{ "id": 4364832, "name": "DUNCAN C. DAY and ASHLEY-BROOK DAY, as Co-Administrators of the Estate of DUNCAN C. DAY, JR., deceased, Plaintiffs v. THOMAS ALAN BRANT, M.D., EDWARD WILLIAM HALES, P.A., MID-ATLANTIC EMERGENCY MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, P.A. and MOORESVILLE HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC. d/b/a LAKE NORMAN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Day v. Brant", "decision_date": "2012-01-17", "docket_number": "No. COA09-573-2", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "22", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "218 N.C. App. 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633373, 12633374, 12633375, 12633376, 12633377, 12633378, 12633379, 12633380, 12633381, 12633382, 12633383, 12633384, 12633385, 12633386, 12633387, 12633388, 12633389, 12633390, 12633391, 12633392, 12633393, 12633394, 12633395 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0738-10", "/se2d/615/0738-01", "/se2d/615/0738-02", "/se2d/615/0738-03", "/se2d/615/0738-04", "/se2d/615/0738-05", "/se2d/615/0738-06", "/se2d/615/0738-07", "/se2d/615/0738-08", "/se2d/615/0738-09", "/se2d/615/0738-16", "/se2d/615/0738-11", "/se2d/615/0738-12", "/se2d/615/0738-13", "/se2d/615/0738-14", "/se2d/615/0738-15", "/se2d/615/0738-17", "/se2d/615/0738-18", "/se2d/615/0738-19", "/se2d/615/0738-20", "/se2d/615/0738-21", "/se2d/615/0738-22", "/se2d/615/0738-23" ] }, { "cite": "664 S.E.2d 331", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641599 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" }, { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/664/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "613 S.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632931 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/613/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 S.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642780 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "716" }, { "page": "716" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/672/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "651 S.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639609 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398" }, { "page": "399" }, { "page": "399", "parenthetical": "\"After a careful review of the record on appeal, we conclude that plaintiffs presented more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the proximate causation element of their medical negligence action.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/651/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 S. Ct. 2786", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12696802, 12696813, 12696814, 12696825, 12696826, 12696827 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2798" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/569/1024-07", "/us/569/1025-01", "/us/569/1025-02", "/us/569/1025-14", "/us/569/1025-15", "/us/569/1025-16" ] }, { "cite": "663 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641536 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453", "parenthetical": "quoting Click v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 300 N.C. 164, 167, 265 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1980)" }, { "page": "453" }, { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/663/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "656 S.E.2d 603", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640356 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607" }, { "page": "608" }, { "page": "607-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/656/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633104 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "625 S.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635061, 12635062 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/625/0778-01", "/se2d/625/0778-02" ] }, { "cite": "624 S.E.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634835 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384", "parenthetical": "quoting Barham v. Hawk, 165 N.C. App. 708, 712, 600 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2004), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 360 N.C. 358, 625 S.E.2d 778 (2006)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/624/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 S.E.2d 922", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634068 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "924", "parenthetical": "quoting Smith v. Whitmer, 159 N.C. 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Food Lion, LLC, 175 N.C. App. 22, 26, 623 S.E.2d 281, 284 (2005), aff'd per curiam, 360 N.C. 472, 628 S.E.2d 761 (2006)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0920-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005 WL 1669128", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4160029 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358946 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 619", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" }, { "page": "623" }, { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 N.C. App. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521231 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/97/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "575 S.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "802" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358281 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" }, { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559969 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 9079053 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259", "parenthetical": "holding that doctor could testify regarding standard of care where doctor testified that: (1) he practiced in Charlotte, North Carolina and was licensed to practice throughout State; (2) he was familiar with standard of care of communities similar to Wilmington, North Carolina; and (3" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9251005 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624", "parenthetical": "holding that doctor could testify regarding standard of care where doctor testified that: (1) he practiced in Charlotte, North Carolina and was licensed to practice throughout State; (2" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3799004 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "605 S.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157", "parenthetical": "holding doctor qualified to testify when he reviewed demographic information regarding Rocky Mount, North Carolina, drove through Rocky Mount, drove by hospital, determined surgical resources available from report of operation, and had practiced in other small towns in North Carolina" }, { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 N.C. App. 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8410973 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" }, { "page": "197" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/167/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3798066 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "600 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8999846 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8352454 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478", "parenthetical": "quoting Barham v. Hawk, 165 N.C. App. 708, 712, 600 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2004), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 360 N.C. 358, 625 S.E.2d 778 (2006)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-21.12", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "582 S.E.2d 669", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 11, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671-72" }, { "page": "673" }, { "page": "672", "parenthetical": "\"Although Dr. Heiman asserted that he was familiar with the applicable standard of care, his testimony is devoid of support for this assertion.