{ "id": 4343322, "name": "DR. YAN-MIN WANG, Petitioner v. UNC-CH SCHOOL OF MEDICINE and DR. WILLIAM SNIDER, Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "Yan-Min Wang v. UNC-CH School of Medicine", "decision_date": "2011-10-04", "docket_number": "No. COA10-1021", "first_page": "185", "last_page": "208", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "216 N.C. App. 185" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "621 S.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634303 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251", "parenthetical": "stating that counsel for the defendant and the plaintiff are not similarly situated with respect to their obligation to maintain the confidentiality of a plaintiff's medical records" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/621/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "625 S.E.2d 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635074, 12635075, 12635076 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/625/0785-01", "/se2d/625/0785-02", "/se2d/625/0785-03" ] }, { "cite": "613 S.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632933 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272" }, { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/613/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "636 S.E.2d 199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636981, 12636982 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/636/0199-01", "/se2d/636/0199-02" ] }, { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635581 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "661 S.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641000, 12641001, 12640999 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/661/0246-02", "/se2d/661/0246-03", "/se2d/661/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "618 S.E.2d 201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633816 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" }, { "page": "206-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/618/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 S.E.2d 729", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640245 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/655/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "637 S.E.2d 219", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637224, 12637225 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that, \"[b]ecause the trial court's interpretation renders the [relevant statutory language] redundant and meaningless, we conclude that the trial court erred in its reading of the statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/637/0219-01", "/se2d/637/0219-02" ] }, { "cite": "631 S.E.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636092 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that, \"[b]ecause the trial court's interpretation renders the [relevant statutory language] redundant and meaningless, we conclude that the trial court erred in its reading of the statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/631/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "627 S.E.2d 462", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635366, 12635367 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/627/0462-01", "/se2d/627/0462-02" ] }, { "cite": "619 S.E.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634057 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "863-64", "parenthetical": "quoting Carroll, 358 N.C. at 659-60, 599 S.E.2d at 894-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/619/0862-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567186 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 S.E.2d 199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203", "parenthetical": "citing Kresge Co. v. Davis, 277 N.C. 654, 660, 178 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1971)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 759", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4710017 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765-66", "parenthetical": "citing Kresge Co. v. Davis, 277 N.C. 654, 660, 178 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1971)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 L. Ed. 1739", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 U.S. 806", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6159389 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/334/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 S.E.2d 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625773 ], "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/228/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 S.E.2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Hedgepeth, 228 N.C. 259, 266, 45 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 806, 68 S. Ct. 1185, 92 L. Ed. 1739 (1948)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 N.C. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561287 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Hedgepeth, 228 N.C. 259, 266, 45 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 806, 68 S. Ct. 1185, 92 L. Ed. 1739 (1948)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/259/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161", "parenthetical": "holding that drivers who move to North Carolina after their licenses have been revoked in another state are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes with drivers whose licenses have been revoked in North Carolina" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 N.C. App. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526166 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486", "parenthetical": "holding that drivers who move to North Carolina after their licenses have been revoked in another state are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes with drivers whose licenses have been revoked in North Carolina" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/75/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 S.E.2d 743", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523475 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8352179 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397", "parenthetical": "stating that counsel for the defendant and the plaintiff are not similarly situated with respect to their obligation to maintain the confidentiality of a plaintiff's medical records" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377", "parenthetical": "holding that the adoption of a zoning ordinance equally applicable to all buildings constructed after a specific date did not result in an equal protection violation because pre-existing buildings and post-ordinance buildings were not similarly situated" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4727847 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "holding that the adoption of a zoning ordinance equally applicable to all buildings constructed after a specific date did not result in an equal protection violation because pre-existing buildings and post-ordinance buildings were not similarly situated" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 S.E.2d 615", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645", "parenthetical": "holding that a prosecutor's decision to strike a particular juror did not constitute an equal protection violation where the information obtained during the jury selection process failed to establish that the two jurors were similarly situated" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152569 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490", "parenthetical": "holding that a prosecutor's decision to strike a particular juror did not constitute an equal protection violation where the information obtained during the jury selection process failed to establish that the two jurors were similarly situated" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 F.3d 368", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9376638 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[a] Plaintiff relying on disparate treatment evidence must show that she was similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she seeks to compare herself\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/316/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Mont. 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mont.", "case_ids": [ 297481 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" }, { "page": "1371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mont/287/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 F.3d 940", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 5321497 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "945", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/444/0940-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1481159 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" }, { "page": "2331" }, { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/505/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3793766, 3788363, 3795889, 3789044, 3793752, 3794619, 3788252, 3795613 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0174-03", "/nc/360/0174-08", "/nc/360/0174-05", "/nc/360/0174-07", "/nc/360/0174-06", "/nc/360/0174-02", "/nc/360/0174-01", "/nc/360/0174-04" ] }, { "cite": "528 U.S. 562", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9476534 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" }, { "page": "1074-1075" }, { "page": "1063" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/528/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9005872 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456-57" }, { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 S.E.2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192", "parenthetical": "holding that a research technician employed by the University lacked a property interest in continued employment and was not entitled to a pre-termination hearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520634 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137", "parenthetical": "holding that a research technician employed by the University lacked a property interest in continued employment and was not entitled to a pre-termination hearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135974, 135596, 135980, 135797, 135800 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0452-02", "/nc/353/0452-01", "/nc/353/0452-03", "/nc/353/0452-05", "/nc/353/0452-04" ] }, { "cite": "542 S.