{ "id": 4343074, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA EX REL THE GUILFORD COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff v. THEODORE DOUGLAS HERBIN, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State ex rel. the Guilford County Board of Education v. Herbin", "decision_date": "2011-09-06", "docket_number": "No. COA10-1178", "first_page": "348", "last_page": "356", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "215 N.C. App. 348" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "257 N.C. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569760 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "670 S.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642407 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/670/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4702150 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "704 S.E.2d 511", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "697 S.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 N.C. App. 716", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4162961 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/194/0716-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 S.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "900" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2509699 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 S.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" }, { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 547", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 N.C. App. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249637 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/155/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 84-4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 N.C. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569760 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0634-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 782, "char_count": 20866, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1473777042599781 }, "sha256": "faa6b3e7fb9da4b5a1938a5bb76d70099c42c27a09834096a9acc6a616c092ef", "simhash": "1:4be9f246176f98e6", "word_count": 3508 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:49:09.394868+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and McCULLOUGH concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA EX REL THE GUILFORD COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff v. THEODORE DOUGLAS HERBIN, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nIn this appeal we affirm the ruling of the trial court and hold that a bail agent may file a motion to set aside forfeiture as the filing of such motion does not constitute an appearance before a judicial body and therefore does not constitute a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 84-4 regarding the unauthorized practice of law.\nFacts and Procedural History\nIn September 2009, Brandon Morgan (bail agent) executed an Appearance Bond on behalf of Allegheny Casualty Company (corporate surety) for the pretrial release of Theodore Douglas Herbin (defendant). When defendant was called and failed to appear in court on 8 February 2010, the corporate surety\u2019s bond was forfeited. Thereafter, notice of forfeiture was served on the corporate surety, bail agent, and defendant.\nOn 15 April 2010, the Guilford County Board of Education (the Board) and the State of North Carolina (collectively plaintiffs) filed in Guilford County District Court and Guilford County Superior Court motions entitled \u201cMotion for Rule 2.1 Designation; Motion for Order Staying All Pending Actions to Set Aside or Remit a Forfeiture; Motion for Transfer of Venue; and Motion to Transfer from District to Superior Court.\u201d Plaintiffs urged the Superior Court to recommend to the Chief Justice that actions seeking to set aside or remit a bond forfeiture filed between 5 April 2010 and 10 May 2010 be designated as an exceptional group and be assigned to a single Superior Court judge. In support of their motions, plaintiffs argued that \u201c[e]ven though a bail agent writes the bond, the surety is liable \u2014 not the bail agent \u2014 for a forfeiture of the bond. By statute, only the surety can move to set aside the forfeiture, and only the surety can move to remit the forfeiture.\u201d On 26 April 2010, then Senior Resident Superior Court Judge Catherine Eagles ordered that \u201c[a]ll hearings on motions to set aside and motions to remit bond forfeitures in Superior Court cases [be] stayed pending further Order of the Court.\u201d On 9 June 2010, a hearing on the plaintiffs\u2019 motions was held in Guilford County District Court before Chief District Court Judge Joseph Turner. Judge Turner rendered a decision in open court on 9 June 2010 denying the plaintiffs\u2019 motions. Thereafter, Judge Turner entered a written administrative order which stated the following findings:\n1. Bail agents may make motions to set aside bond forfeitures;\n2. A bail agent who has financial liability as a result of the bond obligation has a financial interest in the bond forfeiture such that the agent may appear pro se to protect that interest.