{ "id": 4364261, "name": "SAMUEL and DORIS FORT, JULIE KATHERINE FAIRCLOTH, and RAEFORD B. LOCKAMY, II, Petitioners v. COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND, North Carolina, Respondent, and TIGERSWAN, Inc. Intervenor Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Fort v. County of Cumberland", "decision_date": "2012-02-07", "docket_number": "No. COA11-758", "first_page": "401", "last_page": "409", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "218 N.C. App. 401" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635483 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2-3" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E.2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555", "parenthetical": "rejecting the affidavit of the North Carolina Commissioner of Agriculture as to the intent of a statute regulating the sale of milk" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567865 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332-33", "parenthetical": "rejecting the affidavit of the North Carolina Commissioner of Agriculture as to the intent of a statute regulating the sale of milk" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 S.E. 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 N.C. 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8656248 ], "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/182/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 887", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "890-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2508874 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 S.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4754000, 4752627, 4751480, 4758777, 4754845 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0082-01", "/nc/312/0082-05", "/nc/312/0082-03", "/nc/312/0082-04", "/nc/312/0082-02" ] }, { "cite": "317 S.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 N.C. App. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526333 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/69/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 S.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39", "parenthetical": "noting the rules governing statutory interpretation apply equally to interpretations of zoning ordinances" }, { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573796 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428", "parenthetical": "noting the rules governing statutory interpretation apply equally to interpretations of zoning ordinances" }, { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187-88", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2528575 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138-39", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2534314, 2537066, 2536085, 2534232, 2536670 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0071-01", "/nc/336/0071-04", "/nc/336/0071-05", "/nc/336/0071-03", "/nc/336/0071-02" ] }, { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" }, { "page": "201" }, { "page": "201", "parenthetical": "giving consideration to the title of the zoning district when discerning the intent of the zoning ordinance" }, { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4176320 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/204/0130-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 875, "char_count": 19415, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0782041614492968e-07, "percentile": 0.5617719411440589 }, "sha256": "ae53d4a6313fd53196325dae34b111ec7be0eaa7e8290aedb17a43525fa75d6b", "simhash": "1:bb6ac432022e4fda", "word_count": 2979 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:21:59.538017+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and HUNTER, Jr., Robert N., concur." ], "parties": [ "SAMUEL and DORIS FORT, JULIE KATHERINE FAIRCLOTH, and RAEFORD B. LOCKAMY, II, Petitioners v. COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND, North Carolina, Respondent, and TIGERSWAN, Inc. Intervenor Respondent" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.\nPetitioners-appellants, Samuel and Doris Fort, Julia Katherine Faircloth, and Raeford B. Lockamy, II (collectively \u201cpetitioners\u201d) appeal the trial court\u2019s order concluding, inter alia, that intervenorrespondent-appellee TigerSwan, Inc.\u2019s (\u201cTigerSwan\u201d) proposed training facility is a permitted land use under respondent County of Cumberland\u2019s zoning ordinance. After careful review, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part.\nBackground\nPetitioners began the underlying action by appealing to the Cumberland County Board of Adjustment (the \u201cBoard\u201d) the decision of the county\u2019s Zoning Administrator to approve a site plan for a training facility (the \u201cTraining Facility\u201d) in Cumberland County. The site plan for the Training Facility was proposed by TigerSwan, a North Carolina corporation that has leased approximately 1,000 acres in rural Cumberland County as the site for its Training Facility.