{ "id": 4343195, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TERRY RICHMOND", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Richmond", "decision_date": "2011-09-06", "docket_number": "No. COA10-1296", "first_page": "475", "last_page": "482", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "215 N.C. App. 475" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "612 S.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632818 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "645 S.E.2d 780", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638620 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "783", "parenthetical": "noting that Terry established that \"[a] police officer may effect a brief investigatory seizure of an individual where the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime may be underway.\"" }, { "page": "783", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/645/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 S.E.2d 501", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640646 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "504" }, { "page": "504" }, { "page": "504-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/658/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 S.E.2d 311", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641584, 12641582, 12641583 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/664/0311-03", "/se2d/664/0311-01", "/se2d/664/0311-02" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12641516 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/663/0428-02" ] }, { "cite": "656 S.E.2d 721", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640375 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/656/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 S.E.2d 402", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641608 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/664/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 S.E.2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "863" }, { "page": "863" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12129481 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 U.S. 366", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12205 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375-77" }, { "page": "346-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/508/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9005009 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 S.E.2d 347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 N.C. App. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553017 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/17/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 794", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139625 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0794-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 L. Ed. 2d 143", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "444 U.S. 907", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11384974, 11385039 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/444/0907-01", "/us/444/0907-02" ] }, { "cite": "252 S.E.2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570136 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906 and State v. Thompson, 296 N.C. 703, 706, 252 S.E.2d 776, 779, cert denied, 444 U.S. 907, 62 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549311 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441-42", "parenthetical": "citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906 and State v. Thompson, 296 N.C. 703, 706, 252 S.E.2d 776, 779, cert denied, 444 U.S. 907, 62 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 N.C. App. 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8183865 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29", "parenthetical": "noting that Terry established that \"[a] police officer may effect a brief investigatory seizure of an individual where the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime may be underway.\"" }, { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/184/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" }, { "page": "911" }, { "page": "21-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 N.C. App. 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156639 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "458" }, { "page": "458" }, { "page": "458-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/189/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 S.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564129, 8564070, 8564049, 8564156, 8564095 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0666-04", "/nc/290/0666-02", "/nc/290/0666-01", "/nc/290/0666-05", "/nc/290/0666-03" ] }, { "cite": "226 S.E.2d 186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 N.C. App. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552173 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/30/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 213", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 N.C. App. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520084 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/97/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 U.S. 85", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11304934 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" }, { "page": "245", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/444/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 S.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "703 S.E.