{ "id": 4364399, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL SCOTT SISTLER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sistler", "decision_date": "2012-01-17", "docket_number": "No. COA11-1035", "first_page": "60", "last_page": "76", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "218 N.C. App. 60" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "624 S.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634837 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/624/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633262 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "643 S.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638284 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "911" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0909-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 S.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641336 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/662/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "648 S.E.2d 556", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639089 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/648/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 S.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639310 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/650/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8352389 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219899 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 S.E.2d 762", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763", "parenthetical": "\"Defendant is entitled to a new trial only if the impropriety is shown to be prejudicial.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 N.C. App. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526079 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725", "parenthetical": "\"Defendant is entitled to a new trial only if the impropriety is shown to be prejudicial.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/58/0723-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 S.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571552 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "572 S.E.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511176 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541401 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 S.E.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88-89" }, { "page": "89" }, { "page": "89" }, { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526676 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "702 S.E.2d 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2516596 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8438568 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 S.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2507119 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 S.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4742094 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3743134 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562603 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4159864 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 S.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 N.C. App. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524916 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/73/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 S.E.2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523896 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497387 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 S.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 N.C. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2219561 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/244/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8154614 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 S.E.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572874 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0293-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1376, "char_count": 40716, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.728108280744093e-08, "percentile": 0.45451356430432815 }, "sha256": "5da77f64493037945d9f00cc2cef0f474601ad871c352eb2d5e606dad60cb613", "simhash": "1:cb6b6df0162ed76e", "word_count": 6652 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:21:59.538017+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL SCOTT SISTLER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nMichael Scott Sistler (\u201cDefendant\u201d) appeals his conviction for first-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motions to dismiss the first-degree murder charge at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and the close of all the evidence, and by denying Defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor allegedly referred to evidence suppressed by a pre-trial suppression order. Defendant also argues the trial court erred by overruling his objections and motions to strike portions of the State\u2019s rebuttal evidence. Finally, Defendant contends the trial court committed plain error by failing to intervene ex mero motu during the prosecutor\u2019s allegedly improper closing arguments and further erred by overruling Defendant\u2019s objection to a separate portion of the prosecutor\u2019s closing arguments. After careful review, we find no error.\nI. Factual & Procedural Background\nThe State\u2019s evidence at trial tended to show the following. On the night of 28 December 2008, Joseph Heyden, Richard Charlton, and Kristy Brown sat in the living room of Ms. Brown\u2019s mobile home, drinking and watching television. Mr. Charlton and Ms. Brown sat together on the couch, and Mr. Heyden sat on a loveseat nearby. Mr. Charlton and Ms. Brown were dating, and Mr. Charlton kept some of his personal possessions in Ms. Brown\u2019s home, including a Grendel .380 semiautomatic pistol. Mr. Heyden was a friend of Mr. Charlton visiting for the evening.