{ "id": 4361916, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ENDY RAFAEL LOPEZ", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Lopez", "decision_date": "2012-02-21", "docket_number": "No. COA11-957", "first_page": "139", "last_page": "151", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "219 N.C. App. 139" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 923", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639840, 12639841 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0923-01", "/se2d/652/0923-02" ] }, { "cite": "641 S.E.2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637974 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "863" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/641/0858-01" ] }, { "cite": "617 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633690 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/617/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 S.E.2d 235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638316 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/644/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "656 S.E.2d 721", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640375 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724", "parenthetical": "citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/656/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 S.E.2d 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "886", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. App. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520404 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/70/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "588 S.E.2d 497", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504", "parenthetical": "\"Trafficking in cocaine by possession and trafficking in cocaine by transportation . . . require the State to prove that the substance was knowingly possessed and transported.\"" }, { "page": "504", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8957951 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391", "parenthetical": "\"Trafficking in cocaine by possession and trafficking in cocaine by transportation . . . require the State to prove that the substance was knowingly possessed and transported.\"" }, { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "693 S.E.2d 145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 N.C. App. 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4176301 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/203/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 S.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561746 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 248", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6221328 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "302-03", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "251" }, { "page": "303" }, { "page": "251-52" }, { "page": "303", "parenthetical": "citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted" }, { "page": "251" }, { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 698", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3740544, 3744292, 3744617, 3742544, 3744595, 3746836, 3741367, 3741976, 3740634, 3739612 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0698-04", "/nc/361/0698-07", "/nc/361/0698-02", "/nc/361/0698-09", "/nc/361/0698-06", "/nc/361/0698-03", "/nc/361/0698-08", "/nc/361/0698-10", "/nc/361/0698-01", "/nc/361/0698-05" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8171289 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "704 S.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62", "parenthetical": "noting that lack of a driver's license and providing an inconsistent story were factors to be considered in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 L.Ed. 2d 523", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "547 U.S. 1073", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3801139 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 L.Ed. 2d 101", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "502 U.S. 842", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6371424, 6369665, 6369475, 6370820, 6368805, 6369834, 6369998, 6368561, 6370643, 6370388, 6369240, 6371641, 6368410, 6369021, 6370175 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/502/0842-14", "/us/502/0842-07", "/us/502/0842-06", "/us/502/0842-13", "/us/502/0842-03", "/us/502/0842-08", "/us/502/0842-09", "/us/502/0842-02", "/us/502/0842-12", "/us/502/0842-11", "/us/502/0842-05", "/us/502/0842-15", "/us/502/0842-01", "/us/502/0842-04", "/us/502/0842-10" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2537668, 2543786, 2542358, 2539640, 2542331 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0334-04", "/nc/328/0334-02", "/nc/328/0334-01", "/nc/328/0334-03", "/nc/328/0334-05" ] }, { "cite": "397 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" }, { "page": "654-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527353 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633" }, { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "713 S.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248", "parenthetical": "citations, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 N.C. App. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4170375 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241-42", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/199/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8201251 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/183/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "590 S.E.2d 437", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440", "parenthetical": "noting that unchallenged findings of fact are binding on appeal" }, { "page": "442", "parenthetical": "\"Defendant's nervousness was, therefore, properly considered as one of several factors justifying further detention.