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907" }, { "page": "907" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156256 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4159388 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 762, "char_count": 17798, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14738812957821093 }, "sha256": "18fe5df7b56263a5f3efe02f7bf8d371e9e60392a3b506c685003e4eca3aa4ea", "simhash": "1:84a164e013fb0c51", "word_count": 2932 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:49:09.394868+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TERRY RICHMOND" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nTerry Richmond (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that (1) the search of his person was unlawful because the officer \u201chad neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to conduct the search of [defendant][,]\u201d and (2) the nature of the object seized from him during the pat-down was not immediately apparent. For the following reasons, we affirm the denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nI. Background\nOn 12 April 2010, defendant was indicted for possession with intent to manufacture, sell, and deliver marijuana in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(a)(l). On 26 July 2010, defendant filed a motion to suppress, which was heard at the 30 August 2010 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Person County. Following the hearing, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the search of his person, and defendant gave notice of appeal in open court. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to possession with intent to manufacture, sell, and deliver marijuana but reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The trial court sentenced defendant to four to five months imprisonment but suspended that sentence and placed defendant on supervised probation for 24 months. On 30 August 2010, the trial court entered its written order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, making the following findings of fact:\n1. On December 16, 2009, Investigator Will Dunkley with the Roxboro Police Department applied for and was issued a search warrant for a private residence at 410 Green Street in Roxboro and an individual, Rodney Fuller.\n2. Investigator Dunkley and other officers executed the search warrant on December 16, 2009 at 410 Green St., and located the defendant inside the residence.\n3. The defendant was ordered to the ground, cuffed and stood up. Investigator Dunkley patted down the exterior of the defendant\u2019s left front pocket.\n4. Based on the officer\u2019s training and experience, he immediately formed the opinion that the bulge contained a controlled substance.\n5. Investigator Dunkley removed the item from the defendant\u2019s pocket, and found it to be 11 bags of marijuana.\nBased on these findings, the trial court made the following conclusions:\n1. The investigator had a right to detain the defendant for officer safety when he was located in a private residence which was the subject of \u00e1 search warrant.\n2. The investigator had a right to frisk the defendant for weapons for officer safety when he was located in a private residence which was the subject of a search warrant for illegal drugs.\n3. The investigator\u2019s frisk caused the officer, based on his training and experience, to believe that what he was touching was a package containing illegal drugs, and therefore he had a right to remove the object from the defendant\u2019s pocket.\n4.The defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the search should be denied.\nAs noted above, defendant argues on appeal that the denial of his motion to suppress was error as the search of his person was unlawful and the nature of the object seized from his pocket was not immediately apparent to the police officer.\nII. Motion to Suppress\nA. Standard of review\nDefendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.\nIt is well established that \u201c[t]he standard of review to determine whether a trial court properly denied a motion to suppress is whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by the evidence and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.\u201d State v. Tadeja, 191 N.C. App. 439, 443, 664 S.E.2d 402, 406-07 (2008). \u201cThe trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and must be legally correct.\u201d State v. Campbell, 188 N.C. App. 701, 704, 656 S.E.2d 721, 724, (citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted), appeal dismissed, 362 N.C. 364, 664 S.E.2d 311-12 (2008). Additionally, \u201cfindings of fact to which defendant failed to assign error are binding on appeal.\u201d Id.\nState v. Williams,_N.C. App_,_, 703 S.E.2d 905, 907, disc. review denied,_N.C._, 707 S.E.2d 237 (2011). Although assignments of error are no longer required under North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(a), in order to challenge a finding of fact as unsupported by the evidence, the appellant must make this argument in his brief. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(a) (stating that \u201c[t]he scope of review on appeal is limited to issues so presented in the several briefs. Issues not presented and discussed in a party\u2019s brief are deemed abandoned.\u201d). Defendant does not clearly object to any particular finding of fact, but his second argument can be construed as challenging finding of fact No. 4 as unsupported by the evidence. The other findings of fact are therefore binding on appeal, and we will consider the sufficiency of the evidence to support finding No. 4. See Williams,_N.C. App. At_, 703 S.E.2d at 907.\nB. Pat-down of defendant\nDefendant citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-256 (2009) and Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979) argues that Investigator Dunkley\u2019s search of defendant was unlawful. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-256 permits officers who are executing a search warrant to detain persons present at the time of the execution of the search warrant, and to conduct a search of such persons if the search of the premises, vehicle, or person designated in the warrant does not produce the items named in the warrant and if the property in the warrant could be concealed upon a person. The United States Supreme Court in Ybarra held that \u201ca person\u2019s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person.\u201d 444 U.S. at 91, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 245 (citation omitted). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-256 would have permitted Investigator Dunkley to detain defendant during the search of the residence, but the unchallenged findings of fact state that Investigator Dunkley did not immediately search defendant\u2019s person during the execution of the warrant but merely \u201cpatted down the exterior of the defendant\u2019s clothing[.]