{ "id": 4343032, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JULIAN OCHOA GARCIA", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Garcia", "decision_date": "2011-10-04", "docket_number": "No. COA11-262", "first_page": "176", "last_page": "181", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "216 N.C. App. 176" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "557 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9364175 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 781", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "783" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N.C. App. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4171407 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/200/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 U.S. 93", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5902037 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100-01" }, { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/544/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 S.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564129, 8564070, 8564049, 8564156, 8564095 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0666-04", "/nc/290/0666-02", "/nc/290/0666-01", "/nc/290/0666-05", "/nc/290/0666-03" ] }, { "cite": "226 S.E.2d 186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 8552173 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/30/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" }, { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556863 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706" }, { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2403051 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-977(d)" }, { "page": "188", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9080591 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-977(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4689817 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 L. Ed. 2d 568", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12448328, 12448329, 12448330, 12448331, 12448332, 12448333, 12448334, 12448335 ], "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/l-ed-2d/176/0568-01", "/l-ed-2d/176/0568-02", "/l-ed-2d/176/0568-03", "/l-ed-2d/176/0568-04", "/l-ed-2d/176/0568-05", "/l-ed-2d/176/0568-06", "/l-ed-2d/176/0568-07", "/l-ed-2d/176/0568-08" ] }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 796", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "807", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150562 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0261-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 653, "char_count": 12787, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14737345690810547 }, "sha256": "07d6142a5e5348756f8badd57d4dbcfdc27bf88a1076eacd4c26ae9731e42852", "simhash": "1:1faad2e2721605f0", "word_count": 2108 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:13:27.459138+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ERVIN and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JULIAN OCHOA GARCIA" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEPHENS, Judge.\nProcedural History and Evidence\nOn 27 October 2009, Defendant Julian Ochoa Garcia was indicted on charges of trafficking in cocaine by possession and maintaining a dwelling for the keeping or selling of controlled substances. On 7 May 2010, Defendant moved to suppress, inter alia, statements he made to law enforcement officers during a search of Defendant\u2019s apartment. Following a hearing, the trial court suppressed money seized during the officers\u2019 search, but denied the remainder of Defendant\u2019s motion. Subsequently, a jury found Defendant guilty of trafficking in cocaine by possession. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the maintaining a dwelling charge, and the trial judge declared a mistrial as to that charge. The court sentenced Defendant to an active term of 35-42 months imprisonment. Defendant appeals.\nThe evidence at trial tended to show the following: On 11 September 2009, officers with the Raleigh Police Department (\u201cthe Department\u201d) executed a search warrant for an apartment at 3835-B Brentwood Road in Raleigh. The probable cause affidavit attached to the warrant application, signed by Detective K.J. Patchin, stated that a reliable confidential informant told Patchin that narcotics were being sold from the apartment; Patchin sent the informant to the apartment to buy cocaine with marked money from a suspect known as \u201cChino\u201d; and the suspect took the money from the informant and appeared to have entered the apartment before returning to deliver cocaine. Defendant\u2019s name did not appear on the warrant.\nWhen the warrant was executed, officers found three people inside the apartment: Defendant, his wife, and a small child. Officers handcuffed Defendant and his wife and seated them on the floor against the living room wall. When Patchin entered the apartment, he asked Officer Gory Mendez, a Spanish translator with the Department, to read Defendant and his wife their Miranda rights in Spanish. Mendez escorted Defendant into a bathroom, read him his Miranda rights in Spanish, and questioned him about drug activities in the apartment. Defendant denied any knowledge of drug activity. Mendez then returned Defendant to the living room and repeated the process with Defendant\u2019s wife.