{ "id": 4362310, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PERRY ROSS SCHIRO", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Schiro", "decision_date": "2012-02-21", "docket_number": "No. COA11-1092", "first_page": "105", "last_page": "116", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "219 N.C. App. 105" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "627 S.E.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635368 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/627/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "621 S.E.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634300 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/621/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 S.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639310 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/650/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "634 S.E.2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636691, 12636692, 12636693 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/634/0889-01", "/se2d/634/0889-02", "/se2d/634/0889-03" ] }, { "cite": "627 S.E.2d 488", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635392 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490-91", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "489-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/627/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 S.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "804", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 722", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574365 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0722-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-17", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "426 S.E.2d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2546948 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 F.2d 995", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 562145 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/676/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 S.E.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795978 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0580-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 S.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305171 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 573", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524991 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3795412 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8352212 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306215 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 S.E.2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "684", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 N.C. App. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8154614 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "902 F.2d 937", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10537203 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "942" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/902/0937-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3787235, 3791492, 3791302, 3786795, 3798577, 3786587 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0541-06", "/nc/360/0541-01", "/nc/360/0541-05", "/nc/360/0541-03", "/nc/360/0541-04", "/nc/360/0541-02" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8300988 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 U.S. 332", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3653882 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" }, { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/556/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523319 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 248", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6221328 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" }, { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "702 S.E.2d 500", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "691 S.E.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" }, { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 N.C. App. 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4175714 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/203/0561-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E.2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561152 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0561-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 U.S. 366", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12205 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "343-44", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/508/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 S.E.2d 624", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627", "parenthetical": "quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334, 343-44 (1993) (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9082714 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666", "parenthetical": "quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334, 343-44 (1993) (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "601 S.E.2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 N.C. App. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8411088 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/166/0228-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1203, "char_count": 29099, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.298132930532853e-08, "percentile": 0.3335723434068936 }, "sha256": "06bf0ee8f085635b0732fbd550334735615c902f3bf7cfb66a009dec94d8400b", "simhash": "1:e221c0725e2f9572", "word_count": 4850 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:16:59.313771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER (Robert C.) and THIGPEN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PERRY ROSS SCHIRO" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCULLOUGH, Judge.