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. App. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8916310 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254", "parenthetical": "noting that unchallenged findings of fact are binding on appeal" }, { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/162/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156256 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704", "parenthetical": "citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "714 S.E.2d 451", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "713 S.E.2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233-34", "parenthetical": "citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "650 S.E.2d 66", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639393, 12639394, 12639395, 12639396, 12639397, 12639398, 12639399, 12639400, 12639401, 12639402, 12639403, 12639404, 12639405, 12639406, 12639407 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/650/0066-07", "/se2d/650/0066-01", "/se2d/650/0066-02", "/se2d/650/0066-03", "/se2d/650/0066-04", "/se2d/650/0066-05", "/se2d/650/0066-06", "/se2d/650/0066-08", "/se2d/650/0066-09", "/se2d/650/0066-10", "/se2d/650/0066-11", "/se2d/650/0066-01", "/se2d/650/0066-02", "/se2d/650/0066-03", "/se2d/650/0066-04" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1071, "char_count": 27022, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.61740439445329e-08, "percentile": 0.450511786594508 }, "sha256": "dbf6c37bf1bed1e1a2991da152a5cb4756d03659cc00fb8575775b28b43e3164", "simhash": "1:a32b146ac6ee6cc7", "word_count": 4379 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:16:59.313771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge Stephens concurs.", "Judge Beasley concurs in a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ENDY RAFAEL LOPEZ" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nDefendant was convicted of trafficking cocaine by possessing 400 grams or more of cocaine and trafficking cocaine by transporting 400 grams or more of cocaine. Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress and find no error in the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nI. Background\nIn April of 2010, defendant was indicted for various drug offenses. On or about 7 December 2010, defendant filed a motion to suppress:\n1. Any statement(s) or other information gleaned from an unnamed person or from unnamed persons who allegedly provided information to law enforcement officers causing the officers to conduct an investigation leading to the stop and subsequent search of a vehicle defendant was allegedly operating on or about December 10, 2009 in Guilford County, North Carolina; and\n2. Any evidence obtained during a search of a Honda Civic automobile which defendant was allegedly operating on or about December 10, 2009 in Guilford County, North Carolina.\nOn 30 March 2011, the trial court entered an order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress based, inter alia, upon the following findings of fact:\n16. Officer M.R O\u2019Hal was a uniformed officer of the Greensboro Police Department who had received narcotics interdiction and arrest training in his capacity as a K-9 handler and instructor during his 10 \u00bd year career with the Greensboro Police Department. During his career, he had also been certified as a radar operator for speeding enforcement purposes, although his certification had expired because of a change in duties. Also, at that time he had received training in estimating the speed of moving vehicles.\n17. Officer O\u2019Hal was on patrol in the vicinity of the surveillance being conducted by the detectives and received a communication from Sergeant Koonce instructing him to stop the white Honda driven by the defendant and related that there was a large quantity of cocaine in the vehicle. Officer O\u2019Hal was in uniform, but he was operating an unmarked Chevrolet Tahoe on the night in question; and\n18. Officer O\u2019Hal followed the white Honda for about 2 \u00bd to 3 miles. He paced it for about \u00bd mile and utilizing his speedometer, which was regularly calibrated, he formed the opinion that the Honda was traveling approximately 70 mph in a 60 mph zone. He conducted a \u201croutine traffic stop\u201d for that infraction and to investigate possible illegal narcotics activities.\n19. He approached the vehicle on the passenger side and informed the driver, later identified as the defendant, Endy Lopez, that he had stopped him for speeding and asked hi[m] for a valid license or identification to which, the defendant [responded] that he did not know that he was speeding and that he was going to Winston for a construction job and just got off work. Not being able to produce a valid driver\u2019s license, the defendant, Endy Lopez, produced a Mexican identification card and informed the officer that he did not have a valid operator\u2019s license in North Carolina or in any other state.\n20. Officer O\u2019Hal continued asking Mr. Lopez questions about where he was going and what he was doing for the purpose of conducting a narcotics investigation, based upon his training and experience in that regard. Officer O\u2019Hal noticed that the defendant was very well kept, had clean hands, and that his clothing was clean and \u201clightly dressed\u201d for the conditions. In Officer O\u2019Hal\u2019s opinion, the cleanliness of the vehicle, the defendant\u2019s clothing and his hands w[ere] not consistent with his response to questions indicating that he was employed in the construction business.