\"" }, { "page": "672" }, { "page": "672" }, { "page": "673" }, { "page": "671" }, { "page": "672" }, { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8954949 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" }, { "page": "197" }, { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8351176 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194", "parenthetical": "quoting Smith v. Whitmer, 159 N.C. App. 192, 195, 582 S.E.2d 669, 671-72 (2003)" }, { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712" }, { "page": "711" }, { "page": "712", "parenthetical": "refusing to uphold directed verdict in medical malpractice case based on expert's answers to cross-examination questions because doing so would require construing evidence in light most favorable to movants, which \"the law does not permit\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491380 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" }, { "page": "160" }, { "page": "161-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 N.C. App. 670", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8244135 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/180/0670-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3788627 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8349702 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 N.C. App. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156716 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "quoting Herring v. Food Lion, LLC, 175 N.C. App. 22, 26, 623 S.E.2d 281, 284 (2005), aff'd per curiam, 360 N.C. 472, 628 S.E.2d 761 (2006)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/189/0331-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1706, "char_count": 51731, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.3776877221195043e-08, "percentile": 0.2749030928057968 }, "sha256": "a251811a0c5917ca693a56a8ad9b6f47b90cf00db9da2f338e04563e29e8253b", "simhash": "1:8184448a7c2f4102", "word_count": 8338 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:21:59.538017+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ROBERT C. HUNTER and CALABRIA concur." ], "parties": [ "DUNCAN C. DAY and ASHLEY-BROOK DAY, as Co-Administrators of the Estate of DUNCAN C. DAY, JR., deceased, Plaintiffs v. THOMAS ALAN BRANT, M.D., EDWARD WILLIAM HALES, P.A., MID-ATLANTIC EMERGENCY MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, P.A. and MOORESVILLE HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC. d/b/a LAKE NORMAN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nPlaintiffs Duncan C. Day and Ashley-Brook Day have appealed from the trial court\u2019s grant of a directed verdict to defendants Thomas Alan Brant, M.D.; Edward William Hales, P.A.; and Mid-Atlantic Emergency Medical Associates, P.A. Plaintiffs\u2019 16-year-old son, Duncan C. Day, Jr. (\u201cDuncan\u201d), was injured in a car accident and brought to Lake Norman Regional Medical Center (\u201cLNRMC\u201d). After being examined and released, he died from internal bleeding when his liver, which had sustained lacerations in the car accident, ruptured. Plaintiffs contend defendants were negligent in failing to discover the liver lacerations and failing to admit Duncan to the hospital \u25a0for observation and treatment.\nAt trial, defendants made two arguments in support of their motion for a directed verdict: (1) that plaintiffs\u2019 standard of care expert, Dr. Paul Mele, was not qualified to testify to the applicable standard of care and (2) that plaintiffs\u2019 causation expert, Dr. James O. Wyatt, III, presented insufficient evidence of proximate causation. Based on our review of that testimony, we disagree and hold that the testimony of Dr. Mele and Dr. Wyatt was sufficient to defeat defendants\u2019 motion for a directed verdict. Accordingly, we reverse.\nFacts\nOn 27 October 2003, Duncan was involved in a head-on collision after falling asleep while driving on U.S. 21 in Iredell County, North Carolina. When Duncan arrived at LNRMC, Dr. Brant and Mr. Hales were on duty in the emergency room. Duncan had a seatbelt abrasion from his left shoulder to his right upper abdomen and bruises on his arms and legs. He reported neck and chest pain. A physical examination, blood work, a chest x-ray, cervical spine x-rays, and a limited cervical spine CT scan were performed, and no significant problems were discovered. Neither Dr. Brant nor Mr. Hales ordered an ultrasound or CT scan of Duncan\u2019s abdomen. Duncan was given pain medication and discharged.\nThe next morning, 28 October 2003, Duncan was found unresponsive at home and was pronounced dead on arrival at LNRMC. Internal bleeding from a liver rupture caused his death. Plaintiffs filed suit against Dr. Brant, Mr. Hales, Mid-Atlantic Emergency Medical Associates, and LNRMC in Iredell County Superior Court on 15 November 2004, but subsequently voluntarily dismissed the claim against LNRMC.\nAt trial, plaintiffs called Dr. Paul Mele, a board certified emergency medicine physician with 20 years of experience, to give an expert opinion on the standard of care. After the trial court admitted Dr. Mele as an expert over defendants\u2019 objection, Dr. Mele explained that the liver and the spleen are the organs most commonly injured after blunt force trauma to the abdomen. According to Dr. Mele, simply being restrained by a seat belt can injure these organs.\nDr. Mele concluded that Dr. Brant and Mr. Hales failed to follow the standard of care in treating Duncan. He testified that given the facts known by the two men \u2014 Duncan was in a car accident, had chest pain, was bruised across his chest from his shoulder harness, was overweight, and was a teenager \u2014 Dr. Brant and Mr. Hales should have been alerted to the possibility that Duncan might have suffered an abdominal injury despite not reporting abdominal pain or suffering a broken rib. According to Dr. Mele, Dr. Brant and Mr. Hales \u201cjust really didn\u2019t give the abdomen a fair chance to be evaluated,\u201d and \u201c[i]t was just too easily dismissed as not an abdominal injury scenario at all____\u201d\nPlaintiffs tendered, without objection, their causation expert, Dr. James O. Wyatt, III, as an expert in trauma surgery. Dr. Wyatt explained that Duncan\u2019s death was due to exsanguination caused by a Grade IV or V laceration to his liver and a Grade II injury to his spleen. According to Dr. Wyatt, a \u201cfair amount\u201d of blood had built up underneath the laceration to Duncan\u2019s liver, and when it subsequently broke loose, it resulted in rapid bleeding that caused Duncan to pass out and go into cardiac arrest.\nDr. Wyatt testified that none of the studies performed on Duncan when first seen at the hospital would have diagnosed this problem and that such a diagnosis is usually made using a CT scan of the abdomen and pelvis. He testified that if the diagnosis had been made, Duncan should have been admitted to the hospital, where the injury should have initially been handled non-operatively. Dr. Wyatt detailed the options if non operative management failed, including \u201c[angiography with possible embolization,\u201d \u201c[sjurgical management with possible hepatic repair,\u201d and/or \u201c[s]urgical management with damage control packing.\u201d In his written report, he concluded that \u201c[s]urvival is excellent (>51%) in patients who arrive in the hospital and get proper initial and subsequent management.\u201d Dr. Wyatt believed that if Duncan had been in the hospital when his liver ruptured, \u201che would have survived it.\u201d\nAt the conclusion of plaintiffs\u2019 evidence, defendants moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that Dr. Mele was not qualified to give an expert opinion on the standard of care and that plaintiffs had not shown proximate cause. The trial court granted the motion without specifying its grounds. Plaintiffs timely appealed to this Court.\nDiscussion\n\u201c \u2018This Court reviews a trial court\u2019s grant of a motion for directed verdict de novo.\u2019 \u201d Kerr v. Long, 189 N.C. App. 331, 334, 657 S.E.2d 920, 922 (2008) (quoting Herring v. Food Lion, LLC, 175 N.C. App. 22, 26, 623 S.E.2d 281, 284 (2005), aff\u2019d per curiam, 360 N.C. 472, 628 S.E.2d 761 (2006)). The Court must determine \u201c \u2018whether, upon examination of all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and that party being given the benefit of every reasonable inference drawn therefrom, the evidence [is] sufficient to be submitted to the jury.