{ "id": 4342729, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ABDELFETTAH LOUALI", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Louali", "decision_date": "2011-08-16", "docket_number": "No. COA10-1590", "first_page": "176", "last_page": "183", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "215 N.C. App. 176" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "646 S.E.2d 526", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638825 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/646/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "638 S.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637355 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39", "parenthetical": "citation and quotations omitted" }, { "page": "39", "parenthetical": "citation and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/638/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 S.E.2d 615", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638420 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/644/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "916 N.E.2d 1191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1195" }, { "page": "1198" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "394 Ill. App. 3d 977", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4290987 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/394/0977-01" ] }, { "cite": "849 S.W.2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10018211 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "840", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "841" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/849/0838-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E.2d 487", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491-2" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569175 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478-9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E.2d 715", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717", "parenthetical": "holding that the \" [defendant's knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe that the goods were stolen can be implied from his willingness to sell the [good] at a mere fraction of its actual value.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573720 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690", "parenthetical": "holding that the \" [defendant's knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe that the goods were stolen can be implied from his willingness to sell the [good] at a mere fraction of its actual value.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E.2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[furthermore, guilty knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N.C. App. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549119 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[furthermore, guilty knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/45/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2", "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 N.C. App. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525557 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559", "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/58/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 373", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "697 S.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3741573 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 N.C. App. 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8243614 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531", "parenthetical": "citation and quotations omitted" }, { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/180/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 N.C. App. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8204534 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/183/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-71", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 750, "char_count": 15707, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14734353238354822 }, "sha256": "888e2b1f4c3368fa131cb2fc7341f022ffa6ff891ef317dbb9b2d1f9dd2e1b10", "simhash": "1:ae20cdfd17af91f0", "word_count": 2562 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:49:09.394868+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges GEER and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ABDELFETTAH LOUALI" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nWhere there was sufficient evidence that property found in defendant\u2019s possession was explicitly represented by a law enforcement agent as being stolen, an essential element of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-71(b), the trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nFacts and Procedural History\nOn 28 October 2008, Abdelfettah Louali (defendant) was arrested and charged with receiving stolen goods in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-71. On 19 April 2010, a grand jury returned a superceding indictment charging defendant with receiving stolen property, pursuant to a violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-71(b).\nDefendant was tried before a jury beginning on 30 June 2010. The State\u2019s evidence presented at trial indicated the following, in pertinent part: Officer David T. LaFranque, II, of the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD), testified that on 28 October 2008, he participated in an undercover operation. Officer LaFranque testified that he entered Global Electronic Center (GEC), a private business, dressed in plain clothing with two laptop computers inside a black bag, both owned by the CMPD. Upon entering GEC, Officer LaFranque saw a customer and two males standing behind the counter. Officer LaFranque made an in-court identification of defendant as being one of the males standing behind the counter that day and described the other male as wearing a black shirt.\nOfficer LaFranque approached the man in the black shirt placed the laptops on the countertop, and told the man he had laptops for sale. Defendant stood a short distance away, within earshot, from this exchange. Officer LaFranque told the man in the black shirt that his \u201cnephews in the nearby neighborhood told [him] that [GEC] buy[s] stolen property, stolen laptops.\u201d While the man wearing a black shirt examined the laptops, Officer LaFranque stated \u201c[T]his guy that owns a business, he left the door open, the back door open for the business up the street; I ran in and just took [the laptops].\u201d The man in the black shirt and defendant began conversing with one another in a language other than English.\nThereafter, defendant asked Officer LaFranque for the make and model of the two laptops, as well as how much money he wanted for them. Officer LaFranque offered to sell the laptops for $60.00 each. Two more times Officer LaFranque stated to both defendant and the man in the black shirt that \u201cthis stupid guy kept leaving the door open, I kept running in the back of it and taking laptops.\u201d Defendant offered to purchase both laptops and gave Officer LaFranque $80.00 in exchange for the laptops.