\nPerry Ross Schiro (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from his conviction of accessory after the fact to first-degree murder for attempting to hide the murder weapon. We find no error.\nI. Background\nOn the morning of Friday, 21 September 2007, in Carthage, North Carolina, Michael Graham Currie and Sherrod Harrison broke into the home of Emily Haddock, who was home sick from school. Currie proceeded to shoot Haddock twice in the head with a .22 caliber handgun, resulting in her death. Defendant, Currie, Harrison, Ryan White, and Van Roger Smith, Jr., were all initially charged with first-degree murder. Defendant\u2019s charge for first-degree murder was dropped a few days before trial. Currie ultimately escaped being tried for capital murder by confessing and agreeing to testify against defendant. Currie, however, did receive a sentence of life without parole. Currie gave two statements to police on 22 October 2007, but in neither statement did he tell police anything about conveying to defendant that the gun had been used in a murder. Currie allegedly did not alert authorities to having told defendant about the gun until he began discussing his plea bargain with the district attorney. Furthermore, in a 26 June 2009 letter to the district attorney, Currie falsely claimed defendant was the one \u201cwho broke in and shot and killed Emily Haddock.\u201d However, Currie admitted to the fallacy at trial. Defendant did not testify at trial, but he had previously provided law enforcement with a signed statement.\nCurrie obtained the murder weapon during a 20 September 2007 break-in of David Ball\u2019s home with Harrison, where they also stole other goods. The gun had a distinct look to it; mainly that it had a gold trigger. After the shooting, Currie held onto the gun, but then gave it to Harrison. Not much later he got the gun back from Harrison and gave it to White, telling him that he could do \u201c[wjhatever he wanted\u201d with it. Prior to giving the gun to White, though, Currie had been handling it in front of defendant and others while wearing white gloves, which they found to be strange. Defendant and Currie stayed in a hotel in Spring Lake, North Carolina, over the weekend. While there Currie called White and told him to give the gun to defendant.\nDefendant went by White\u2019s house to pick up the gun and subsequently shot the gun once inside of a Wendy\u2019s bag. Defendant then returned to the hotel with the gun. Currie testified that while he and defendant were in the hotel room he told defendant \u201cwhere the gun was from\u201d and at some point before they were locked up \u201cthat Sherrod [Harrison] did that shooting.\u201d Furthermore, he testified that he \u201ctold [defendant] the next night at the hotel\u2014Sunday night I told him what happened. I told him me and Sherrod were involved and Ryan had the gun.\u201d Defendant also learned at some point before being arrested that a Moore County detective was looking for Currie. Currie had told defendant to toss the gun somewhere Currie could find it, so Currie could get rid of it.\nDefendant left the hotel early Monday morning with the gun in a Nike bag. At some point that morning, defendant went by Jamel Allen\u2019s house where he put the gun in a sock and hid it in the trunk of his car. He then went to eat with some friends where they discussed needing to stay away from Currie because he was acting weird and wearing white gloves. He stated that had he known at the time that Haddock had been shot, he would have thought Currie was involved in the shooting. Soon thereafter, he and White got in the car to ride around looking for Currie, but they could not find him and thus returned to White\u2019s house. About five minutes later, the Harnett County Sheriff\u2019s Office pulled up and started questioning defendant about his car and Currie\u2019s whereabouts. Detective Lieutenant Joe Webb asked defendant for the keys to his car, so defendant told his little brother to give them to Lieutenant Webb. Lieutenant Webb and Detective Justin Toler then opened defendant\u2019s trunk to find the gun hidden in the wheel well.\nThe trial court held a pretrial hearing regarding defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence seized from the car. Conflicting evidence was presented regarding the consent necessary to search the vehicle. Detective Toler testified that the search was based on consent, but his report stated it was incident to arrest. Upon hearing all the evidence, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion. The trial court entered oral findings of fact and conclusions of law.\nIn summary, the trial court found that upon determining that the license plate on defendant\u2019s car was stolen, officers placed defendant under arrest and Lieutenant Webb accompanied defendant to the rear of defendant\u2019s car. Detective Toler searched the driver\u2019s side of the car where he found a marijuana bud under the seat. He continued to search the backseat where he found a vanity license plate containing the words \u201cHOTT CHIC,\u201d which belonged to a stolen Lexus found on 24 September 2007, after being wrecked and burned. Lieutenant Webb asked defendant for consent to search the rest of his vehicle, to which defendant acquiesced. Another patrol car arrived and defendant was placed in the passenger seat, about 10-15 feet away from the trunk of his car. Lieutenant Webb obtained the keys and opened defendant\u2019s trunk to search it. While authorities were searching his vehicle, defendant complained to Lieutenant Darren Ritter, who was sitting in the patrol car with defendant, that they were \u201ctearing up\u201d his cax. Both rear quarter panels of the trunk were fitted with carpet/cardboard type interior trim, which were loose. Detective Toler found the gun behind the right rear quarter panel. Defendant was within range to verbally withdraw consent. Defendant told Lieutenant Ritter that he was a convicted felon, that his fingerprints should not be on the gun, and that he did not know anything about the gun. Lieutenant Ritter testified that defendant was visibly sweating and shaking.