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N.C. App. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9439459 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/142/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3796032, 3790818, 3789125, 3789098, 3787920, 3788211, 3789724, 3796477, 3794782 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0581-08", "/nc/360/0581-01", "/nc/360/0581-06", "/nc/360/0581-03", "/nc/360/0581-04", "/nc/360/0581-09", "/nc/360/0581-05", "/nc/360/0581-07", "/nc/360/0581-02" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571708 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 215", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8301108 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-35", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 S.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573981 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 U.S. 341", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6176818 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" }, { "page": "2077" }, { "page": "690" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/426/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160", "parenthetical": "citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L. Ed. 2d 684, 690 (1976), and quoting Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 723-24, 260 S.E.2d 611, 616 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559865 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134", "parenthetical": "citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L. Ed. 2d 684, 690 (1976), and quoting Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 723-24, 260 S.E.2d 611, 616 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 286", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149213 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511222 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 S.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128", "parenthetical": "quoting Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cty. Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 15, 565 S.E.2d 9, 18 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 N.C. App. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250779 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493", "parenthetical": "quoting Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cty. Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 15, 565 S.E.2d 9, 18 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/155/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E.2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761", "parenthetical": "other citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564265 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561", "parenthetical": "other citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "945 F.2d 796", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10524339 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "797" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/945/0796-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" }, { "page": "376", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[r]emand for further findings was essential upon concluding that the findings of record presented an inadequate basis for review\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 N.C. App. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552836 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" }, { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/43/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 S.E.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[a] whole record review does not permit us to substitute our judgment for the [agency's] findings of fact\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8471263 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[a] whole record review does not permit us to substitute our judgment for the [agency's] findings of fact\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 782", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3795500 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "788" }, { "page": "789-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-84", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 466", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2493346 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3796742, 3788236, 3792718, 3793232, 3791474, 3787990 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that, \"[b]ecause the trial court's interpretation renders the [relevant statutory language] redundant and meaningless, we conclude that the trial court erred in its reading of the statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0655-01", "/nc/360/0655-02", "/nc/360/0655-03", "/nc/360/0655-04", "/nc/360/0655-06", "/nc/360/0655-05" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8377893 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380", "parenthetical": "stating that, \"[b]ecause the trial court's interpretation renders the [relevant statutory language] redundant and meaningless, we conclude that the trial court erred in its reading of the statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-1.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. 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Stat.", "weight": 14, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(l)" }, { "page": "(cl)(8)" }, { "page": "(cl)(8)" }, { "page": "(c5)" }, { "page": "(c)(l)" }, { "page": "(c)(l)" }, { "page": "(c5)" }, { "page": "(c5)" }, { "page": "(cl)" }, { "page": "(c5)" }, { "page": "(c5)" }, { "page": "(c5)" }, { "page": "(c5)" }, { "page": "(cl)(8)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571692 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 S.E.2d 151", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154", "parenthetical": "citing Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 523, 507 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151122 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616", "parenthetical": "citing Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 523, 507 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0612-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 S.E.2d 723", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11651162 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380", "parenthetical": "citing In re Appeal of Willis, 129 N.C. App. 499, 502, 500 S.E.2d 723, 726 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9125788 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130", "parenthetical": "citing In re Appeal of Willis, 129 N.C. App. 499, 502, 500 S.E.2d 723, 726 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527936 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392", "parenthetical": "quoting Amanini v. N.C. Dep't of Human Resources, 114 N.C. App. 668, 675, 443 S.E.2d 114, 118-19 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53839 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706", "parenthetical": "quoting Amanini v. N.C. Dep't of Human Resources, 114 N.C. App. 668, 675, 443 S.E.2d 114, 118-19 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3787206 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8350640 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121", "parenthetical": "quoting Carroll, 358 N.C. at 659-60, 599 S.E.2d at 894-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "894" }, { "page": "894-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2987357 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" }, { "page": "659-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-1.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(cl)" }, { "page": "(cl)" }, { "page": "(c5)" }, { "page": "(c5)" }, { "page": "(cl)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1877, "char_count": 59149, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0061458305102561e-07, "percentile": 0.5407624151060545 }, "sha256": "801cd76a065b793a976994bc403803c3f3083c9480f22e7832aa2c57d076747d", "simhash": "1:9be8946e751e3cda", "word_count": 9341 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:13:27.459138+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge STEELMAN concurs.", "Judge Elmore concurs in part, concurs in the result in part, and dissents in part by separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "DR. YAN-MIN WANG, Petitioner v. UNC-CH SCHOOL OF MEDICINE and DR. WILLIAM SNIDER, Respondents" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Judge.\nRespondents UNC-Chapel Hill School of Medicine and Dr. William Snider appeal an order reversing a decision of the Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina to the effect that Petitioner Dr. Yan-Min Wang had not been treated in an impermissible and unlawful manner in connection with her employment and ordering UNC-Chapel Hill to reinstate Petitioner to a position she previously held with the university, to pay Petitioner\u2019s attorney\u2019s fees, and to revise its grievance procedures. On appeal, Respondents argue that the trial court misapplied the whole record test in evaluating the BOG\u2019s decision, erred reviewing the constitutional and other legal issues raised by Petitioner, and erred by reversing the BOG\u2019s decision. After careful consideration of Respondents\u2019 challenges to the trial court\u2019s order in light of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order in part and reverse and remand the trial court\u2019s order in part.