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Brookshire v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 180 N.C. App. 670, 672, 637 S.E.2d 902, 904 (2006)).\n\u201cWhen a defendant moves for a directed verdict in a medical malpractice case, the question raised is whether the plaintiff has offered evidence of each of the following elements of his claim for relief: (1) the standard of care, (2) breach of the standard of care, (3) proximate causation, and (4) damages.\u201d Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 162, 381 S.E.2d 706, 712 (1989). In this case, the sole issues are the sufficiency of the evidence as to the standard of care and proximate causation.\nI\nThere is no dispute that Dr. Mele testified that defendants breached the standard of care. Defendants, however, contend that plaintiffs did not properly establish that Dr. Mele was qualified to provide expert testimony on the applicable standard of care. In medical malpractice cases, \u201c \u2018[b]ecause questions regarding the standard of care for health care professionals ordinarily require highly specialized knowledge, the plaintiff must establish the relevant standard of care through expert testimony.\u2019 \u201d Billings v. Rosenstein, 174 N.C. App. 191, 194, 619 S.E.2d 922, 924 (2005) (quoting Smith v. Whitmer, 159 N.C. App. 192, 195, 582 S.E.2d 669, 671-72 (2003)).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-21.12 (2009) sets out the standard of care applicable in a medical malpractice action:\nIn any action for damages for personal injury or death arising out of the furnishing or the failure to furnish professional services in the performance of medical, dental, or other health care, the defendant shall not be liable for the payment of damages unless the trier of the facts is satisfied by the greater weight of the evidence that the care of such health care provider was not in accordance with the standards of practice among members of the same health care profession with similar training and experience situated in the same or similar communities at the time of the alleged act giving rise to the cause of action.\nAn expert witness may testify regarding this standard of care \u201c \u2018when that physician is familiar with the experience and training of the defendant and either (1) the physician is familiar with the standard of care in the defendant\u2019s community, or (2) the physician is familiar with the medical resources available in the defendant\u2019s community and is familiar with the standard of care in other communities having access to similar resources.\u2019 \u201d Purvis v. Moses H. Cone Mem\u2019l Hosp. Serv. Corp., 175 N.C. App. 474, 478, 624 S.E.2d 380, 384 (2006) (quoting Barham v. Hawk, 165 N.C. App. 708, 712, 600 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2004), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 360 N.C. 358, 625 S.E.2d 778 (2006)).\nDefendants first argue that Dr. Mele was not qualified to testify under Rule 702(b) of the Rules of Evidence because he never testified he was a licensed physician. See N.C.R. Evid. 702(b) (providing that \"[i]n a medical malpractice action as defined in G.S. 90-21.11, a person shall not give expert testimony on the appropriate standard of health care as defined in G.S. 90-21.12 unless the person is a licensed, health care provider in this State or another state and meets\u201d specified criteria (emphasis added)).\nWhile Dr. Mele was never specifically asked whether he had a medical license, he testified that he was an emergency medicine physician; that he was board certified in emergency medicine; that he used to have emergency room privileges at Rex Hospital in Raleigh, North Carolina; that he had stopped practicing in an emergency department less than a year earlier because of the difficulties in working on a night shift; that, at the time of the trial, he was instead practicing in occupational medicine and urgent care; and that he now had urgent care privileges at hospitals. Even though Dr. Mele, at the time of his testimony, was no longer an emergency medicine doctor, he was still practicing medicine. A jury could reasonably infer from this testimony that Dr. Mele did in fact have a medical license.\nDefendants next contend that plaintiffs failed to show Dr. Mele\u2019s familiarity with defendants\u2019 community at the time of the alleged breach. If a plaintiff\u2019s standard of care expert witness \u201cfail[s] to demonstrate that he [is] sufficiently familiar with the standard of care \u2018among members of the same health care profession with similar training and experience situated in the same or similar communities at the time of the alleged act giving rise to the cause of action,\u2019 \u201d then the \u201cplaintiff [is] unable to establish an essential element of his claim, namely, the applicable standard of care,\u201d and the trial court properly enters judgment on behalf of the defendant. Smith, 159 N.C. App. at 197, 582 S.E.2d at 673 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-21.12).\nDr. Mele testified at trial that he reviewed defendants\u2019 depositions to determine the standard of practice for emergency medicine at LNRMC in 2003. He confirmed that the way they practiced emergency medicine was no different than his practice and that their training and experience in emergency medicine was no different. Dr. Mele reviewed the website of the medical group employing Dr. Brant and Mr. Hales and \u201cread through the qualifications and trainings of their doctors and PA\u2019s.\u201d He concluded that the physicians had similar academic backgrounds, training, and experience to his.\nDr. Mele also reviewed documents describing the population of the community, the number of beds in the hospital, the kinds of facilities available in the hospital, the kinds of patients seen, and the diagnostic services available. He testified that the descriptions of the facilities, the equipment available, the number of beds, and the services performed were all similar to that of hospitals in which he has worked, including Rex Hospital. Dr. Mele did internet research to obtain demographics regarding Mooresville and determined that it was similar to Wake County where Rex Hospital is located. Additionally, Dr. Mele testified that during his career, he has had an opportunity to consult with practitioners working in communities very similar to Iredell County and has determined that the standard of care in those communities is the same as in Iredell County and in the facilities in which he has worked.\nThis testimony was sufficient to establish Dr. Mele\u2019s familiarity with defendants and the standard of care in their community or similar communities. See Billings, 174 N.C. App. at 195, 619 S.E.2d at 925 (holding that doctor established sufficient familiarity with standard of care for neurologists in Wilkes County, North Carolina, when he examined demographic data on Wilkes County, he testified he was familiar with similar communities, he was licensed in North Carolina, and he had practiced in multiple communities in North Carolina); Pitts v. Nash Day Hosp., Inc., 167 N.C. App. 194, 199, 605 S.E.2d 154, 157 (2004) (holding doctor qualified to testify when he reviewed demographic information regarding Rocky Mount, North Carolina, drove through Rocky Mount, drove by hospital, determined surgical resources available from report of operation, and had practiced in other small towns in North Carolina), aff\u2019d per curiam, 359 N.C. 626, 614 S.E.2d 267 (2005); Coffman v. Roberson, 153 N.C. App. 618, 624, 571 S.E.2d 255, 259 (2002) (holding that doctor could testify regarding standard of care where doctor testified that: (1) he practiced in Charlotte, North Carolina and was licensed to practice throughout State; (2) he was familiar with standard of care of communities similar to Wilmington, North Carolina; and (3) he based his opinion on internet research he conducted about hospital\u2019s size, training program, and other information); Leatherwood v. Ehlinger, 151 N.C. App. 15, 22 23, 564 S.E.2d 883, 888 (2002) (reversing directed verdict when plaintiffs\u2019 expert specifically testified that he had knowledge of standard of care in Asheville, North Carolina and similar communities because of his practice in communities of size similar to Asheville and because he had attended rounds as medical student in Asheville hospital at issue).