\nAt approximately 9:15 PM, Ms. Brown noticed headlights outside of her home and observed a vehicle enter her driveway. She watched as her ex-boyfriend, Defendant, emerged from his vehicle with a 12-gauge pump shotgun. Ms. Brown had not invited Defendant to her home that evening. In a panic, she struggled to lock the front door and yelled to Mr. Charlton and Mr. Heyden: \u201cHe\u2019s got a gun.\u201d\nMs. Brown and Mr. Charlton fled from the living room area, down a hallway, to the master bedroom in the rear of the home. Mr. Charlton grabbed his semiautomatic pistol on his way to the bedroom. Mr. Heyden crouched behind a counter in the kitchen area adjoining the living room. Defendant entered through the front door, shouting vulgarities. He carried a sawed-off shotgun at his hip. Mr. Heyden observed Defendant move through the living room, past the kitchen area, and point the shotgun down the hallway leading to the master bedroom. Mr. Heyden heard a shotgun blast immediately after losing sight of Defendant. Mr. Heyden headed for the front door and exited the home. Ms. Brown pushed her way past Defendant in the hallway and went out the front door not far behind Mr. Heyden. Mr. Heyden and Ms. Brown heard several more gunshots, one from the shotgun and three or four from the semiautomatic pistol owned by Mr. Charlton.\nOnce outside, Mr. Heyden called 911. Ms. Brown joined Mr. Heyden in the front yard as he placed the call. Mr. Heyden went back inside the house to check on Mr. Charlton. He saw Defendant \u201cshot up\u201d and stationary on the floor of the hallway. There was a trail of blood leading from Defendant to the master bedroom. Mr. Heyden found Mr. Charlton on the floor of the bedroom. Mr. Charlton\u2019s chest was bloody and he had no pulse.\nDeputy Sheriff Patrick Medlin of the Johnston County Sheriff\u2019s office was the first law enforcement officer to arrive at the scene at approximately 9:42 PM. He observed Mr. Heyden and Ms. Brown standing in the front yard of Ms. Brown\u2019s residence and noted three vehicles in the driveway. Ms. Brown informed Officer Medlin of two gunshot victims inside the residence. Officer Medlin entered the residence and immediately noticed Defendant lying face down in the hallway. Defendant was bleeding badly and barely breathing. Officer Medlin also noticed a blood trail leading from the hallway to a bedroom in the rear of the mobile home. He found Mr. Charlton not breathing and bleeding' badly from a chest wound. Officer Medlin observed Defendant\u2019s shotgun on the floor of the bedroom to the left of Mr. Charlton and Mr. Charlton\u2019s pistol on the opposite side of the room. EMS arrived and rendered medical assistance to Defendant. Mr. Charlton was pronounced dead at the scene.\nOn 12 January 2009, a Johnston County Grand Jury indicted Defendant on one count of first-degree murder and one count of first-degree burglary. A superseding indictment was later issued on the first-degree burglary charge, removing reference to first-degree murder as the underlying felony. On 15 September 2010, Defendant notified the State of his intent to raise self-defense as a defense to both charges.\nOn 15 October 2010, the State sent the shotgun recovered from the crime scene to the State Bureau of Investigation (\u201cSBI\u201d) for ballistics testing to determine the distance from which the shotgun was fired when the first shotgun blast struck the wall approximately five feet from the entrance of the master bedroom. The SBI report indicated the shotgun was fired \u201cfrom a distance greater than 14 feet but less than 18 feet.\u201d The State averred this report demonstrated that, due to the dimensions of the bedroom, Defendant must have fired the shotgun outside of the bedroom. On 3 December 2010, Defendant moved to suppress this evidence. As trial was set for 10 January 2011, defense counsel contended he had insufficient time to prepare in light of this new evidence. Johnston County Superior Court Judge Thomas H. Lock agreed, and, on 7 January 2011, Judge Lock entered an order granting Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the SBI\u2019s testing and results obtained therefrom (hereinafter referred to as the \u201cSuppression Order\u201d). The Suppression Order prohibited the State from referring to the shotgun firing distance testing either directly or through the testimony of its witnesses. The trial date was delayed from 10 January 2011 to 7 March 2011 due to inclement weather, prompting the State to file a motion with the trial court to reconsider the Suppression Order. Judge Lock denied the State\u2019s motion.\nThis matter came on for trial at the 7 March 2011 Criminal Session of the Johnston .County Superior Court, the Honorable Robert F. Floyd presiding. At trial, Mr. Heyden testified as a witness for the State. Mr. Heyden testified he saw Defendant point the shotgun down the hallway and heard a shotgun blast the moment he lost sight of Defendant. According to Mr. Heyden, it was not until he exited Ms. Brown\u2019s home that he heard the semiautomatic pistol fire several times. When pressed on cross-examination, Mr. Heyden stated he was \u201csure\u201d he heard the shotgun blast prior to the firing of the semiautomatic pistol. He testified he was able to distinguish between the shotgun and the pistol because he had \u201cshot pistols and shotguns and rifles pretty much [his] whole life,\u201d he had personally fired Mr. Charlton\u2019s pistol, and he was well aware of the sound of a shotgun when fired, as he had fired a shotgun hundreds of times.