\nTigerSwan\u2019s site plan classified the proposed Training Facility as a \u201cfirearms training facility\u201d and the evidence presented in the subsequent appeals established that TigerSwan intends to provide instruction to military, law enforcement, and security personnel in topics such as weapons training, urban warfare, convoy security operations, and \u201c[wjarrior [c]ombatives\u201d in order to \u201cteach, coach, and mentor tomorrow\u2019s soldiers.\u201d TigerSwan also intends to provide courses on topics such as first aid, firearm and hunting safety and foreign languages for adults and children.\nIn addition to classroom facilities, the site plan for the Training Facility includes multiple firing ranges surrounded by berms, or earthen embankments, intended as a barrier to suppress noise from firing weapons and to prevent ammunition from leaving the firing range. Beyond the berms, the firing ranges are surrounded by Surface Danger Zones (\u201cSDZs\u201d), which TigerSwan\u2019s site plan describes as open areas of land where \u201cricochet hazards\u201d that \u201cmay endanger nonparticipating personnel, or the general public\u201d might land within TigerSwan\u2019s property.\nThe land leased by TigerSwan, as well as petitioners\u2019 property is zoned as belonging to an A1 Agricultural District under Cumberland County\u2019s Zoning Ordinance (the \u201cZoning Ordinance\u201d or \u201cOrdinance\u201d). The Zoning Ordinance limits the types of commercial uses permitted in an A1 Agricultural District and provides a list of permitted and conditional uses within the district. Included in the list of permitted uses are \u201cSCHOOLS, public, private, elementary or secondary.\u201d The Cumberland County Zoning Administrator approved TigerSwan\u2019s site plan by classifying the business as a \u201cprivate school.\u201d\nPetitioners appealed the approval of the site plan to the Board providing affidavits and in-person testimony of their opposition to the Training Facility Petitioner Faircloth resides on her property with her family While petitioners Fort and Lockamy do not live on their properties, they use the properties to enjoy the quiet atmosphere of the rural setting for family cookouts, gardening, and other means of recreation. Petitioners expressed their concerns for the increased noise from the firing ranges and TigerSwan\u2019s potential use of helicopters. In addition to the potential noise, petitioners were concerned for their personal safety due to the potential for stray gunfire given that TigerSwan intends to provide weapons training on firearms that require SDZs of two and a half miles. Due to the quantity of ammunition TigerSwan estimates it will fire in a year (15 million rounds), petitioners also raised concerns over lead contamination of the groundwater and surrounding soil. Because of these potential adverse effects, petitioners believe the approval of the TigerSwan Training Facility will result in a decrease in their property values.\nThe Board voted unanimously that petitioners had standing to challenge the approval of TigerSwan\u2019s site plan, and voted three-to-two in favor of reversing the decision of the Zoning Administrator. However, as a vote of four-fifths of the Board was required to reverse the decision of the Zoning Administrator, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 153A-345(e) (2009), the Zoning Administrator\u2019s approval of the site plan was affirmed as a matter of law. Petitioners appealed the Board\u2019s decision to the superior .court by petition for writ of certiorari. The trial court concluded that petitioners had standing to maintain their appeal, but held that the Training Facility was a permitted use in an A1 Agricultural District under the Cumberland County\u2019s Zoning Ordinance. Petitioners appeal from this order.\nDiscussion\nA. Standing\nTigerSwan first argues that petitioners do not have standing to maintain their challenge to the approval of TigerSwan\u2019s site plan. We disagree.\nWhether a party has standing to maintain an action \u201cimplicates a court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction and may be raised at any time, even on appeal.\u201d Fish House, Inc. v. Clarke, 204 N.C. App. 130, 136, 693 S.E.2d 208, 212, disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 324, 700 S.E.2d 750 (2010). In our determination of whether a party has standing, we utilize a de novo review and must \u201cview the allegations as true and the supporting record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.\u201d Mangum v. Raleigh Bd. of Adjustment, 362 N.C. 640, 644, 669 S.E.2d 279, 283 (2008). Here, petitioners assert they have standing pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-393(d)(2) (2009), which confers standing to challenge the Board\u2019s decision to \u201cperson[s] who will suffer special damages as the result of the decision being appealed.