\nTo the extent defendants are challenging the fact that Dr. Mele acquired most of his information regarding the community after reaching his opinions and having his deposition taken, this Court has already rejected the argument that such an approach disqualifies the doctor\u2019s testimony. In Roush v. Kennon, 188 N.C. App. 570, 576, 656 S.E.2d 603, 607 (2008), the expert witness dentist, who was from Atlanta, Georgia, had similarly testified in a deposition that he had never been to the community at issue (Charlotte) and knew nothing about the dental community in Charlotte, but, prior to trial, had \u201csupplement[ed] his understanding of the applicable standard of care in the Charlotte metropolitan area by reviewing, inter alia, the demographic data for the Charlotte metropolitan area, the Dental Rules of the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, and the deposition of [the defendant] regarding the procedures, techniques, and implements which he used . . . .\u201d Based on this supplemented knowledge, the Court concluded that the expert witness had sufficient, familiarity with Charlotte to testify consistent with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-21.12. 188 N.C. App. at 576-77, 656 S.E.2d at 608. We can see no meaningful distinction between this case and Roush.\nDefendants also argue that Dr. Mele \u201cnever testified as to what he specifically learned about the relevant community from reading Defendants\u2019 depositions and did not give any specific testimony regarding the physician skill and training in the community, facilities, equipment, funding or physical and financial environment of the evant medical community.\u201d Defendants have cited no authority requiring that an expert witness testify \u201cas to what he specifically learned,\u201d and we have found none.\nSmith establishes that an expert witness cannot simply assert that he is familiar with the applicable standard of care without also providing an explanation of the basis for his familiarity. Smith, 159 N.C. App. at 196, 582 S.E.2d at 672 (\u201cAlthough Dr. Heiman asserted that he was familiar with the applicable standard of care, his testimony is devoid of support for this assertion.\u201d). Smith does not, however, require the degree of specificity urged by defendants. In Smith, the proposed expert admitted that the only basis for his claim of familiarity with the standard of care was verbal information received from the plaintiff\u2019s attorney regarding the size of the community and \u201c \u2018what goes on there.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 196-97, 582 S.E.2d at 672. The expert knew nothing about the medical community, had never visited the community,' had not spoken to health care practitioners in the community, and was \u201c \u2018not acquainted with the medical community\u2019 \u201d in the area involved. Id. at 197, 582 S.E.2d at 672. Further, the expert \u201coffered no testimony regarding defendants\u2019 training, experience, or the resources available in the defendants\u2019 medical community.\u201d Id., 582 S.E.2d at 673.\nIn this case, Dr. Mele established in his testimony that he had done research and had personal knowledge that supplied the information that the expert in Smith lacked. While Dr. Mele did not testify to specific numbers or actual details regarding the hospital and community, his testimony provided a basis \u2014 his research and personal knowledge \u2014 for his claim of familiarity. This case does not involve a bare statement of familiarity such as that present in Smith.\nFinally, defendants argue that Dr. Mele incorrectly applied a national standard of care rather than the \u201c \u2018same or similar community\u2019 \u201d standard applicable in North Carolina. In Smith, although the plaintiff\u2019s expert testified he was familiar with the standard of care for orthopedic surgeons practicing in the relevant community, he ultimately admitted that he was basing his opinions on the fact that the standard of care for orthopedic surgeons all over the country was \u201c \u2018very similar.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 194, 582 S.E.2d at 671. In affirming the trial court\u2019s exclusion of the expert\u2019s testimony, this Court observed that the expert could comment only on the standard of care anywhere in the country regardless of what the medical community involved in the case might do. Id. at 197, 582 S.E.2d at 672. Because \u201cthere was no evidence that a national standard of care is the same standard of care practiced in defendants\u2019 community[,]\u201d this testimony was insufficient. Id., 582 S.E.2d at 673.\nIt is, however, established that mere mention of a national standard is not sufficient to warrant disregard of an expert\u2019s testimony if the expert has testified regarding his or her familiarity with the standard of care in the same or similar communities. In Roush, 188 N.C. App. at 576, 656 S.E.2d at 607-08, once this Court concluded that the plaintiff\u2019s expert was qualified to testify given the evidence of his familiarity with Charlotte and his conclusion that the standard of care there was similar to that of Atlanta, \u201c[t]he fact that [the plaintiff\u2019s expert] previously testified that he believed in a national standard of care [did] not invalidate this conclusion.\u201d See also Pitts, 167 N.C. App. at 197, 605 S.E.2d at 156 (\u201cAlthough Dr. Strickland testified that the standard of care for laparoscopic surgery is a national standard, we are not of the opinion that such testimony inexorably requires that his testimony be excluded. Rather, the critical inquiry is whether the doctor\u2019s testimony, taken as a whole, meets the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-21.12.\u201d); Cox v. Steffes, 161 N.C. App. 237, 244, 246, 587 S.E.2d 908, 913, 914 (2003) (holding that although witness testified that standard of care at issue \u201cwas in fact the same across the nation,\u201d testimony was sufficient to support jury\u2019s verdict of negligence, despite reference to national standard of care, because expert had testified specifically that he knew standard of care practiced in defendant\u2019s community).\nDefense counsel, in this case, asked Dr. Mele whether he was testifying that he was applying a national standard of care, to which Dr. Mele responded:\nA. I testified that I understood the national standard of care to mean that any hospital that\u2019s a Level Two trauma center, perhaps the way we are, would have the same kind of care and the same kind of expertise no matter what city or state it was located in, if it was a Level Two trauma center with particular surgeons and diagnostic capabilities available.\nDefense counsel then asked: \u201cAnd the standard of care that you\u2019re applying is the standard of care that you believe would be the same in any city in America; correct?\u201d Dr. Mele replied:\nA. Standard of care applying is a board certified ER doctor who has CAT scan available and has a surgeon available, who has nurses and paramedics available.... Those are a more generic definition of what\u2019s available to practice medicine in that ER.\nA. The word national doesn\u2019t have the same meaning to me as perhaps you. And if I missed the legal point with that, I apologize. But the standard I\u2019m applying is the training that was available to the physician, the training that was available to the PA. and the resources that are available for him to do that. It doesn\u2019t, in my mind, change his skill or his abilities, what building he\u2019s practicing or what the name of the city is if he has those facilities available. So maybe I misspoke on that, but that\u2019s my concept.\nQ. And your concept is that the standard of care is the same in any city in the [sic] America, isn\u2019t that right?\nA. The concept is the standard of care is the same if those other conditions are met.