\nRonald Mazur, a crime scene investigator with the Johnston County Sheriffs office, described the layout of Ms. Brown\u2019s mobile home and the location of the evidence collected by investigators at the crime scene. During the course of direct examination, the prosecutor stated: \u201cThere was testimony in this case that a shot was fired from a shotgun in the hallway of the residence.\u201d Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor\u2019s statement and, out of the presence of the jury, moved for a mistrial. Defense counsel contended the prosecutor\u2019s statement assumed matters not in evidence because no witness had testified to actually seeing Defendant fire a gunshot down the hallway and, moreover, the prosecutor\u2019s statement elicited testimony in violation of the Suppression Order. The trial court sustained the objection and directed the jury to disregard the statement. The trial court denied Defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial, but \u201cadmonished [the State] not to argue or presume matters that are not yet in evidence.\u201d\nJohn D. Butts, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy on Mr. Charlton, testified that Mr. Charlton died as a result of a shotgun wound to his left chest region. When asked on cross-examination whether Mr. Charlton would have been able to fire a gun after sustaining the shotgun wound, Dr. Butts testified \u201cMr. Charlton would have lost consciousness rather rapidly, but he could well have been conscious and capable of a few voluntary efforts for a brief period of time before he lost consciousness.\u201d\nDefense counsel moved to dismiss the charges against Defendant at the close of the State\u2019s evidence, asserting the State had failed to offer evidence sufficient to prove each element of the charged offenses. With respect to the murder charge, Defendant contended that the State had introduced no evidence indicating Defendant\u2019s permission to enter Ms. Brown\u2019s residence had been revoked and that the only evidence indicating Defendant had pulled the trigger was circumstantial. The court denied Defendant\u2019s motions.\nMs. Brown testified as a witness on Defendant\u2019s behalf. She stated she had been in a romantic relationship with Defendant for approximately eighteen months. They were not \u201cboyfriend and girlfriend,\u201d but they did spend Christmas Eve together just a few nights prior to the night in question. According to Ms. Brown, Defendant had \u201cstanding consent\u201d to come and go from Ms. Brown\u2019s residence. Ms. Brown testified that she was also romantically involved with Mr. Charlton. Mr. Charlton stayed with Ms. Brown at her residence from 26 December 2008 through the time of his death. When Ms. Brown saw Defendant outside of her home on the night of 28 December 2008, she tried to stop Defendant from seeing inside because she did not want Defendant to see her with Mr. Charlton. At the sight of Defendant\u2019s shotgun, she feared for the safety of both men because she knew Mr. Charlton was also armed.\nMs. Brown testified that Defendant entered through the front door into the living room area. Ms. Brown and Mr. Charlton headed for the master bedroom in the rear of the trailer, and Defendant followed. Mr. Charlton pointed his pistol at Defendant as Defendant entered the bedroom. Defendant held his shotgun pointed straight ahead with his hand on the pump. Ms. Brown left the bedroom and heard gunfire. She did not know how many shots had been fired, or who fired first. Ms. Brown \u201cabout ran over\u201d Mr. Heyden on her way to the front door. After the shooting ceased, Ms. Brown reentered the residence and found Defendant crawling through the kitchen area. Defendant stated to Ms. Brown: \u201cBaby, he shot me first.\u201d Ms. Brown found Mr. Charlton lying beside the bed in the master bedroom.\nOn cross-examination, Ms. Brown testified she received threatening text messages from Defendant earlier that night. Ms. Brown read to the jury the following text message exchange, which transpired at approximately 7:45 PM:\nDEFENDANT: \u201cFuck you, you slut. You want to fuck Nigger [Mr. Charlton] on Christmas. Fuck you. I hope you die.\u201d\nMS. BROWN: \u201cWhat the fuck ever, you drama queen. I didn\u2019t fuck [Mr. Charlton] on Christmas Day. Don\u2019t be ugly to me. Mean people suck udders.\u201d\nDEFENDANT: \u201cFuck you. You\u2019re a fucking liar. I wish you both die. I hate you.\u201d\nDefendant took the stand and testified in his own defense. He described the text messages between himself and Ms. Brown as the way they communicated when they were not getting along, and he was just \u201cmessing around\u201d with her. Defendant testified he went to Ms. Brown\u2019s residence that night because he was leaving town for work and needed to pick up some clothes. When Defendant arrived at Ms. Brown\u2019s residence, he noticed a vehicle in the driveway that he believed to be Mr. Charlton\u2019s truck. According to Defendant, he grabbed his shotgun for his own protection. Defendant explained that Mr. Charlton had assaulted him in the past, and Defendant knew that Mr. Charlton \u201ccarried a pistol with him at all times.\u201d Defendant entered Ms. Brown\u2019s residence through the front door with the shotgun \u201cas a deterrent.\u201d Mr. Charlton was in the living room and Mr. Heyden was in the kitchen. Defendant told Mr. Charlton he didn\u2019t want any trouble and was just there to pick up some clothes. Defendant followed Mr. Charlton down the hallway to the master bedroom at the rear of the residence. When they reached the bedroom, Mr. Charlton \u201cspun around and was training his pistol on [Defendant].\u201d Defendant raised his arm and was about to yell, \u201cDon\u2019t shoot\u201d when Mr. Charlton opened fire. The bullet penetrated Defendant\u2019s arm, and, stumbling backwards, he pumped the shotgun. Defendant \u201cknew he was trying to kill me then.