\nThe trial court found that the search of the driver\u2019s area of the vehicle was lawful subsequent to defendant\u2019s arrest. Additionally, the search of the interior was lawful after finding the marijuana and the search of the trunk was based on voluntary consent. Furthermore, the search of the entire vehicle was justified based on the interest of seeking evidence of contraband and crime after finding the license plate from the stolen car along with marijuana.\nMoreover, at trial, the State presented evidence that defendant had been involved in the theft of the Lexus connected to the license plate \u201cHOTT CHIC.\u201d Olivia Marie Elliott-Priest, a friend of Currie and defendant, testified that she had seen defendant driving around in a white Lexus, which she had never seen him in. Defendant usually drove a green Cadillac. She also testified to defendant and Currie having arrived at her house earlier in the week late at night, after having wrecked the Lexus about two minutes away. White had then picked defendant and Currie up in defendant\u2019s Cadillac.\nAnother issue arose at trial regarding the admission of evidence and testimony pertaining to defendant\u2019s involvement in the robbery of David Wayne Oakley\u2019s house. Defendant filed a motion in limine to prevent mention of these details. The trial court initially sustained an objection to the admission of the evidence due to hearsay, but eventually let the evidence in based on its corroborating other testimony and showing the chain of circumstances of the weekend. The robbery included the taking of nearly a dozen guns and over one thousand rounds of ammunition. Mr. Oakley\u2019s neighbor, John Vincent Gallant, III, testified to having seen defendant outside Mr. Oakley\u2019s house and telling him to leave. Major Jeffrey Huber testified that he found a rifle and a pair of black bootie socks in the area where Mr. Gallant had seen defendant.\nDefendant pled not guilty to the charges, but a jury found him guilty on 3 January 2011. The trial court sentenced defendant to 116 to 149 months in prison. Defendant appeals.\nII. Analysis\nA. Motion to Suppress\nDefendant raises four issues on appeal with the first being that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle. Defendant contends the gun obtained during the search of his vehicle was the result of an illegal search and seizure. For the following reasons, we disagree.\nWhen reviewing an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, the findings of fact are binding if supported by competent evidence and the conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. State v. Barnhill, 166 N.C. App. 228, 230-31, 601 S.E.2d 215, 217 (2004). The State has the burden of showing the constitutionality of a search. State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 136, 291 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1982). Furthermore, the review of a search should be for constitutional errors, which the State has the burden of proving are \u201charmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(b) (2011).\nDefendant first argues that warrantless searches are presumed to be unconstitutional. In arguing so, defendant notes that \u201c[a] search and seizure 1 \u201cconducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, [is] per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment\u2014subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.\u201d \u2019 \u201d State v. Summey, 150 N.C. App. 662, 666, 564 S.E.2d 624, 627 (2002) (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334, 343-44 (1993) (citations omitted)). Here, authorities did not obtain a search warrant, court order, written waiver, or acknowledgment to search defendant\u2019s vehicle. However, an officer may conduct a search and seizure based on consent. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-221(a) (2011). Consent refers to \u201ca statement to the officer, made voluntarily and in accordance with the requirements of G.S. 15A-222, giving the officer permission to make a search.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-221(b). Moreover, \u201cconsent . . . must be freely and intelligently given, without coercion, duress or fraud, and the burden is upon the State to prove that it was so, the presumption being against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.\u201d State v. Vestal, 278 N.C. 561, 578-79, 180 S.E.2d 755, 767 (1971).\nIn the case at hand, officers testified to receiving consent from defendant to search his vehicle. Defendant even showed officers which key opened the trunk of his car. Defendant, alternatively, contends he revoked his consent while sitting, arrested, in a nearby patrol car when he \u201csaid several times, \u2018They\u2019re\u2014man, they\u2019re tearing up my trunk.\u2019 \u201d Defendant correctly notes that a person may withdraw his or her consent to a search. State v. Hagin, 203 N.C. App. 561, 564, 691 S.E.2d 429, 433, disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 438, 702 S.E.2d 500 (2010). \u201cThe scope of a valid consent search is measured against a standard of objective reasonableness where the court asks \u2018what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?\u2019 \u201d Id. at 564, 691 S.E.2d at 432 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297, 302 (1991)). A reasonable person would not have considered defendant\u2019s statements that the officers were \u201ctearing up\u201d his car to be an unequivocal revocation of his consent. Similarly, in State v. Morocco, 99 N.C. App. 421, 430, 393 S.E.2d 545, 550 (1990), our Court held that the trial court did not err in determining that the defendant did not revoke his consent to search his vehicle when he made the ambiguous statement that a tote bag found in his car had nude photographs of his wife. Had defendant, in the case at bar, desired to revoke his consent he should have made it in a clearer statement that a reasonable person would have considered to be a revocation.