{ "id": 4347533, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SHANNON ELIZABETH CRAWLEY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Crawley", "decision_date": "2011-12-20", "docket_number": "No. COA11-93", "first_page": "509", "last_page": "519", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "217 N.C. App. 509" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "200 S.E.2d 208", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 N.C. App. 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555600 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/19/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 S.E.2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893", "parenthetical": "\"Evidentiary errors are harmless unless a defendant proves that absent the error a different result would have been reached at trial.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11437253 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307", "parenthetical": "\"Evidentiary errors are harmless unless a defendant proves that absent the error a different result would have been reached at trial.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4719603 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 S.E.2d 530", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559705 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2531370 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 S.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571664, 571660 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0372-01", "/nc/349/0372-02" ] }, { "cite": "503 S.E.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11468718 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0505-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1037, "char_count": 24814, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.299769946118584e-07, "percentile": 0.6219096171243961 }, "sha256": "48e91a5c974aaa1e273f055fd8ac139f38a7c88016842d93c8d57261d2abfcf5", "simhash": "1:a66e6096500e6c4a", "word_count": 4157 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:07:22.966851+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SHANNON ELIZABETH CRAWLEY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nShannon Elizabeth Crawley (\u201cDefendant\u201d) appeals from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding her guilty of first-degree murder. We find no error.\nI. Factual & Procedural History\nOn 2 April 2007, the Durham County Grand Jury indicted Defendant for the murder of Denita Monique Smith. A jury trial began 8 February 2010 in Durham County Superior Court, the Honorable Judge Ronald Stephens presiding. The State\u2019s evidence at trial tended to show the following.\nAt approximately 8:10 a.m. on 4 January 2007, Michael Hedgepeth, the maintenance director for the Campus Crossings Apartments in Durham (\u201cCampus Crossings\u201d), heard a shot fired and saw a woman running from the back to the front of the 1100 building of the complex. Mr. Hedgepeth testified that the woman\u2019s route was an unusual one because there was a more convenient exit to the parking lot. As Mr. Hedgepeth drove toward the 1100 building, he saw a young woman, possibly the same woman as before, driving away from the building in a burgundy SUV. Mr. Hedgepeth testified the young woman was hysterical about the gunshot; she told him it was because she was afraid of guns. The young woman told Mr. Hedgepeth she stayed at the 1200 building, so he told her to go wait for him there while he called the police.\nMr. Hedgepeth saw the young woman in the SUV once more in the parking lot of Campus Crossings while he was on the phone with police but did not see her after that. Police arrived at Campus Crossings in response to Mr. Hedgepeth\u2019s 911 call, but they left without filing a report because they were unable to ascertain the source of the gunshot.\nAt approximately 10:00 a.m. that morning, Corey Smith, a Campus Crossings resident, was coming out of his apartment to go to work when he saw someone\u2019s belongings scattered down the staircase. At first, he thought someone did not make it up the stairs for some reason, but at the bottom of the stairs, he discovered a body. After seeing that the body was not breathing, Mr. Smith called 911 on his cell phone. Based on instructions from the 911 operator, he checked a purse on the stairs for identification and found out it was the body of Denita Smith, a Campus Crossings resident and student pursuing a master\u2019s degree at North Carolina Central University. Mr. Smith then went to the clubhouse at Campus Crossings to notify Mr. Hedgepeth.\nCorolla Lauck, a paramedic and one of the first people at the scene, determined at her arrival that Ms. Smith was already dead. Once police arrived, Mr. Hedgepeth gave investigators a description of the woman he saw earlier that morning. Mr. Hedgepeth described the woman as a black female, 5\u201910\u201d, with a ponytail, who was driving a burgundy SUV.\nEdith Crawley-Kearns, Ms. Smith\u2019s best friend, received a phone call from her brother who lived at Campus Crossings asking whether she had heard from Ms. Smith, since he knew something was going on at the complex. After trying to call Ms. Smith without getting an answer, Ms. Crawley-Kearns called Jermeir Stroud (\u201cOfficer Stroud\u201d), Ms. Smith\u2019s fianc\u00e9. Officer Stroud was a Greensboro police officer and had been engaged to Ms. Smith since November 2006. Officer Stroud told Ms. Crawley-Kearns that he had heard something was going on at Campus Crossings and that he was on his way to Durham since he had not heard from Ms. Smith. Upon his arrival at the scene, Officer Stroud was told of Ms. Smith\u2019s death, and, after providing his information to investigators, he spent the rest of the day with his family and Ms. Smith\u2019s family.