\nI. Factual Background\nA. Substantive Facts\nOn 1 August 2004, Dr. William Snider, the director of the Neuroscience Center at the UNC-Chapel Hill School of Medicine, appointed Petitioner to a part-time position as a research scientist. Dr. Snider leads a team that conducts experiments on the nerve processes of genetically modified mice. The funding necessary to support this work comes from grants provided by the National Institutes of Health and private foundations. Petitioner was initially appointed for a one year term, with her employment contingent upon the continued availability of the necessary funding and subject to the need for compliance with the University\u2019s Employment Policies for EPA Non-Faculty Employees. In an e-mail sent prior to Petitioner\u2019s appointment, Dr. Snider stated that, \u201cif things go well\u201d and the needed funding became available, Petitioner might obtain a full-time appointment as a non-tenure track research assistant professor in the future.\nOn 27 April 2005, Dr. Snider submitted an application for a \u201creentry\u201d grant from the NIH to fund Petitioner\u2019s position as a full-time research assistant professor. On 1 August 2005, while the grant application was still pending, Petitioner was appointed to a second one-year term as a part-time research scientist.\nAfter her reappointment, Petitioner worked for Dr. Snider on a separate funding proposal involving the provision of support for Dr. Snider\u2019s work using a line of experimental mice. As part of that process, Petitioner conducted preliminary genotyping tests on the mice used in the lab\u2019s experiments for the purpose of confirming that the mice-in question were isletl-Cre positive as had been reported in the funding proposal. As a result of the tests that she performed, Petitioner concluded that the mice were not all isletl-Cre positive, a finding that she reported to Dr. Snider. Although the evidence concerning the extent to which there actually were any genotyping problems in the laboratory and what, if any, steps needed to be taken to identify and solve any genotyping problems was conflicting, the record indicates that, in early December 2005, Petitioner and Dr. Snider exchanged a series of e-mails in which they disputed the appropriateness of the tone that each had used in commrmicating with other during various conversations concerning the genotyping issue and the specifics of what each had said to the other during these conversations.\nOn 12 December 2005, Dr. Snider learned that the NIH grant had been approved. In January 2006, Dr. Snider sent e-mails to Petitioner stressing the importance that the level of collegiality that she displayed while interacting with others would play in his decision concerning whether to reappoint Petitioner to another term of employment. On 31 January 2006, Dr. Snider informed Petitioner that he had decided not to recommend her for a research faculty appointment due to concerns about her tendency to make \u201cintemperate comments\u201d and engage in \u201charsh interactions.\u201d However, Dr. Snider told Petitioner that, if she could \u201cinteract productively around the science,\u201d he would set up a \u201cmentoring committee\u201d that would monitor Petitioner\u2019s progress and advise him \u201cif and when it is appropriate to make the research faculty appointment.\u201d\nIn February 2006, Petitioner met with Denise Vandervort, a human relations facilitator, for the purpose of expressing her concerns about Dr. Snider\u2019s decision to refrain from recommending her for appointment to a full-time position. After discussing the matter with Petitioner and Dr. Snider, Ms. Vandervort and Dr. Snider \u201cagreed that any further interactions between [Dr. Snider and Petitioner] should take place in the presence of a third party\u201d and created a mentoring committee for the purpose of assisting in the resolution of the various issues that surrounded Petitioner\u2019s employment. On 24 March 2006, the mentoring committee presented Petitioner with a \u201cmemorandum of understanding\u201d detailing the terms under which she would be allowed to continue to work at the Center. However, Petitioner did not sign the MOU because she did not agree with its terms.\nOn 31 March 2006, Petitioner met with Karen Silverburg, the Associate Dean of Human Resources, for the primary purpose of discussing her contention that Dr. Snider had \u201cpromised\u201d to promote her to a full-time position. Although Plaintiff asserts in her brief before this Court that she \u201cmentioned\u201d problems with the mouse colony during this meeting, the record contains no indication that issues concerning laboratory procedures were addressed at that time.\nIn late March and early April, 2006, Petitioner wrote a letter (referred to as the \u201cDear Dr.\u201d letter) in which she complained about Dr. Snider\u2019s \u201cbroken promises\u201d to hire her as a full-time researcher. In addition, the \u201cDear Dr.\u201d letter included a paragraph discussing Petitioner\u2019s concerns about mouse genotyping in Dr. Snider\u2019s lab. Petitioner e-mailed or gave this letter to Dr. James Anderson and Dr. Colin Hall, the chairs of the two departments in which Dr. Snider had an appointment; Associate Dean Karen Silverberg; Dr. Albert Collier, the University\u2019s Scientific Integrity Officer; Wayne Blair and Dr. Laurie Mesibov, the University\u2019s ombudsmen; and Dr. Anthony-Sam Lamantia, a professor in the Neurosciences Center and one of Dr. Snyder\u2019s colleagues. According to applicable University policies, Drs. Anderson, Hall, Collier and Mesibov and Mr. Blair were faculty members or administrators to whom a complaint could appropriately be directed. However, Petitioner should not, under established University policy, have sent the \u201cDear Dr.\u201d letter to Dr. Lamantia. After learning that Petitioner had sent a copy of the \u201cDear Dr.\u201d letter to Dr. Lamantia, Dr. Snider decided that he could not work with Petitioner any longer. As a result, on 13 April 2006, Dr. Snider rejected the funding from the NIH grant which would have been used to employ Petitioner in a full-time position, instructed Petitioner to work at an off-campus site for the remainder of her contract, and notified Petitioner that she would not be reappointed.\nB. Procedural History\nOn 23 April 2006, Petitioner filed a grievance with the EPA Non-Faculty Grievance Committee in which she alleged that Dr. Snider had failed to renew her appointment in retaliation for her decision to report his \u201cbroken promises\u201d to promote her to a full-time position and the problems with mouse genotyping in his lab. On 1 June 2006, the Grievance Committee reported to Chancellor James Moeser that it had found \u201cno basis to determine that Dr. Snider has engaged in unfair or retaliatory treatment toward the grievant or to other employees.\u201d Petitioner appealed the Grievance Committee\u2019s decision to the Chancellor, who rejected her appeal on 22 August 2006. At that point, Petitioner appealed to the Board of Trustees. On 20 December 2006, the BOT\u2019s Grievance Panel remanded Petitioner\u2019s grievance to the Grievance Committee in order to permit that body to make detailed factual findings concerning Petitioner\u2019s grievance on the basis of a de novo review of the record and recommended that Petitioner be permitted to submit a new grievance.\nOn 25 February 2007, Petitioner submitted a new statement of her grievances in which she asserted four claims:\n1.) On April 13, 2006, Dr. Snider gave me a signed letter informing me that I was to [work off campus for the rest of my appointment.] This action was in retaliation for reports I had made about him to appropriate University administrative officials starting in late March, 2006 .. . concerning] matters governed by . . . University policy and [the Whistleblower Act.]\n2.) On April 13, 2006 in the same letter Dr. Snider informed me that my contract would not be renewed and that my reentry grant would be returned to NIH. This action was in retaliation for reports I had made about him to appropriate University administrative officials starting in late March, 2006... concerning] matters governed by . . . University policy and [the Whistleblower Act.]\n3.) During the entire period of my employment in his lab, Dr. Snider discriminated against me on the basis of my age (48), sex (female), and national origin (Chinese).\nAfter identifying the issues that it needed to address in order to resolve Petitioner\u2019s grievance, the Grievance Committee reviewed documentary evidence, interviewed witnesses and conducted a hearing at which Petitioner and Dr. Snider presented their respective contentions. On 21 May 2007, the Grievance Committee issued a report concluding that it could not \u201cfind in favor of any of Dr. Wang\u2019s claims.\u201d\nOn 4 June 2007, Petitioner appealed the Grievance Committee\u2019s decision to the Chancellor. On 10 October 2007, Chancellor Moeser rejected Petitioner\u2019s appeal. Petitioner appealed the Chancellor\u2019s determination to the BOT, which rejected Petitioner\u2019s appeal by means of a letter dated 26 February 2008. Petitioner appealed the BOT\u2019s decision to the BOG on 11 July 2008.\nOn 8 January 2009, the BOG\u2019s Committee on Personnel and Tenure submitted a report addressing Petitioner\u2019s allegations. The report was adopted by the BOG as its decision on the following day. In its decision, the BOG considered Petitioner\u2019s arguments on a de novo basis. In response to Petitioner\u2019s contention that she had been subjected to impermissible discrimination stemming from her age, sex, and national origin, the BOG concluded that, \u201cbased upon all of the evidence in the record and the legal precedents,\u201d Petitioner had \u201cfailed to carry her burden of demonstrating that she was discriminated against.\u201d Moreover, the BOG concluded that, given her status as an EPA Non-Faculty employee, Petitioner was not protected by the Whistleblower Act and that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on First Amendment grounds. In addition, the BOG stated that:\nAlthough we conclude that Dr. Wang does not have an appeal to this Board for retaliation under the whistleblower statute or the First Amendment, we note that the Record on Appeal does not show retaliation by Dr. Snider under either basis. It shows two people who simply could not get along, and a supervisor who finally reached the breaking point and ended the relationship.