\nIt is questionable whether this testimony could even be viewed as embracing a national standard of care since Dr. Mele repeatedly rejected defense counsel\u2019s attempt to extend Dr. Mele\u2019s opinion to all cities and limited his opinion, as our courts require, to those cities having the same facilities, resources, and training available. In any event, Dr. Mele\u2019s testimony as a whole met the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-21.12, and he specifically testified that the standard of care he was applying was the standard of care for defendants\u2019 community, just like the experts in Roush, Pitts, and Cox.\nWe, therefore, hold that Dr. Mele was qualified to testify as to the applicable standard of care. Since defendants have not disputed that Dr. Mele further testified that defendants breached that standard of care, plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the question of the breach of the standard of care.\nII\nDefendants argued alternatively that plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence that any breach of the standard of care proximately caused Duncan\u2019s death. As this Court has explained, \u201c[o]ur eourts rely on medical experts to show medical causation because \u2018the exact nature and probable genesis of a particular type of injury involves complicated medical questions far removed from the ordinary experience and knowledge of laymenf.]\u2019 \u201d Azar v. Presbyterian Hosp., 191 N.C. App. 367, 371, 663 S.E.2d 450, 453 (2008) (quoting Click v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 300 N.C. 164, 167, 265 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1980)), cert. denied, 363 N.C. 372, 678 S.E.2d 232 (2009).\nThe expert testimony must establish that the connection between the medical negligence and the injury is \u201c \u2018probable, not merely a remote possibility.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting White v. Hunsinger, 88 N.C. App. 382, 387, 363 S.E.2d 203, 206 (1988)). If, however, \u201cthis testimony is based merely upon speculation and conjecture, ... it is no different than a layman\u2019s opinion, and as such, is not sufficiently reliable to be considered competent evidence on issues of medical causation.\u201d Id. (citing Young v. Hickory Bus. Furn., 353 N.C. 227, 230, 538 S.E.2d 912, 915 (2000)).\nDefendants argue that Dr. Wyatt\u2019s testimony was insufficient evidence of proximate cause because Dr. Wyatt\u2019s testimony as to Duncan\u2019s chances of survival, had he been admitted and observed at the hospital, amounted to mere speculation. Defendants contend that, as to this issue, the Court should apply the abuse of discretion standard of review set out in Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd,., 358 N.C. 440, 458, 597 S.E.2d 674, 686 (2004). We disagree.\nHowerton addresses the test applicable in determining the admissibility of expert testimony. Id. In Howerton, our Supreme Court set out a \u201cthree-step inquiry for evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony: (1) Is the expert\u2019s proffered method of proof sufficiently reliable as an area for expert testimony? (2) Is the witness testifying at trial qualified as an expert in that area of testimony? (3) Is the expert\u2019s testimony relevant?\u201d Id. (internal citations omitted).\nIn this case, there was no dispute at trial regarding the admissibility of Dr. Wyatt\u2019s expert testimony. He was admitted as an expert witness without any objection. As for the first prong of the test, defendants expressed no concern regarding the reliability of Dr. Wyatt\u2019s \u201cmethod of proof.\u201d See id. at 459, 460, 597 S.E.2d at 687 (holding that, in determining reliability, trial court should first look at whether precedent justifies recognition or rejection of \u201cscientific theory or technique\u201d advanced by expert; in absence of precedent, trial court must look at indices of reliability, including expert\u2019s use of established techniques, expert\u2019s professional background in field, use of visual aids before jury, and independent research conducted by expert\u201d). As for the other two prongs, defendants neither challenge Dr. Wyatt\u2019s qualifications to testify nor argue that his testimony was irrelevant. Howerton is simply inapplicable.\nInstead of challenging the admissibility of Dr. Wyatt\u2019s testimony, defendants, at trial and on appeal, have challenged the sufficiency of Dr. Wyatt\u2019s testimony to establish causation. Our Supreme Court in Holley v. ACTS, Inc., 357 N.C. 228, 232, 581 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2003), warned that \u201cthe standards for admissibility of expert opinion testimony have been confused with the standards for sufficiency of such testimony.\u201d Expert testimony as to causation \u201cis admissible if helpful to the jury,\u201d although it may be \u201cinsufficient to prove causation, particularly \u2018when there is additional evidence or testimony showing the expert\u2019s opinion to be a guess or mere speculation.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 233, 581 S.E.2d at 753 (quoting Young, 353 N.C. at 233, 538 S.E.2d at 916). Defendants\u2019 argument on appeal perpetuates this confusion by failing to distinguish between the standard of review for admissibility and the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence.\nOur Supreme Court, in Howerton, cautioned against the merging of the two issues. After rejecting the federal Daubert standard for evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony, the Court emphasized its \u201cconcem[] that trial courts asserting sweeping pre-trial \u2018gatekeeping\u2019 authority under Daubert [regarding the admissibility of expert testimony] may unnecessarily encroach upon the constitutionally-mandated function of the jury to decide issues of fact and to assess the weight of the evidence.\u201d Howerton, 358 N.C. at 468, 597 S.E.2d at 692.\nMore recently, the Supreme Court underscored, in the medical malpractice context, Howerton\u2019s desire to ensure that preliminary questions of admissibility not intrude upon the right to trial by jury:\nWe emphasized [in Howerton], on the other hand, that the trial court\u2019s preliminary assessment should not \u201cgo so far as to require the expert\u2019s testimony to be proven conclusively reliable or indisputably valid before it can be admitted into evidence.\u201d [Howerton, 358 N.C.] at 460, 597 S.E.2d at 687. Evidence may be \u201cshaky but admissible,\u201d and it is the role of the jury to make any final determination regarding the weight to be afforded to the evidence. Id. at 460-61, 597 S.E.2d at 687-88 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 484, 133 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993)).\nCrocker v. Roethling, 363 N.C. 140, 149-50, 675 S.E.2d 625, 632 (2009) (Martin, J., concurring). The Court further pointed to \u201cthe emphasis Howerton places on the jury\u2019s role in evaluating expert testimony\u201d and concluded that procedures must be adopted with an eye towards \u201cprotecting the jury from unreliable expert testimony yet preserving the jury\u2019s role in weighing the credibility of expert testimony when appropriate.\u201d Id. at 153, 675 S.E.2d at 634-35. Even the dissent in Crocker recognized that Howerton called on the trial court, when \u201cdetermining whether an expert\u2019s testimony is sufficiently rehable for admission,\u201d to make \u201c \u2018a preliminary, foundational inquiry into the basic methodological adequacy of [the] expert testimony.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 157, 675 S.E.2d at 637 (quoting Howerton, 358 N.C. at 460, 597 S.E.2d at 687).\nIn this appeal, no issue exists regarding any preliminary foundational inquiry into the basic methodological adequacy of Dr. Wyatt\u2019s testimony or his qualifications to testily. Howerton is immaterial, as is its standard of review. Instead, the proper standard of review is the one applicable to decisions at trial regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to take plaintiff\u2019s case to the jury \u2014 the directed verdict standard.