\u201d After sustaining a second gunshot wound, Defendant looked away \u2014 to avoid being shot in the face \u2014 -and pulled the trigger on his shotgun. The shooting stopped. Defendant fell to the ground and saw Mr. Charlton, eyes open, propped up against the bed. Defendant did not know if Mr. Charlton was dead. Defendant crawled out of the bedroom and collapsed in the hallway when he was unable to drag himself further.\nThe defense also introduced the testimony of Defendant\u2019s former girlfriend, Teresa Thomas. Ms. Thomas testified that a fight had occurred between Defendant and Mr. Charlton in 2003 after Mr. Charlton slapped Ms. Thomas on the butt at a party. According to Ms. Brown, Defendant \u201cgot beat up really bad,\u201d was knocked unconscious, and required stitches to his forehead.\nThe State called Mr. Heyden as a rebuttal witness. Mr. Heyden described to the jury, using a diagram depicting the layout of Ms. Brown\u2019s apartment, where he was when he heard the shotgun blast and where he thought Defendant might have been. Defense counsel objected and moved to strike Mr. Heyden\u2019s testimony. The trial court overruled the objection and the motion to strike.\nDefendant renewed his motions to dismiss the charges against Defendant at the close of all the evidence. The trial court granted Defendant\u2019s motion as to the first-degree burglary charge based on its finding that Defendant had standing consent to enter Ms. Brown\u2019s residence, and the State had failed to offer sufficient evidence establishing that this consent had been withdrawn. The trial court denied Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the first-degree murder charge.\nDuring closing arguments, the prosecutor portrayed Defendant as a man tired of losing to Mr. Charlton, referencing both the fight in 2003 and Mr. Charlton\u2019s relationship with Defendant\u2019s ex-girlfriend, Ms. Brown. In light of the text message exchange between Defendant and Ms. Brown and Ms. Brown\u2019s relationship with Mr. Charlton, the prosecutor argued, Defendant knew \u201cthat his right to go into [Ms. Brown\u2019s] house ha[d] been revoked.\u201d The prosecutor emphasized that the facts indicated Ms. Brown revoked Defendant\u2019s \u201cstanding consent\u201d to enter her home on the night in question. Defendant raised no objection. The prosecutor accused Defendant of possessing an \u201coutlaw mentality:\u201d instead of attempting to obtain his clothes from Ms. Brown\u2019s home peacefully, Defendant carried a loaded shotgun into Ms. Brown\u2019s home with the intent to kill Mr. Charlton. At this point, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument. The trial court overruled Defendant\u2019s objection.\nOn 17 March 2011, the jury convicted Defendant of first-degree murder. Judge Floyd sentenced Defendant to the mandatory sentence of life in prison without parole. At the conclusion of sentencing, Defendant entered notice of appeal in open court.\nII. Jurisdiction\nThis Court exercises jurisdiction over Defendant\u2019s appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27(b), as Defendant appeals from the superior court\u2019s final judgment as a matter of right.\nIII. Analysis\nA. Defendant\u2019s Motion to Dismiss\n[1 ] The first issue presented for this Court\u2019s review is whether the trial court erred by denying Defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss the first-degree murder charge at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and at the close of all the evidence. Defendant contends he is entitled to a new trial under State v. Corn, 303 N.C. 293, 278 S.E.2d 221 (1981) because the trial court erred in submitting first-degree murder as a possible verdict to the jury. We disagree and hold that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the first-degree murder charge.\n\u201cWhen ruling on a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the trial court must determine whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, and (2) that the defendant is the perpetrator of the offense.\u201d State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). \u201cSubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). The trial court should grant the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss \u201c[i]f the evidence is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the offense or the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of it.\u201d State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1982).\n\u201cThe elements required for conviction of first degree murder are (1) the unlawful killing of another human being; (2) with malice; and (3) with premeditation and deliberation.\u201d State v. Haynesworth, 146 N.C. App. 523, 531, 553 S.E.2d 103, 109 (2001). In determining whether substantial evidence of each element exists, this Court must view the evidence presented before the trial court in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980). Conflicting testimony, contradictions, and discrepancies are factual determinations to be resolved by the jury and do not require dismissal. State v. Prush, 185 N.C. App. 472, 478, 648 S.E.2d 556, 560 (2007). However, whether substantial evidence exists with respect to each element of the charged offense is a question of law. State v. Stephens, 244 N.C. 380, 384, 93 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1956). Accordingly, we review the trial court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss de novo. See State v. McNeil, __ N.C. App. _, _, 707 S.E.2d 674, 679 (2011).