\u201d Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-255 (2009), \u201c[a]n officer executing a warrant directing a search of premises or of a vehicle may, if the officer reasonably believes that his safety or the safety of others then present so requires, search for any dangerous weapons by an external patting of the clothing of those present.\u201d (emphasis added) See State v. Jones, 97 N.C. App. 189, 196, 388 S.E.2d 213, 217 (1990) (noting that \u201c[a]n officer executing a search warrant is authorized by statute to detain persons present on the premises, G.S. 15A-256, and to frisk those present for weapons if he reasonably believes that there is a threat to the safety of himself or others. G.S. 15A-255. These provisions are clearly designed to enable officers to ensure their safety and to prevent possible suspects from fleeing or destroying evidence. See State v. Watlington, 30 N.C. App. 101, 226 S.E.2d 186, disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 290 N.C. 666, 228 S.E.2d 457 (1976). To require officers to serve the warrant prior to taking the precautionary measures authorized by G.S. 15A-255 and 15A-256 would frustrate the purposes of the [warrant] statutes.\u201d).\nThis Court has further stated that \u201c[t]he purpose of the officer\u2019s frisk or pat-down is for the officer\u2019s safety; as such, the pat-down is limited to the person\u2019s outer clothing and to the search for weapons that may be used against the officer.\u201d State v. Robinson, 189 N.C. App. 454, 458, 658 S.E.2d 501, 504 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we have stated that a police officer is permitted to conduct a stop and pat-down, when he \u201cobserves unusual behavior which leads him to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity may be occurring and that the person may be armed and dangerousf.]\u201d Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968)). See State v. Barnard, 184 N.C. App. 25, 29, 645 S.E.2d 780, 783 (2007) (noting that Terry established that \u201c[a] police officer may effect a brief investigatory seizure of an individual where the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime may be underway.\u201d). Reasonable suspicion requires that \u201c[t]he stop ... be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training.\u201d State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441-42, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906 and State v. Thompson, 296 N.C. 703, 706, 252 S.E.2d 776, 779, cert denied, 444 U.S. 907, 62 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1979)). A court considers the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the officer possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion. Bernard, 184 N.C. App. at 29, 645 S.E.2d at 783 (citation omitted).\nThe trial court only made two findings of fact relating to Investigator Dunkley\u2019s pat-down of defendant:\n2. Investigator Dunkley and other officers executed the search warrant on December 16, 2009 at 410 Green St., and located the defendant inside the residence.\n3. The defendant was ordered to the ground, cuffed and stood up. Investigator Dunkley patted down the exterior of the defendant\u2019s left front pocket.\nBased on these findings the trial court concluded\n2. The investigator had a right to frisk the defendant for weapons for officer safety when he was located in a private residence which was the subject of a search warrant for illegal drugs.\nBased on these findings we cannot determine as a matter of law whether Investigator Dunkley \u201creasonably believe [d] that his safety or the safety of others then present\u201d required a pat down of defendant for dangerous weapons during the execution of the search warrant, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-255, or any observations by Investigator Dunkley of \u201cunusual behavior which [led] him to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity may be occurring and that [defendant] may be armed and dangerous[.]\u201d See Robinson, 189 N.C. App. at 458, 658 S.E.2d at 504. \u201cWhen a trial court conducts a hearing on a motion to suppress, the court should make findings of fact that will support its conclusions as to whether the evidence is admissible. If there is no conflict in the evidence on a fact, failure to find that fact is not error. Its finding is implied from the ruling of the court.\u201d State v. Smith, 346 N.C. 794, 800, 488 S.E.2d 210, 214 (1997) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, there is no conflict in the evidence and the record shows that Investigator Dunkley reasonably believed that the safety of the officers justified the pat-down of defendant. Investigator Dunkley applied for the search warrant and, with other officers, conducted the search. Investigator Dunkley\u2019s application stated that the basis for the search was that law enforcement believed that illegal narcotics were being sold from the residence, as officers had conducted two previous controlled buys from this residence, one only 72 hours prior to the warrant application on 16 December 2009. When officers entered, they found six individuals, including defendant, and they secured each individual pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-256. In the residence officers discovered drugs in plain view. Investigator Dunkley in response to the State\u2019s question \u201cWhy are you concerned about officer safety on a search warrant like this?\u201d explained that it was his experience as a narcotics officer that, \u201cWhere there\u2019s drugs, there\u2019s guns[.]\u201d As there was no conflict in the evidence and the evidence shows that Investigator Dunkley reasonably believed that for his safety he should perform a pat down of defendant, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-255, Robinson, 189 N.C. App. at 458, 658 S.E.2d at 504, we find no merit in defendant\u2019s argument.