\nThis conclusion is consistent with this Court\u2019s decision in Weaver v. Sheppa, 186 N.C. App. 412, 651 S.E.2d 395 (2007), aff\u2019d per curiam by an equally divided court, 362 N.C. 341, 661 S.E.2d 733 (2008), a medical malpractice appeal in which the Court reversed the trial court\u2019s grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict (\u201cJNOV:\u201d). After noting that \u201c[b]ecause causation is, in essence, a factual inference to be garnered from attendant facts and circumstances, it is a question generally best answered by a jury,\u201d the Court acknowledged \u2014 as defendants argue here \u2014 that \u201cexpert testimony based merely on speculation and conjecture \u2018is not sufficiently reliable to qualify as competent evidence on issues of medical causation.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 416, 651 S.E.2d at 398 (quoting Young, 353 N.C. at 230, 538 S.E.2d at 915).\nHowever, the Court further stressed that \u201cwhen the challenged expert testimony relates to causation such admitted testimony is competent \u2018as long as the testimony is helpful to the jury and based sufficiently on information reasonably relied upon under Rule 703[.]\u2019 \u201d Id. at 416-17, 651 S.E.2d at 399 (quoting Johnson v. Piggly Wiggly of Pinetops, Inc., 156 N.C. App. 42, 49, 575 S.E.2d 797, 802 (2003)). The Court then proceeded to review the sufficiency of the expert testimony of causation under the traditional standard of review applicable to decisions granting JNOV. Id. at 417, 651 S.E.2d at 399 (\u201cAfter a careful review of the record on appeal, we conclude that plaintiffs presented more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the proximate causation element of their medical negligence action.\u201d). Consequently, in this case, we apply the standard of review applicable to directed verdicts and not the Howerton abuse of discretion standard urged by defendants.\nTurning to the merits, Dr. Wyatt testified that had a CT scan been performed on Duncan\u2019s abdomen, the liver lacerations would have been discovered. He also testified that he believed Duncan died from the bleeding caused by the liver lacerations and subsequent rupture.\nDr. Wyatt was then asked, \u201cAnd you have an opinion satisfactory to yourself and to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that had [Duncan\u2019s] liver laceration been diagnosed and treated that he would have had a better than 51 percent chance of survival?\u201d Dr. Wyatt responded, \u201cYes.\u201d He testified: \u201cI believe he would have survived it.\u201d This was in conformity with Dr. Wyatt\u2019s conclusion in his written report, admitted into evidence, that \u201c[s]urvival is excellent (>51%) in patients who arrive in the hospital and get proper initial and subsequent management.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, Dr. Wyatt was asked, \u201cAnd you cannot say to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that had he been admitted for observation that the outcome would have been any different, because it\u2019s speculation, correct?\u201d He replied: \u201cIt is speculation, but I do think he would have had a better chance of surviving.\u201d He admitted that he could not \u201csay for certainty\u201d that Duncan would have survived. Dr. Wyatt was then asked:\nQ. And where you talked about in response to the questions of [plaintiffs\u2019 counsel], in your report where it says \u201csurvival is excellent,\u201d that\u2019s . . . where you say \u201cgreater than 51 percent,\u201d . . . you\u2019re talking generally, patients generally have survival chances above 51 percent, correct?\nHe responded:\nA. Well, I was talking specifically about this injury. If \u2014 if he had been observed in the proper unit when he started to bleed or showed signs of instability, then I think he had a greater than 50 percent chance of surviving.\nWhen defense counsel pressed him to agree that \u201che would have had a better chance, but no one can say \u2014 -it would be speculation to say he would have had a 51 percent or a 49 percent chance, correct?\u201d, Dr. Wyatt replied: \u201cThat\u2019s all speculation.\u201d\nFinally, Dr. Wyatt was asked:\nQ. And that with regard to this particular case and Duncan Day\u2019s particular circumstances, you cannot say to any certainty that he would have, in fact, survived, correct?\n[Plaintiffs\u2019 Counsel]: Objection.\nA. I\u2019m not quite sure if I understand the question.\nQ. Okay. Meaning that with regard to Duncan Day\u2019s situation, as you just testified to, all you can say is that he would have had a better chance of survival. You can\u2019t say what percentage it would have been. Correct?\nA. I can say; but, I mean, that\u2019s \u2014 it\u2019s all just specu \u2014 I mean, it\u2019s \u2014 it\u2019s guessing. I don\u2019t\u2014\nQ. Okay.\nA. He certainly would have had a better chance of survival.\nQ. Okay. But in terms of what percentage, then it would all be speculation, correct?\nA. Right.\nQ. And all you can say is he just would have had a better chance, correct?\nA. Yes.\nOn re-direct, Dr. Wyatt was asked:\nQ. Based on the patients that you have treated with Type IV or Type V liver lacerations, is it still your opinion of the over \u2014 based on your overall experience that those people given proper management have a better than 51 percent [sic] of survival?\nA. What I can\u2014\n[Defendants\u2019 Counsel]: Objection.\nA. What I can say from my experience is that those who have been managed in the hospital with Grade IV liver lacerations and some Grade V\u2019s, most of them have survived.\nQ. Would it be more than 51 percent?\nA. Yes.\nWe believe this case is controlled by Felts v. Liberty Emergency Serv., P.A., 97 N.C. App. 381, 388 S.E.2d 619 (1990). In Fete, the plaintiffs\u2019 expert witness testified that it was \u201c \u2018possible\u2019 \u201d that the plaintiffs heart attack could have been prevented if the plaintiff had been admitted to the hospital\u2019s Coronary Care Unit. Id. at 388, 388 S.E.2d at 623. Although acknowledging that this testimony that the heart attack could have possibly been prevented, standing alone, would not be sufficient, the Court pointed out that the expert had also given \u201ca detailed explanation of how admission to a hospital . . . could have prevented plaintiff\u2019s heart attack.\u201d Id. at 389, 388 S.E.2d at 623.\nThe Court held that the testimony as a whole \u201craise [d] more than a \u2018mere possibility or conjecture\u2019 and [wa]s sufficient to withstand a directed verdict.\u201d Id. (quoting Bruegge v. Mastertemp, Inc., 83 N.C. App. 508, 510, 350 S.E.2d 918, 919 (1986)). The Court explained:\nWe find that plaintiffs\u2019 evidence at trial establishes more than a minimal \u201cshowing that different treatment would have improved [his] chances of recovery.\u201d Plaintiffs\u2019 evidence before the trial court tended to show that defendants\u2019 failure to hospitalize and failure to more thoroughly diagnose plaintiff\u2019s condition contributed to his myocardial infarction and its severity. We hold that this is sufficient to overcome a directed verdict motion on the issue of proximate cause.\nId. at 390, 388 S.E.2d at 624.\nHere, Dr. Wyatt specifically testified that \u201cif [Duncan] had been observed in the proper unit when he started to bleed or showed signs of instability, then I think he had a greater than 50 percent chance of surviving.\u201d On top of specifically testifying that had he been admitted and observed, Duncan would have had a greater than 50% chance of survival, Dr. Wyatt\u2019s report explicitly set out how, if the laceration had been discovered, a rupture and internal bleeding could have been prevented or stopped. Under Felts, this was sufficient evidence of proximate cause.\nDefendants, however, argue that Dr. Wyatt\u2019s proximate cause testimony amounted to speculation. In Young, the Supreme Court recognized that \u201cwhen . . . expert opinion testimony is based merely upon speculation and conjecture, it can be of no more value than that of a layman\u2019s opinion. As such, it is not sufficiently reliable to qualify as competent evidence on issues of medical causation.