{ "id": 4343353, "name": "IN RE RELEASE OF THE SILK PLANT FOREST CITIZEN REVIEW COMMITTEE'S REPORT AND APPENDICES, Petitioner v. MICHAEL N. BARKER, RICHARD E. BEST, ROBERT G. COZART, JOHN GRISMER, BRYAN L. MACY, MICHAEL C. ROWE, MICHAEL L. SHARPE, MICHAEL POE, RANDY PATTERSON, RANDY N. WEAVIL, LONNIE M. MAINES, MARY McNAUGHT, et. al., Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "Release of the Silk Plant Forest Citizen Review v. Barker", "decision_date": "2011-10-04", "docket_number": "No. COA10-1516", "first_page": "268", "last_page": "274", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "216 N.C. App. 268" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "702 S.E.2d 330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335", "parenthetical": "\"[I]t is well-established that an appellate court will not decide a constitutional question when the disposition of the case may be resolved on other grounds.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 748", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752" }, { "page": "750" }, { "page": "752" }, { "page": "755", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "755" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11436537 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" }, { "page": "611" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E.2d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573538 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 S.E. 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1908, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11270715 ], "year": 1908, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/149/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511376 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574-75", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 216", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 741, "char_count": 17256, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14740222306397013 }, "sha256": "7b83a1032cb7454dae7af4d8fe1f7bb06aeb446ac01a544fb9a1c6a67e27732e", "simhash": "1:d26bd12ef67e0ff2", "word_count": 2737 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:13:27.459138+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STROUD and HUNTER, Robert N., Jr. concur." ], "parties": [ "IN RE RELEASE OF THE SILK PLANT FOREST CITIZEN REVIEW COMMITTEE\u2019S REPORT AND APPENDICES, Petitioner v. MICHAEL N. BARKER, RICHARD E. BEST, ROBERT G. COZART, JOHN GRISMER, BRYAN L. MACY, MICHAEL C. ROWE, MICHAEL L. SHARPE, MICHAEL POE, RANDY PATTERSON, RANDY N. WEAVIL, LONNIE M. MAINES, MARY McNAUGHT, et. al., Respondents" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.\nRespondent police officers (\u201cthe officers\u201d or \u201crespondents\u201d) appeal from the trial court\u2019s 4 March 2010 order granting the City of Winston-Salem\u2019s (\u201cthe City\u201d) petition for disclosure of transcripts contained in respondents\u2019 personnel files. Respondents argue on appeal that: (1) the trial court erred in granting the petition pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-168(c)(4) (2009), and (2) disclosure of the transcripts would violate respondents\u2019 privacy and liberty interests guaranteed under the 9th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 1,19,35, and 36 of the North Carolina Constitution. After careful review, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order.\nBackground\nOn 22 October 2007, the City of Winston-Salem City Council adopted a resolution establishing a citizen review committee called the Silk Plant Forest Review Committee (\u201cthe Committee\u201d), the purpose of which was to \u201cconduct a comprehensive fact finding review\u201dof the Winston-Salem Police Department\u2019s investigation into the 1995 assault and robbery of Jill Marker. This police investigation ultimately led to the indictment and conviction of Kalvin Michael Smith for the crimes of assault with a deadly weapon with 'intent to kill inflicting serious injury and armed robbery. According to the City\u2019s resolution, the police department\u2019s investigation into the attack on Ms. Marker \u201cresulted in questions concerning whether police procedures were properly followed[.]\u201d During the Committee\u2019s extensive inquiry into the 1995 police investigation, respondents, who are all current or former Winston-Salem police officers, were interviewed concerning their role in th.e investigation. The officers were notified in writing that the questioning by the Committee was a \u201cpart of an official investigation by the Winston-Salem Police Department\u201d and that refusal to cooperate could result in \u201cdismissal from the Police Department.\u201d These interviews were recorded and transcribed.\nOn 17 March 2009, the Committee, after concluding its inquiry, adopted a resolution which provided in part: \u201cWe are aware of no credible evidence that Kalvin Michael Smith was at the location of the Silk Plant Forest Store in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, on 9 December 1995, at or about the time that the crime for which he was charged was committed.\u201d The Committee further stated that it did not \u201chave confidence in the investigation ... or the result of the investigation\u201d and that investigators \u201cfailed to follow procedures which, if followed, would have enhanced the reliability and completeness of the information that was provided to the prosecutors and ultimately the court.