{ "id": 4348012, "name": "JUDY ST. JOHN, Plaintiff, v. TAMMY BRANTLEY, Defendant; JUDY ST. JOHN, Plaintiff, v. VICKY BRANTLEY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "St. John v. Brantley", "decision_date": "2011-12-20", "docket_number": "No. COA11-635; NO. COA11-643", "first_page": "558", "last_page": "566", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "217 N.C. App. 558" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "661 S.E.2d 924", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641232 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "926" }, { "page": "925-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/661/0924-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5001", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-226", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4159089 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" }, { "page": "148-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 S.E.2d 892", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11795407 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0327-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 739, "char_count": 19039, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14777174267688967 }, "sha256": "3b5a56385f9fbdd7db3d838581a090f19f39febfa4ffbbc023d4410d736102bf", "simhash": "1:a74b81477f3c6754", "word_count": 3016 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:07:22.966851+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "JUDY ST. JOHN, Plaintiff, v. TAMMY BRANTLEY, Defendant; JUDY ST. JOHN, Plaintiff, v. VICKY BRANTLEY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEPHENS, Judge.\nOn 10 December 2010, Plaintiff Judy St. John filed complaints for civil no-contact orders against Defendants Tammy Brantley and Vicky Brantley, who are sisters. On the same date, the trial court issued ex parte temporary civil no-contact orders restraining Defendants from contacting or harassing Plaintiff. Following a hearing on 16 February 2011, on 24 February 2011, nunc pro tunc 16 February 2011, the court entered one-year civil no-contact orders against both Defendants.\nAt the request of Plaintiff, Defendants, and the State, the court heard the civil no-contact matters and a related misdemeanor criminal case against Tammy at the same time. The evidence tended to show the following: Plaintiff lives across the street from the home where Defendants live with their mother. Defendants had a volatile relationship with each other as reported by Plaintiff and other neighbors. On 23 September 2010, Plaintiff heard Tammy screaming at Vicky and threatening to kick her out of the house. Later that morning, Tammy came outside and began shouting about \u201c[s]ocial [s]ervices\u201d and said \u201cthat bitch across the street had called [social services,]\u201d referring to Plaintiff. Plaintiff had not called the Pitt County Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d) on that occasion, but did call on 24 September to report her concerns that Tammy was mistreating Vicky and might have been locking her out of their house overnight.\nOn 2 October 2010, Plaintiff looked out her front window and saw Tammy push her sister off their front porch. Tammy then began singing \u201cChristian songs\u201d loudly as she beat her sister with an object Plaintiff could not identify. Plaintiff called the Greenville Police Department (\u201cGPD\u201d), but could not wait for their arrival due to a doctor\u2019s appointment. As Plaintiff left for her appointment, she saw a neighbor who was planning to go to Defendants\u2019 home and tell them to be quiet. Plaintiff told him she had called police. As Plaintiff and her neighbor spoke, Defendants were \u201cscreaming at [them].\u201d On her way to the appointment, Plaintiff saw several other neighbors who had heard the commotion, and Plaintiff also told them that she had already called police.\nPlaintiff called a GPD detective about the incident a few days later. After speaking with Plaintiff, the detective obtained a warrant and arrested Tammy on 8 October 2010 for misdemeanor assault. Plaintiffs name did not appear on the warrant. Defendants denied any assault took place and the criminal charge was dismissed. The charge was reinstated on 8 November 2010, leading again to Tammy\u2019s arrest. Plaintiff was listed as the complainant on the second warrant, which was issued 10 December 2010.\nPlaintiff testified that after her call to police, Defendants began harassing her. On 3 October, Plaintiff received a message on her Facebook account with the subject line, \u201cDid you know you are committing a sin?\u201d On 11 October, Vicky came to Plaintiff\u2019s home and threatened to sue Plaintiff for libel. Vicky also reported that a police officer had told Defendants that Plaintiff had a recording of the 2 October assault. Plaintiff responded that she did not have a recording, but had given police a statement about the assault. On 12 October, Vicky returned to Plaintiff\u2019s home to tell her she knew Plaintiff was going to testify against Tammy. Later that day, both Defendants came to Plaintiff\u2019s house. They told Plaintiff they had seen young men on her carport, knew who the men were but would not identify them to Plaintiff, and stated they did not want Plaintiff to think Defendants were responsible if anything in Plaintiff\u2019s carport was damaged. Plaintiff believed that Defendants were planning to vandalize her property and wanted to plant a false cover story about the alleged young men. Plaintiff planned to have motion-sensor lights installed outside her home and moved her grill from her porch because she feared Defendants might use it to set her house on fire.