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nA property owner does not have standing to challenge another\u2019s lawful use of her land merely on the basis that such use will reduce the value of her property. Jackson v. Guilford Co. Bd. of Adjustment, 275 N.C. 155, 161, 166 S.E.2d 78, 82 (1969). However, where the challenged land use is \u201cprohibited by a valid zoning ordinance, the owner of adjoining or nearby lands, who will sustain special damage from the proposed use through a reduction in the value of his own property, does have a standing\u201d to maintain an action to prevent the use. Id.\nAdditionally, in Magnum, our Supreme Court held that the petitioners in that case had standing to maintain their suit where the petitioners: (1) challenged a land use that would be unlawful without a special use permit; (2) alleged they would suffer special damages if the use is permitted; and (3) provided evidence of \u201c \u2018increased traffic, increased water runoff, parking, and safety concerns,\u2019 as well as the secondary adverse effects\u201d that would result from the challenged use. 362 N.C. at 643-44, 669 S.E.2d at 282-83. Recently, this Court applied the standard set forth in Magnum and concluded that a petitioner challenging her neighbor\u2019s application for a use permit on the basis that the proposed use would reduce the value of the petitioner\u2019s property was sufficient to establish the petitioner had standing. Sanchez v. Town of Beaufort,_N.C. App._,_, 710 S.E.2d 350, 353-54, review denied and dismissed, _ N.C. _, 717 S.E.2d 745, 718 S.E.2d 152, and 718 S.E.2d 153 (2011).\nWe discern no meaningful distinction between Magnum, Sanchez, and the present case. Here, petitioners testified to their concerns that the alleged unlawful approval of the Training Facility would increase noise levels, had the potential to result in groundwater and soil contamination, and threatened the safety of anyone on their property due to stray bullets. These problems, petitioners contend, would result in a decrease in their property values. We conclude this evidence was sufficient to establish standing to challenge TigerSwan\u2019s proposed land use.\nTigerSwan contends that petitioners\u2019 evidence as to the potential impact on their property values is insufficient to support their claim. Specifically, TigerSwan cites N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-393, which provides that lay witnesses\u2019 opinions as to property values do not constitute competent evidence. However, reading section 160A-393 as a whole, it is apparent the definition of competent evidence provided in subsection (k)(3) of the statute is limited to that subsection, and the definition does not affect the Court\u2019s analysis of standing, which is governed by subsection (d). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-393. TigerSwan\u2019s argument is overruled.\nB. Permitted Use\nNext, petitioners contend that the trial court erred in affirming the Board\u2019s decision to uphold the Zoning Administrator\u2019s classification of the TigerSwan Training Facility as a permitted use in the A1 Agricultural District. We agree.\n\u201cIn cases appealed from administrative tribunals, we review questions of law de novo and questions of fact under the whole record test.\u201d Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 386, 628 S.E.2d 1, 2-3 (2006). \u201cQuestions involving the interpretation of ordinances are questions of law.\u201d Ayers v. Bd. of Adjustment, 113 N.C. App. 528, 531, 439 S.E.2d 199, 201, disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 71, 445 S.E.2d 28 (1994). In our review of the alleged errors of law made below, we may freely substitute our judgment for that of the superior court. Id. at 530-31, 439 S.E.2d at 201.\n\u201cIn interpreting a municipal ordinance \u2018[t]he basic rule is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislative body.\u2019 \u201d Capricorn Equity Corp. v. Town of Chapel Hill Bd. of Adjustment, 334 N.C. 132, 138-39, 431 S.E.2d 183, 187-88 (1993) (citations omitted). In the present case, the Zoning Ordinance for the district in which the Training Facility is located expressly states the intent of the district, as follows:\nA1 Agricultural District. This district is designed to promote and protect agricultural lands, including woodland, within the County. The general intent of the district is to permit all agricultural uses to exist free from most private urban development except for large lot, single-family development. Some public and/or semi-public uses as well as a limited list of convenient commercial uses are permitted to ensure essential services for the residents.\nCumberland County Zoning Ordinance, art. Ill, \u00a7 303A (2010) (Emphasis added.) Although we feel this statement of intent is unambiguous, we also note the title of the zoning district \u2014 the A1 Agricultural District \u2014 provides additional indication of the spirit and goal of the ordinance. Ayers, 113 N.C. App. at 531, 439 S.E.2d at 201 (giving consideration to the title of the zoning district when discerning the intent of the zoning ordinance).