\nDefendant concedes he fired the gunshot that killed Mr. Charlton. Defendant\u2019s sole contention is that his actions were justified under a theory of self-defense and the State failed to carry its burden in proving otherwise. The law of perfect self-defense excuses a killing if, at the time of the killing: (1) the defendant subjectively believed it necessary to kill the deceased to preserve his own life or to avoid substantial bodily injury; (2) the defendant\u2019s belief was objectively reasonable; (3) the defendant was not the initial aggressor; and (4) the amount of force employed by the defendant was reasonably necessary under the circumstances to protect himself. State v. McAvoy, 331 N.C. 583, 595, 417 S.E.2d 489, 497 (1992). In State v. Hamilton, this Court stated:\nThe State bears the burden of proving that defendant did not'act in self-defense. To survive a motion to dismiss, the State must therefore present sufficient substantial evidence which, when taken in the light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that defendant did not act in self-defense.\n77 N.C. App. 506, 513, 335 S.E.2d 506, 511 (1985) (internal citation omitted).\nViewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, Defendant drove to Ms. Brown\u2019s residence, uninvited, after sending threatening text messages to Ms. Brown expressing anger towards Ms. Brown and her relationship with Mr. Charlton. Defendant saw Mr. Charlton\u2019s vehicle in the driveway and grabbed his loaded, sawed off shotgun. Wielding the shotgun, Defendant entered Ms. Brown\u2019s home. Defendant moved through the living room, past the kitchen area, and down the hallway where he opened fire in the direction of Mr. Charlton and the master bedroom. Mr. Charlton died as a result of a shotgun wound to his chest. Mr. Charlton was able to fire off several rounds with his pistol before succumbing to his injuries. We hold this to be substantial evidence from which a jury could find Defendant acted with premeditation, deliberation, and malice, and, further, is sufficient evidence to convince a rational jury that Defendant did not act in self-defense.\nDefendant avers \u201c[a]ll of the evidence at trial showed [Defendant] was shot twice before he fired the fatal shot,\u201d and, therefore, the State failed to carry its burden in proving Defendant\u2019s conduct was not justified. Defendant\u2019s contention ignores Mr. Heyden\u2019s testimony indicating Defendant fired the first shot. Mr. Heyden testified he heard a shotgun blast when he was in the kitchen, immediately after losing sight of Defendant. It was not until he ran from the kitchen and out the front door that he heard shots fired from Mr. Charlton\u2019s pistol. Mr. Heyden confirmed he was \u201csure\u201d he heard the shotgun first when pressed on cross-examination. Defendant\u2019s contention also ignores Dr. Butts\u2019 testimony acknowledging that it would have been possible for Mr. Charlton to fire his pistol after sustaining the shotgun blast.\nDefendant points to the testimony of Ms. Brown and Defendant indicating Mr. Charlton fired the first shot, and Defendant returned fire to preserve his own life. According to Defendant, this testimony indicates that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant did not act in self-defense. Defendant misconstrues our standard of review on this issue. While it may be true that a jury could infer Defendant acted in self-defense based upon the evidence presented at trial, we are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State in reviewing the trial court\u2019s ruling on Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. See supra. Defendant\u2019s evidence is considered only to the extent it is favorable to the State. State v. Streath, 73 N.C. App. 546, 552, 327 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1985). We conclude that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to convince a rational jury that Defendant did not act in self-defense. The conflicting evidence presented at trial concerning, e.g., who fired the first shot and whether Defendant fired the shotgun in the hallway or in the bedroom, left material questions of fact to be resolved by the jury. It was not the function of the trial court to make these determinations in ruling on Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. See Powell, 299 N.C. at 99, 261 S.E.2d at 117 (holding that upon considering a motion to dismiss, the trial court \u201cis concerned only with the sufficiency of the evidence to carry the case to the jury and not with its weight\u201d). We hold there was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the charge of first-degree murder and the trial court did not err in denying Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nB. Defendant\u2019s Motion for a Mistrial\nDefendant next contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor allegedly referred to suppressed evidence. We disagree and hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Defendant\u2019s motion.\nWe review the trial court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion. See State v. Simmons, 191 N.C. App. 224, 227, 662 S.E.2d 559, 561 (2008). \u201cAbuse of discretion results where the court\u2019s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988). \u201cIn our review, we consider not whether we might disagree with the trial court, but whether the trial court\u2019s actions are fairly supported by the record.\u201d State v. Lasiter, 361 N.C. 299, 302, 643 S.E.2d 909, 911 (2007).\n\u201cThe judge must declare a mistrial upon the defendant\u2019s motion if there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, resulting in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the defendant\u2019s case.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1061 (2009). \u201cMistrial is a drastic remedy, warranted only for such serious improprieties as would make it impossible to attain a fair and impartial verdict.