\u201d 353 N.C. at 230, 538 S.E.2d at 915. In that case, the Court held that the plaintiff\u2019s expert\u2019s opinion as to what caused the plaintiff\u2019s fibromyalgia \u201cwas based entirely upon conjecture and speculation.\u201d Id. at 231, 538 S.E.2d at 915. The expert had testified that there were several potential causes of the plaintiff\u2019s fibromyalgia other than her work-related back injury, but that he had not performed any testing to determine what was, in fact, the cause of her symptoms. Id. That testimony was not sufficient evidence of proximate causation. Id. at 233, 538 S.E.2d at 917.\nSimilarly, in Azar, 191 N.C. App. at 371, 663 S.E.2d at 453, this Court held there was not sufficient evidence of causation when the plaintiff\u2019s expert testified that the plaintiff\u2019s bedsores were \u201c \u2018at least one cause of infection\u2019 \u201d and that she died \u201c \u2018as a result of all of [her] complications.\u2019 \u201d The Court held that the expert\u2019s testimony was mere speculation because he could not identify which complication was the ultimate cause of her death. Id. at 372, 663 S.E.2d at 453. See also Campbell v. Duke Univ. Health Sys., Inc., 203 N.C. App. 37, 44-45, 691 S.E.2d 31, 37 (holding expert testimony constituted speculation where expert unable to point to any specific action by defendants during plaintiff\u2019s surgery that would have caused injury), disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 434, 702 S.E.2d 220 (2010).\nHere, there is no dispute that Duncan died because of the bleeding due to lacerations to his liver sustained in the car accident. This case is, therefore, unlike Young, in which the question was what caused the injurious condition (fibromyalgia), and unlike Azar, in which the issue was which condition was the immediate cause of death. It is also unlike Campbell in that Dr. Wyatt, in discussing the cause of Duncan\u2019s death, specifically pointed to defendants\u2019 failure to uncover the lacerations through a CT scan and to hospitalize Duncan for observation and treatment. Dr. Wyatt also gave a detailed explanation of how the failure to perform a CT abdomen scan and admit Duncan to the hospital caused Duncan\u2019s death, explaining the list of steps that could have been taken to treat the injury had the scan been performed and the lacerations been discovered while Duncan was in the hospital.\nAlthough defendants also have cited Gaines v. Cumberland Cnty. Hosp. Sys., Inc., 195 N.C. App. 442, 446, 672 S.E.2d 713, 716 (2009), this Court granted rehearing in that case, 203 N.C. App. 213, 222-23, 692 S.E.2d 119, 124-25, disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 324, 700 S.E.2d 750 (2010). Initially, this Court held that expert testimony was speculative and insufficient to show proximate cause when the expert testified that if the health care provider defendants had pursued an investigation of potential child abuse of the plaintiff, they would have reported the situation to the Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d). DSS would have then investigated and substantiated the report and removed the plaintiff from the home, preventing further injury. The Court reasoned that while the expert \u201cdid testify regarding what she believed was more likely than not the proximate cause of [the plaintiff\u2019s] injuries, her testimony was based on speculation and was not grounded in fact.\u201d Gaines, 195 N.C. App. at 446, 672 S.E.2d at 716.\nOn rehearing, however, this Court held that this testimony was sufficient evidence of proximate cause to survive summary judgment, explaining that the expert, who was familiar with. DSS policies and procedures, had specifically listed how and why the plaintiff would have been removed from the home, and how the defendants\u2019 negligence in not investigating more likely than not caused the plaintiff\u2019s injuries. Gaines, 203 N.C. App. at 222-23, 692 S.E.2d at 124-25. The Court held that any competing testimony was a question for the jury. Id. at 223, 692 S.E.2d at 125.\nSimilarly, in this case, Dr. Wyatt had experience treating patients with comparable liver lacerations, specifically listed what would have been done had the lacerations been diagnosed and Duncan hospitalized, and testified that \u201cmost\u201d patients with Duncan\u2019s level of lacerations survive if hospitalized and properly managed. Under Gaines, this testimony was sufficient to take the case to the jury.\nDefendants nonetheless contend that Dr. Wyatt admitted that his testimony was speculation. Although Dr. Wyatt used the word \u201cspeculation\u201d in portions of his testimony, our review of the entirety of his testimony indicates that Dr. Wyatt was not labeling as speculation his opinion that if Duncan\u2019s liver laceration had been diagnosed and treated, he would have had greater than 51% chance of survival.' Rather, we read his testimony as acknowledging that the practice of putting a specific percentage on Duncan\u2019s chance of survival is inherently speculative. Dr. Wyatt, however, ultimately testified that \u201cmost\u201d patients with Duncan\u2019s injury who are treated in accordance with the standard of care will survive and that he believes Duncan \u201cwould have survived.\u201d This opinion is sufficient to establish a probability of survival regardless of the precise numerical percentage used. See also Turner, 325 N.C. at 160, 381 S.E.2d at 711 (reversing directed verdict entered based on lack of evidence of proximate cause when expert witness expressed opinion that defendant \u201cshould have carefully examined Mrs. Turner\u2019s abdomen [and] [h]ad he done so, a colostomy could subsequently have been performed which could have saved Mrs. Turner\u2019s life\u201d; stating that \u201c[s]uch evidence is the essence of proximate cause\u201d).\nWe also note that we cannot, as defendants urge, pull out portions of Dr. Wyatt\u2019s testimony that might support a directed verdict and disregard portions that would support sending the case to the jury. A defendant cannot justify a directed verdict by pointing to inconsistencies and contradictions in a plaintiff\u2019s evidence because \u201con a motion for directed verdict conflicts in the evidence unfavorable to the plaintiff must be disregarded.\u201d Polk v. Biles, 92 N.C. App. 86, 88, 373 S.E.2d 570, 571 (1988). Conflicts in the evidence and contradictions within a particular witness\u2019 testimony are \u201cfor the jury to resolve.\u201d Shields v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 61 N.C. App. 365, 374, 301 S.E.2d 439, 445 (1983). See also Alexander v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 N.C. App. 563, 573, 603 S.E.2d 552, 558 (2004) (Hudson, J., dissenting) (\u201c[I]t is [not] the role of this Court to comb through the testimony and view it in the light most favorable to the defendant, when the Supreme Court has clearly instructed us to do the opposite. Although by doing so, it is possible to find a few excerpts that might be speculative, this Court\u2019s role is not to engage in such a weighing of the evidence.\u201d), rev\u2019d per curiam for reasons in dissenting opinion, 359 N.C. 403, 610 S.E.2d 374 (2005).\nThis aspect of the directed verdict standard is consistent with the Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Howerton that \u201conce the trial court makes a preliminary determination that the scientific or technical area underlying a qualified expert\u2019s opinion is sufficiently reliable (and, of course, relevant), any lingering questions or controversy concerning the quality of the expert\u2019s conclusions go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility.\u201d 358 N.C. at 461, 597 S.E.2d at 688. See also Turner, 325 N.C. at 161-62, 381 S.E.2d at 712 (refusing to uphold directed verdict in medical malpractice case based on expert\u2019s answers to cross-examination questions because doing so would require construing evidence in light most favorable to movants, which \u201cthe law does not permit\u201d); Workman v. Rutherford Elec. Membership Corp., 170 N.C. App. 481, 494, 613 S.E.2d 243, 252 (2005) (in workers\u2019 compensation case, holding that even though causation expert did not testify without equivocation and gave testimony conflicting to some extent with his medical notes, \u201c[credibility issues caused by any variance in [expert\u2019s] treatment notes and his later testimony was for the Commission to decide\u201d).