\nDefendant also argues the trial court erred in failing to note that law enforcement records stated that the search was incident to arrest, and at the same time failing to note that the search was based upon consent. Defendant contends the search was not allowed as incident to an arrest, pursuant to Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009). Furthermore, in Gant the Court set out a two-prong test under which \u201c[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant\u2019s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.\u201d Id. at 351, 173 L. Ed. 2d at 501. We agree that the search of defendant\u2019s trunk was not valid as incident to arrest, but we do not think the trial court erred in failing to address law enforcement\u2019s noting that the search was incident to arrest. The trial court thoroughly addressed the motion to suppress and determined that the search was valid based on defendant\u2019s consent and lack of revocation.\nFinally, defendant claims the officers\u2019 search of his trunk was excessive in taking off the rear quarter panels. Defendant argues his case is similar to State v. Johnson, 177 N.C. App. 122, 627 S.E.2d 488, disc. review allowed, vacated and remanded, 360 N.C. 541, 634 S.E.2d 889 (2006), where \u201ca plastic wall panel was removed by a law enforcement officer from the interior of defendant\u2019s van, thereby facilitating discovery of the cocaine. \u2018[A]n individual consenting to a vehicle search should expect that search to be thorough[; however,] he need not anticipate that the search will involve the destruction of his vehicle, its parts or contents.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 125, 627 S.E.2d at 490-91 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 942 (11th Cir. 1990)). We, however, believe defendant\u2019s case can be distinguished in that here the trial court found \u201cthat both the left and right quarter panels of the interior of the trunk were fitted with carpet/cardboard type interior trim\u201d and that they \u201cwere loose.\u201d Additionally, the trial court found that \u201cDetective Toler was easily able to pull back the carpet/cardboard type trim... covering the right rear quarter panel where he observed what appeared to be a sock with a pistol handle protruding from the sock.\u201d In Johnson, the search of the van appears to be much more invasive than the one in the case at hand. See id. at 123-24, 627 S.E.2d at 489-90. There, the officers had to pull back multiple glued down side panels of the van, while in the case at hand Detective Toler merely had to pull back a loose carpet/cardboard panel. See id. We do not believe Detective Toler\u2019s actions amount to the destruction present in Johnson. See id. Furthermore, it was reasonable for Detective Toler to believe contraband could be hidden behind the panels after having found marijuana and a stolen license plate in the front section of the vehicle. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, as it was based on voluntary consent given by defendant.\nB. Motion to Dismiss\nDefendant next contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, defendant argues the State did not present sufficient evidence, that defendant knew the gun found in his vehicle had been used in a murder, for him to be convicted as an accessory after the fact to first-degree murder. We disagree.\n\u201cThis Court reviews the trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.\u201d State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). \u201cUpon defendant\u2019s motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.\u201d State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980). \u201cIf the evidence is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the offense or the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of it, the motion should be allowed.\u201d Id. The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994).\nIn order to prove a person was an accessory after the fact under G.S. 14-7 [] three essential elements must be shown: (1) a felony was committed; (2) the accused knew that the person he received, relieved or assisted was the person who committed the felony; and (3) the accused rendered assistance to the felon personally.\nState v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 68, 296 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1982).\nDefendant argues all the evidence presented by the State merely amounts to speculation that defendant knew the gun was used in Emily Haddock\u2019s murder and is not substantial evidence of the third element of the offense. First, defendant testified and put in his statement that he thought Haddock had been beaten to death, not shot. He further stated he told friends that he would kill whoever beat Haddock to death because he had a sister of a similar age. Defendant also notes that Currie\u2019s testimony was based on a plea bargain and was. conflicting in certain areas. Defendant did not destroy the gun and was cooperative with law enforcement. Defendant admitted to having fired the gun in a Wendy\u2019s bag, which he argues is not something a felon would do if he knew the gun was a murder weapon.\nThe State, on the other hand, contends there is substantial direct evidence through Currie and defendant\u2019s statements for the jury to find that defendant knew the gun had been used in a murder. As mentioned above, Currie testified to having told defendant that the gun was used in Haddock\u2019s murder sometime before they were arrested. He testified that it could have been while they were in the hotel together over the weekend. Detective Toler found the gun in the trunk of defendant\u2019s car where defendant had hidden it in a sock in the wheel well. \u201cIt is not necessary that the aid be effective to enable the felon to escape all or part of his punishment.