\u201d State v. Stocks, 319 N.C. 437, 441, 355 S.E.2d 492, 494 (1987). \u201c \u2018Ordinarily, when incompetent or objectionable evidence is withdrawn from the jury\u2019s consideration by appropriate instructions from the trial judge, any error in the admission of the evidence is cured.\u2019 \u201d See State v. Upchurch, 332 N.C. 439, 450, 421 S.E.2d 577, 584 (1992) (citation omitted).\nHere, the prosecutor made the following statement during the State\u2019s direct examination of Mr. Mazur: \u201cThere was testimony in this case that a shot was fired from a shotgun in the hallway of the residence.\u201d We agree with Defendant that the prosecutor\u2019s statement was misleading. Mr. Heyden testified he heard the shotgun blast as Defendant moved out of his line of vision into the hallway; he did not testify to actually seeing Defendant fire the shotgun in the hallway. Nor did any other witness at trial testify that the shotgun was fired in the hallway. While the jury may have inferred from Mr. Heyden\u2019s testimony that Defendant fired the shotgun in the hallway, the prosecutor\u2019s statement assumed matters not in evidence. However, the trial court took steps to mitigate the impact of the statement on the jury by sustaining Defendant\u2019s objection to the statement and instructing the jury to disregard it.\nDefendant further contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial because the prosecutor\u2019s statement violated the Suppression Order. We disagree. The Suppression Order prohibited the State from introducing testimony relating to the SBI\u2019s testing and the results obtained from the testing. The Suppression Order did not constitute a complete ban on all evidence pertaining to Defendant\u2019s location when he fired the shotgun. The prosecutor\u2019s statement improperly implied that Mr. Heyden observed Defendant fire the shotgun in the hallway, but it did not refer to the SBI testing. Thus, the prosecutor\u2019s statement did not violate the Suppression Order. In light of the trial court\u2019s instruction to the jury and our conclusion that the prosecutor did not violate the Suppression Order, we hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial.\nC. Defendant\u2019s Objections and Motions to Strike\nAfter the defense rested its case, the State called Mr. Heyden as a rebuttal witness. During Mr. Heyden\u2019s testimony, the prosecutor asked Mr. Heyden to step down from the witness stand and identify\u2014 using a diagram of Ms. Brown\u2019s residence \u2014 where he believed Defendant was located at the time he heard the first shotgun blast. The following exchange took place:\n[PROSECUTOR]: And where was the defendant when you heard that sound?\n[MR. HEYDEN]: He would have been just past this point here (indicating [on the diagram]).\n[PROSECUTOR]: Thank you.\n(Witness resumes the stand.)\n[PROSECUTOR]: Mr. Heyden, how long had you known Richard Charlton?\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I would object to the last question, object to his answer, and move the jury to strike it.\nTHE COURT: Overruled at this point.\n[PROSECUTOR]: How long have you know Richard Charlton?\n[MR. HEYDEN]: Almost 20 years.\nTHE COURT: And the motion to strike is denied at this point.\nDefendant contends the trial court erred by overruling his objection and motion to strike Mr. Heyden\u2019s testimony concerning Defendant\u2019s location when Mr. Heyden heard the shotgun blast. Defendant asserts this testimony was speculative and deprived him of his right to a fair trial. We do not address the merits of Defendant\u2019s argument because Defendant failed to object to the challenged testimony in a timely manner.\n\u201cAssignments of error are generally not considered on appellate review unless an appropriate and timely objection was entered.\u201d State v. Curry, 171 N.C. App. 568, 573, 615 S.E.2d 327, 331 (2005). \u201c[U]nder Rule 103 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, error may not be predicated on a ruling admitting evidence unless a timely objection or motion to strike appears in the record.\u201d State v. Reid, 322 N.C. 309, 312, 367 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1988) (emphasis added). Where the defendant has \u201c \u2018the opportunity to learn that the evidence was objectionable,\u2019 \u201d but fails to object, \u201che waives the inadmissibility of the evidence.\u201d State v. Potts,_N.C. App._,_, 702 S.E.2d 360, 363 (2010) (citation omitted).\nIn State v. Heyder, the State\u2019s witness read into evidence an out of court statement made by the defendant. 100 N.C. App. 270, 274-75, 396 S.E.2d 86, 88-89 (1990). As the witness was reading the statement, defense counsel objected and moved to strike the testimony. Id. at 275, 396 S.E.2d at 89. The trial court overruled the objection. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court erred by overruling the objection and motion to strike because the entire statement was hearsay. Id. This Court held that \u201cthe defendant did not object in apt time\u201d because \u201cthe defendant was fully aware throughout the reading of the statement that it was an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matters contained within it.\u201d Id. at 275-76, 396 S.E.2d at 89. Accordingly, we held the defendant had failed to preserve the alleged error for appeal. Id. at 276, 396 S.E.2d at 89.\nIn the instant case, the record indicates Defendant failed to raise a timely objection to the challenged testimony. Mr. Heyden stepped down from the witness stand and used a diagram of Ms. Brown\u2019s residence to indicate to the jury where he believed Defendant to be when he heard the shotgun blast. Defendant did not object. Mr. Heyden returned to the witness stand. The prosecutor then proceeded with Mr. Heyden\u2019s testimony, stating: \u201cMr. Heyden, how long had you known Mr. Charlton?