\nFinally, the BOG concluded that:\nin this appeal, Dr. Wang did not meet her burden of proving discrimination or retaliation. She did not show that discrimination or retaliation were the reasons she was not reappointed, the grant application was withdrawn, and/or she was barred from the lab. .. . Therefore, the Committee recommends that the Chancellor\u2019s decision not to reappoint should be affirmed.\nOn 9 February 2009, Petitioner filed a petition seeking judicial review of the BOG\u2019s decision in the Orange County Superior Court. In her petition, Petitioner asserted that the BOG had erred in a number of respects, including allegations that:\n1. The BOG erred by ruling that, as an EPA Non-Faculty employee, Petitioner was not protected by the Whistleblower Act.\n2. The BOG erred by rejecting Petitioner\u2019s claim to the protection of the First Amendment and analogous provisions of the North Carolina Constitution.\n3. The BOG erred in its reliance on and interpretation of case law and its analysis of salaries paid to other employees in connection with its consideration of Petitioner\u2019s discrimination claims[.]\n4. The BOG erred by denying Petitioner\u2019s request for copies of CD recordings of the witness interviews conducted in connection with the Grievance Committee\u2019s investigation.\n5. The BOG erred in its analysis of Petitioner\u2019s retaliation and discrimination claims by failing to subject the record evidence to \u201ca pretext or mixed motive analysis.\u201d\n6. The applicable grievance procedures, on their face and as applied to Petitioner, \u201cviolated Petitioner\u2019s Constitutional rights under Article I of the North Carolina Constitution, particularly Sections 18 and 19, which provide for timely hearings and guaranteeing that the state will provide equal protection and the law of the land to all citizens, which includes the right to a fair, impartial hearing.\u201d\nIn addition, Petitioner asserted that the BOG\u2019s decision was arbitrary and capricious and rested upon a misapplication of the applicable law.\nPetitioner\u2019s petition came on for hearing before the trial court at the 25 January 2010 civil session of Orange County Superior Court. On 14 May 2010, the trial court entered an order reversing the BOG and ruling that:\n1. Petitioner, an EPA Non-Faculty employee, was protected by the Whistleblower Act.\n2. Dr. Wang\u2019s distribution of the \u201cDear Dr.\u201d letter was protected activity, and was \u201ca substantial or motivating factor\u201d in Dr. Snider\u2019s decision not to renew her contract.\n3. The BOG \u201carbitrarily and capriciously mis-stated and misapplied the appropriate law\u201d to the evidence concerning Petitioner\u2019s claims under the Whistleblower Act by failing to \u201csubject the evidence to the pretext and mixed motive analyses.\u201d\n4. The BOG violated Petitioner\u2019s rights under the North Carolina Constitution by failing to provide her with transcripts of its interviews with witnesses.\n5. The applicable grievance procedures, which afford more procedural rights to career State employees who challenge the existence of just cause for an adverse employment action than to EPA Non-Faculty employees who file a grievance alleging discrimination or retaliation, violated Petitioner\u2019s rights to due process and equal protection.\nBased upon these determinations, the trial court ordered the UNC School of Medicine to \u201creinstate, Petitioner in a comparable position with retroactive pay and benefits that she would now be entitled to as if she had been employed since the University banned her from her workplace!,] \u2022 \u2022 \u2022 reimburse her reasonable attorney\u2019s fees and costs[,] . . . bring the University\u2019s unconstitutional Grievance Procedure into compliance consistent with this Decision and Order, and . . . make available to all parties ... all testimonial evidence adduced in any grievance!.]\u201d Respondents noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court\u2019s order.\nII. Legal Analysis\nA. Standard of Review\nAccording to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-43, \u201c[a]ny person who is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case, and who has exhausted all administrative remedies made available to him by statute or agency rule, is entitled to judicial review of the decision.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51(b) authorizes a trial court to reverse or modify an agency\u2019s decision if the petitioner\u2019s substantial rights have been prejudiced because the agency\u2019s findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:\n(1) In violation of constitutional provisions;\n(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency;\n(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;\n(4) Affected by other error of law;\n(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence admissible under [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7] 150B-29(a), 150B-30, or 150B-31 in view of the entire record as submitted; or\n(6) Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.\n\u201cOn judicial review of an administrative agency\u2019s final decision, the substantive nature of each assignment of error dictates the standard of review.\u201d N.C. Dep\u2019t of Env\u2019t & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 658, 599 S.E.2d 888, 894 (2004).\nThe first four grounds are \u201claw-based\u201d inquiries warranting de novo review. The latter two grounds are \u201cfact-based\u201d inquiries warranting review under the whole-record test. Under de novo review, a court \u201cconsiders the matter anew[] and freely substitutes its own judgment for the agency\u2019s.\u201d Under the whole-record test, a court \u201cexamines all the record evidence ... to determine whether there is substantial evidence to justify the agency\u2019s decision.\u201d\nTrayford v. N.C. Psychology Bd., 174 N.C. App. 118, 121, 619 S.E.2d 862, 863-64 (2005) (quoting Carroll, 358 N.C. at 659-60, 599 S.E.2d at 894-95), aff\u2019d, 360 N.C. 396, 627 S.E.2d 462 (2006). \u201cAs to appellate review of a superior court order regarding an agency decision, \u2018the appellate court examines the trial court\u2019s order for error of law. The process has been described as a twofold task: (1) determining whether the trial court exercised the appropriate scope of review and, if appropriate, (2) deciding whether the court did so properly.\u2019 \u201d ACT-UP Triangle v. Commission for Health Servs., 345 N.C. 699, 706, 483 S.E.2d 388, 392 (1997) (quoting Amanini v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Human Resources, 114 N.C. App. 668, 675, 443 S.E.2d 114, 118-19 (1994)). In reviewing \u201can agency decision, the trial court should state the standard of review it applied to resolve each issue.\u201d Zimmerman v. Appalachian State Univ., 149 N.C. App. 121, 130, 560 S.E.2d 374, 380 (2002) (citing In re Appeal of Willis, 129 N.C. App. 499, 502, 500 S.E.2d 723, 726 (1998)).\nB. Whistleblower Act\n1. Applicability\nN.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 126, Article 14, \u00a7\u00a7 126-84-88, which is commonly known as the \u201cWhistleblower Act,\u201d protects State employees who report serious misconduct to their superiors or other appropriate authorities. The determination of whether EPA Non-Faculty employees such as Petitioner are protected by the Whistleblower Act requires interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. \u201cQuestions of statutory interpretation are ultimately questions of law for the courts and are reviewed de novo.\u201d In re Summons of Ernst & Young, 363 N.C. 612, 616, 684 S.E.2d 151, 154 (2009) (citing Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 523, 507 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1998)). Thus, the appropriateness of the BOG\u2019s decision concerning the extent, if any, to which Petitioner is entitled to the protections of the Whistleblower Act is subject to de novo review.\nAccording to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(a)(l), the provisions of the State Personnel Act apply to \u201c[a]ll State employees not herein exempt.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(cl)(8) provides that, \u201c[e]xcept as to . . . the provisions of Articles 6 and 7 of this Chapter, the provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to . . . research staff... of The University of North Carolina.\u201d In the absence of another statutory provision to the contrary, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(cl)(8) clearly exempts individuals occupying Petitioner\u2019s position from the coverage of most provisions of the State Personnel Act. However, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(c5) specifically states that, \u201c[notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, Article 14 of this Chapter shall apply to all State employees, public school employees, and community college employees.\u201d As we have previously noted, \u201c[t]he legislative intent that the protections of this legislation apply to all state employees is clear.\u201d Caudill v. Dellinger, 129 N.C. App. 649, 654, 501 S.E.2d 99, 102 (1998), aff'd in part; disc, review improvidently allowed in part, 350 N.C. 89, 511 S.E.2d 304 (1999). For that reason, Respondents correctly concede in their brief that \u201c[t]he BOG erred when it stated that the Whistleblower Act did not apply to [Petitioner].