\u201d State v. Martin, 30 N.C. App. 166, 169, 226 S.E.2d 682, 684 (1976) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant was not successful in helping Currie escape punishment, but he did knowingly aid Currie by hiding the murder weapon. They even discussed Currie getting the gun back, so he could properly dispose of it. Defendant had seen Currie handling the gun over the weekend with white gloves on. Consequently, \u201c[t]he totality of the evidence ... is such to give rise to a reasonable inference that defendant knew precisely what had taken place.\u201d Earnhardt, 307 N.C. at 68, 296 S.E.2d at 653. The trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss as the evidence was sufficient to constitute more than speculation and to be presented to the jury.\nC. Admission of Other Crimes\nDefendant\u2019s third argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of other thefts and break-ins, including alleged crimes committed after the time of the charged offense. We disagree.\nRule 404(b) is a \u201cgeneral rule of inclusion of relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by a defendant, subject to but one exception requiring its exclusion if its only probative value is to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged.\u201d State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990). Additionally, \u201cRule 404(b) . . . allows for the admission of prior bad acts to show a defendant\u2019s \u2018motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\u2019 \u201d State v. Renfro, 174 N.C. App. 402, 405, 621 S.E.2d 221, 223 (2005) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2003)), aff\u2019d, 360 N.C. 395, 627 S.E.2d 463 (2006).\nDefendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the mention of any prior bad acts because he believed the State\u2019s use of the prior bad acts would be for the purpose of showing his bad character. The trial court did not specifically address defendant\u2019s motion prior to trial, but dealt with issues pertaining to prior bad acts as they came up and defendant objected. Defendant objected to two specific instances with the first being the State\u2019s questioning of Officer Toler regarding the breaking in of David Oakley\u2019s house on the Saturday night after Haddock\u2019s death. In the situation in question, some guns and ammunition were stolen from Mr. Oakley\u2019s house and a gun, along with two black socks and a tire tool, were found outside of his house. The State wanted Detective Toler to testify regarding what was found outside of Mr. Oakley\u2019s house. However, Detective Toler was not the officer that found the evidence outside of Mr. Oakley\u2019s home, so the trial court sustained defendant\u2019s objection to Detective Toler testifying regarding this evidence. Consequently, this testimony and evidence does not appear to raise an issue.\nNonetheless, an issue regarding the same evidence came up the next day when the State presented John Gallant, Mr. Oakley\u2019s neighbor, to testify about having seen defendant outside Mr. Oakley\u2019s house where the gun, socks, and tire tool were found. At this point, defendant objected to the admission of this testimony based on it not falling under an exception to Rule 404(b). The State argued that the evidence should be admitted to show defendant\u2019s opportunities to gain knowledge about Currie\u2019s use of the gun. The State had already presented evidence of defendant\u2019s interaction Friday night with Currie, in which they wrecked the stolen Lexus and burned it. The State desired to present evidence of the break-in of Mr. Oakley\u2019s house to show that the two were together on Saturday, and then also present evidence that they were together Sunday night for a full chain of events of the weekend.\nEvidence of prior bad acts may be admitted for corroboration. See State v. Alston, 80 N.C. App. 540, 543, 342 S.E.2d 573, 575 (1986). Moreover, the same evidence may be admitted \u201cto establish the context or chain of circumstances of a crime[.]\u201d See State v. Agee, 326 N.C. 542, 547, 391 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1990). The State argues the evidence in question was admissible to corroborate the testimony of several other witnesses who testified regarding defendant and Currie\u2019s actions on Saturday night. The State also contends the evidence was relevant to show defendant\u2019s motive, opportunity, intent, and knowledge; specifically, that it gave defendant motive to aid Currie in hiding the murder weapon because Currie now had incriminating evidence against defendant in having been involved in the break-in of Mr. Oakley\u2019s house. We believe the trial court properly admitted Mr. Gallant\u2019s testimony for the purposes argued by the State and, additionally, any unfair prejudice was outweighed by the evidence\u2019s probative value. Thus, defendant\u2019s argument is without merit.\nD. Jury Instructions\nDefendant\u2019s final argument is that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it was immaterial that the verdict sheet did not distinguish between the two murder theories of the underlying felony. Defendant contends the trial court\u2019s instructions allowed the jury to return a non-unanimous verdict. We disagree.\n\u201cA party may not make any portion of the jury charge or omission therefrom the basis of an issue presented on appeal unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires].]\u201d N.C.R. App. R 10(a)(2) (2011). Our Supreme Court \u201chas elected to review unpreserved issues for plain error when they involve either (1) errors in the judge\u2019s instructions to the jury, or (2) rulings on the admissibility of evidence.