\nThe Zoning Ordinance further provides a list of permitted, conditional, and special uses for the various districts in the County\u2019s Zoning Ordinance, including the A1 Agricultural District. Permitted land uses in the A1 Agricultural District include, among others, \u201cSCHOOLS, public, private, elementary or secondary.\u201d Petitioners and respondents disagree as to how to interpret these words.\nPetitioners argue that by including \u201cSCHOOLS, public, private, elementary or secondary\u201d as permitted uses, the drafters of the ordinance intended the words \u201celementary or secondary\u201d to qualify, and to limit, the types of public and private schools, permitting only: public elementary schools, private elementary schools, public secondary schools, and private secondary schools. This interpretation, TigerSwan argues, renders the words \u201cpublic, private\u201d redundant as all elementary or secondary schools must be either public or private.\nAlternatively, TigerSwan proposes an interpretation that each word offset by commas holds their own meaning. Thus, \u201cpublic\u201d and \u201cprivate\u201d do not modify \u201celementary or secondary,\u201d and the following schools would be permitted uses: public schools, private schools, elementary schools, and secondary schools. TigerSwan contends the Training Facility qualifies as a \u201cprivate school\u201d and therefore is a permitted use in the A1 Agricultural District. Petitioners counter that this interpretation renders the words \u201celementary or secondary\u201d redundant; because all elementary or secondary schools must be either public or private, the inclusion of \u201celementary or secondary\u201d would be unnecessary unless the words were intended as a limitation.\nWe construe the Zoning Ordinance by adhering to well-founded principles of statutory construction. See Cogdell v. Taylor, 264 N.C. 424, 428, 142 S.E.2d 36, 39 (1965) (noting the rules governing statutory interpretation apply equally to interpretations of zoning ordinances). First, we presume that \u201cno part of a statute is mere surplusage, but that each provision adds something not otherwise included therein.\u201d Duke Power Co. v. City of High Point, 69 N.C. App. 378, 387, 317 S.E.2d 701, 706, disc. review denied, 312 N.C. 82, 321 S.E.2d 895 (1984). Second, \u201cwords and phrases of a statute may not be interpreted out of context, but must be interpreted as a composite whole so as to harmonize with other statutory provisions and effectuate legislative intent,\u201d id., while avoiding absurd or illogical interpretations, Ayers, 113 N.C. App. at 531, 439 S.E.2d at 201. Additionally, we find instructive this Court\u2019s use of the long-standing rule of statutory construction: \u201cecepressio unius est exclusio alterius,\" meaning the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. Mangum, 196 N.C. App. at 255, 674 S.E.2d at 747 (citing Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 337, 410 S.E.2d 887, 890-91 (1991) and Bd. of Drainage Comm\u2019rs v. Credle, 182 N.C. 442, 445, 109 S.E. 88, 90 (1921)).\nApplying these rules of construction to the ordinance at issue, we conclude the inclusion of \u201celementary or secondary\u201d in the description of permissible schools was intended to exclude other types of \u201cSCHOOLS,\u201d whether they be private or public. It would be illogical for the drafters to provide that all public and all private schools are permitted in addition to elementary and secondary schools. Rather, in light of the drafters\u2019 express intent for the AI Agricultural District to limit commercial uses to those providing \u201cessential services,\u201d we regard the inclusion of \u201cpublic\u201d and \u201cprivate\u201d as an affirmation that private elementary or secondary schools are permitted as commercial uses providing \u201cessential services\u201d to residents.\nThis interpretation is reinforced by the drafters\u2019 express prohibition of \u201cSCHOOL[S], business and commercial for nurses or other medically oriented professions, trade, vocational & fine arts.\u201d Petitioners argue that the Training Facility should be prohibited based upon this language, while TigerSwan attempts to distinguish the Training Facility from trade or vocational schools by arguing they will teach skills, not occupations. Without deciding whether the Training Facility qualifies as either a trade or vocational school, we conclude that the Training Facility is not a permitted use as it is not a public or private, elementary or secondary school.