\u201d\nOur dissenting colleague argues, in reliance upon N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(c)(l), that \u201cthe North Carolina Whistleblower Act does not apply to \u2018[a] State employee who is not a career state employee as defined by this Chapter\u2019 \u201d and that we should, for that reason, uphold the BOG\u2019s determination concerning the applicability of the Whistleblower Act to persons in Petitioner\u2019s position. Admittedly, as the dissent correctly notes, Petitioner is not a career State employee as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-1.1. Although N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(c)(l) does provide, in pertinent part, that \u201cthe provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to\u201d \u201c[a] State employee who is not a career State employee as defined by this Chapter,\u201d the language upon which our dissenting colleague relies is subject to the additional caveat set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(c5), which we quoted above. As used in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(c5), \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d means \u201cin spite of,\u201d \u201cnevertheless,\u201d or \u201cin spite of the fact that,\u201d depending upon whether it is used as a preposition, an adverb, or a conjunctive. New Oxford American Dictionary 1201 (3d ed. 2010). As a result, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(cl) essentially means that, \u201cin spite of any other provision of this Chapter,\u201d the Whistleblower Act applies \u201cto all State employees, public school employees, and community college employees,\u201d including Petitioner. Since the statutory language upon which our dissenting colleague relies in concluding that the protections of the Whistleblower Act is all contained within Chapter 126 of the North Carolina General Statutes, those statutory provisions are clearly \u201ctrumped\u201d by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(c5). Our dissenting colleague\u2019s conclusion to the effect that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(c5) \u201cis meant to operate as a residuary, or catch-all, provision that is applicable only when the statute does not otherwise provide to the contrary\u201d has no support in the relevant statutory language and would deprive N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(c5) of any real meaning, since N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(c5) would, under this interpretation, only make the protections of the Whistleblower Act available to a particular state employee in the event that some other statutory provision had the same effect. Wilkins v. N.C. Stat. Univ., 178 N.C. App. 377, 380, 631 S.E.2d 221, 224 disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 655, 637 S.E.2d 219 (2006) (stating that, \u201c[b]ecause the trial court\u2019s interpretation renders the [relevant statutory language] redundant and meaningless, we conclude that the trial court erred in its reading of the statute\u201d) (citing HCA Crossroads Residential Ctrs. v. N.C. Dept. of Human Res., 327 N.C. 573, 578, 398 S.E.2d 466, 470 (1990)). As a result, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the protections of the Whistleblower Act were available to Petitioner.\n2. Validity of Petitioner\u2019s Whistleblower Act Claim\nAccording to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-84, \u201cState employees shall be encouraged to report verbally or in writing to their supervisor, department head, or other appropriate authority, evidence of activity by a State agency or State employee constituting:\n(1) A violation of State or federal law, rule or regulation;\n(2) Fraud;\n(3) Misappropriation of State resources;\n(4) Substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety; or\n(5) Gross mismanagement, a gross waste of monies, or gross abuse of authority.\u201d\n\u201c[The] Whistleblower Act . . . requires a Petitioner to prove the following three essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence in order to establish a prima facie case: \u2018(1) that the Petitioner engaged in a protected activity, (2) that the Respondent took adverse action against the Petitioner in his or her employment, and (3) that there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action taken against the Petitioner.\u2019 \u201d Holt v. Albemarle Reg\u2019l Health Servs. Bd., 188 N.C. App. Ill, 115, 655 S.E.2d 729, 732 (quoting Newbeme v. Department of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 359 N.C. 782, 788, 618 S.E.2d 201, 206 (2005)), disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 357, 661 S.E.2d 246 (2008). As a result, the ultimate inquiry required in connection with the consideration of any claim advanced in reliance upon the Whistleblower Act is whether the claimant has demonstrated that he or she engaged in protected conduct and whether any adverse treatment to which the claimant was subjected constituted retaliation for eng\u00e1ging in protected activities.\nPetitioner\u2019s claim to have engaged in \u201cprotected activity\u201d rests on the following language from the \u201cDear Dr.\u201d letter:\n... In late 2005 I brought to Dr. Snider\u2019s attention a very serious problem with the mouse population that his lab has been using. The mouse colony is filled with mice whose genotypes are incorrectly identified. For close to two years researchers in the lab had used these mice in their experiments without being aware of this fact. Dr. Snider asked me to leave the lab shortly after I brought this to his attention. Again, the reason he gave is \u201cangry conversations\u201d or the use of an \u201cunpleasant tone.\u201d I think it is fair to say that his sensitivity to my tone of voice intensified after I brought the mouse problem to his attention.\nThe BOG did not make any definitive determination as to whether Petitioner engaged in any protected activity during the interval leading up to the events that underlie her complaints or whether Petitioner was subject to employment-related retaliation for engaging in that conduct. Instead, the BOG simply concluded that Petitioner was not entitled to raise a claim under the Whistleblower Act. The BOG did include a single conclusory statement in its order to the effect that Plaintiff had not shown retaliation and that the record simply revealed, instead, the existence of a personality conflict between Petitioner and Dr. Snider. However, the BOG failed to make adequate factual findings explaining what it meant by these statements, the standard that it used in reaching the conclusion that it deemed appropriate, and the facts that led it to find that no retaliation had occurred. In the absence of factual findings addressing these issues, the administrative record is simply not sufficient to permit a determination of the extent, if any, to which Petitioner\u2019s Whistleblower\u2019s Act claim has substantive merit.\nAlthough the trial court correctly determined that Petitioner was entitled to the protections of the Whistleblower Act, it erred by proceeding to determine that Petitioner had been subjected to impermissible employment-related retaliation because of her protected activities. In essence, the trial court, in violation of the applicable standard of review, Vanderburg v. N.C. Dept. of Revenue, 168 N.C. App. 598, 612, 608 S.E.2d 831, 841 (2005) (stating that \u201c[a] whole record review does not permit us to substitute our judgment for the [agency\u2019s] findings of fact\u201d) (citing Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Savings & Loan Comm., 43 N.C. App. 493, 497, 259 S.E.2d 373, 376 (1979), resolved disputed questions of fact during the judicial review process instead of remanding this issue to the BOG for appropriate factual development. As a result, even though the trial court correctly resolved the coverage issue, it erred in the course of addressing Petitioner\u2019s Whistleblower Act claim on the merits. Thus, the decisions of both the trial court and the BOG with respect to Petitioner\u2019s claims under the Whistleblower Act and the First Amendment are reversed and the case is remanded to the BOG for the making of adequate findings and conclusions concerning the Whistleblower Act and First Amendment issues. Savings & Loan Assoc., 43 N.C. App. at 498, 259 S.E.2d at 376 (stating that \u201c[r]emand for further findings was essential upon concluding that the findings of record presented an inadequate basis for review\u201d).\nC. Discrimination Claims\nOn appeal, Respondents argue that the trial court erred by reversing the BOG\u2019s finding that Dr. Snider had not discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her gender, age, and national origin. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court should have affirmed the BOG\u2019s decision with respect to this issue and erred by concluding otherwise.\nIn her grievance, Petitioner asserted that, as a 48 year old Chinese woman, she had been the victim of unlawful discrimination on the basis of her gender, age, and nationality during her tenure in Dr. Snider\u2019s lab. After inferring, in reliance upon Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991), that Dr. Snider\u2019s initial decision to hire Petitioner indicated that he was not biased against persons of Petitioner\u2019s age, gender, and national origin, the BOG expressly determined that Petitioner had failed to rebut this inference. More specifically, the BOG stated that:\nIn addition to the inference stated above, the salary data does not support Dr. Wang\u2019s claim. The heart of Appellant\u2019s claim of sex, age, and national origin discrimination is her allegation[] of salary inequity compared with co-workers. The salary information does not support Dr. Wang\u2019s claim. ... Dr. Wang apparently either approached Dr. Snider without any job posting, or applied for a position for which she was overqualified. The result was that Dr. Snider cobbled together a part-time salary until grant funding for her salary could be obtained. By the time funding was obtained, Dr. Wang had destroyed her relationship with him to the point that Dr. Snider was no longer willing to work with her. Dr. Snider had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for paying Dr. Wang only a part-time salary originally and for not wanting to continue working with her.\nTherefore, based upon all of the evidence in the record and the legal precedents, Dr. Wang failed to carry her burden of demonstrating that she was discriminated against.