{
  "id": 4347663,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOSEPH ROBERT HARRISON SURETY: BRAXTON D. EGGERS, Agent for International Fidelity Insurance Company JUDGMENT CREDITOR: Watauga County Board of Education",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Joseph Robert Harrison Surety",
  "decision_date": "2011-12-06",
  "docket_number": "No. COA11-343",
  "first_page": "363",
  "last_page": "369",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "217 N.C. App. 363"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 458,
    "char_count": 13171,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.727,
    "sha256": "db6d54b89a09153cf29bd473be31de78cc789bdad0fcdec1a0656788977073a7",
    "simhash": "1:c9686df043271fde",
    "word_count": 2118
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:07:22.966851+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges GEER and STROUD concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOSEPH ROBERT HARRISON SURETY: BRAXTON D. EGGERS, Agent for International Fidelity Insurance Company JUDGMENT CREDITOR: Watauga County Board of Education"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "THIGPEN, Judge.\nThe senior resident superior court judge of the 24th Judicial District issued an administrative order regarding conditions of pretrial release applicable to counties within the senior resident superior court judge\u2019s district. The order was issued without consulting with the chief district court judge or other district court judges within the district. A district court judge within the judicial district did not follow the administrative order. We must decide whether the district court judge erred by not following the administrative order. We conclude that since the administrative order was issued in contravention of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-535(a) (2009), the district court judge did not err.\nThe facts of this case are not disputed. On 18 February 2009, Joseph Robert Harrison (\u201cDefendant\u201d) was charged with four misdemeanors in Watauga County. Defendant\u2019s bond was set at $2,500.00, and Braxton D. Eggers, the agent for the International Fidelity Insurance Company (\u201cthe Surety\u201d) executed a Surety Appearance Bond on his behalf. On 18 May 2009, Defendant entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the following conditions: (1) Defendant was placed on unsupervised probation for twelve months; (2) Defendant was required to abide by the regular conditions of unsupervised probation; and (3) Defendant was required to pay court costs and fines in the amount of $308.50. Defendant failed to comply with the terms of the agreement to defer prosecution by failing to appear on 28 May 2010, and an order for his arrest was entered. On 4 June 2010, the Watauga County Clerk of Court\u2019s Office sent the Surety a bond forfeiture notice. On 25 October 2010, the Surety filed a motion to set aside the forfeiture, attaching copies of an administrative order of the 24th Judicial District Senior Resident Superior Court Judge James L. Baker (\u201cthe 24th District administrative order\u201d), and an administrative order of Senior Resident Superior Court Judge Robert F. Floyd, Jr., and Chief District Court Judge J. Stanley Carmical in Judicial District 16B (\u201cthe District 16B administrative order\u201d). Both orders decreed that \u201cthe obligations of a bondsman or other surety pursuant to any appearance bond for pretrial release are, and shall be, terminated immediately upon the entry of the State and the Defendant into a formal Deferred Prosecution Agreement!.]\u201d The Surety\u2019s motion stated that the forfeiture must be set aside pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-544.5(b)(2) (2009), which states that \u201ca forfeiture shall be set aside\u201d if \u201c[a]ll charges for which the defendant was bonded to appear have been finally disposed by the court other than by the State\u2019s taking dismissal with leave, as evidenced by a copy of an official court record, including an electronic record.\u201d The Watauga County Board of Education (\u201cthe Judgment Creditor\u201d) timely filed an objection to the Surety\u2019s motion.\nOn 25 January 2011, the district court entered an order denying the motion to set aside the forfeiture. From this order, the Surety appeals.\nI: Background\nThe 24th District administrative order in the matter of appearance bonds and deferred prosecution agreements is central to this appeal. The order decrees, in pertinent part, the following:\nIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:\n1. That the obligations of a bondsman or other surety pursuant to any appearance bond for pretrial release are, and shall be, terminated immediately upon the entry of the State and a Defendant into a formal Deferred Prosecution Agreement, approved by a court, concerning the underlying criminal charges referred to in the Appearance Bond for Pretrial Release.\n2. That this order shall be applied both prospectively and retroactively, as to Deferred Prosecution Agreement cases in which no forfeiture of bond has as of this date been ordered by a court.