\nAfter giving defendant the laptops, Officer LaFranque was exiting GEC when the following occurred:\n[Officer LaFranque:] I pretty much took the [black] bag [the laptops came in]. And after we made the deal, I started to walk out and the defendant asked me for the bag. He said, Can I have the bag? I said, Well, do you want me to get more computers? If the guy keeps leaving the door open, I can get some more. And he says, Okay, yeah, yeah, take the bag. I told him I would need the bag to get them.\n[The State:] To get the laptops?\n[Officer LaFranque:] To get some more, yes.\nFollowing this exchange, Officer LaFranque exited the store.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s evidence, defendant made a motion to dismiss the charge under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-71 arguing that the evidence presented did not state that the undercover officer, Officer LaFranque, explicitly represented to defendant that the goods were stolen. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. On 1 July 2010, defendant was found guilty of feloniously receiving stolen goods and was sentenced to six to eight months in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Corrections. Defendant appeals.\nDefendant\u2019s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of receiving stolen goods in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-71(b). Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence \u201cproperty was explicitly presented to [defendant] by a law enforcement agent as being stolen,\u201d an essential element to a conviction pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-71(b). Defendant argues that Officer LaFranque failed to explicitly represent to defendant that the laptops were stolen, never referring to the laptops as being \u201cstolen,\u201d \u201cnor even us[ing] the words \u2018stole\u2019 or \u2018stolen\u2019 when discussing the laptops.\u201d Defendant asserts that \u201cat most, Officer LaFranque implied that the laptops were stolen\u201d which was obscure, ambiguous, and consisted of a disguised meaning or reservation.\n\u201cThe denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence is a question of law . . . which this Court reviews de novo[.]\u201d State v. Bagley, 183 N.C. App. 514, 523, 644 S.E.2d 615, 621 (2007) (citations omitted). \u201cIn ruling on a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the trial court should consider if the state has presented substantial evidence on each element of the crime and substantial evidence that the defendant is the perpetrator.\u201d State v. Sloan, 180 N.C. App. 527, 531, 638 S.E.2d 36, 39 (2006) (citation and quotations omitted). \u201cAs to whether substantial evidence exists, the question for the trial court is not one of weight, but of the sufficiency of the evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a conclusion.\u201d State v. Harris, 361 N.C. 400, 402, 646 S.E.2d 526, 528 (2007) (internal citations omitted). \u201cThe evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the [S]tate, with all conflicts resolved in the [S]tate\u2019s favor ... If substantial evidence exists supporting defendant\u2019s guilt, the jury should be allowed to decide if the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Sloan, 180 N.C. App. at 531, 638 S.E.2d at 39 (citation and quotations omitted).\nStatutory interpretation begins with the cardinal principle of statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is controlling. In ascertaining the legislative intent, courts should consider the language of the statute, the spirit of the statute, and what it seeks to accomplish. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the Court does not engage in judicial construction but must apply the statute to give effect to the plain meaning and definite meaning of the language.\nState v. Stanley,_N.C. App._,_, 697 S.E.2d 389, 390 (2010) (citation omitted). The trial court entered judgment against defendant for violating N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-71(b), which reads:\nIf a person knowingly receives or possesses property in the custody of a law enforcement agency that was explicitly represented to the person by an agent of the law enforcement agency as stolen, the person is guilty of a Class H felony and may be indicted, tried, and punished in any county in which the person received or possessed the property.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-71(b) (2009) (emphasis added). N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-71 was amended in 2007 to include section (b). 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 373. We note that although the phrase \u201cexplicitly represented\u201d is not necessarily ambiguous or unclear, it is nevertheless, not defined in Chapter 14 of our General Statutes. Therefore, we must seek the definition of \u201cexplicitly represented\u201d which is in accord with the General Assembly\u2019s intent for N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-71(b).\nThe legislative intent will be ascertained by such indicia as the purposes appearing from the statute taken as a whole, the phraseology, the words ordinary or technical, the law as it prevailed before the statute, the mischief to be remedied, the remedy, the end to be accomplished, statutes in pari materia, the preamble, the title, and other like means ....\nState v. White, 58 N.C. App. 558, 559, 294 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1982) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).\nPrior to the addition of section (b) in 2007, N.C.G.S \u00a7 14-71 provided that\n[i]f any person shall receive any chattel, property, money, . . . the stealing or taking whereof amounts to larceny or a felony, . . . such person knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe the same to have been feloniously stolen or taken, he shall be guilty of a Class H felony, and may be indicted and convicted . . . and such receiver shall be punished as one convicted of larceny.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-71 (2003) (emphasis added). By including the phrase \u201creasonable grounds to believe\u201d that the property received was stolen, the General Assembly necessarily made guilty knowledge an essential element of an offense under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-71. See State v. Allen, 45 N.C. App. 417, 421, 263 S.E.2d 630, 633 (1980) (stating that \u201c[furthermore, guilty knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.\u201d); State v. Haywood, 297 N.C. 686, 690, 256 S.E.2d 715, 717 (1979) (holding that the \u201c [defendant's knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe that the goods were stolen can be implied from his willingness to sell the [good] at a mere fraction of its actual value.\u201d); State v. Fearing, 304 N.C. 471, 478-9, 284 S.E.2d 487, 491-2 (1981) (noting that, under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-71, \u201cwhile it is true that it is not necessary that the person from whom the goods are received shall state to the person charged that the goods were stolen, ... it is necessary to establish either actual or implied knowledge on the part of the person charged of the facts that the goods were stolen.