\nThe next day, Officer Stroud found out that police were looking for someone with a red Ford Explorer in connection with the murder. Officer Stroud had been in a romantic relationship with Defendant in 2004-2005 and knew that she drove a red Ford Explorer. Officer Stroud called Jack Cates of the Durham Police Department, who asked him to return to Durham to speak with investigators. Officer Stroud told Investigator Shawn Pate about Defendant, and Investigator Pate headed to Greensboro, where Defendant worked, to meet with Defendant.\nOn 5 January 2007, Defendant told Investigator Pate that she did not know Ms. Smith and had only seen her once two weeks prior in church and in pictures at Officer Stroud\u2019s house. She stated that on the morning of 4 January 2007, she was late to work because she took her child to a doctor\u2019s appointment. She told Investigator Pate that she had never owned a gun or had a gun.\nFive months later, however, on 30 May 2007, Defendant told Investigator Pate that she wanted to talk about what happened on 4 January 2007. She said that on 3 January 2007, she came home and found Officer Stroud in her bedroom. He indicated that he had a weapon and that she should be quiet. He then drove her to Durham to Campus Crossings. They then drove back to Greensboro, and Officer Stroud left. Defendant said that on 4 January 2007, the same thing happened and that Officer Stroud threatened to harm her children if she would not come with him. When they got to Campus Crossings, Officer Stroud got out of the vehicle. Defendant heard arguing and got out of the vehicle. She was about three or four feet in front of the vehicle when she heard a gunshot. Officer Stroud came back to the vehicle and got into the driver\u2019s seat. Defendant tried to get in the passenger seat behind the driver, but the back seat was locked, so Officer Stroud jumped into the back from the driver\u2019s seat, and Defendant got into the driver\u2019s seat. Defendant said it was then that she ran into Mr. Hedgepeth and that Mr. Hedgepeth could not see Officer Stroud because he was crouched in the back of the vehicle. Defendant was later charged with first-degree murder.\nOn 20 June 2008, while out on bond, Defendant told Charlotte law enforcement that Officer Stroud came to Charlotte and raped her between 2:30 and 5:30 a.m. Defendant alleged that Officer Stroud had cut her clothes off of her with a knife, held a knife to her throat, cut her thigh, penetrated her vagina with the knife, and ejaculated.\nPamela Zinkann, a detective in the sexual assault unit of the Charlotte/Mecklenburg Police Department, testified that based on the alleged time of the rape and Officer Stroud\u2019s cell phone records, Officer Stroud would have had to travel from Charlotte to Greensboro at approximately 120 miles per hour without stopping for red lights to have committed the rape. A rape kit was analyzed, and the results were negative for semen. There were lacerations to Defendant\u2019s neck and thigh, as well as abrasions to the outer labia. However, despite Defendant\u2019s contentions to Detective Zinkann that she needed stitches and had been penetrated by a knife, both a nurse and a physician\u2019s assistant testified that there were no injuries requiring stitches and that there were no injuries to the vaginal canal.\nOn 21 June 2008, Defendant suggested to Detective Zinkann that law enforcement search Officer Stroud\u2019s trash can at his residence to look for the knife. On or about 23 June 2008, Officer Stroud put trash in his trash can for the first time since the alleged rape. At the bottom of his otherwise empty trash can, he saw a knife. Officer Stroud called the Greensboro Police Department about the knife. Brandon Inscore, one of Officer Stroud\u2019s neighbors, told Detective Zinkann that he heard a thump and saw a vehicle drive away from Officer Stroud\u2019s trash can on 19 June 2008. Another neighbor, Jessica Hopkins, told Detective Zinkann that on 19 June 2008, she saw someone throw something into Officer Stroud\u2019s trash can and drive off. Evidence of this incident was introduced at trial but is not at issue on appeal.\nDr. Cynthia Gardner, a forensic pathologist, testified at trial that Ms. Smith was killed by a distant range gunshot wound to the head. During the autopsy, Dr. Gardner recovered a bullet from Ms. Smith\u2019s body. Agent Scott Jones, a forensic firearms analyst at the State Bureau of Investigation (\u201cSBI\u201d), examined the bullet. Using factors such as size, shape, and rifling characteristics, Agent Jones determined that the bullet most likely came from a revolver and that its caliber was in the .38 family. A search of the FBI general rifling characteristics database revealed eight possible firearms which could have fired the shot, including a Taurus.\nRonald Simpson, Defendant\u2019s co-worker, testified that he sold Defendant a .38 Taurus Special revolver in October 2006 in the parking lot of the 911 Center where they worked. Defendant testified that she had disposed of the gun shortly after receiving it by throwing the gun in one dumpster and the ammunition in another dumpster. Officer Stroud testified that the only two weapons he owned were a .40 caliber Sig Sauer he carries while on duty and a .40 caliber Glock 23 model pistol he carries while off duty. Agent Jones testified that a .40 caliber weapon is not designed to fire a .38 caliber bullet and that he was not sure whether it was possible for a .38 caliber bullet to be fired from a .40 caliber weapon. Michael Gurdziel, a forensic chemist at the SBI, testified that an analysis of a lift taken from the driver\u2019s seat of Defendant\u2019s vehicle tested positive for gunshot residue.