\nIt appears that Dr. Wang has also based her retaliation claim upon her report of sex, age, and national origin discrimination at the end of March 2006. By that time, relations were extremely strained between Dr. Wang and Dr. Snider. The de novo review of the Record does not show that Dr. Wang carried her burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Snider retaliated against her for making a complaint of discrimination.\nBased upon these findings, the BOG concluded that:\n[I]n this appeal, Dr. Wang did not meet her burden of proving discrimination or retaliation. She did not show that discrimination or retaliation were the reasons she was not reappointed, the grant application was withdrawn, and/or she was barred from the lab.\nWe conclude that the BOG\u2019s decision with respect to this issue should be upheld on the grounds that it has adequate evidentiary support and that the trial court\u2019s decision to the contrary should be reversed.\nThe trial court\u2019s discussion of Petitioner\u2019s discrimination claims consists almost exclusively of a narrative describing the record evidence from Petitioner\u2019s perspective. However,, \u201cwhere the findings of fact of an administrative agency are supported by substantial competent evidence in view of the entire record, they are binding on the reviewing court, and that court lacks authority to make alternative findings at variance with the agency\u2019s.\u201d Carroll at 663, 599 S.E.2d at 897 (citing In re Appeal of AMP, Inc., 287 N.C. 547, 561, 215 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1975) (other citations omitted)). Unfortunately, that is exactly what the trial court appears to have done in this case. Instead of reviewing the record to determine whether the BOG\u2019s findings had adequate evidentiary support, the trial court, in essence, concluded that the BOG had incorrectly analyzed the facts and stated its own position concerning what the record actually established. The trial court is not, given the applicable standard of review, authorized to undertake such an independent exercise in fact-finding. Although this deficiency in the trial court\u2019s order would, standing alone, suffice to justify an appellate reversal, \u201c \u2018we do not believe a remand is necessary, however, because the central issue presented ... is whether there was competent, material, and substantial evidence to support [the BOG\u2019s] decision ... and the entire record of the hearing is before us.\u2019 \u201d Sack v. N.C. State Univ., 155 N.C. App. 484, 493, 574 S.E.2d 120, 128 (2002) (quoting Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cty. Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 15, 565 S.E.2d 9, 18 (2002)). Having reviewed the BOG\u2019s findings in light of the record evidence, we hold that the BOG\u2019s determination to the effect that Petitioner failed to prove that she had been subjected to unlawful discrimination on the grounds of age, gender, or national origin or to retaliation for claiming to have been treated in that fashion had ample evidentiary support and that the trial court erred by reaching a contrary conclusion. As a result, we reverse the trial court\u2019s decision that Petitioner had been subjected to unlawful discrimination on the basis of her age, gender, or nationality and that she had been subject to retaliatory treatment because she claimed to have been mistreated in that manner.\nD. Constitutional Claims\n1. Nature of Petitioner\u2019s Claims\nIn her petition for judicial review, Petitioner made a generalized allegation that the BOG\u2019s decision violated her state constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. According to Petitioner:\n. . . The University\u2019s EPA Non-Faculty Employee Grievance Procedure does not, on its face, provide for any kind of hearing, much less one with the right to counsel, to confront witnesses, to full disclosure of all evidence to all parties, and the other basic elements of the law of the land for an employee who believed she has been expelled from her workplace and then terminated because of her reports of discrimination based on her gender and national origin, or Constitution Article 1. . . . [The Grievance] Committee provides full due process procedures when a discharge for cause is alleged, but for all Grievances except Grievances Concerning Discharge for Cause, ... no hearing is provided and the investigation of the Grievance is done by interviews of parties and witnesses, where there is no chance to confront witnesses, provide all testimonial evidence to all parties, and other fundamental aspects of due process hearings. The Procedure fails to provide even minimal due process (law of the land) rights to a state employee who has alleged discrimination or retaliation, and who believes she has lost her employment because of her allegations.\nPetitioner\u2019s constitutional claims can be described as follows:\n1. The grievance procedures available to EPA Non-Faculty employees violate her right to due process, in that these procedures do not include the right to discovery of all evidence available to the Grievance Committee, and do not provide for an adversarial hearing at which Petitioner may be represented by counsel and may cross-examine witnesses.\n2. Career State employees who challenge the existence of just cause for termination have the right to an adversarial hearing and other due process protections, while EPA Non-Faculty employees who allege discrimination or retaliation do not have \u201cfull due process procedures.\u201d Petitioner asserts that the difference in the procedures and rights applicable to these categories of employees and to their differing claims constitutes a violation of her right to equal protection.\nPetitioner is not entitled to relief on the basis of either of these constitutional claims.\n2, Due Process Claim\n\u201cThe Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides in pertinent part: \u2018No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]\u2019 \u201d Chapel Hill Title & Abstract Co. v. Town of Chapel Hill, 362 N.C. 649, 654, 669 S.E.2d 286, 289 (2008). \u201cAt the threshold of any procedural due process claim is the question of whether the complainant has a liberty or property interest, determinable with reference to state law, that is protectable under the due process guaranty. We have consistently held that, \u2018[n]othing else appearing, an employment contract in North Carolina is terminable at the will of either party,\u2019 and that such a contract is not a sufficient proprietary interest to require full-scale constitutional protection in the form of a pretermination hearing.\u201d Maines v. City of Greensboro, 300 N.C. 126, 134, 265 S.E.2d 155, 160 (1980) (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L. Ed. 2d 684, 690 (1976), and quoting Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 723-24, 260 S.E.2d 611, 616 (1979)).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-35 affords career State employees certain procedural rights that must be honored before adverse employment actions may be taken against such employees. For example, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-35(a) provides that \u201c[n]o career State employee subject to the State Personnel Act shall be discharged, suspended, or demoted for disciplinary reasons, except for just cause.\u201d \u201cOur Supreme Court has held that, for the purpose of procedural due process, \u2018the North Carolina General Assembly created, by enactment of the State Personnel Act, a constitutionally protected property interest in the continued employment of career State employees.\u2019 \u201d Teague v. N.C. Dept. of Transp., 177 N.C. App. 215, 220, 628 S.E.2d 395, 399 (quoting Peace v. Employment Sec. Comm\u2019n, 349 N.C. 315, 321, 507 S.E.2d 272, 277 (1998)), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 581, 636 S.E.2d 199 (2006).\nPetitioner, however, was employed as an EPA Non-Faculty research assistant. \u201c \u2018EPA\u2019 is an abbreviation designating those employees who are exempt from the State Personnel Act. . . . [Petitioner was] exempt from the State Personnel Act. . . [and] cannot establish a property right through the State Personnel Act.\u201d McCallum v. N.C. Coop. Extension Serv., 142 N.C. App. 48, 57-58, 542 S.E.2d 227, 235, disc, review denied, 353 N.C. 452, 548 S.E.2d 527 (2001); see also, e.g., Privette v. University of North Carolina, 96 N.C. App. 124, 137, 385 S.E.2d 185, 192 (1989) (holding that a research technician employed by the University lacked a property interest in continued employment and was not entitled to a pre-termination hearing). As a result, we hold that Petitioner lacked a property interest in her continued and future employment sufficient to trigger the protections of the due process clause. Having reached this conclusion, we need not comment on the propriety of the procedures utilized to address Petitioner\u2019s grievance. Thus, we hold that the trial court committed an error of law by concluding that Petitioner\u2019s right to due process was violated by the applicable University procedures and by ordering that revisions be made to those procedures.\n3. Equal Protection Claim\n\u201cThe Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall \u2018deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.\u2019 The United States Supreme Court has \u2018explained that the purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State\u2019s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.\u2019 \u201d Thus, while the principle of substantive due process protects citizens from arbitrary or irrational laws and government policies, the right to equal protection guards against the government\u2019s use of invidious classification schemes.\nClayton v. Branson, 170 N.C. App. 438, 456-57, 613 S.E.2d 259, 272 (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1074-1075,145 L. Ed. 2d 1060, 1063 (2000)), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 174, 625 S.E.2d 785 (2005). \u201cOf course, most laws differentiate in some fashion between classes of persons. The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.