\u201d\nOn 16 October 2009, the City filed a petition with the Superior Court of Forsyth County requesting, inter alia, that the trial court grant \u201cfull disclosure\u201d of the officers\u2019 transcribed interviews to the general public. The City provided the following rationale for its request:\nThe Committee\u2019s materials are of great interest to the citizenry. There have been a number of requests both from citizens and the media for all the Committee\u2019s materials to be publicly released. The City Council has determined that a full release of the Committee\u2019s report, its appendices, and related materials is necessary and essential to maintaining public confidence in the administration of city services.\nThe City claimed that the transcripts of the officers\u2019 interviews were a part of the officers\u2019 personnel files, and, therefore, the City was required to obtain a court order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-168(c)(4) in order to lawfully release the transcripts to the general public.\nThe trial court deemed the action a special proceeding and conducted a hearing in regards to the petition on 15 January 2010. The trial court entered a written order on 4 March 2010 and found as fact that \u201cdespite any personnel privacy protections provided by N.C.G.S. 160A-168, it is necessary and essential to maintaining the public\u2019s confidence in the administration of City services, that these interview[] statements, in their entirety, be added to those Committee materials already publicly released.\u201d The trial court decreed: \u201cThe City is hereby authorized and permitted to make full public disclosure of interview statements, and any summaries or transcripts made therefrom, made by current and former members of the Winston-Salem Police Department. . . .\u201d Respondents timely appealed to this Court. The trial court has stayed its order \u201cuntil the completion of the appellate process.\u201d\nDiscussion\nFirst, we address respondents\u2019 claim that the trial court erred in granting the City\u2019s petition under the auspices of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-168(c)(4). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-168 states in pertinent part:\n(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 132-6 or any other general law or local act concerning access to public records, personnel files of employees, former employees, or applicants for employment maintained by a city are subject to inspection and may be disclosed only as provided by this section. For purposes of this section, an employee\u2019s personnel file consists of any information in any form gathered by the city with respect to that employee and, by way of illustration but not limitation, relating to his application, selection or nonselection, performance, promotions, demotions, transfers, suspension and other disciplinary actions, evaluation forms, leave, salary, and termination of employment. As used in this section, \u201cemployee\u201d includes former employees of the city.\n(c) All information contained in a city employee\u2019s personnel file, other than the information made public by subsection (b) of this section, is confidential and shall be open to inspection only in the following instances:\n(4) By order of a court of competent jurisdiction, any person may examine such portion of an employee\u2019s personnel file as may be ordered by the court.\nAs a preliminary matter, the City argued before the trial court that the transcripts are, in fact, apart of the officers\u2019 personnel files. The City does not contend otherwise on appeal. Consequently, we will assume for purposes of this appeal that the transcripts at issue are a part of the officers\u2019 personnel files and are thus confidential and protected by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-168(c). The issue we must decide is whether the trial court had authority under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-168(c)(4) to release the transcripts to the general public.\nThis Court has never directly addressed the scope of the trial court\u2019s authority to allow examination of confidential personnel files pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-168(c)(4), and the statute itself is silent as to the extent of the trial court\u2019s authority. Consequently, the primary issue before us is whether the legislature intended to grant the trial court the authority to release portions of a city employee\u2019s confidential personnel file to the general public pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-168(c)(4). We hold that the trial court was not granted such authority under the statute.\n\u201cQuestions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, reviewed de novo on appeal.\u201d State v. West, _ N.C. App._, _, 689 S.E.2d 216, 221 (2010).\nThe primary goal of statutory construction is to effectuate the purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute. The legislative purpose of a statute is first ascertained by examining the statute\u2019s plain language. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction!],] and the courts must give [the statute] its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.\nLiberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pennington, 356 N.C. 571, 574-75, 573 S.E.2d 118, 121 (2002) (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). \u201cIf the Legislature has used language of clear import, the court should not indulge in speculation or conjecture for its meaning. . . . Courts are not permitted to assume that the lawmaker has used words ignorantly or without meaning[.]\u201d Nance v. R.R., 149 N.C. 366, 371, 63 S.E. 116, 118 (1908). \u201cNothing else appearing, the legislature is presumed to have used the words of a statute to convey their natural and ordinary meaning.\u201d Wood v. Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. 636, 643, 256 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1979).\nThe plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-168(c)(4) allows, by order of the trial court, \u201cexamination\u201d by \u201cany person\u201d the relevant \u201cportion\u201d of a city employee\u2019s personnel file. The natural meaning of these terms indicate a clear intent to maintain the privacy of a city employee\u2019s personnel file except under limited circumstances where examination of only the relevant portion of the file is allowed. The key term in this subsection is \u201cany person.\u201d The legislature did not use the term \u201cgeneral public\u201d or even the word \u201cpeople.\u201d We must presume that the legislature chose \u201cany person\u201d as a limiting mechanism. While we do not read the term \u201cany person\u201d so narrowly as to mean only one individual, we do not read it so broadly as to mean the general public. Certainly, there are circumstances when justice requires that an individual, or perhaps a group of individuals sharing a common goal, be permitted to examine a relevant portion of a city employee\u2019s personnel file, but a wholesale publication of even a portion of the file would be contrary to the legislative intent behind N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-168(c)(4). Had the legislature intended to grant the trial court the authority to release these protected records to the general public, it would have done so in specific terms, or at least in terms that would render such an interpretation logical. Rather, the legislature chose to grant the trial court limited authority to allow \u201cany person\u201d to \u201cexamine\u201d a relevant \u201cportion\u201d of the file.\nFurthermore, when subsection (c) is read in pari materia with the remainder of the statute, the intent to keep these personnel files confidential is clear. In contrast to subsection (c), subsection (b) specifically states what information is deemed public, such as the employee\u2019s name, age, salary, and the office to which the employee is assigned. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-168(b). Thus, there is a clear delineation between what is public and what is confidential. What is confidential is, necessarily, not public information under this statute. Moreover, according to the statute, public records can not only be examined, they can by copied, and, consequently, disseminated to the general public. Id. That portion of a City employee personnel file that is not deemed public can only be \u201cexamine[d]\u201d when so ordered by the trial court. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-168(c)(4). The use of the word \u201cexamine,\u201d as opposed to \u201ccopy\u201d or another word pertaining to mass publication, indicates the legislature\u2019s intent to limit the exposure of these personnel files. In fact, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-168(e) makes it a criminal offense for a \u201cpublic official or employee . . . [to] permit[] any person to have access to information contained in a personnel file[,]\u201d with the exception of what is made public by subsection (b).\nAs stated supra, this Court has never directly addressed the scope of the trial court\u2019s authority under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-168(c)(4); however, In re Brooks, 143 N.C. App. 601, 606, 548 S.E.2d 748, 752 (2001), is instructive regarding the legislative intent behind the statute. In Brooks, the District Attorney of Orange County sought a court order requiring the disclosure of several police officers\u2019 personnel files to special agents of the State Bureau of Investigation for examination. Id. at 602-03, 548 S.E.2d at 750. The trial court granted the petition and the officers appealed. Id. This Court held that, \u201c[t]he plain language of section 160A-168(c)(4) indicates that the Superior Court. . . being a court of competent jurisdiction, [i]s indeed authorized to allow inspection of the [police] officers\u2019 personnel files.\u201d Id. at 606, 548 S.E.2d at 752. Lacking guidance from the statute on the scope of the trial court\u2019s authority, this Court went on to set forth general parameters for the trial court\u2019s determination regarding examination of an employee\u2019s confidential personnel records:\nThe Superior Court should make an independent determination that the interests of justice require disclosure of the confidential employment information. It is further within the Superior Court\u2019s inherent power and discretion to implement other procedures as may be required to effectuate the legislature\u2019s intent that the information remain somewhat confidential. The court could, for example, limit that dissemination and use of disclosed materials to certain individuals, order an in camera inspection, or redact certain information.