\nDuring the trial, the State called Ryan Harger, a custodian of records for Sprint/Nextel, a telecommunications company which transmitted electronically recorded cell phone records to the Durham Police Department during its investigation. Over objection, Mr. Harger indicated that the records which were transmitted to the police included the date and time of a call, the numbers called, the length of the call, and the cell phone towers that were used to make or receive the call. At the trial, a screen was set up and Mr. Harger was asked if he recognized information on the screen as being the same information sent from Sprint/Nextel to the Durham police. Mr. Harger then identified a screen print that contained subscriber information for the accounts of Defendant and Officer Stroud. The subscriber history for Defendant was identified for the date Ms. Smith was killed and the date Defendant alleged she was assaulted by Officer Stroud. Next, Mr. Harger identified a cell site list that contained the latitude and longitude of each tower site. Mr. Harger then explained how a cell phone transmits its signals from a cell phone to a cell tower to another telephone. Each cell tower is given an urban area network code to identify the urban area in which the cell phone tower is located. In addition, each cell tower has one, two, or three sets of antennas which can be directed to an area within the cell phone tower\u2019s coverage area to better facilitate calls from certain geographic areas. Mr. Harger identified the call record, which has columns containing, inter alia, the following information: the telephone number making and receiving the call, the date of the call, the time the call began, the duration of the call in seconds, whether the call is inbound or outbound, any 911 calls made, and the phone receiving the call. Additional columns contain the cell site which received the cell signal when the call was originated and terminated, including the local site name and the number of the switch on the tower which received the call.\nThe State then had Mr. Harger examine the computer records on the screen for Defendant\u2019s and Officer Stroud\u2019s cell phones for the time period in which the killing took place. Afterwards, Mr. Harger was handed a CD which contained the Sprint/Nextel records shown on the computer screen. He then verified the information between the computer screen records and the records on the CD to be the same. Based on this testimony, the State then introduced the CD as Exhibit 120.\nOn cross-examination, Defendant elicited the fact that Mr. Harger did not create the CD himself and could not confirm the accuracy of the information in the exhibit, but only that he believed it to be accurate. On redirect, the State asked if he believed the records to be accurate, to which he answered that he did believe they were accurate.\nThe State then called Durham Police Detective Chappell, who was assigned by the investigation department to \u201cextrapolate\u201d cell phone calls with cell tower locations to determine when and where a cell phone call was made or received. Based upon the electronic records received from Sprint/Nextel, Detective Chappell plotted the information on a map. This information was made into an exhibit and introduced as part of Exhibit 121. This exhibit was created in part by copying and pasting sections of the Nextel records into the chart created by Detective Chappell. These calls and the towers which received them were then geographically put on a map for the dates of the death and alleged assault. A separate color point was used to locate the cell phone numbers for Defendant and Officer Stroud.\nThe effect of the summary of the cell phone records was to demonstrate to the jury that on the day before the killing of the decedent, Defendant\u2019s cell phone was making cell phone calls from Durham near the Campus Crossing Apartments. All of the calls made that day from Officer Stroud\u2019s cell phone were relayed through towers located around Greensboro.\nOn 22 February 2010, the jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On 23 February 2010, Defendant timely filed written notice of appeal to this Court.\nII. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review\nDefendant appeals from a final judgment in superior court where she was convicted of a non-capital offense. Therefore, we have jurisdiction over her appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27(b) (2009).\nA trial court\u2019s determination as to whether a document has been sufficiently authenticated is reviewed de novo on appeal as a question of law. State v. Owen, 130 N.C. App. 505, 510, 503 S.E.2d 426, 430, disc. review denied, 349 N.C. 372, 525 S.E.2d 188 (1998).\nIII. Analysis\nDefendant first contends the trial court erred by admitting Defendant and Officer Stroud\u2019s cell phone records into evidence over Defendant\u2019s objection for insufficient authentication. We disagree.