\nFinally, defendants argue that Dr. Wyatt\u2019s testimony is insufficient because he merely testified that if the liver laceration had been discovered and Duncan had been in the hospital when his liver ruptured, he had a \u201cbetter\u201d chance of survival. In this respect, defendants contend this case is similar to Lord v. Beerman, 191 N.C. App. 290, 664 S.E.2d 331 (2008), and White v. Hunsinger, 88 N.C. App. 382, 363 S.E.2d 203 (1988).\nIn Lord, 191 N.C. App. at 297, 664 S.E.2d at 336, the plaintiff\u2019s first expert testified that although earlier receipt of steroid therapy might hasten a patient\u2019s recovery with respect to most eye diseases, he could not say whether earlier treatment would have increased the plaintiffs prognosis due to the rarity of his particular eye disease and the lack of research. The plaintiff\u2019s second expert similarly testified that while earlier steroid treatment \u201c \u2018perhaps\u2019 \u201d could have led to a fuller recovery and that the plaintiff\u2019s eyesight \u201c \u2018may have been improved to a better outcome,\u2019 \u201d an attempt to quantify what improvement might have been obtained \u201cwould amount to sheer speculation[.]\u201d Id. at 300, 664 S.E.2d at 338. This Court held, after reviewing this testimony, that \u201cPlaintiff\u2019s evidence was insufficient to establish the requisite causal connection between Defendants\u2019 alleged negligence and Plaintiff's blindness.\u201d Id.\nIn White, 88 N.C. App. at 383, 363 S.E.2d at 205, the plaintiff\u2019s expert testified that the decedent\u2019s chances of survival would have increased if he had been transferred to a neurosurgeon earlier. On appeal, the Court affirmed the order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, explaining that \u201cplaintiff could not prevail at trial by merely showing that a different course of action would have improved [the decedent\u2019s] chances of survival.\u201d Id. at 386, 363 S.E.2d at 206. The Court emphasized that \u201c[p]roof of proximate cause in' a malpractice case requires more than a showing that a different treatment would have improved the patient\u2019s chances of recovery.\u201d Id. The Court concluded: \u201cThe connection or causation between the negligence and death must be probable, not merely a remote possibility.\u201dM at 387, 363 S.E.2d at 206.\nIn this case, Dr. Wyatt supplied the testimony that was missing in Lord and White. While the experts in Lord and White merely testified that complying with the standard of care would have given the plaintiffs a \u201cbetter\u201d chance, Dr. Wyatt specifically testified that when patients with liver lacerations like that suffered by Duncan are hospitalized, monitored, and treated, \u201cmost\u201d of them survive. He further testified that if the defendants had followed the standard of care, Duncan would have had a better than 51% chance of survival and that he believes Duncan would have survived. In sum, Dr. Wyatt\u2019s testimony established that Duncan\u2019s survival was not merely possible but rather was probable if defendants had complied with the standard of care. Although defendants point out that Dr. Wyatt could not say to an absolute certainty that Duncan would have survived, absolute certainty is not required. We hold that Dr. Wyatt\u2019s testimony was sufficient to send the issue of proximate cause to the jury.\nIn sum, we hold that plaintiffs presented sufficient competent evidence through Dr. Mele that defendants breached the applicable standard of care. Further, Dr. Wyatt provided sufficient evidence of proximate causation. Since those are the only two elements at issue, we hold that the trial court erred in entering a directed verdict in favor of defendants.\nReversed.\nJudges ROBERT C. HUNTER and CALABRIA concur.\n. Athough defendants contend that Dr. Mele did not specify in his trial testimony that he was reviewing 2003 information about the community and the hospital, his testimony as a whole indicates that he was looking at information from 2003.\n. Dr. Mele had in fact worked in the emergency department at LNRMC in 1992 or 1993.\n. Defendants also argue that Dr. Wyatt\u2019s testimony as to when Duncan\u2019s liver began to bleed and the process that ultimately caused his death was speculation. This testimony is immaterial to the issues raised on appeal, and we do not address it.\n. Justice Martin\u2019s opinion concurring in the plurality opinion by Justice Hudson constitutes the controlling opinion. Id. at 154 n.l, 675 S.E.2d at 635 n.1 (Newby, X, dissenting).\n. Defendants also cite Norman v. Branner, 171 N.C. App. 515, 615 S.E.2d 738, 2005 WL 1669128, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 1324 (2005) (unpublished), but as that case is unpublished and not controlling authority, we do not discuss it.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "John J. Korzen and David A. Manzi for plaintiffs-appellants.", "Carruthers & Roth, RA., by Richard L. Vanore, Norman F. Klick, Jr., and Robert N. Young, for Thomas Alan Brant, M.D., Edward William Hales, P.A., and Mid-Atlantic Emergency Medical Associates, P.A., defendants-appellees.", "Jackson & McGee, LLP, by Sam McGee; and Ferguson, Stein, Chambers, Gresham, & Sumter, P.A., by Adam Stein, for North Carolina Advocates for Justice, Amicus Curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DUNCAN C. DAY and ASHLEY-BROOK DAY, as Co-Administrators of the Estate of DUNCAN C. DAY, JR., deceased, Plaintiffs v. THOMAS ALAN BRANT, M.D., EDWARD WILLIAM HALES, P.A., MID-ATLANTIC EMERGENCY MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, P.A. and MOORESVILLE HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC. d/b/a LAKE NORMAN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, Defendants\nNo. COA09-573-2\n(Filed 17 January 2012)\n1. Medical Malpractice \u2014 expert testimony \u2014 medical license\u2014 applicable standard of care in community\nThe trial court erred in a medical malpractice case by directing verdict in favor of defendants based on its conclusion that plaintiffs did not properly establish that a doctor was qualified to provide expert testimony on the applicable standard of care. A jury could reasonably infer from the testimony that the doctor did in fact have a medical license and that he was familiar with defendants and the standard of care in their community or similar communities.\n2. Medical Malpractice \u2014 proximate cause \u2014 breach of standard of care\nThe trial court erred in a medical malpractice case by directing verdict in favor of defendants based on its conclusion that plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence that any breach of the standard of care proximately caused the patient\u2019s death. Although the doctor used the word \u201cspeculation\u201d in portions of his testimony, he was merely acknowledging that the practice of putting a specific percentage on the patient\u2019s chance of survival was inherently\nspeculative. The testimony was sufficient to send the issue of proximate cause to the jury.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from order entered 25 July 2008 by Judge Christopher M. Collier in Iredell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 November 2009. Opinion filed 20 July 2010. Petition for rehearing granted 29 September 2010. The following opinion supersedes and replaces the opinion filed 20 July 2010.\nJohn J. Korzen and David A. Manzi for plaintiffs-appellants.\nCarruthers & Roth, RA., by Richard L. Vanore, Norman F. Klick, Jr., and Robert N. Young, for Thomas Alan Brant, M.D., Edward William Hales, P.A., and Mid-Atlantic Emergency Medical Associates, P.A., defendants-appellees.\nJackson & McGee, LLP, by Sam McGee; and Ferguson, Stein, Chambers, Gresham, & Sumter, P.A., by Adam Stein, for North Carolina Advocates for Justice, Amicus Curiae." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 11, "last_page_order": 32 }