\nDuring Mendez\u2019s questioning of Defendant\u2019s wife, Patchin discovered a digital scale and two plastic bags of a white, powdery substance, later determined to be cocaine, hidden behind the ceiling tiles of the apartment. Defendant gestured that he wanted to speak with Mendez again and stated that the drugs were his and his wife was not involved. Defendant was then arrested.\nOn appeal, Defendant raises two issues: that the trial court erred in (1) failing to exercise its discretion in responding to the jury request to review the transcript of Mendez\u2019s testimony, and (2) denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to Mendez. We find no error in the trial court\u2019s response to the jury request and affirm its ruling on the motion to suppress.\nJury Request\nThe North Carolina General Statutes provide:\n(a) If the jury after retiring for deliberation requests a review of certain testimony or other evidence, the jurors must be conducted to the courtroom. The judge in his discretion, after notice to the prosecutor and defendant, may direct that requested parts of the testimony be read to the jury and may permit the jury to reexamine in open court the requested materials admitted into evidence.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1233 (2009). \u201cTo comply with this statute, a court must exercise its discretion in determining whether or not to permit the jury to examine the evidence. A court does not exercise its discretion when it believes it has no discretion or acts as a matter of law.\u201d State v. Maness, 363 N.C. 261, 278, 677 S.E.2d 796, 807 (2009) (citations omitted), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 176 L. Ed. 2d 568 (2010).\nHere, during deliberations, the jury asked to review Mendez\u2019s trial testimony. The trial transcript contains the following exchange, made outside the jury\u2019s presence, between the trial court and Defendant\u2019s counsel:\nThe Court: All right. The jury has sent out a request for a copy of Officer Mendez\u2019s testimony. I intend to call them in and tell them it is their duty to recall the testimony in this case, it is not prepared in a form that can be submitted to them at this time.\n[Defense Counsel]: Would you consider letting them know that it can be read to them.\nThe Court: I don\u2019t intend to read it to them or have it read to them. It\u2019s their duty to recall the evidence that they have heard.\nIt\u2019s not prepared in a form that can be submitted to them, so I\u2019ll just tell them they need to recall the evidence.\n(Emphasis added). After the jury returned to the courtroom, the trial court explained its decision as follows:\nThe Court: [Y]ou have indicated in this note that you\u2019re requesting a copy of Officer Mendez\u2019[s] testimony.\n[Jury Foreperson]: Yes, sir, Your Honor.\nThe Court: That is not prepared in a form that can be submitted to you. The Court Reporter takes it down, but she is taking it down for later typing everything, but it\u2019s not done immediately, so it is not in a form that could be submitted to you.\nIt is your duty to recall the evidence based on your recollection of the evidence that you have heard and the testimony that you have heard in this case.\nDefendant contends that this response suggests the court believed it was unable to provide the transcript to the jury, a situation we have consistently held is a failure to exercise discretion. See, e.g., State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 35-36, 331 S.E.2d 652, 656-57 (1985). While the trial court\u2019s comments might have misled the jury about the availability of the transcript, it is the trial court\u2019s understanding we consider here, not that of the jury. The court\u2019s remarks to defense counsel indicate its awareness that the jury request could be granted by reading the transcript. Thus, the court was aware it had the ability to grant the jury request, but exercised its discretion in declining to do so. Accordingly, we overrule this argument.\nMotion to Suppress\nDefendant next asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to Mendez, arguing these state-' ments were obtained as the result of his \u201cunlawful and unconstitutional arrest.\u201d We disagree.\n\u201cWhere a trial court conducts a hearing upon a motion to suppress made prior to trial, the trial court must make findings of fact.\u201d State v. Reid, 151 N.C. App. 420, 422, 566 S.E.2d 186, 188 (2002) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-977(d)). \u201cIn reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, [an appellate court is] limited to determining whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether the findings of fact in turn support legally correct conclusions of law.\u201d Id. at 422, 566 S.E.2d at 188 (citation omitted). Thus, in general, a trial court\u2019s \u201c[findings and conclusions are required in order that there may be a meaningful appellate review of the decision.\u201d State v. Horner, 310 N.C. 274, 279, 311 S.E.2d 281, 285 (1984). However, \u201c[i]f there is not a material conflict in the evidence, it is not reversible error to fail to make such findings because we can determine the propriety of the ruling on the undisputed facts which the evidence shows.\u201d State v. Lovin, 339 N.C. 695, 706, 454 S.E.2d 229, 235 (1995).\nHere, Defendant\u2019s motion sought to suppress, inter alia, \u201cany statements that [] Defendant allegedly provided to law enforcement because there was no reasonable suspicion to detain [Defendant and] there was no probable cause to arrest [Defendant].