\nId. at 611, 548 S.E.2d at 755 (emphasis added). The Brooks Court recognized the legislative intent behind N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-168 \u2014 to keep a city employee\u2019s personnel file confidential except under limited circumstances. Brooks does not address whether the trial court is permitted to make confidential personnel records available to the general public; however, the Court acknowledged that even when justice requires disclosure of this information, the disclosure should be narrowly tailored in order to adhere to the legislative intent. Id.\nBased on the foregoing, we hold that \u201ca court of competent jurisdiction\u201d does not have the authority under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-168 (c)(4) to order the release of any portion of a city employee\u2019s confidential personnel file to the general public. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting the City\u2019s petition in this case. We must, therefore, reverse the trial court\u2019s order. We need not address respondents\u2019 remaining arguments, including their claim that the trial court\u2019s order violated their constitutional rights. State v. Dubose, _ N.C. App. _, _, 702 S.E.2d 330, 335 (2010) (\u201c[I]t is well-established that an appellate court will not decide a constitutional question when the disposition of the case may be resolved on other grounds.\u201d).\nReversed.\nJudges STROUD and HUNTER, Robert N., Jr. concur.\n. Only Michael N. Barker, Richard E. Best, Robert G. Cozart, John Grismer, Michael C. Rowe, Michael L. Sharpe, Michael Poe, and Randy Patterson are listed as respondents-appellants on the notice of appeal in this case.\n. The resolution was amended on 3 March 2008.\n. We note that respondents filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for directed verdict prior to the hearing in this matter. The trial court denied those motions in its order; however, the issue before us is whether the trial court erred in granting the City\u2019s petition, which was deemed a special proceeding, and not the propriety of the trial court's rulings on respondents\u2019 motions.\n. The statute was amended by 2010 N.C. Sess. Law ch. 169, \u00a7 18(f) (effective Oct. 1, 2010). This amendment does not apply to the present action.\n. It is undisputed that the deposition transcripts are not a matter of public record pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-168(b).\n. By disclosing the materials to the general public, the trial court would, in effect, provide the materials to the media, which has expressed an interest in all of the information and documents procured by the Committee.\n. We note that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-168(c)(7) pertains to release of information regarding \u201cdisciplinary action\u201d; however, this information may only be released if the procedures outlined in that subsection are followed. It does not appear from the record that any disciplinary action was taken against respondents.\n. The City argues that this Court reviews the trial court\u2019s determination under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-168(c)(4) for abuse of discretion. Due to our determination that the trial court has no authority to release these protected files to the general public we need not address this matter; however, we note Brooks indicates that, in instances where the trial court has authority to allow examination of these records, the trial court has been given \u201cinherent power and discretion\u201d to tailor the method of disclosure. Brooks, 143 N.C. App. at 611, 548 S.E.2d at 755. It follows that the trial court\u2019s determination would be reviewed for an abuse of that discretion.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Alan A. Andrews for petitioner-appellee.", "The McGuinness Law Firm, by J. Michael McGuinness, for respondents-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN RE RELEASE OF THE SILK PLANT FOREST CITIZEN REVIEW COMMITTEE\u2019S REPORT AND APPENDICES, Petitioner v. MICHAEL N. BARKER, RICHARD E. BEST, ROBERT G. COZART, JOHN GRISMER, BRYAN L. MACY, MICHAEL C. ROWE, MICHAEL L. SHARPE, MICHAEL POE, RANDY PATTERSON, RANDY N. WEAVIL, LONNIE M. MAINES, MARY McNAUGHT, et. al., Respondents\nNo. COA10-1516\n(Filed 4 October 2011)\nPolice Officers \u2014 examination of confidential personnel files by general public \u2014 no trial court authority\nThe trial court did not have the authority under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-168(c)(4) to grant the City\u2019s petition for disclosure of transcripts contained in respondent police officers\u2019 confidential personnel files.\nAppeal by respondents from order entered 4 March 2010 by Judge Richard W. Stone in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 August 2011.\nAlan A. Andrews for petitioner-appellee.\nThe McGuinness Law Firm, by J. Michael McGuinness, for respondents-appellants." }, "file_name": "0268-01", "first_page_order": 278, "last_page_order": 284 }