\u201d It was only at this point that Defendant lodged an objection. While it is impossible to surmise from the transcript the precise period of time that had elapsed, this progression of events indicates Defendant failed to object to the challenged testimony in a timely manner.\nFurthermore, even if the objection was timely, we further note defense counsel failed to state the specific grounds for the objection. \u201cIn order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented the trial court with a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling sought if the specific grounds are not apparent.\u201d State v. Eason, 328 N.C. 409, 420, 402 S.E.2d 809, 814 (1991) (emphasis added); see N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1). Here, defense counsel did not state the grounds for the objection and, further, the transcript indicates potential confusion as to what Defendant was objecting. Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor\u2019s \u201clast question.\u201d However, the \u201clast question\u201d posed by the prosecutor was \u201cMr. Heyden, how long had you known Mr. Charlton?\u201d It was not until after Mr. Heyden answered this question, stating he had known Mr. Charlton for \u201c20 years,\u201d that the trial court overruled defense counsel\u2019s motion to strike. Accordingly, we hold that defense counsel\u2019s objection was untimely and lacked the requisite precision, and, therefore, Defendant failed to preserve this issue for appellate review.\nWe have reviewed Defendant\u2019s remaining contentions with respect to the objections and motions lodged by defense counsel during the course of Mr. Heyden\u2019s rebuttal testimony and find no error in the trial court\u2019s rulings.\nD. The State\u2019s Closing Arguments\nDefendant\u2019s final contentions take issue with the prosecutor\u2019s closing arguments. During her closing arguments, the prosecutor reminded the jury of the threatening text messages sent by Defendant to Ms. Brown, the violent history between Defendant and Mr. Charlton, and Mr. Charlton\u2019s relationship with Ms. Brown. The prosecutor then stated:\nAnd so when he goes into that house \u2014 the defendant would never admit to this, but he knows that his right to go into that house has been revoked. And he knows that because, again, of the text messages, he knows she\u2019s sleeping with another man. He\u2019s called her a slut. He\u2019s mad at her. A reasonable person, after saying those types of things, would never think you could walk into a woman\u2019s house when she was with another man.\nDefendant did not object. Later, the prosecutor explained to the jury that it was their job to weigh the testimony of the witnesses and determine the credibility of those witnesses, including Mr. Heyden and Ms. Brown. The prosecutor then stated:\nI would submit to you that the truth is the same yesterday as it is today and as it will be tomorrow. And you cannot do that when you look at Kristy Brown\u2019s statement in this case because she said one thing the night of the murder, that she shut the door in the defendant\u2019s face as he\u2019s coming up to her house with a gun, and she gets on the stand and she testifies that he had consent, \u201cHe had standing consent to enter my residence.\u201d Is that reasonable to believe, members of the jury? That when she shut the door in his face she wants him to come in the house when she knew he had a shotgun. It\u2019s not reasonable to assume.\nAgain, Defendant did not object.\nOn appeal, Defendant contends the prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that Defendant\u2019s right to enter Ms. Brown\u2019s home had been revoked improperly contravened the trial court\u2019s earlier ruling on the issue of consent. At the close of all the evidence, the trial court dismissed the charge of first-degree burglary against Defendant, stating:\nI just don\u2019t see where there\u2019s been sufficient evidence shown that she has indicated through her testimony that the standing consent or the consent to \u2014 specific intent to come and go into the home, there\u2019s no evidence through her indicating that that was negated in her opinion.\nIn light of the trial court\u2019s ruling, Defendant contends the prosecutor\u2019s remarks during closing arguments prejudiced Defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial and the trial court committed plain error by failing to intervene ex mero motu. Because Defendant failed to object at trial, this Court must determine whether the prosecutor\u2019s remarks were \u201cso grossly improper that the trial court erred in failing to intervene ex mero motu.\u201d State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 358, 572 S.E.2d 108, 135 (2002).\nN.C. Gen. Stat \u00a7 15A-1230 provides:\nDuring a closing argument to the jury an attorney may not become abusive, inject his personal experiences, express his personal belief as to the truth or falsity of the evidence or as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, or make arguments on the basis of matters outside the record except for matters concerning which the court may take judicial notice. An attorney may, however, on the basis of his analysis of the evidence, argue any position or conclusion with respect to a matter in issue.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1230(a) (2009). As our Supreme Court has explained, the trial court must intervene during closing arguments only where \u201cthe argument, strays so far from the bounds of propriety as to impede defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial.\u201d State v. Atkins, 349 N.C. 62, 84, 505 S.E.2d 97, 111 (1998); see also State v. Paul, 58 N.C. App. 723, 725, 294 S.E.2d 762, 763 (1982) (\u201cDefendant is entitled to a new trial only if the impropriety is shown to be prejudicial.\u201d).