\u201d Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2331, 120 L. Ed. 2d 1, 12 (1992).\nIn its order, the trial court appears to have analyzed Petitioner\u2019s due process and equal protection claims jointly and concludes that the fact that career State employees have more extensive procedural and substantive statutory rights than are afforded to non-career State employees, such as EPA Non-Faculty employees like Petitioner, constitutes an equal protection violation. More particularly, the trial court stated that:\n. . . The University\u2019s Procedure sets up two classifications of grievants. Class I are those employees who grieve they were discharged without just cause. For this classification, the University \u2022provides: The employee shall have the right to counsel, to present the testimony of witnesses and other evidence, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to examine all documents and other adverse demonstrative evidence. A written transcript of all proceedings shall be kept; upon request, a copy thereof shall be furnished to the employee at the University\u2019s expense....\nFor grievants who allege they suffered injuries to their reputation (liberty) and to their contract rights because of their national origin and race, and because they have followed State policy that encourages the reporting of wrongdoing, they are relegated to the back of the grievance bus. They are second-class grievants. The University provides them no hearing, no investigation of the Grievance except interviews of parties and witnesses, no opportunity to confront witnesses, no requirements to provide all evidence to all parties, and the denial of other fundamental aspects of due process hearings.\nAfter carefully reviewing the applicable law, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to properly allege the existence of an equal protection violation, that the analysis employed by the trial court in addressing the equal protection issue was fatally flawed, and that the trial court\u2019s decision concerning this issue should be reversed.\n\u201cTo establish an equal protection violation, [Petitioner] must identify a class of similarly situated persons who are treated dissimilarly.\u201d Geach v. Chertoff, 444 F.3d 940, 945 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Thus, \u201c[i]n addressing an equal protection challenge, we first identify the classes involved and determine whether they are similarly situated.\u201d Matter of S.L.M., 287 Mont. 23, 32, 951 P.2d 1365, 1371 (1997). For that reason, Petitioner was required to show as an integral part of her equal protection claim that similarly situated individuals were subjected to disparate treatment. Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that \u201c[a] Plaintiff relying on disparate treatment evidence must show that she was similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she seeks to compare herself\u201d); see also State v. Waring, 364 N.C. 443, 490, 701 S.E.2d 615, 645 (2010) (holding that a prosecutor\u2019s decision to strike a particular juror did not constitute an equal protection violation where the information obtained during the jury selection process failed to establish that the two jurors were similarly situated); Grace Baptist Church v. City of Oxford, 320 N.C. 439, 447, 358 S.E.2d 372, 377 (1987) (holding that the adoption of a zoning ordinance equally applicable to all buildings constructed after a specific date did not result in an equal protection violation because pre-existing buildings and post-ordinance buildings were not similarly situated); Mayfield v. Hannifin, 174 N.C. App. 386, 397, 621 S.E.2d 243, 251 (2005) (stating that counsel for the defendant and the plaintiff are not similarly situated with respect to their obligation to maintain the confidentiality of a plaintiff\u2019s medical records); State v. Davis, 96 N.C. App. 545, 549, 386 S.E.2d 743, 745 (1989) (holding that the prosecution of a defendant who intentionally failed to pay taxes as a protest while refraining from taking such action against an individual who failed to pay taxes due to neglect did not constitute an equal protection violation since the two categories of defendants were not similarly situated); Smith v. Wilkins, 75 N.C. App. 483, 486, 331 S.E.2d 159, 161 (1985) (holding that drivers who move to North Carolina after their licenses have been revoked in another state are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes with drivers whose licenses have been revoked in North Carolina). Thus, in order to properly assert an equal protection violation, Petitioner was required to allege and demonstrate that she was treated differently than other similarly situated individuals in some relevant way.\nPetitioner\u2019s equal protection claim seems to hinge on the fact that career State employees have more extensive procedural and substantive rights than other State employees, such as probationary, temporary, or EPA Non-Faculty employees like Petitioner. However, Petitioner fails to identify a specific class of employees with whom she claims to be similarly situated, or to articulate any basis for any such claim of substantial similarity. For example, Petitioner does not allege or demonstrate that all State employees or even all University employees are \u201csimilarly situated\u201d in some relevant respect. In addition, Petitioner has not alleged or demonstrated that similarly situated persons within the class of EPA Non-Faculty university employees have been subjected to disparate treatment. At bottom, \u201c[Petitioner has] not identified] any \u2018classification\u2019 upon which [she] was denied equal protection\u201d or \u201callege [d] that the [rights afforded to different classes of employees] included the use of any inherently suspect criteria, such as race, religion, or disability status.\u201d Clayton, 170 N.C. App. at 457, 613 S.E.2d at 273. Aside from noting that Petitioner is a member of a larger class of State employees and arguing that equal protection claims stemming from differential treatment based on the exercise of one\u2019s free speech rights or an employee\u2019s age, gender, or national origin should be subject to strict scrutiny, neither Petitioner nor the trial court made any effort to articulate the relevant respects in which career State employees and non-career State employees wishing to assert a grievance against their employer are similarly situated for equal protection purposes. Instead, Petitioner and the trial court have simply assumed that all State employees, or all State employees who have asserted a grievance, are similarly situated, an omission which fundamentally undermines Petitioner\u2019s equal protection claim. As a result, we conclude that Petitioner failed to assert a valid equal protection claim, find that the trial court committed an error of law in the event that it determined otherwise, and reverse the trial court\u2019s order to the extent that it found that Petitioner\u2019s equal protection rights had been violated.\nIII. Conclusion\nThus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s determination that EPA Non-Faculty employees such as Petitioner are entitled to the protections of the Whistleblower Act is correct and should be affirmed. However, since the BOG failed to make adequate findings concerning the merits of Petitioner\u2019s claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-84 and the First Amendment and since the trial court deviated from the applicable standard of review during its consideration of the merits of those claims, we remand this case to the Orange County Superior Court for further remand to the BOG in order to permit the BOG to make adequate findings of fact addressing Petitioner\u2019s Whistleblower Act and First Amendment claims. In addition, we affirm the BOG\u2019s determination that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on the basis of her claim to have been subjected to age, gender, or nationality-based discrimination or to have been retaliated against for asserting such a claim on the grounds that the BOG\u2019s factual findings have adequate record support and reverse the trial court\u2019s decision to the contrary. Finally, we hold that Petitioner has not established the existence of valid due process or equal protection claims and that the trial court erred in reaching a different conclusion.\nAFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.\nJudge STEELMAN concurs.\nJudge Elmore concurs in part, concurs in the result in part, and dissents in part by separate opinion.\n. Genotyping is a process used to identify the specific genetic characteristics of genetically altered mice.\n. In view of our determination that the Whistleblower Act issue needs to be remanded to the BOG for findings concerning whether Petitioner engaged in protected conduct and, if so, whether she was subjected to retaliation for engaging in such conduct, we need not discuss the trial court\u2019s treatment of the merits of Petitioner\u2019s claim in any detail.\n. The same errors that are discussed in the text with respect to Petitioner\u2019s \u25a0Whistleblower Act claim were committed by both the BOG and the trial court in connection with Petitioner\u2019s First Amendment claim. As a result, our decision to remand this case to the trial court for further remand to the BOG in order to allow the BOG to make appropriate findings applies to both the 'Whistleblower and First Amendment claims.\n. We also note that the \u201cpretext and mixed motive\u201d analyses upon which Petitioner relied before the trial court and this Court and which the trial court discussed in its order are applicable only in the event that Petitioner has demonstrated that she engaged in protected conduct and that a causal relationship between her protected conduct and the treatment to which she was subjected has been shown to exist. Newberne, 359 N.C. at 789-91, 618 S.E.2d at 206-07. Similarly, the legal implications of Petitioner\u2019s assertion that Dr. Snider effectively threatened Petitioner when he informed her that the funding for her position was contingent upon his receiving a particular grant depend upon the exact factual findings made by the administrative agency. Each of these issues can be addressed by the BOG on remand and need not detain us further on appeal.