\nC. Immediately apparent nature of the object\nDefendant next challenges the trial court\u2019s conclusion that Investigator Dunkley had probable cause to seize the object from defendant\u2019s pocket based on the plain feel doctrine. In explaining the \u201cplain feel\u201d doctrine, we have stated that\n[i]f during \u201c[a] limited weapons search, contraband or evidence of a crime is of necessity exposed, the officer is not required by the Fourth Amendment to disregard such contraband or evidence of crime.\u201d State v. Streeter, 17 N.C. App. 48, 50, 193 S.E.2d 347, 348 (1972). \u201cEvidence of contraband, plainly felt during a pat-down or frisk, may ... be admissible, provided the officer had probable cause to believe that the item was in fact contraband.\u201d [State v. Shearin, 170 N.C. App. 222, 226, 612 S.E.2d 371, 376 (2005)] (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-77, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334, 346-47 (1993)).\nUnder the \u201cplain feel\u201d doctrine if a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect\u2019s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect\u2019s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer\u2019s search for weapons. Minnesota, 508 U.S. 366, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334.\nThis Court must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the incriminating nature of the object was immediately apparent and thus, whether probable cause existed to seize it. State v. Briggs, 140 N.C. App. 484, 492, 536 S.E.2d 858, 863 (2000). Aprobable cause determination does not require hard and fast certainty by the officer but involves more of a commonsense determination considering evidence as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement. Id. at 493, 536 S.E.2d at 863.\nRobinson, 189 N.C. App. at 458-59, 658 S.E.2d at 504-05.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that the nature of the contraband was not \u201cimmediately apparent\u201d to Investigator Dunkley because he could not testify that he identified which specific drugs he was touching. However, under the plain feel doctrine, to conduct a search an officer need only have probable cause to believe the object felt during the pat down was contraband before he seized it, not that he determine the specific controlled substance before taking action. See id. As noted above, the probable cause determination, \u201cinvolves more of a common-sense determination considering evidence as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.\u201d See id. Here, the trial court found that when Investigator Dunkley patted down defendant during the execution of the warrant he \u201cfelt a bumpy bulge in the defendant\u2019s left front pocket\u201d and based on Investigator Dunkley\u2019s \u201ctraining and experience, he immediately formed the opinion that the bulge contained a controlled substance.\u201d\nAs noted above, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding that Investigator Dunkley immediately formed the opinion that defendant\u2019s pocket contained a controlled substance. Defendant focuses upon Investigator Dunkley\u2019s testimony that he felt a \u201cknot\u201d in the defendant\u2019s pants which he could not \u201cdescribe with any specificity.\u201d But Defendant\u2019s argument takes one of Investigator Dunkley\u2019s statements out of context. Investigator Dunkley testified as follows regarding his pat-down of defendant:\n[Defense counsel:] So, if your hands are out, then how could you determine that what was in his pocket was some sort of contraband?\n[Investigator Dunkley:] Through six years of doing this job, knowing what it feels like.\nQ. What did it feel like?\nA. A knot of lumps. I don\u2019t know how else to describe it to you.\nQ. Did you have your hands out \u2014 -just with your hands flat out, you could feel a knot of lumps?\nA. Yes, ma\u2019am. They got good feeling in them.\nQ. Exactly how were you feeling him?\nA. Just like that.\nQ. So, were you just patting down for weapons or were you groping?\nA. I don\u2019t believe there was any groping involved. It was a pat-down for weapons. I don\u2019t know how to describe it to you other than a pat-down for weapons.\nQ. And somehow with this pat-down for weapons, you felt a knot of something?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And why would that be considered contraband in your experience?\nA. Why would it?\nQ. Um-hum.\nA. Because I discovered that same thing many times.\nQ. But what was it when you discovered it before?\nA. Bags of marijuana, bags of cocaine, bags of crack.\nThis evidence supports the trial court\u2019s finding that \u201c[b]ased on the officer\u2019s training and experience, he immediately formed the opinion that the bulge contained a controlled substance.\u201d We uphold the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the facts were sufficient to justify a search of defendant\u2019s pants pocket and seizure of the eleven bags containing marijuana.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges McGEE and BEASLEY concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper; III, by Assistant Attorney General Steven F. Bryant, for the State.", "Cheshire, Parker, Schneider, Bryan & Vitale, by Maitri \u201cMike\u201d Klinkosum, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TERRY RICHMOND\nNo. COA10-1296\n(Filed 6 September 2011)\nSearch and Seizure \u2014 drugs\u2014pat down \u2014 reasonable articulable suspicion\nThe trial court did not err in a drugs case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his pants pocket and the seizure of eleven bags containing marijuana. The evidence showed that an officer had a reasonable belief that for his safety he should perform a pat down of defendant. Further, based on the officer\u2019s training and experience, he immediately formed the opinion that the bulge in defendant\u2019s pocket contained a controlled substance.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 30 August 2010 by Judge Howard E. Manning, Jr. in Superior Court, Person County. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 26 April 2011.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper; III, by Assistant Attorney General Steven F. Bryant, for the State.\nCheshire, Parker, Schneider, Bryan & Vitale, by Maitri \u201cMike\u201d Klinkosum, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0475-01", "first_page_order": 485, "last_page_order": 492 }