\u201d Following testimony from Mendez and Patchin at a pretrial hearing, the court denied Defendant\u2019s motion in open court and later issued a written order doing the same. The written order, however, does not contain findings of fact or conclusions of law.\nThe trial judge made the following remarks regarding Defendant\u2019s motion:\nThe Court does find, however, . . . that [Defendant] was lawfully detained. He was properly advised of his [Miranda] rights, even prior to the time that the cocaine was found. He . . . positively indicated his understanding of those rights. And the Court would find based upon that, that any statements that he made subsequent to being advised of his [Miranda] rights in Spanish and acknowledging and understanding of those rights, his statements were voluntary and therefore admissible.\nThe trial court concluded that Defendant was not under arrest at the time of his statement, but rather had been lawfully detained ancillary to execution of the search warrant. The court did not explicitly dictate findings in support of this conclusion but, as noted above, this is not reversible error if the relevant facts are undisputed. Id. Thus, the specific issue before us is whether the undisputed facts in the record show that Defendant was lawfully detained at the time of his statement.\n\u201cAn officer executing a warrant directing a search of premises not generally open to the public ... may detain any person present for such time as is reasonably necessary to execute the warrant.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-256 (2009). Detentions pursuant to this statute are consistent with Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches. See State v. Watlington, 30 N.C. App. 101, 226 S.E.2d 186, appeal dismissed and disc, review denied, 290 N.C. 666, 228 S.E.2d 457 (1976). Further, officers may use handcuffs to detain the occupants of a residence being searched and may question them, so long as the questioning does not extend the length of detention beyond that required to complete the search. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100-01, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 308 (2005); accord State v. Carrouthers, _ N.C. App. _, _, _ S.E.2d_, _ (2011). Neither the use of handcuffs nor questioning by officers transforms a lawful detention incident to a search into an arrest. Id.\nDefendant acknowledges this holding, but contends that his lawful detention was transformed into an arrest because Mendez moved him into a bathroom and read him his Miranda rights before questioning him. Defendant cites no authority in support of these assertions. Nothing in our case law suggests that officers cannot move occupants into a different room where questioning can take place out of earshot of the other occupants and out of the way of the search itself. Nor are we aware of any case suggesting that the reading of Miranda rights to a lawfully detained person transforms his detention into an arrest.\nThe evidence shows that Defendant was handcuffed during the search, as is permitted, and Mendez\u2019s questioning of Defendant occurred during the search and did not extend Defendant\u2019s detention. There is no conflict in the testimony on these points. Thus, the trial court\u2019s failure to make findings is not reversible error \u201cbecause we can determine the propriety of the ruling on the undisputed facts which the evidence shows.\u201d Lovin, 339 N.C. at 706, 454 S.E.2d at 235. We conclude that the trial court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his statements was proper. Accordingly, we overrule this argument.\n.NO ERROR IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART.\nJudges ERVIN and BEASLEY concur.\n. Although the trial court used the word \u201cfind\u201d in its remarks, whether a defendant is under arrest is a conclusion of law. See, e.g., State v. Carrouthers, 200 N.C. App. 415, 417-18, 683 S.E.2d 781, 783 (2009); State v. Logner, 148 N.C. App. 135, 138-39, 557 S.E.2d 191, 193-94 (2001).", "type": "majority", "author": "STEPHENS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Grady L. Balentine, Jr., for the State.", "James H. Monroe for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JULIAN OCHOA GARCIA\nNo. COA11-262\n(Filed 4 October 2011)\n1. Criminal Law \u2014 jury request \u2014 transcript of testimony\u2014 judge\u2019s discretion\nThe trial court exercised its discretion when responding to a jury request for a transcript of certain testimony where the court told the jury that the transcript was not available and that it was their duty to recall the evidence. The trial court\u2019s remarks to defense counsel indicated the court\u2019s awareness that the request could be granted by reading the transcript; it is the court\u2019s understanding that is considered, not that of the jury.\n2. Search and Seizure \u2014 detention pursuant to search warrant \u2014 separate room \u2014 Miranda warnings\nA lawful detention pursuant to the execution of a search warr rant was not transformed into an arrest where defendant was moved into a bathroom of his house and read his Miranda warnings, and the trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nAppeal by Defendant from order entered 17 June 2010 and judgment entered 1 July 2010 by Judge Kenneth C. Titus in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 September 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Grady L. Balentine, Jr., for the State.\nJames H. Monroe for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0176-01", "first_page_order": 186, "last_page_order": 191 }