\n. Although Petitioner alleges violations of her rights under Article I, \u00a7\u00a7 18 and 19 of the North Carolina Constitution, she has not attempted to assert a violation of her rights under the United States Constitution. However, \u201c[t]he words \u2018the law of the land\u2019 as used in section [19], Article I of the North Carolina Constitution are equivalent to the words \u2018due process of law\u2019 required by section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.\u201d Rice v. Rigsby, 259 N.C. 506, 518, 131 S.E.2d 469, 477 (1963) (citing State v. Hedgepeth, 228 N.C. 259, 266, 45 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 806, 68 S. Ct. 1185, 92 L. Ed. 1739 (1948)). \u201cIt is also true that the Equal Protection Clause of Article I, \u00a7 19 of the Constitution of North Carolina is functionally equivalent to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.\u201d White v. Pate, 308 N.C. 759, 765-66, 304 S.E.2d 199, 203 (1983) (citing Kresge Co. v. Davis, 277 N.C. 654, 660, 178 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1971)). As a result of the similarity between the relevant constitutional provisions and Petitioner\u2019s failure to advance a state constitution-specific argument in her brief, we will utilize decisions under the United States Constitution and the North Carolina Constitution to analyze the validity of Petitioner\u2019s constitutional claims.\n. We also note that the mere fact that Petitioner was required to work from home for the last several months of her second term of employment did not result in a deprivation of Petitioner\u2019s protected rights or trigger the applicability of any due process protections.\n. Petitioner also contends that she was deprived of a protected liberty interest without due process, with this contention predicated on the assertion that, when she was directed to work from home during the last ten weeks of her term and not reappointed, she thereby suffered \u201cpublic humiliation and loss of name and reputation.\u201d As a result of the fact that Petitioner neither alleged this claim in her grievance nor points to any support for this contention in the record, we hold that Petitioner failed to preserve her \u201cdeprivation of liberty\u201d claim for judicial review or to demonstrate its validity.\n. In ruling that Petitioner\u2019s right to equal protection had been violated, the trial court discussed the fact that Petitioner was not provided with recordings of a number of witness interviews. However, Petitioner\u2019s claim that she was entitled to discovery of these recordings \u2014 or of any other specific materials in the university\u2019s possession \u2014 is based on her allegation that her due process rights were violated. Having concluded that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a property interest in her employment sufficient to demonstrate an entitlement to procedural due process protections, we necessarily find that Petitioner had no constitutional right to discovery of these recordings.\n. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-1.1 states that, \u201cunless the context clearly indicates otherwise, \u2018career State employee\u2019 means a State employee . . . who: (1) [i]s in a permanent position appointment; and (2) [h]as been continuously employed by the State of North Carolina ... in a position subject to the State Personnel Act for the immediate 24 preceding months.\u201d In addition, as we have already noted, members of the University research staff, such as Petitioner, are expressly excluded from the coverage of the provisions of the State Personnel Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(cl)(8). Aside from the fact that she was a member of the University\u2019s research staff, Petitioner occupied a temporary, rather than a permanent, position and had been employed for less than 24 months at the time that Dr. Snider declined to renew her appointment.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Judge." }, { "text": "ELMORE, Judge,\nconcurring in part, concurring in the result in part, and dissenting in part.\nI concur with the Court\u2019s determination that the UNC-Chapel Hill EPA Non-Faculty Grievance Procedure did not violate petitioner\u2019s rights to procedural due process or equal protection of the laws under the North Carolina Constitution. I also concur with the Court\u2019s decision to remand this case to the Orange County Superior Court. However, I respectfully dissent from the Court\u2019s holding that EPA Non-Faculty employees such as petitioner are entitled to the protections of the Whistleblower Act. As a result, I concur in the Court\u2019s decision in part, concur in the result reached in the Court\u2019s decision in part, and dissent from the Court\u2019s decision in part.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(cl) states that the North Carolina Whistle-blower Act does not apply to \u201c[a] State employee who is not a career state employee as defined by this Chapter.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(cl) (2009). A career state employee under this chapter is defined as one who:\n(1) Is in a permanent position appointment; and\n(2) Has been continuously employed by the State of North Carolina or a local entity as provided in G.S. 126 5(a)(2) in a position subject to the State Personnel Act for the immediate 24 preceding months.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-1.1 (2009).\nHere, petitioner was not in a permanent employment position. Her position was for the term of one year, and it was subject to the continued availability of funds. Furthermore, as the majority has correctly determined, petitioner\u2019s position as an EPA Non-Faculty employee was not subject to the State Personnel Act. Therefore, the North Carolina Whistleblower Act did not apply to petitioner.\nThe majority cites N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(c5) as the basis for protection of petitioner under the Whistleblower Act. However, this section of the statute specifically states that, \u201c[notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, Article 14 of this Chapter shall apply to all State employees, public school employees, and community college employees.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(c5) (2009). The very language of this section itself clearly indicates that \u00a7 126-5(c5) only applies notwithstanding any other provision. This language clearly indicates that \u00a7 126-5(c5) is meant to operate as a residuary, or catchall, provision that is applicable only when the statute does not otherwise provide to the contrary. Here, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-5(cl) very clearly articulates that the Whistleblower Act does not apply to a state employee who is not a career state employee. The statute further provides a very precise definition of a career state employee. Here, petitioner clearly does not satisfy either part of the definition of a career state employee. Petitioner was 1) not in a permanent employment position, and 2) her position was not subject to the State Personnel Act.\nAs a result, I am unable to agree with the Court\u2019s determination that petitioner was entitled to the protections of the Whistleblower Act. I agree with the Court\u2019s determination that this case should be remanded to the superior court. However, I conclude that remand would be proper only with instructions to the trial court to affirm the final decision of the Board of Governors consistent with this dissent.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "ELMORE, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Alan McSurely for petitioner.", "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Gary R. Govertfor respondents." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DR. YAN-MIN WANG, Petitioner v. UNC-CH SCHOOL OF MEDICINE and DR. WILLIAM SNIDER, Respondents\nNo. COA10-1021\n(Filed 4 October 2011)\n1. Public Officers and Employees \u2014 Whistleblower Act \u2014 EPA non-faculty employee\nA de novo review revealed that the trial court did not err when it concluded that the Whistleblower Act applied to petitioner, an EPA non-faculty employee.\n2. Public Officers and Employees \u2014 Whistleblower Act \u2014 sufficiency of findings of fact\nAlthough the trial court properly determined that petitioner was entitled to the protections of the Whistleblower Act, it erred by proceeding to determine that petitioner had been subjected to impermissible employment-related retaliation instead of remanding this issue to the Board of Governors (BOG) for appropriate findings of fact. The case was remanded to the superior court for further remand to the BOG.\n3. Public Officers and Employees \u2014 doctor\u2014failure to show gender, age, and national origin discrimination\nThe trial court erred by reversing the Board of Governors\u2019 (BOG) finding that a doctor had not discriminated against petitioner on the basis of her gender, age, and national origin. However, a remand was not necessary because there was competent, material, and substantial evidence in the record to support the BOG\u2019s decision.\n4. Constitutional Law \u2014 due process \u2014 equal protection\nThe trial court erred by concluding that petitioner established the existence of valid due process or equal protection claims.\nJudge ELMORE concurring in part, concurring in result in part, and dissenting in part in separate opinion.\nAppeal by respondents from order entered 14 May 2010 by Judge Abraham Penn Jones in Orange County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 February 2011.\nAlan McSurely for petitioner.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Gary R. Govertfor respondents." }, "file_name": "0185-01", "first_page_order": 195, "last_page_order": 218 }