{
  "id": 4364008,
  "name": "IN THE MATTER OF J.S.L.",
  "name_abbreviation": "In re J.S.L.",
  "decision_date": "2012-02-07",
  "docket_number": "No. COA11-928",
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      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8-50.1",
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      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "weight": 2,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:21:59.538017+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge BRYANT concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "IN THE MATTER OF J.S.L."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "McCullough, judge.\nThe mother (hereinafter \u201cpetitioner\u201d) of J.S.L., a child born out of wedlock, filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent, whom she alleged to be the biological father of J.S.L. Because no father was named on the birth certificate, petitioner also sought to terminate the parental rights of any possible unknown father. Respondent, pro se, filed an answer to the petition in which he denied paternity and moved for DNA paternity testing. The trial court subsequently appointed an attorney to represent respondent, and at the call of the case for hearing, respondent\u2019s attorney renewed the request for paternity testing. The court denied the motion and proceeded to conduct the hearing upon the petition. The court filed an order on 29 April 2011 terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights to the child pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1111(5) and (7) (2011). Respondent filed notice of appeal on 17 May 2011 from the order terminating his parental rights. He filed the record on appeal and a petition for writ of certiorari in the event the notice of appeal did not adequately preserve an appeal from the order denying his request for DNA paternity testing. We allow the petition.\nRespondent contends that the court erred by denying his motion for DNA paternity testing. We agree. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8-50.1(bl) (2011) mandates that in \u201cany civil action in which the question of parentage arises, the court shall, on motion of a party, order... blood or genetic marker tests, to be performed by a duly certified physician or other expert.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). \u201cIn cases where the issue of paternity has not been litigated ... or in cases where the alleged father has never admitted paternity, G.S. \u00a7 8-50.1 controls and the request for a paternity test will be allowed.\u201d Ambrose v. Ambrose, 140 N.C. App. 545, 546, 536 S.E.2d 855, 857 (2000) (emphasis added). Respondent contested paternity in his answer, and nothing in the record shows that the question of paternity had ever been determined judicially or otherwise prior to the filing of the petition.\nWe further conclude that the court\u2019s subsequent termination of respondent\u2019s parental rights did not render the error non-prejudicial or moot. \u201cA civil appeal is not moot when the challenged judgment may cause collateral legal consequences for the appellant.\u201d In re A.K., 360 N.C. 449, 453, 628 S.E.2d 753, 756 (2006). Here, the court\u2019s order has collateral legal consequences; namely, termination of respondent\u2019s parental rights could form the basis for terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights to other children. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1111(a)(9) (2011) (permitting termination of parental rights on the ground that \u201c[t]he parental rights of the parent with respect to another child of the parent have been terminated involuntarily by a court of competent jurisdiction and the parent lacks the ability or willingness to establish a safe home\u201d). If the court had ordered DNA paternity testing, and respondent had been excluded by such testing as being the father, then the court would have been required to dismiss the petition against respondent.\nWe therefore reverse the order and remand to the district court for a new hearing where the district court shall order DNA testing to establish paternity. Our disposition renders it unnecessary to consider respondent\u2019s other three contentions.\nReversed and remanded.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge BRYANT concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "McCullough, judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "No brief filed for petitioner-appellee or guardian ad litem.",
      "Jeffrey L. Miller for respondent-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF J.S.L.\nNo. COA11-928\n(Filed 7 February 2012)\nTermination of Parental Rights \u2014 paternity testing \u2014 motion erroneously denied\nThe trial court erred by denying respondent\u2019s motion for DNA paternity testing in a termination of parental rights case. Respondent contested paternity in his answer and nothing in the record showed that the question of paternity had ever been determined judicially or otherwise prior to the filing of the petition. Further, the court\u2019s subsequent termination of respondent\u2019s parental rights did not render the error non-prejudicial or moot as the order had collateral legal consequences.\nAppeal by respondent from order entered 29 April 2011 by Judge John B. Carter in Robeson County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 January 2012.\nNo brief filed for petitioner-appellee or guardian ad litem.\nJeffrey L. Miller for respondent-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0610-01",
  "first_page_order": 620,
  "last_page_order": 622
}