\nTigerSwan places great emphasis on the testimony of the Cumberland County Planning Director as to the original intent of the list of prohibited schools and his contention that schools such as the one proposed by TigerSwan were not intended to be prohibited. However, as our Supreme Court has clearly stated, the intent of the drafters of a statute cannot be established in this manner: \u201cTestimony, even by members of the Legislature which adopted the statute, as to its purpose and the construction intended to be given by the Legislature to its terms, is not competent evidence upon which the court can make its determination as to the meaning of the statutory provision.\u201d State v. Nat\u2019l Food Stores, Inc., 270 N.C. 323, 332-33, 154 S.E.2d 548, 555 (1967) (rejecting the affidavit of the North Carolina Commissioner of Agriculture as to the intent of a statute regulating the sale of milk). As the rules governing statutory interpretation apply equally to interpretations of zoning ordinances, Cogdell, 264 N.C. at 428, 142 S.E.2d at 39, the Cumberland County Planning Director\u2019s testimony as to the intent of the Ordinance is irrelevant to our analysis.\nLastly, TigerSwan argues petitioners distort the nature of the activities that will occur at the Training Facility by focusing on the more extreme activities highlighted in their advertising materials\u2014 such as training law enforcement and military personnel in urban warfare. TigerSwan does not dispute such skills will be taught at its facility. Rather, TigerSwan stresses that it will also instruct adults and children in leadership, first aid, and foreign languages \u2014 skills commonly taught in elementary and secondary schools. However, the Zoning Ordinance expressly states in the introduction to the section on permitted and conditional uses that \u201cno land, building or structure shall be used ... in whole or in part for any use other than the uses permitted\u201d by the district in question. (Emphasis added.) Thus, while TigerSwan may offer some instruction that would be permitted in an elementary or secondary school, the inclusion of permitted uses cannot offset the uses prohibited by the Ordinance. TigerSwan\u2019s argument is overruled.\nConclusion\nIn sum, the trial court did not err in concluding petitioners had standing to maintain their appeal of the decision of the Board of Adjustment. However, the trial court erred in concluding the TigerSwan Training Facility is a permitted use within the A1 Agricultural District under the Cumberland County Zoning Ordinance. The trial court\u2019s order is therefore affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part.\nAffirmed, in part, and reversed, in part.\nJudges McGEE and HUNTER, Jr., Robert N., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Currin & Currin, Attorneys at Law, by Robin T. Currin and George B. Currin, for petitioners-appellants.", "Deputy County Attorney Harvey W. Raynor, III, for respondentappellee County of Cumberland.", "Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Charles C. Meeker and Brenton W. McConkey, for intervenor-respondent-appellee TigerSwan, Inc." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SAMUEL and DORIS FORT, JULIE KATHERINE FAIRCLOTH, and RAEFORD B. LOCKAMY, II, Petitioners v. COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND, North Carolina, Respondent, and TIGERSWAN, Inc. Intervenor Respondent\nNo. COA11-758\n(Filed 7 February 2012)\n1. Zoning \u2014 standing to challenge proposed use \u2014 owner of adjoining land \u2014 use prohibited by ordinance \u2014 special damages alleged\nPetitioners had standing to challenge the Cumberland County Board of Adjustment\u2019s approval of intervenor respondent\u2019s plan to build a firearms training facility. Petitioners were the owners of adjoining or nearby lands, the challenged land use was prohibited by a valid zoning ordinance, and petitioners alleged that they would sustain special damage from the proposed use through a reduction in the value of their property.\n2. Zoning \u2014 agricultural district \u2014 firearms training facility\u2014 not permitted use\nThe trial court erred in a zoning case by affirming the Cumberland County Board of Adjustment\u2019s decision to uphold the Zoning Administrator\u2019s classification of petitioner intervenor\u2019s firearms training facility as a permitted use in the A1 Agricultural District. The zoning ordinance for the district in which the training facility was to be located expressly stated that it was to be used as an agricultural district with limited exceptions, including elementary or secondary schools. Respondent\u2019s facility failed to qualify under any permitted use.\nAppeal by petitioners from order entered 22 February 2011 by Judge Robert F. Floyd, Jr., in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 November 2011.\nCurrin & Currin, Attorneys at Law, by Robin T. Currin and George B. Currin, for petitioners-appellants.\nDeputy County Attorney Harvey W. Raynor, III, for respondentappellee County of Cumberland.\nParker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Charles C. Meeker and Brenton W. McConkey, for intervenor-respondent-appellee TigerSwan, Inc." }, "file_name": "0401-01", "first_page_order": 411, "last_page_order": 419 }