\nRule 901 of our Rules of Civil Procedure requires authentication or identification \u201cby evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 901 (2009). Rule 901 does not require the proponent of evidence to conclusively prove that tendered documents or electronic evidence is definitively a record, only that the evidence is relevant for the jury to conclude that it is authentic. Our Supreme Court \u201chas held that \u2018[t]he competency, admissibility, and sufficiency of the evidence is a matter for the court to determine. The credibility, probative force, and weight is a matter for the jury.\u2019 \u201d State v. Wiggins, 334 N.C. 18, 34, 431 S.E.2d 755, 764 (1993) (citation omitted). In Wiggins, the Court stated, \u201cIt was not error for the trial court to admit the [evidence] if it could reasonably determine that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that \u2018the matter in question is what its proponent claims.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 901). The Court then explained that Defendant would be \u201cfree to introduce any competent evidence relevant to the weight or credibility of [the witness\u2019s] testimony.\u201d Id. (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 104(e)).\nBusiness records stored electronically are admissible if\n(1) the computerized entries were made in the regular course of business, (2) at or near the time of the transaction involved, and (3) a proper foundation for such evidence is laid by testimony of a witness who is familiar with the computerized records and the methods under which they were made so as to satisfy the court that the methods, the sources of information, and the time of preparation render such evidence trustworthy.\nState v. Springer, 283 N.C. 627, 636, 197 S.E.2d 530, 536 (1973). The authenticity of such records may be established by circumstantial evidence. State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 533, 330 S.E.2d 450, 462 (1985). \u201cThere is no requirement that the records be authenticated by the person who made them.\u201d Id. If the records themselves show they were made at or near the time of the transaction, the witness does not need to testify from personal knowledge that they were made at that time. Id.\nDefendant argues the cell phone records were not properly authenticated because defense counsel\u2019s cross examination of Mr. Harger revealed that Mr. Harger himself did not provide the records to the police and that he could not know for certain if a particular document was, in fact, from Sprint/Nextel. However, Mr. Harger\u2019s testimony, taken together with the circumstances, establishes sufficient circumstantial evidence to authenticate the documents, and any question of credibility is left to the jury. Mr. Harger, a custodian of records for Sprint/Nextel for 10 years, testified that he is familiar with Sprint/Nextel records and that he has testified in other cases. He stated that Sprint/Nextel transmitted records to the Durham Police Department and that he believed it was by e-mail. He testified that the records were kept in the normal course of business and that the documents he saw were the same as those normally sent to law enforcement in connection with a case.\nAccording to Mr. Harger\u2019s testimony, Exhibit 120 included a response letter from Sprint, a screen print of Sprint\u2019s database, a directory of cell sites, and call detail records. Although Mr. Harger did not send the documents to the Durham Police Department, he testified that he believed them to be accurate and that he was familiar with each type of document. This was sufficient evidence to show that the records were, as the State claimed, records from Sprint/Nextel, and any question as to the accuracy or reliability of such records is a jury question.\nAssuming, arguendo, Mr. Harger\u2019s testimony did not authenticate the records, this error was not prejudicial, as Detective Chappell\u2019s testimony sufficiently authenticated Exhibit 121, which also contained Sprint/Nextel phone records for Defendant and Officer Stroud. See State v. Ferguson, 145 N.C. App. 302, 307, 549 S.E.2d 889, 893 (2001) (\u201cEvidentiary errors are harmless unless a defendant proves that absent the error a different result would have been reached at trial.\u201d). Detective Chappell testified that he received the records from Sprint/Nextel pursuant to a court order in this matter and that they were the same records that Mr. Harger testified to. Detective Chappell then testified as to how he mapped out the relative locations of Defendant and Officer Stroud based on the cell phone records provided by Sprint/Nextel.\nUnder Rule 901, \u201c[t]estimony of [a] [w]itness with [knowledge\u201d sufficiently conforms to the methods of authentication and identification provided for under the Rule. N.C. R. Evid. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 901(b)(1) (2009). Detective Chappell\u2019s testimony as to the same records as Mr. Harger sufficiently satisfied the \u201cwitness with knowledge\u201d standard provided for under Rule 901(b). Id. Because Detective Chappell\u2019s testimony authenticated the phone records, any possible error in admitting the records during Mr. Harger\u2019s testimony was not prejudicial.\nDefendant also alleges that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to review cell phone records and hear audiotapes during their deliberation because they contained material not put before the jury during the presentation of evidence, which Defend\u00e1nt did not have the opportunity to address with rebuttal evidence or in closing argument. We find Defendant has waived this argument.