reason such statements are admissible is not that they fall under an exception to the [hearsay] rule, but that they simply are not hearsay \u2014 they do not come within the . . . legal definition of the term.\u201d Long v. Paving Co., 47 N.C. App. 564, 569, 268 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1980). The trial court\u2019s determination as to whether an out-of-court statement constitutes hearsay is reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. Miller, 197 N.C. App. 78, 87-88, 676 S.E.2d 546, 552, disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 586, 683 S.E.2d 216 (2009).\nHere, as noted by the trial court in denying defendant\u2019s motion, the detectives\u2019 references to statements by unidentified third parties are not hearsay because they were \u201cnot admitted for the purpose of conferring the truth of what [was] contained in [the] statements.\u201d Instead, the detectives\u2019 statements were offered to provide context for defendants\u2019 answers and to explain the detectives\u2019 interviewing techniques. See id. at 89, 676 S.E.2d at 553 (\u201cBecause defendant changed his story as a result of these out-of-court statements, it can be properly said that these questions were admitted to show their effect on defendant, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d). As the detectives\u2019 statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, they did not constitute hearsay, and the trial court properly admitted the evidence.\nThe trial court, moreover, instructed the jury twice \u201cnot to consider such statements for the truth of what was said but only for the impact those statements may have had on the Defendant as an interviewing technique by the detective[s].\u201d It is well established that \u201c[t]he law presumes that the jury heeds limiting instructions that the trial judge gives regarding the evidence.\u201d State v. Shields, 61 N.C. App. 462, 464, 300 S.E.2d 884, 886 (1983).\nB. Right to Confrontation\nDefendant also argues that the admission of the detectives\u2019 statements violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. It is well recognized, however, that \u201c[t]he Confrontation Clause \u2018does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.\u2019 \u201d Miller, 197 N.C. App. at 87, 676 S.E.2d at 552 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 197-98 n.9 (2004)). Thus, because the detectives\u2019 statements were not admitted to establish the truth of the assertions, \u2014 that certain witnesses saw defendant pick up the knife and stab Aguilar \u2014 but were instead used to provide context for defendant\u2019s responses, the admission of these statements did not violate defendant\u2019s confrontation rights. See id. at 90-91, 676 S.E.2d at 554 (finding no Confrontation Clause violation from admission of detectives\u2019 questions which included statements by non-testifying declarants as the evidence was admissible to assist the jury in \u201cunderstand[ing] the circumstances in which the defendant was caught in a lie, changed his story, and made significant admissions of fact, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted\u201d). Defendant\u2019s arguments are overruled.\nII\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in not redacting those portions of the transcript in which Detective Santiago accused defendant of telling a \u201clie\u201d and giving an account of the fight that was \u201cbullshit\u201d and like \u201cthe shit you see in the movies\u201d. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to redact these statements, observing that \u201cofficers are permitted to employ investigative and questioning techniques designed to elicit information from a suspect.\"\nA. Improper Opinion Evidence\nDefendant claims that Detective Santiago\u2019s \u201cstatements constituted inadmissible opinion evidence on the truth or falsity of [defendant]^ pretrial statement and, ultimately, [his] testimony at trial.\u201d Because, defendant argues, the issue of defendant\u2019s credibility was \u201cfor the jury and the jury alone,\u201d the trial court erred in admitting this evidence. Defendant is correct that \u201c [i]t is fundamental to a fair trial that the credibility of the witnesses be determined by the jury\u201d and that testimony \u201cto the effect that a witness is credible, believable, or truthful is inadmissible.\u201d State v. Hannon, 118 N.C. App. 448, 451, 455 S.E.2d 494, 496 (1995). The issue of the admissibility of an interrogator\u2019s statements during an interview that -the suspect is being untruthful, however, has not been decided by North Carolina\u2019s appellate courts.\nThe majority of appellate courts of other jurisdictions that have considered such statements have held them admissible based on the rationale that such \u201caccusations\u201d by interrogators are an interrogation technique and are not made for the purpose of giving opinion testimony at trial. See, e.g., Dubria v. Smith, 224 F.3d 995, 1001 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting, in habeas corpus case, defendant\u2019s argument that detective\u2019s \u201ccomments and questions contained statements of disbelief of [defendant]\u2019s story, opinions concerning [defendant]\u2019s guilt, elaborations of the police theory of [vicitm]\u2019s death, and references to [defendant\u2019s involvement in the crime\u201d should have been redacted from tape and transcript because \u201c[t]he questions and comments by [the detective] placed [defendant]\u2019s answers in context\u201d); State v. Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325, 334-35, 185 P.3d 111, 120-21 (upholding trial court\u2019s admission of video in which detective \u201crepeatedly accused [the defendant] of lying\u201d because detective\u2019s \u201caccusations were part of an interrogation technique and were not made for the purpose of giving opinion testimony at trial\u201d), cert. denied, __ U.S. _, 172 L. Ed. 2d 757 (2008); State v. Cordova, 137 Idaho 635, 641, 51 P.3d 449, 455 (Idaho App. Ct. 2002) (concluding that \u201cofficers\u2019 comments made during both interrogations indicating that they believed [defendant] was lying were admissible for the purpose of providing context to [defendant\u2019s inculpatory answers\u201d); but see State v. Elnicki, 279 Kan. 47, 57, 105 P.3d 1222, 1229 (2005) (concluding that jury \u201cshould be prohibited from hearing\u201d videotape of detective\u2019s statements during interview that defendant \u201cwas a liar,\u201d that defendant was \u201c \u2018bullshitting\u2019 \u201d the detective, and that defendant was \u201c \u2018weaving a web of lies\u2019 \u2019\u2019just as \u201c[a] jury is clearly prohibited from hearing such statements from the witness stand\u201d).\nAs one state appellate court has recognized, \u201cthere is a difference between an investigating officer giving an opinion as testimony before a jury, and an investigating officer giving an opinion during the interrogation of a suspect.\u201d Odeh v. State, _ So. 3d _, _, 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 11005, *11, 2011 WL 2694434, *5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). The Supreme Court of Kentucky explained in Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 14 (Ky. 2005), that officers\u2019 comments during questioning that a suspect is not being truthful\nare not an attempt to describe to the jury the defendant\u2019s personality; nor are they statements aimed at impeaching a witness, especially when it is unknown whether a criminal defendant will take the stand. By making such comments, the officer is not trying to convince anyone \u2014 not the defendant (who knows whether he or she is telling the truth), other officers, a prosecutor, or the jury \u2014 that the defendant was lying. Rather, such comments are part of an interrogation technique aimed at showing the defendant that the officer recognizes the holes and contradictions in the defendant\u2019s story, thus urging him or her to tell the truth.\nId. at 27 (emphasis in original).\nIn holding that comments by police, similar to those by Detective Santiago in this case, were admissible, the Lantham Court noted that \u201c[a]lmost all of the courts that have considered the issue recognize that this form of questioning is a legitimate, effective interrogation tool. And because such comments are such an integral part of the interrogation, several courts have noted that they provide a necessary context for the defendant\u2019s responses.\u201d Id. at 26-27. Thus the court concluded that \u201csuch recorded statements by the police during an interrogation axe a legitimate, even ordinary, interrogation technique, especially when a suspect\u2019s story shifts and changes.\" Id. at 27 (emphasis added).\nIn this case, during his post-arrest interview, defendant\u2019s explanation of what happened at Barrera\u2019s apartment during the afternoon of 23 December 2007 shifted from not \u201cremember[ing] picking [up] the knife,\u201d to remembering \u201ct[aking] it away\u201d from Aguilar; from not remembering stabbing Aguilar at all, to remembering stabbing Aguilar \u201c[m]aybe one\u201d time, and then remembering stabbing him \"twice in the stomach.\u201d These changes in defendant\u2019s story were in response to the detective\u2019s statements that defendant was not being truthful. Because Detective Santiago\u2019s statements were part of an interrogation technique designed to show defendant that the detectives were aware of the holes and discrepancies in his story and were not made for the purpose of expressing an opinion as to defendant\u2019s credibility or veracity at trial, the trial court properly admitted the evidence. See Boggs, 218 Ariz. at 335, 185 P.3d at 121 (upholding admission of officer\u2019s accusation that defendant was not being truthful \u201c[b]ecause [officer]\u2019s accusations were part of an interrogation technique and were not made for the purpose of giving opinion testimony at trial\u201d).\nInterrogators\u2019 comments reflecting on the suspect\u2019s truthfulness are not, however, always admissible. As the Idaho Court of Appeals explained:\nA suspect\u2019s answers to police questioning \u00e1re only admissible to the extent that they are relevant. Thus, an interrogator\u2019s comments that he or she believes the suspect is lying are only admissible to the extent that they provide context to a relevant answer by the suspect. Otherwise, interrogator comments that result in an irrelevant answer should be redacted.\nCordova, 137 Idaho at 641, 51 P.3d at 455 (citing state evidence rule analogous to N.C. R. Evid. 401). Here, Detective Santiago\u2019s statements that he believed that defendant was \u201clying\u201d and that his story was not believable are admissible as the statements provided the context surrounding defendant\u2019s inculpatory responses \u2014 statements relevant to the murder charge. See id. (\u201cThe officers\u2019 statements in this case that they believed Cordova was lying were admissible because the comments gave context to Cordova\u2019s inculpatory statements, which were relevant to the proceedings.\u201d); see also Miller, 197 N.C. App. at 87, 676 S.E.2d at 552 (finding police statements relevant because \u201c[t]he circumstances under which [the defendant\u2019s] concessions were made were relevant to understanding the concessions themselves and therefore to the subject matter of the case\u201d).