\n3. That in such cases regarding Deferred Prosecution Agreements in which a forfeiture of bond has been ordered, sureties or bondsmen shall have the right to petition a court for appropriate remedy, and this order may be presented in support of the sureties\u2019 position.\n4. That this order shall remain in effect indefinitely unless modified, amended, or vacated by future court order.\n5. This order shall be effective from the date of execution. (Emphasis added)\nThe 24th District administrative order was signed by only the senior resident superior court judge. The order was not signed by the chief district court judge.\nI: Date of Forfeiture\nPreliminarily, we address the Judgment Creditor\u2019s contention that the date of forfeiture was 4 June 2010, and that 4 June 2010 is the applicable date to consider in the context of the 18 August 2010 24th District administrative order, which states, \u201cthis Order shall be applied both prospectively and retroactively, as to Deferred Prosecution Agreement cases in which no forfeiture of bond has as of this date been ordered by a court.\u201d The date of entry of forfeiture was 4 June 2010; however, the final judgment of forfeiture would have been 2 November 2010, had the Surety not filed a motion to set aside the forfeiture. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-544.6 (2009) (providing, \u201c[a] forfeiture entered under G.S. 15A-544.3 becomes a final judgment of forfeiture without further action by the court and may be enforced under G.S. 15A-544.7, on the one hundred fiftieth day after notice is given under G.S. 15A-544.4, if: (1) No order setting aside the forfeiture under G.S. 15A-544.5 is entered on or before that date; and (2) No motion to set aside the forfeiture is pending on that date\u201d). Moreover, the trial court did not enter an order on the Surety\u2019s 25 October 2010 motion to set aside forfeiture until 25 January 2011. Both the original date of final judgment of forfeiture, 2 November 2010, and the date of the trial court\u2019s denial of the Surety\u2019s motion to set aside forfeiture, 25 January 2011, were after the 18 August 2010 24th District administrative order. Therefore, to accept the Judgment Creditor\u2019s interpretation of the 24th District administrative order would be tantamount to denying the Surety the period of time to file a motion to set aside the forfeiture. We believe a proper interpretation of the 24th District administrative order is that the phrase \u2014 \u201cas to Deferred Prosecution Agreement cases in which no forfeiture of bond has as of this date been ordered by a court\u201d \u2014 refers to final judgments of forfeiture. This did not occur until 25 January 2011. Therefore, no forfeiture of bond had been ordered as of the date of the 18 August 2010 24th District administrative order, and the 24th District administrative order applied to Defendant\u2019s deferred prosecution agreement.\nI: Applicability of Order to District Courts\nOn appeal, the Surety argues the district court erred by entering an order denying its motion to set aside the forfeiture for two reasons: (1) the district court\u2019s order is inconsistent with the 24th District administrative order regarding appearance bonds and deferred prosecution agreements, and \u201cone trial level judge may not overrule another\u201d; and (2) the district court erred by concluding an order to defer prosecution is not a final disposition for purposes of appearance bonds on pretrial release. We find neither of these arguments dispositive of the issue presented on appeal. Rather, because there is no evidence of record that Senior Resident Superior Court Judge James L. Baker entered the administrative order in a manner consistent with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-535(a), we conclude the district court was not obligated to follow the administrative order in this case, and therefore did not err in failing to do so.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7A-41.1(c), 7A-146, and 15A-535(a) (2009) are pertinent to our analysis of the question presented in this case. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-41.1(c) states, in pertinent part, the following:\n(c) Senior resident superior court judges and regular resident superior court judges possess equal judicial jurisdiction, power, authority and status, but all duties placed by the Constitution or statutes on the resident judge of a superior court district, including the-appointment to and removal from office, which are not related to a case, controversy or judicial proceeding and which do not involve the exercise of judicial power, shall be discharged, throughout a district as defined in subsection (a) of this section or throughout all of the districts comprising a set of districts so defined, for each county in that district or set of districts, by the senior resident superior court judge for that district or set of districts.\nId. Likewise, \u201c[t]he chief district judge, subject to the general supervision of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, has administrative supervision and authority over the operation of the district courts and magistrates in his district.