\nOn 10 December, Vicky rang Plaintiff\u2019s doorbell. When Plaintiff would not answer, Tammy pounded on the door and yelled loudly at Plaintiff. Later that day, Tammy returned, screaming \u201cI know you\u2019re in there,\u201d and pounding on Plaintiff\u2019s door until pictures on the wall shook. Plaintiff testified, \u201cI believe if I had opened the door she would have pushed through and beat me.\u201d On 11 December, Tammy knocked on Plaintiff\u2019s door again and when Plaintiff refused to answer, Tammy stood on Defendants\u2019 porch and screamed loudly about committing suicide. The following day, Tammy followed Plaintiff in her car when Plaintiff was running errands. Plaintiff testified she did \u201cnot feel safe\u201d and stated, \u201cI think if I go outside, except to get in my car, Tammy will try to harm me.\u201d\nIn each of the orders, the trial court made detailed findings of fact about the behaviors Defendants engaged in against Plaintiff, as well as the criminal charges Tammy faced and Plaintiffs role as a witness in that matter. The court specifically found that Defendants\u2019 behavior \u201cconstitute[d] the unlawful conduct of intimidating a witness in a pending criminal case[.]\u201d Based on these findings, the court concluded that Defendants \u201ccommitted acts of unlawful conduct against [P]laintiff.\u201d Defendants appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in entering the no-contact orders. We disagree and affirm.\nDiscussion\n\u201cA trial judge, sitting without a jury, acts as fact finder and weigher of evidence. Accordingly, if [the court\u2019s] findings are supported by competent evidence, they are binding on appeal, although there may be evidence that may support findings to the contrary.\u201d S. Bldg. Maint. v. Osborne, 127 N.C. App. 327, 331, 489 S.E.2d 892, 895 (1997) (citation omitted). Here, Defendant does not challenge the content of any findings of fact, and thus, they are binding on appeal.\n\u201cUpon a finding that the victim has suffered unlawful conduct committed by the respondent, the court may issue temporary or permanent civil no-contact orders as authorized in this Chapter.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50C-5(a) (2009). Two types of \u201cunlawful conduct\u201d can support the entry of a civil no-contact order under section 50C-5(a): nonconsensual sexual conduct or stalking. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50C-1(7) (2009). The statute further defines stalking as\n[ o]n more than one occasion, following or otherwise harassing, as defined in G.S. 14-277.3A(b)(2) [the criminal stalking statute], another person without legal purpose with the intent to do any of the following:\na. Place the person in reasonable fear either for the person\u2019s safety or the safety of the person\u2019s immediate family or close personal associates.\nb. Cause that person to suffer substantial emotional distress by placing that person in fear of death, bodily injury, or continued harassment and that in fact causes that person substantial emotional distress.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50C-1(6). This Court has emphasized that entry of a civil no-contact order requires not only findings of fact that show the defendant harassed the plaintiff, but also that the \u201cdefendant\u2019s harassment was accompanied by the specific intent\u201d described in section 50C-l(6)(a) or (b). Ramsey v. Harman, 191 N.C. App. 146, 149, 661 S.E.2d 924, 926 (2008). As for behavior that constitutes harassment, section 50C-1(6) refers to the definition contained in our criminal stalking statute: \u201cKnowing conduct. . . directed at a specific person that torments, terrorizes, or terrifies that person and that serves no legitimate purpose.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.3A(b)(2) (2009).\nRelevancy of Findings\nDefendants first argue that most of the court\u2019s findings are irrelevant because they pertain to Defendants\u2019 actions prior to 10 December 2010 when the second warrant for Tammy\u2019s arrest was issued. We disagree.\nBecause Plaintiff\u2019s name did not appear on the first warrant, issued on 8 October 2010, Defendants contend they could not have known Plaintiff would be a witness against Tammy and thus cannot have been harassing her for purposes of witness intimidation. However, at the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she told Vicky on 11 October that she had called the police and made a written report about the assault. In addition, as the court found in finding of fact 7, the following day, Vicky told Plaintiff that Defendants knew Plaintiff was going to testify against them. Thus, Defendants\u2019 actions prior to 10 December were taken with knowledge of Plaintiff\u2019s role in the charges against Tammy and were highly relevant. This meritless argument is overruled.