\u201d)\nWe believe that with the addition of section (b), the General Assembly intended to require more than guilty knowledge to support conviction under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-71(b). The addition of section (b) supports the same type of conviction characterized under section (a) but also provides for circumstances where a person receives or possesses property that is \u201cexplicitly represented\u201d as stolen by a law enforcement agency or a person authorized to act on behalf of an law enforcement agency. However, we reject defendant\u2019s argument that specific words are required to be spoken by an agent of the law enforcement agency in order to fulfill the \u201cexplicitly represented\u201d element of section (b).\nAn examination of the ordinary meanings of the words at issue reveals that \u201cexplicit\u201d is defined as \u201c[f]ully and clearly expressed.\u201d The American Heritage College Dictionary 482 (3rd ed. 1993). A \u201crepresentation\u201d is defined as \u201c[a] presentation of fact \u2014 either by words or conduct \u2014 made to induce someone to act[.]\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1415 (9th ed. 2009). We do not believe the statute requires the strict interpretation defendant advances as he argues there was no explicit representation made because Officer LaFranque \u201cnever referred to the laptops as being \u2018stolen,\u2019 nor even used the words \u2018stole\u2019 or \u2018stolen\u2019 when discussing the laptops.\u201d On the contrary, when taken in context, the ordinary meanings of this particular phrase in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-71(b) merely requires that a person knowingly receives or possesses property that was clearly expressed, either by words or conduct, as constituting stolen property.\nIn support of our determination that in enacting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-71(b), the General Assembly did not intend that specific words be required before one could be prosecuted under that statute, we look to how other states have viewed the words \u201cexplicitly represented\u201d in similar theft statutes.\nIn Allen v. State, -Tex. App.-, 849 S.W.2d 838 (1993), the defendant was found guilty of theft by receiving property under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. \u00a7 31.03(a) and (b) (Vernon 1989), which read:\n(a) A person commits an offense if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property.\n(b) Appropriation of property is unlawful if:\n(3) property in the custody of any law enforcement agency was explicitly represented by any law enforcement agent to the actor as being stolen and the actor appropriates the property believing it was stolen by another.\nTEX. PENAL CODE ANN. \u00a7 31.03(a) and (b) (Vernon 1989) (emphasis added). The defendant argued that the merchandise he purchased from a law enforcement agent was not explicitly represented as being stolen property. The law enforcement agent stated to the defendant that, \u201cIt\u2019s Christmas time, there is [sic] not too many people boosting like I am right now due to the holidays.\u201d Id. at 4, 849 S.W.2d at 840 (emphasis added). The state in Allen introduced to the jury, Webster\u2019s New Collegiate Dictionary\u2019s definition of \u201cboost\u201d as slang for \u201csteal\u201d or \u201cshoplift.\u201d Id. The Court of Appeals of Texas held that \u201ca representation involving only slang terminology can be an explicit representation.\u201d Id. at .6-7, 849 S.W.2d at 841.\nIn People v. Garmon, 394 Ill. App. 3d 977, 916 N.E.2d 1191 (2009), the defendant was convicted of theft for \u201cknowingly obtaining property in the custody of a law enforcement agency which was \u2018explicitly represented\u2019 to him by a law enforcement officer as stolen\u201d pursuant to 720ILCS 5/16-1(a)(5)(A) (West 2006). Id. at 980, 916 N.E.2d at 1195. The undercover law enforcement officer in Garmon presented to the defendant multiple cellular phones over a period of time that the defendant purchased. The undercover law enforcement officer testified that he told the defendant \u201cI almost got caught twice taking them.\u201d Id. at 984, 916 N.E.2d at 1198. The Appellate Court of Illinois held that \u201c[although the word \u2018stolen\u2019 was not used during the entirety of [the defendant\u2019s] transaction, . . . veiled references to stealing could be inferred by the trier of fact as an explicit representation, in the same manner that slang references to stealing have been similarly determined by other jurisdictions.\u201d. Id.\nSimilarly, we conclude that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-71(b) does not require that specific words be used by an agent of or person authorized to act on behalf of a law enforcement agency to represent property as stolen. In the case sub judice, Officer LaFranque stated to the man in the black shirt, within earshot of defendant, that his \u201cnephews in the nearby neighborhood told [him] that [GEC] buy[s] stolen property, stolen laptops.\u201d (T 49) Further, Officer LaFranque directly reminded defendant on two occasions that \u201cthis stupid guy kept leaving the door open, [and] I kept running in the back of it and taking laptops.\u201d (T 53) After the exchange of money for the laptops, Officer LaFranque also told defendant that he could get more laptops.\nWe hold that the words used by Officer LaFranque in defendant\u2019s presence constituted language that could reasonably be determined to explicitly represent that the items discussed had been stolen. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence that the laptops were explicitly represented to defendant to have been stolen. The trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of receiving stolen goods in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-71(b). Accordingly, defendant\u2019s argument is overruled.\nNo error.\nJudges GEER and BEASLEY concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Rufus C. Allen, for the State.", "Tin Fulton Walker & Owen, PLLC, by Noell P. Tin and Matthew G. Pruden, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ABDELFETTAH LOUALI\nNo. COA10-1590\n(Filed 16 August 2011)\nPossession of Stolen Property \u2014 receiving stolen goods \u2014 explicitly represented as stolen \u2014 specific words not required\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of receiving stolen goods. There was sufficient evidence that property found in defendant\u2019s possession was explicitly represented by a law enforcement agent as being stolen as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-71(b), and specific words were not required to be used.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 1 July 2010 by Judge Nathaniel J. Poovey in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 June 2011.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Rufus C. Allen, for the State.\nTin Fulton Walker & Owen, PLLC, by Noell P. Tin and Matthew G. Pruden, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0176-01", "first_page_order": 186, "last_page_order": 193 }