\n3. Bail agents who appear oro se under this procedure must serve notice on the Guilford County Board of Education, by service on its attorney and serve notice to the corporate surety insuring the bond and to any other bail agent or bondsman associated with the bond for which forfeiture has been entered, in accordance with Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (NCGS 1A-1 [,]Rule 4).\n4. A corporate surety must be represented by counsel to be heard at a bond-related hearing, and failure to so appear will constitute a waiver of the right to be heard on any issue raised in the proceeding.\n5. The stay in the undersigned\u2019s Order of May 20, 2010 regarding cases filed between April 15, 2010 and June 9, 2010, is hereby lifted. As a matter of equity, the relevant time periods in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-544.5 are tolled for the period of time between April 15 and June 9, 2010, inclusive.\nThe order also set out the following pertinent conclusions:\n7. [T]he bail agent is not \u201cappearing] as attorney or counselor at law in any action or proceeding before any judicial body.\u201d Therefore, in making motions to set aside forfeiture, bail agents do not violate N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 84-4.\n10. The Court concludes that a bail agent who has financial liability to the surety as a result of the bond obligation has a financial interest in the bond forfeiture issue such that the agent may appear pro se at the bond forfeiture hearing to protect that interest. If a corporate surety wishes to be heard at a bond-related hearing, it must be represented by counsel, pursuant to LexisNexis, Div. of Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Travishan Corp., 155 N.C. App. 205, 573 S.E.2d 547 (2002).\nMeanwhile on 22 June 2010, the bail agent in the instant case filed a Motion to Set Aside the forfeiture of the corporate surety\u2019s bond, and the Board objected. Soon thereafter, the Board filed a motion asking the District Court to reconsider its administrative order. On 9 July 2010, Judge Turner overruled the Board\u2019s objections and granted the motion to set aside forfeiture. From this order, the Board appeals.\nWe first note that the notice of appeal filed on 20 July 2010 refers to the 9 July 2010 \u201cOrder Granting Allegheny Casualty Company / Brandon Morgan\u2019s Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture.\u201d However, the briefs submitted by the parties on appeal, including that of amicus curiae, reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the trial court in its amended administrative order. Our record does not support a notice of appeal from the administrative order. Nevertheless, because all of the arguments on appeal clearly challenge or support the ruling of the trial court in the administrative order, we will issue a writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. Rule 21(a)(1) (2009) to hear this appeal of the administrative order as well. (See Rule 21 stating that \u201c[t]he writ of certiorari may be issued in appropriate circumstances by either appellate court to permit review of the judgments and orders of trial tribunals when the right to prosecute an appeal has been lost by failure to take timely action . . . .\u201d).\nIn this appeal, the Board essentially challenges the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law that: (I) a bail agent may file a motion to set aside pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-544.5; (II) the filing of a motion to set aside is not an appearance in front of a judicial body and therefore not a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 84-4; and (III) a bail agent\u2019s activity is permitted pursuant to State v. Pledger, 257 N.C. 634, 127 S.E.2d 337 (1962).\nI\nFirst, the Board argues that the trial court erred in finding that a bail agent may file a Motion to Set Aside pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-544.5. The Board contends that by its express terms, in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-544.5(d) \u201cthe legislature conspicuously denied this right [to move to set aside a forfeiture] to bail agents.\u201d We disagree.\nHere, the Board does not challenge the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, only its conclusions of law. Therefore the findings of fact are binding on appeal. In re Estate of Trogdon, 330 N.C. 143, 147, 409 S.E.2d 897, 900 (1991). \u201cQuestions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which are reviewed de novo by an appellate court.\u201d Martin v. N.C. HHS, 194 N.C. App. 716, 719, 670 S.E.2d 629, 632 (2009) (citation omitted).\nStatutory interpretation begins with the cardinal principle of statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is controlling. In ascertaining the legislative intent, courts should consider the language of the statute, the spirit of the statute, and what it seeks to accomplish. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the Court does not engage in judicial construction but must apply the statute to give effect to the plain and definite meaning of the language.\nState v. Stanley,_N.C. App._,_, 697 S.E.2d 389, 390 (2010) (citation omitted).\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A~544.5(a) provides that \u201c[tjhere shall be no relief from a forfeiture except as provided in this section.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-544.5(d)(1) sets out the \u201conly procedure\u201d for setting aside a forfeiture. \u201cAt any time before the expiration of 150 days after the date on which notice was given under G.S. 15A-544.4, the defendant or any surety on a bail bond may make a written motion that the forfeiture be set asidef.]\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A~544.5(d)(l) (emphasis added). \u201cSurety\u201d is defined as \u201c[t]he insurance company, when a bail bond is executed by a bail agent on behalf of an insurance company.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-531(8)(a). A \u201cbail agent\u201d is defined as \u201cany person who is licensed by the Commissioner as a surety bondsman ... , is appointed by an insurance company by power of attorney to execute or countersign bail bonds for the insurance company in connection with judicial proceedings, and receives or is promised consideration for doing so.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-531(3) (emphasis added).\nThe Board urges us to adopt a strict and literal interpretation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-544.5 and hold that only a defendant or surety, as opposed to a bail agent, can file a motion to set aside a forfeiture. However, to adopt the Board\u2019s argument would make the statute meaningless. Viewing other provisions of Chapter 15A indicates that bail agents, who are licensed as surety bondsman, are treated similarly to the defendant and the sureties they represent in bond forfeiture procedures.\nFor example, in cases where there is an entry of forfeiture, \u201c[t]he name, address of record, license number, and power of appointment number of any bail agent who executed the bail bond on behalf of an insurance company\u201d is to be included in the forfeiture. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-544.3(b)(6) (2009) (emphasis added). The forfeiture notice must also include the following language: \u201cTO THE DEFENDANT AND EACH SURETY NAMED ABOVE:... A forfeiture for the amount of the bail bond shown above was entered in favor of the State against the defendant and each surety named above[.]\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-544.3(b)(9). The surety named above includes the name of the bail agent who executed the bail bond on behalf of an insurance company.\n\u201cIn construing statutes courts normally adopt an interpretation which will avoid absurd or bizarre consequences, the presumption being that the legislature acted in accordance with reason and common sense and did not intend untoward results.\u201d In re J.N.S.,_ N.C. App._,_, 704 S.E.2d 511, 516 (2010) (citation omitted). In light of this rule of statutory interpretation, we respectfully decline to embrace the Board\u2019s argument that we adopt a strict and literal interpretation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-544.5(d)(1). We do not believe this was the intent of the General Assembly, as such an interpretation would lead to bizarre and untoward results. For instance, in light of the other sections of Chapter 15A that require the bail agent\u2019s name and mailing address to be included on every relevant bail bond that is executed (N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-544.3(a)(4)) and that require a bail agent receive notice of forfeiture (N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-544.3(b)(6)), to hold that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-544.5(d)(1) is not applicable to a bail agent, especially one acting as an agent for an insurance company, would render an absurd result.\nSuch reasoning would suggest that accommodation bondsmen and other professional bondsmen who are also defined as sureties (N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-531(8)(b) and (c)) but, who like bail agents are not specifically named as sureties under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-544.5(d)(1), would not be allowed to file a motion to set aside forfeiture. This cannot be the result intended by the legislature. Therefore, we overrule this argument.\nII\nNext, the Board, in disputing the right of a bail agent to file a motion to set aside forfeiture, argues that the bail agent is engaging in the unauthorized practice of law by making an unauthorized appearance before a judicial body in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4. We disagree.\nThe \u201cpractice of law\u201d is defined as:\nperforming any legal service for any other person, firm or corporation ... specifically including ... preparing or aiding in the preparation of any petitions or orders in any probate or court proceeding; abstracting or passing upon titles, the preparation and filing of petitions for use in any court, including administrative tribunals and other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies[.]