\nDuring jury deliberations, the jury asked to review the evidence, including the cell phone records and audio tapes of Defendant\u2019s phone conversations with Officer Stroud. Defense counsel objected to the cell phone records, asking that the court\nlimit the jury\u2019s consideration of all the information on those CDs that was not the subject of a direct \u2014 or question or cross-examination question under oath, on the grounds that there was a lot of information that was not provided to the jury in the State\u2019s case.\nAnd it would be improper now to enter that evidence without\u2014 after the case is the over and after the State has rested. I do understand that the CDs themselves were admitted under evidence and that that was done through a witness under oath. And I would do my objections on the grounds that at the time that there was no proper foundation for that person to enter those records. But you\u2019ve already ruled on that as well. So that\u2019s what I wanted to put on record.\nDefense counsel also objected to the audio tapes, stating that \u201ceverything after the first call on that tape was not played to the jury during the trial.\u201d\nDefense counsel later clarified his exception, stating,\nBecause there are substantially new materials that I did not have the opportunity to address in my closing argument. The other of those calls on there, as you may know, these tapes were handed over to her attorneys who it sounds like, I don\u2019t know, there were some mixed \u2014 the way some started and the way some stopped. She was not asked about those or had the opportunity to address those on direct or on cross or redirect. And I was not \u2014 did not have an opportunity to address the Court \u2014 the jury about. Especially all the new material we have heard in these tapes regarding, you know, this meeting and why didn\u2019t you show up and why didn\u2019t you \u2014 was there someone in the car, you know, there wasn\u2019t. And all of that, the jury\u2019s hearing for the first time. And the State\u2019s evidence is closed. And none of that was authenticated or foundation laid. And I didn\u2019t have the opportunity to address it in closing.\nAnd I think it violates her Sixth Amendment right to counsel to now have stuff played for the jury that was not put in the State\u2019s evidence and published to \u2014 and they had the opportunity to publish that entire tape during the case \u2014 State\u2019s case. And she \u2014 they were asked, is there anything else you want to show to the jury. And it\u2019s not until we\u2019ve closed and it\u2019s done that they\u2019re now hearing about it. And I was \u2014 move for a mistrial.\nDefendant argues that it was error for the trial court to permit the jury to hear this evidence without providing Defendant an opportunity to present a rebuttal. Defendant, however, did not make a motion to reopen the case and did not explain what rebuttal would have been provided if the opportunity was given. Absent a motion to reopen the case, we cannot rule on the trial court\u2019s failure to allow an opportunity for rebuttal. See N.C. R. App. P 10(a)(1) (requiring a party to make a request, objection, or motion at the trial and obtain a ruling upon that request, objection, or motion to preserve it for appellate review). This argument has been waived.\nIV. Conclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons we find\nNo error.\nJudges HUNTER, Robert C., and STROUD concur.\n. Mr. Smith is not related to Denita Smith.\n. Ms. Crawley-Kearns is not related to Defendant.\n. Defendant cites to State v. Thompson, 19 N.C. App. 693, 200 S.E.2d 208 (1973) in her argument. In Thompson, however, the defendant requested permission to recall a witness and that request was denied. Id. at 695, 200 S.E.2d at 210. Here, we have no such request to introduce evidence or reopen the case.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Bur\u00e9n R. Shields, III, for the State.", "Glover & Petersen, P.A., by Ann B. Petersen, for Defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SHANNON ELIZABETH CRAWLEY\nNo. COA11-93\n(Filed 20 December 2011)\n1. Evidence \u2014 cell phone records \u2014 authentication\u2014circumstantial evidence\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder case by admitting defendant\u2019s and an officer\u2019s cell phone records into evidence over defendant\u2019s objection based on alleged insufficient authentication. A witness\u2019s testimony, taken together with the circumstances, established sufficient circumstantial evidence to authenticate the documents, and any question of credibility was left to the jury.\n2. Appeal and Error \u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to make motion to reopen case for rebuttal\nAlthough defendant contended that the trial court erred in a first-degree murder case by allowing the jury to review cell phone records and hear audiotapes during their deliberation without providing defendant an opportunity to present a rebuttal, defendant waived this argument. Defendant did not make a motion to reopen the case and did not explain what rebuttal would have been provided had the opportunity been given.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 22 February 2010 by Judge Ronald L. Stephens in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 August 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Bur\u00e9n R. Shields, III, for the State.\nGlover & Petersen, P.A., by Ann B. Petersen, for Defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0509-01", "first_page_order": 519, "last_page_order": 529 }