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-146.\nWith regard to the senior resident superior court judge and the chief district court judge\u2019s roles in establishing the bond policy and conditions of pre-trial release, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-535(a) states, in pertinent part, the following:\n[T]he senior resident superior court judge for each district or set of districts as defined in G.S. 7A-41.1(a) in consultation with the chief district court judge or judges of all the district court districts in which are located any of the counties in the senior resident superior court judge\u2019s district or set of districts, must devise and issue recommended policies to be followed within each of those counties in determining whether, and upon what conditions, a defendant may be released before trial and may include in such policies, or issue separately, a requirement that each judicial official who imposes condition (4) or (5) in G.S. 15A-534(a) must record the reasons for doing so in writing.\nId.\nIn this case the 24th District administrative order was modeled after the District 16B administrative order. In the District 16B administrative order, the order itself shows that the policy regarding deferred prosecution agreements was devised in \u201cconsultation with the chief district court judge[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-535(a). Chief District Court Judge J. Stanley Carmical\u2019s signature is on the order. However, there is no signature of the chief district court judge on the 24th District administrative order. While N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-535(a) does not require a signature of the chief district court judge, the statute expressly requires \u201cconsultation with the chief district court judge or judges of all the district court districts in which are located any of the counties in the senior resident superior court judge\u2019s district or set of districts[.]\u201d Id. In this case, there is no evidence in the record of either. Because the evidence, or lack thereof, shows that the senior resident superior court judge did not comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-535(a) when entering the 24th District administrative order, we believe the district court judge in this case was not obligated to follow it, and the order is not binding on district courts in the 24th Judicial District. We emphasize that nothing in this opinion precludes Senior Resident Superior Court Judge James L. Baker from entering a similar administrative order that complies with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-535(a). However, we point out that the duty of the senior resident superior court judge to promulgate and issue policies pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-535(a), is to be done after consultation with the chief district court judge.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges GEER and STROUD concur.\n. Watauga County is in the 24th Judicial District.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "THIGPEN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Eggers, Eggers, Eggers & Eggers, PLLC, by Stacy G. Eggers, TV, for surety-appellant.",
      "Miller & Johnson, PLLC, by Nathan A. Miller, for judgment creditor-appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOSEPH ROBERT HARRISON SURETY: BRAXTON D. EGGERS, Agent for International Fidelity Insurance Company JUDGMENT CREDITOR: Watauga County Board of Education\nNo. COA11-343\n(Filed 6 December 2011)\n1. Bail and Pretrial Release \u2014 date of bond forfeiture \u2014 deferred prosecution agreement \u2014 final judgments\nA 24th District administrative order regarding deferred prosecution agreement cases in which no forfeiture of bond had been ordered by a court referred to final judgments of forfeiture. Thus, no forfeiture bond had been ordered in this case as of the date of the 18 August 2010 24th District administrative order, and the order applied to defendant\u2019s deferred prosecution agreement.\n2. Bail and Pretrial Release \u2014 applicability of pretrial release administrative order to district courts\nA district court judge did not err in a bond forfeiture case by failing to follow an administrative order regarding pretrial release applicable to counties within the senior resident superior court judge\u2019s district because there was no evidence of record that the senior resident superior court judge entered the administrative order in a manner consistent with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-535(a) or after consultation with the chief district court judge.\nAppeal by the surety from order entered 25 January 2011 by Judge R. Gregory Horne in Watauga County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 September 2011.\nEggers, Eggers, Eggers & Eggers, PLLC, by Stacy G. Eggers, TV, for surety-appellant.\nMiller & Johnson, PLLC, by Nathan A. Miller, for judgment creditor-appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0363-01",
  "first_page_order": 373,
  "last_page_order": 379
}