\u201d State v. Gregory, 342 N.C. 580, 584, 467 S.E.2d 28, 31 (1996). Plain error occurs when the error is \u201c \u2018so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done[.]\u2019 \u201d State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982)). \u201cUnder the plain error rule, defendant must convince this Court not only that there was error, but that absent the error, the jury probably would have reached a different result.\u201d State v. Jordan, 333 N.C. 431, 440, 426 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1993).\nDefendant claims the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could convict defendant \u201ceither on the basis of malice, premeditation and deliberation and/or the felony murder rule\u201d even though the indictment only alleged \u201cthe felony murder rule.\u201d However, a closer reading of the indictment shows that it actually states the \u201cfelony of murder\u201d and not \u201cfelony murder rule.\u201d The indictment correctly cites to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-17, which describes the crime of murder, a felony. The underlying felony \u201cneed not be set out as fully and specifically as would be required in an indictment for the actual commission of that felony. It is enough to state the offense generally and to designate it by name.\u201d State v. Saults, 294 N.C. 722, 725, 242 S.E.2d 801, 804 (1978) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the indictment stated the underlying felony as \u201cthe felony of murder\u201d and cited to the proper statute for the charge of murder. While this may not have been the best wording of the indictment, we do not believe it specified the felony murder rule. Consequently, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that Currie could be found guilty \u201ceither on the basis of malice, premeditation and deliberation and/or the felony murder rule.\u201d That would not affect the jury unanimously finding defendant guilty of knowingly and willingly assisting Currie in attempting to escape detection and/or arrest by hiding the firearm. Consequently, the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury.\nIII. Conclusion\nAccordingly, we find no error on behalf of the trial court. The trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motions to suppress and dismiss; in allowing the admission of testimony regarding the break-in of Mr. Oakley\u2019s home; and in instructing the jury on the various theories of murder for which Currie could be convicted.\nNo error.\nJudges HUNTER (Robert C.) and THIGPEN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCULLOUGH, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Lars F. Nance, for the State.", "M. Alexander Chams for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PERRY ROSS SCHIRO\nNo. COA11-1092\n(Filed 21 February 2012)\n1. Search and Seizure\u2014motion to suppress\u2014gun\u2014vehicle search\u2014consent\u2014contraband in car panels\nThe trial court did not err in an accessory after the fact to first-degree murder case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle, including a gun. A reasonable person would not have considered defendant\u2019s statements that the officers were \u201ctearing up\u201d his car to be an unequivocal revocation of his consent. Further, it was reasonable for a detective to believe contraband could have been hidden behind the car panels after having found marijuana and a stolen license plate in the front section of the vehicle.\n2. Accomplices and Accessories\u2014accessory after the fact to first-degree murder\u2014motion to dismiss\u2014sufficiency of evidence\u2014knowledge that gun in vehicle used in murder\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of accessory after the fact to first-degree murder based on alleged insufficiency of the evidence that defendant knew the gun found in his vehicle had been used in a murder. The totality of the evidence gave rise to a reasonable inference that defendant knew precisely what had taken place.\n3. Evidence\u2014prior crimes or bad acts\u2014other thefts and break-ins\u2014corroboration\u2014motive\u2014opportunity\u2014intent\u2014 knowledge\nThe trial court did not err in an accessory after the fact to first-degree murder case by admitting evidence of other thefts and break-ins, including alleged crimes committed after the time of the charged offense. The evidence was admissible to corroborate the testimony of several other witnesses and was relevant to show defendant\u2019s motive, opportunity, intent, and knowledge because the shooter in the first-degree murder case had incriminating evidence against defendant in having been involved in a break-in.\n4. Constitutional Law\u2014right to unanimous verdict\u2014jury instruction\u2014failure to distinguish between two murder theories\nThe trial court did not err in an accessory after the fact to first-degree murder case by instructing the jury that it was immaterial that the verdict sheet did not distinguish between the two murder theories of the underlying felony even though defendant contended that it allowed the jury to return a non-unanimous verdict. The indictment stated the \u201cfelony of murder\u201d and not the \u201cfelony murder rule.\u201d Further, it would not have affected the jury unanimously finding defendant guilty of knowingly and willingly assisting the shooter in attempting to escape detection and/or arrest by hiding the firearm.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 14 January 2011 by Judge James M. Webb in Moore County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 January 2012.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Lars F. Nance, for the State.\nM. Alexander Chams for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0105-01", "first_page_order": 115, "last_page_order": 126 }