\nRequirement of Criminal Conduct by Defendants\nDefendants next argue that because Plaintiff did not testify that Defendants committed \u201ccriminal conduct\u201d against her, Defendants cannot have engaged in \u201cunlawful conduct\u201d as required for issuance of a civil no-contact order. As noted supra, \u201cunlawful conduct\u201d under section 50C-l(a) does not require commission of a crime against a plaintiff. Instead, \u201cunlawful conduct\u201d includes harassment which the defendant intends to cause the plaintiff \u201creasonable fear\u201d for her safety or \u201csubstantial emotional distress[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50C-1(6). Further, we note that in unchallenged finding of fact 16, the court found that Defendants\u2019 behavior \u201cconstitute [d] the unlawful conduct of intimidating a witness in a pending criminal case,\u201d which is a Class H felony in this State. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-226(a) (2009). Thus, although not required for issuance of a civil no-contact order, the trial court here did find that Defendants engaged in criminal behavior toward Plaintiff. This meritless argument is overruled.\nStatutory Basis for Civil No-contact Orders\nDefendants also argue that \u201cintimidating a witness in a pending criminal case\u201d does not fall into either of the two categories of behavior defined as unlawful conduct sufficient to support entry of a civil no-contact order. We disagree.\nAs discussed above, under Chapter 50C, unlawful conduct includes stalking, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50C-1(7), which in turn includes harassment as defined in our criminal stalking statute. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50C-1(6). The criminal stalking statute defines harassment as \u201c[k]nowing conduct . . . directed at a specific person that torments, terrorizes, or terrifies that person and that serves no legitimate purpose.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.3A(b)(2). We hold that, although Chapter 50C does not specifically use the term \u201cwitness intimidation,\u201d the definitions of \u201cunlawful conduct\u201d contained therein are more than broad enough to encompass such behavior.\nHere, Defendants\u2019 \u201cknowing conduct\u201d was directed at Plaintiff and terrorized her. In addition, not only was Defendants\u2019 conduct toward Plaintiff without any legitimate purpose, the trial court specifically found that Defendants undertook their course of conduct for an illegitimate and criminal purpose, to wit, to discourage Plaintiff from testifying in Tammy\u2019s pending criminal case. Thus, Defendants\u2019 actions to intimidate Plaintiff were \u201charassment\u201d under section 14-277.3A(b)(2), which in turn constituted \u201cstalking\u201d and thus \u201cunlawful conduct\u201d under Chapter 50C. The plain language of Chapter 50C does not require any particular purpose behind a defendant\u2019s stalking or harassment, beyond an intent to frighten a plaintiff or cause her severe emotional distress. Nor does Chapter 50C require that the trial court use the term \u201charassment\u201d or \u201cstalking\u201d in its findings of fact to support a civil no-contact order. Rather, the court need only find \u201cthat the victim has suffered unlawful conduct committed by the [defendant.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50C-5(a). The court so found here. Accordingly, this meritless argument is overruled.\nSpecific Intent\nIn a related argument, Defendants assert that the court\u2019s findings that they \u201cintimidate[d] a witness in a pending criminal case\u201d were insufficient to support the no-contact orders because witness intimidation does not reflect the specific intent required of Defendants under section 500-1(6). We disagree.\nIn making this contention, Defendants rely on Ramsey, supra, in which this Court reversed a civil no-contact order where the trial court found that the defendant had harassed the plaintiff, but made no findings about the defendant\u2019s intent. 191 N.C. App. at 148-49, 661 S.E.2d at 925-26. We held that a mere finding of harassment is insufficient because\n[ t]he statute requires the trial court to further find [the] defendant\u2019s harassment was accompanied by the specific intent to either: (1) place the person in fear for their safety, or the safety of their family or close personal associates or (2) cause the person substantial emotional distress by placing that person in fear of death, bodily injury, or continued harassment and in fact cause that person substantial emotional distress.\nId. at 149, 661 S.E.2d at 926 (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5001(6)).\nHere, in contrast to Ramsey, the court found that Defendants intimidated Plaintiff because she was to be a witness in the criminal case against Tammy. \u201cIntimidate\u201d means \u201cto make timid or fearful],]\u201d \u201cinspire or affect with fear[,]\u201d and \u201cto compel action or inaction (as by threats)[.]\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (unabridged 2002). Intimidating a witness in a criminal trial, as the court found occurred here, encompasses all three of these definitions and fully reflects the specific intent required under section 50C-1 (6)'. This meritless argument is overruled.\nLack of Required Findings\nDefendants next argue that the trial court erred in entering the no-contact orders because the orders lacked statutorily-required findings. We disagree.