\nB. Danger of Unfair Prejudice\nDefendant alternatively argues that even if Detective Santiago\u2019s statements accusing defendant of not being truthful were relevant, they should have been excluded under Rule 403, which prohibits the admission of evidence, despite being relevant, when the evidence\u2019s \u201cprobative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ....\u201d N.C. R. Evid. 403. The decision concerning whether to exclude evidence under Rule 403\u2019s balancing test is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion, State v. McCray, 342 N.C. 123, 131, 463 S.E.2d 176, 181 (1995), meaning that \u201cthe court\u2019s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988).\nDefendant maintains that the trial court abused its discretion under Rule 403 by allowing the jury to hear Detective Santiago\u2019s comments during the interview that defendant was lying and giving a story that was \u201cbullshit\u201d and like the \u201cshit you see in the movies.\u201d As we have already explained, a jury may consider an interrogator\u2019s statements about a crime when they elicit a relevant response from the suspect being questioned. An interrogating detective\u2019s statements to a suspect, when placed in their proper context, may be understood by a rational jury to be interrogation techniques used by law enforcement officers to obtain inculpatory statements from a suspect. See Eugene v. State, 53 So. 3d 1104, 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (\u201cWhen placed in their proper context, an interrogating detective\u2019s statements to a suspect could be understood by a rational jury to be techniques used by law enforcement officers to secure confessions.\u201d (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).\nIn this case, when considered in the context of the entire interview, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403 in admitting Detective\u2019s Santiago\u2019s statements. See id. (holding that, \u201c[w]hen placed in the context of the entirety of the interrogation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting\u201d interrogating detectives\u2019 accusations that defendant was lying); Bostick v. State, 773 N.E.2d 266, 271 (Ind. 2002) (concluding that admission of \u201cinterrogators\u2019 accusations\u201d that defendant had lied about not committing crime, \u201cin the context of the entire statement, did not create a substantial risk of unfair prejudice\u201d). This argument is overruled.\nIll\nAlthough we have held that the trial court did not err in admitting either of the two statements by the detectives, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the statements should have been redacted, defendant is not entitled to a new trial. The State presented overwhelming evidence at trial of defendant\u2019s guilt. Barrera, who was five or six feet from the fight, testified to seeing defendant \u201cjump\u201d on Aguilar, repeatedly stab him in the chest and, after knocking Aguilar down to the ground, stab him several times in the back. After stabbing Aguilar eight times in the front and seven times in the back, defendant left the scene without calling for help and fled the state. In light of this overwhelming evidence, any error in the admission of the challenged evidence is harmless. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443 (a) and (b) (2009).\nNo error.\nJudges STROUD and Robert N. HUNTER, Jr. concur.\n. While decisions from other jurisdictions may have persuasive value, they are not binding on North Carolina courts. Morton Bldgs., Inc. v. Tolson, 172 N.C. App. 119, 127, 615 S.E.2d 906, 912 (2005).", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General K. D. Sturgis, for the State.", "Duncan B. McCormick for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RAYMUNDO ANTONIO CASTANEDA\nNo. COA11-7\n(Filed 16 August 2011)\n1. Evidence \u2014 hearsay\u2014not for truth of matter asserted\u2014 context \u2014 Confrontation Clause\nThe trial court did not err in a second-degree murder case by admitting the transcript of a police interview without redacting detectives\u2019 statements indicating that witnesses saw defendant pick up a knife and stab the victim. The references to statements by unidentified third parties were not hearsay because they were offered to provide context and explain interviewing techniques. Further, the Confrontation Clause does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.\n2. Evidence \u2014 failure to redact transcript \u2014 defendant telling a lie \u2014 police interrogation technique\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a second-degree murder case by failing to redact those portions of the transcript in which a detective accused defendant of telling a lie. The statements were part of an interrogation technique designed to show defendant that the detectives were aware of discrepancies in defendant\u2019s story rather than for the purpose of expressing an opinion as to defendant\u2019s credibility or veracity at trial.\n3. Homicide \u2014 second-degree murder \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nEven assuming arguendo that detectives\u2019 statements should have been redacted in a second-degree murder case, defendant was not entitled to a new trial in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 2 June 2010 by Judge Calvin E. Murphy in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 June 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General K. D. Sturgis, for the State.\nDuncan B. McCormick for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0144-01", "first_page_order": 154, "last_page_order": 163 }