\nAfter careful review of the record, we conclude the prosecutor\u2019s remarks did not impede Defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial. The prosecutor\u2019s closing arguments asked the jury to infer from the circumstances that Ms. Brown revoked Defendant\u2019s permission to enter her home. The prosecutor also encouraged the jury to evaluate the credibility of Ms. Brown\u2019s testimony: on one hand, Ms. Brown testified Defendant had \u201cstanding consent\u201d to enter her home; on the other hand, Ms. Brown testified she did not want Defendant to see her with Mr. Charlton and slammed the door in Defendant\u2019s face. Even assuming the prosecutor\u2019s remarks possessed some degree of impropriety in light of the trial court\u2019s earlier ruling, we cannot conclude these remarks impeded Defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial. As the burglary charge had been dismissed, the issue of whether Defendant had consent to enter Ms. Brown\u2019s home had little practical bearing on the jury\u2019s verdict as to the first-degree murder charge. Defendant\u2019s means of entry is immaterial if he shot and killed Mr. Charlton with premeditation, deliberation, and malice.\nDefendant also contends the trial court erred when it overruled Defendant\u2019s objection after the prosecutor stated Defendant could have called law enforcement to help him retrieve his clothes from Ms. Brown\u2019s residence. Defendant did object to this portion of the prosecutors closing arguments, and we review the trial court\u2019s ruling for abuse of discretion. State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 131, 558 S.E.2d 97, 106 (2002).\n\u201cDuring closing arguments, trial counsel is allowed \u2018wide latitude\u2019 in his remarks to the jury and may argue the law, all the facts in evidence, and any reasonable inference drawn from the law and facts.\u201d State v. Anderson, 175 N.C. App. 444, 452, 624 S.E.2d 393, 400 (2006). The thrust of Defendant\u2019s argument is that the prosecutor\u2019s statement \u201cwas a calculated attempt to mislead the jurors.\u201d We disagree with Defendant\u2019s characterization of this portion of the prosecutor\u2019s closing arguments. The prosecutor posed a statement to the jury grounded in reason and common sense: if Defendant needed to obtain his personal possessions from Ms. Brown\u2019s residence, there were ways of doing so without resorting to violence. We hold the trial court was within its discretion in allowing the prosecutor\u2019s statement.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we conclude Defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges HUNTER, Robert C., and GEER concur.\n. Although it is unclear from the transcript, Defendant\u2019s testimony indicates Ms. Brown was in or around the bedroom at this time, but fled up the hallway when Mr. Charlton pointed his gun at Defendant.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General L. Michael Dodd, for the State.", "Marilyn G. Ozerfor Defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL SCOTT SISTLER\nNo. COA11-1035\n(Filed 17 January 2012)\n1. Homicide \u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence \u2014 premeditation\u2014deliberation\u2014malice\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss the first-degree murder charge at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and at the close of all evidence. There was substantial evidence that defendant acted with premeditation, deliberation, and malice. Further, defendant did not act in self-defense.\n2. Criminal Law \u2014 motion for mistrial \u2014 reference to suppressed evidence \u2014 trial court steps to mitigate\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree murder case by denying defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor allegedly referred to suppressed evidence. The suppression order did not constitute a complete ban on all evidence pertaining to defendant\u2019s location when he fired the shotgun. Further, the trial court took steps to mitigate the impact of the prosecutor\u2019s statement by sustaining defendant\u2019s objection and instructing the jury to disregard it.\n3. Appeal and Error \u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 untimely objection \u2014 failure to state specific grounds for objection\nAlthough defendant contended that the trial court erred in a first-degree murder case by overruling his objection and motion to strike a witness\u2019s testimony concerning defendant\u2019s location when the witness heard the shotgun blast, defendant waived review of this issue by failing to object to the challenged testimony in a timely manner. Even if the objection was timely, defense counsel failed to state the specific grounds for the objection.\n4. Criminal Law \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 right to enter home revoked \u2014 law enforcement could have helped\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a first-degree murder case by failing to intervene ex mero mo tu during the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument allegedly insinuating that defendant\u2019s right to enter a home had been revoked or by overruling defendant\u2019s objection after the prosecutor stated defendant could have called law enforcement to help him retrieve his clothes from the residence. The consent issue was immaterial, and the law enforcement statement was grounded in reason and common sense.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 17 March 2011 by Judge Robert F. Floyd, Jr. in Johnston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 November 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General L. Michael Dodd, for the State.\nMarilyn G. Ozerfor Defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0060-01", "first_page_order": 70, "last_page_order": 86 }