\nDefendants contend that the no-contact orders were erroneously entered because there were no findings that Plaintiff suffered substantial emotional distress and that the evidence would not support any such findings. However, under the statute, entry of a civil no-contact order is proper, not only based on findings that the plaintiff has suffered substantial emotional distress, but also when a defendant harasses a person with the intent to \u201c[p]lace the person in reasonable fear ... for the person\u2019s safety[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50C-l(6)(a).\nHere, Plaintiff testified in detail about her fear of Defendants, including, inter alia, that Plaintiff: (1) \u201cbelieve[d] if I had opened the door [Tammy] would have pushed through and beat me[,]\u201d (2) did \u201cnot feel safe[,]\u201d and (3) worried that \u201cif I go outside, except to get in my car, Tammy will try to harm me.\u201d In finding of fact 9, the court found that Plaintiff had installed motion-sensor lighting outside her home and moved her grill out of fear that Defendants were planning to vandalize or burn down her house. In finding of fact 11, the court found that when Defendants had pounded on Plaintiff\u2019s door and yelled at her, \u201cPlaintiff was afraid[.]\u201d In finding of fact 16, the court found that Defendants\u2019 actions were undertaken in order to intimidate Plaintiff because she planned to testify in Tammy\u2019s criminal trial. These findings comport with the statute\u2019s requirements and support entry of the no-contact orders. This meritless argument is overruled.\nReliance on Inadmissible Evidence\nDefendants last argue that the court\u2019s findings about the circumstances surrounding Tammy\u2019s alleged assault on her sister were based on evidence barred by Rule 404(b). We disagree.\n\u201cIn order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context.\u201d N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1). Because Defendants did not object to Plaintiff\u2019s testimony about Tammy\u2019s assault on Vicky, they have waived their right to appellate review of this issue. Further, even if Defendants had preserved this issue, they would not prevail.\nUnder Rule 404(b),\n[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2009). Evidence about Tammy\u2019s assault on Vicky and Plaintiff\u2019s role in the subsequent criminal charges explained Defendants\u2019 motive in harassing Plaintiff, and thus was not barred by Rule 404(b). Defendants\u2019 argument lacks merit and is overruled. The trial court\u2019s civil no-contact orders are\nAFFIRMED.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge ELMORE concur.\n. Here, there are no allegations of sexual conduct by Defendants.\n. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge remarked, \u201cIt\u2019s a wonder that they weren\u2019t charged with a felony of harassing or intimidating a witness.\u201d [T130]", "type": "majority", "author": "STEPHENS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "The Foster Law Firm, P.A., by Jeffery B. Foster, for Plaintiff", "Sutton Law Offices, PA., by David C. Sutton, for Defendants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JUDY ST. JOHN, Plaintiff, v. TAMMY BRANTLEY, Defendant; JUDY ST. JOHN, Plaintiff, v. VICKY BRANTLEY, Defendant\nNo. COA11-635; NO. COA11-643\n(Filed 20 December 2011)\n1. Evidence \u2014 prior crimes or bad acts \u2014 relevancy\nThe trial court did not err in a stalking case by considering defendants\u2019 actions prior to 10 December 2010 because they were taken with knowledge of plaintiff\u2019s role in the charges against Tammy Brantley and were highly relevant.\n2. Stalking \u2014 civil no-contact order \u2014 engaging in criminal behavior\nAlthough not required for issuance of a civil no-contact order, the trial court did find that defendants engaged in criminal behavior toward plaintiff.\n3. Stalking \u2014 intimidating witness \u2014 harassment\u2014unlawful conduct\nDefendants\u2019 actions to intimidate plaintiff, a witness in a pending criminal case, were harassment under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-277.3A(b)(2), which in turn constituted stalking and unlawful conduct.\n4. Stalking \u2014 civil no-contact order \u2014 intimidating a witness\u2014 specific intent\nThe trial court did not err by concluding that intimidating a witness in a criminal trial encompassed all three definitions and fully reflected the specific intent required under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50C-1(6) for a civil no-contact order.\n5. Stalking \u2014 civil no-contact order \u2014 statutorily-required findings\nThe trial court made the required findings under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50C-1(6) to enter the no-contact orders.\n6. Evidence \u2014 prior crimes or bad acts \u2014 motive\nThe trial court did not err in a stalking case by considering the circumstances surrounding defendant Tammy Brantley\u2019s alleged assault on her sister and plaintiff\u2019s role in the subsequent criminal charges because it explained defendants\u2019 motive in harassing plaintiff.\nAppeal by Defendants from orders entered 24 February 2011 by Judge Charles M. Vincent in Pitt County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 November 2011.\nThe Foster Law Firm, P.A., by Jeffery B. Foster, for Plaintiff\nSutton Law Offices, PA., by David C. Sutton, for Defendants.\n. Pursuant to Rule 40 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure and based on the identity of the legal issues raised, COA11-635 and COA11-643 are consolidated for decision on appeal." }, "file_name": "0558-01", "first_page_order": 568, "last_page_order": 576 }