\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-2.1 (2009). N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4 provides for the following:\n[e]xcept as otherwise permitted by law, it shall be unlawful for any person or associate of persons, except active members of the Bar of the State of North Carolina admitted and licensed to practice as attorneys-at-law, to appear as attorney or counselor at law in any action or proceeding before any judicial body.\nIn the case sub judice, the trial court made the following relevant findings of fact in its administrative order:\n5. Bail agents, in writing a bond on behalf of a surety, are sometimes contractually obligated to indemnify the surety and/or a surety\u2019s managing agent, which supervises the bail agents acting on behalf of a surety. This arrangement means that a bail agent may become financially liable to the surety or managing agent, if the bond becomes forfeit. Bail agents also typically sign a number of different forms on behalf of the surety during the bonding process.\n6. The North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts provides a form (AOC-CR-213) by which motions to set aside forfeiture may be made by the defendant, a surety\u2019s corporate officer, the bail agent, or an attorney. Regardless of which of the aforementioned four persons makes the motion to set aside forfeiture, the form merely requires checking two boxes, inserting the surety\u2019s name, and signing the motion; the motion is then filed with the Clerk of Court.\nThe trial court then concluded:\nin making the motion to set aside forfeiture, the bail agent is not \u201cappealing] as attorney or counselor at law in any action or proceeding before any judicial body.\u201d Therefore, in making motions to set aside forfeiture, bail agents do not violate N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 84-4.\nThe Board asserts that our holding in Lexis-Nexis v. Travishan Corp., 155 N.C. App. 205, 573 S.E.2d 547 (2002) is controlling and cannot be reconciled with the trial court\u2019s conclusion. We find the Board\u2019s arguments unconvincing.\nIn Lexis-Nexis, our Court held that \u201c[t]he prevailing rule is that a corporation cannot appear and represent itself either in proper person or by its officers, but can do so only by an attorney admitted to practice law.\u201d Lexis-Nexis, 155 N.C. App. at 207, 573 S.E.2d at 549. However, because the word \u201cappearance\u201d is not defined in Chapter 84, we apply the plain meaning of the word within the statute. Stanley,_N.C. App. at_, 697 S.E.2d at 390. An \u201cappearance\u201d is defined as\n[a] coming into court as a party or interested person, or as a lawyer on behalf of a party or interested person; esp., a defendant\u2019s act of taking part in a lawsuit, whether by formally participating in it or by an answer, demurrer, or motion, or by taking postjudgment steps in the lawsuit in either the trial court or an appellate court.\nBlack\u2019s Law Dictionary, 107 (8th ed. 1999).\nWe must agree with the trial court that filing a motion to set aside a bond forfeiture is not considered an appearance before a judicial body in the manner contemplated by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4 and, therefore, does not constitute the practice of law. The Board\u2019s argument is overruled.\nIll\nIn its third issue, the Board argues that the trial court erred in finding that a bail agent\u2019s activity was permitted pursuant to State v. Pledger, 257 N.C. 634, 127 S.E.2d 337 (1962). The Board\u2019s argument is based on the following conclusion of the trial court:\nEven if an agent\u2019s checking two boxes, inserting the surety\u2019s name, and signing the motion [to set aside forfeiture] was deemed to constitute the preparation of a legal document, that activity would still be permitted pursuant to State v. Pledger, 257 N.C. 634, 127 S.E.2d 337 (1962), because the agent would be \u201cprepar[ing] a legal document in connection with a business transaction in which the corporation [surety] has a primary interest,\u201d that is, the undertaking on the bond.\nIn Pledger, the defendant was charged with the unauthorized practice of law under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4 when he allegedly prepared deeds of trust without being a member of the North Carolina Bar and without being licensed as an attorney at law. Id. at 636, 127 S.E.2d at 339. The question before the Pledger court was whether the defendant prepared the documents \u201c \u2018for another person, firm or corporation\u2019 within the intent and meaning of [N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4].\u201d Id. at 637, 127 S.E.2d at 339. The Pledger court held that \u201c[a] person, firm or corporation having a primary interest, not merely an incidental interest, in a transaction, may prepare legal documents necessary to the furtherance and completion of the transaction without violating G.S. 84-4.\u201d Id.\n[A] person who, in the course of his employment by a corporation, prepares a legal document in connection with a business transaction in which the corporation has a primary interest, the corporation being authorized by law and its charter to transact such business, does not violate the statute [against the unauthorized practice of law], for his act in so doing is the act of the corporation in furtherance of its business.\nGardner v. N.C. State Bar, 316 N.C. 285, 290, 341 S.E.2d 517, 520 (1986) (citation omitted). Therefore, based on our reading of Pledger, a bail agent who, as an agent for the corporate surety, \u201cis appointed by an insurance company by power of attorney to execute or countersign bail bonds for the insurance company in connection with judicial proceedings\u201d is not prohibited from filing a motion to set aside a bond forfeiture. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-531(3). Further, we agree with the trial court that a bail agent may appear pro se at a hearing on a motion to set aside forfeiture if the agent has a financial liability to the surety as a result of the bond. However, a bail agent is prohibited from appearing at the motion hearing in court to represent the corporate surety. See Lexis-Nexis, 155 N.C. App. 205, 573 S.E.2d 547. Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err in its conclusion that the bail agent\u2019s actions were permitted under Pledger. The Board\u2019s argument is overruled.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the trial court\u2019s order is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges HUNTER, Robert C., and McCULLOUGH concur.\n. There is no indication in the record that any further action was taken on the Board\u2019s Rule 2.1 motion, and no indication the Superior Court division filed an administrative order. However, the record does contain an order signed by Superior Court Judge Stuart Albright, dated 8 July 2010, finding and concluding that two individuals (presumably bail agents) who filed motions to set aside on behalf of Allegheny Casualty Company, had committed a violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4, and striking the motion to set aside forfeiture from the trial court record. The record does not indicate that Judge Albright\u2019s ruling was appealed.\n. On 13 July 2010, after a hearing on the Board\u2019s motion to reconsider the court\u2019s administrative order, Judge Turner amended the order to include finding of fact number 3 and renumbered the paragraphs accordingly. Otherwise the order remained the same.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, LLP, by Clint S. Moore, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Steven A. McCloskey for defendant-appellee.", "Tharrington Smith, LLP, by Rod Malone, and North Carolina School Boards Association, by Allison B. Schafer, for North Carolina School Boards Association, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA EX REL THE GUILFORD COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff v. THEODORE DOUGLAS HERBIN, Defendant\nNo. COA10-1178\n(Filed 6 September 2011)\n1. Bail and Pretrial Release \u2014 bond forfeiture \u2014 motion to set aside \u2014 bail agent\nThe trial court did not err by finding that a bail agent may file a motion to set aside forfeiture of a bail bond. The strict and literal interpretation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-544.5 argued by the Board of Education was declined as leading to bizarre and untoward results.\n2. Bail and Pretrial Release \u2014 bail agent \u2014 motion to set aside forfeiture \u2014 not unauthorized practice of law\nThe trial court did not err by concluding that a bail agent was not engaging in the unauthorized practice of law by filing a motion to set aside a bond forfeiture. Filing a motion to set aside a bond forfeiture is not considered an appearance before a judicial body.\n3. Bail and Pretrial Release \u2014 bail agent \u2014 motion to set forfeiture \u2014 preparing document \u2014 appearance at hearing\nThe trial court did not err by concluding that a bail bond agent's activity was permitted under State v. Pledger, 257 N.C. 634. A bail agent who is appointed by power of attorney to execute or countersign bail bonds is not prohibited from filing a motion to set aside a bond forfeiture. Furthermore a bail agent may appear pro se at a hearing on a motion to set aside forfeiture if the agent has a financial liability to the surety, but may not appear to represent' the corporate surety.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 9 July 2010 by Judge Joseph E. Turner in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 April 2011.\nBrooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, LLP, by Clint S. Moore, for plaintiff-appellant.\nSteven A. McCloskey for defendant-appellee.\nTharrington Smith, LLP, by Rod Malone, and North Carolina School Boards Association, by Allison B. Schafer, for North Carolina School Boards Association, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0348-01", "first_page_order": 358, "last_page_order": 366 }