\n21. The defendant was very polite and cooperative during the stop, but became visibly nervous by breathing rapidly when questioned further. His heart appeared to be beating rapidly, he exchanged glances with his passenger and both individuals looked at an open plastic bag in the back seat of the vehicle. Officer O\u2019Hal noticed that the passenger, Garcia, was looking nervous and continuing to look into the back seat. Officer O\u2019Hal also observed dryer sheets protruding from the open bag which also contained a yellow box of clear plastic wrap. Due to his training and experience in narcotics investigations, Officer O\u2019Hal is aware that items such as these are used to package drugs and conceal their identity.\n22. Officer O\u2019Hal returned to his patrol vehicle and confirmed by radio communication that Mr. Lopez did not have a valid operator\u2019s license. At this point, Officer O\u2019Hal was able to determine that Garcia had an identification card from Virginia. Officer O\u2019Hal then went back to the vehicle the defendant was operating and asked him whether he had anything illegal on his person or in the vehicle.\n23. Officer O\u2019Hal asked about the car and the defendant stated th\u00e1t it was not his car and that he was not sure of his friend\u2019s name. Officer O\u2019Hal then asked whether the defend-ant had \u201cany weapons, brass knuckles, or drugs?\u201d Officer O\u2019Hal followed by asking permission to search the vehicle by saying \u201cdo you mind if I search the vehicle?\u201d Mr. Lopez responded, \u201cNo, I don\u2019t mind.\u201d Officer O\u2019Hal asked \u201cdo you understand?\u201d to which the defendant gave the positive response, \u201cI do.\u201d In an attempt to confirm this permission, Officer O\u2019Hal followed and asked \u201cdo you have a pistol?\u201d The defendant stated, \u201cO.K. you can look\u201d whereupon Officer O\u2019Hal conducted a search of the vehicle. . . .\n24. After searching the passenger compartment of the vehicle, Officer O\u2019Hal went to the front of the vehicle. As Officer O\u2019Hal did this, he saw that the defendant appeared to grow very nervous and concerned. Officer O\u2019Hal stated that he is aware th[r]ough his training and experience that contraband is often concealed in the air intake of vehicles. After he got to the front of the vehicle, Officer O\u2019Hal opened the hood, which he knew the defendant had opened a few minutes earlier, and observed that the air intake compartment appeared to be cleaner tha[n] the rest of the parts in the engine compartment. He released several clips or latches which secured the top of the air filter compartment and removed the top disclosing a large quantity of powder cocaine wrapped in clear plastic.\n25. The evidence shows that the encounter lasted a total of between 12-13 minutes. During the period of the stop and search, the defendant was polite and cooperative and did not appear to have any difficulty understanding English. The evidence also shows that the defendant did not limit the scope of Officer O\u2019Halfs] search of the vehicle nor did he revoke his permission or consent at any time prior to, during, or after the search. Additionally, there is no evidence before the court that the passenger, Garcia, exercised control over the vehicle or in any way limited the search of the vehicle or revoked the permission given to search by the defendant.\nDefendant was arrested, indicted, and received a trial by jury. The jury found defendant guilty of trafficking in cocaine by the unlawful possession of 400 grams or more of cocaine (\u201ctrafficking by possession\u201d) and trafficking in cocaine by the unlawful transportation of 400 grams or more of cocaine (\u201ctrafficking by transportation\u201d). The trial court entered judgments sentencing defendant to 175 to 219 months imprisonment for each conviction. Defendant appeals.\nII. Motion to Suppress\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Defendant does not specifically challenge any finding of fact made by the trial court but rather generally argues that reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop to a search cannot be based upon (1) information from a confidential informant because the informant\u2019s information was not corroborated or (2) Officer O\u2019Hal\u2019s personal observations once the stop was made. Furthermore, defendant contends that even if there was reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop, the State did not demonstrate that defendant\u2019s consent for the search was voluntary. Finally, defendant argues that even if defendant\u2019s voluntary consent is established, it did not extend to under the hood of the vehicle.\nDefendant concedes that he \u201cfailed to object to the admission of the evidence[,]\u201d and thus we may only review this argument for plain error.\nAs a result of the fact that [the defendant] did not object to the admission of the evidence in question at trial, we review the denial of his suppression motion utilizing a plain error standard of review. Plain error is an error that is so fundamental as to result in a miscarriage of justice or denial of a fair trial. In order to establish plain error, [the defendant] is required to show not only that there was error, but that absent the error, the jury probably would have reached a different result.\nState v. Ellison, _ N.C. App. _, _, 713 S.E.2d 228, 233-34 (2011) (citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted). \u201cBut before a ruling can be plain error, it must be error.\u201d State v. Wade, _ N.C. App. _, _, 714 S.E.2d 451, 459 (2011). In reviewing a motion to suppress for errors,\n[i]t is well established that the standard of review in evaluating a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress is that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting. In addition, findings of fact to which defendant failed to assign error are binding on appeal. Once this Court concludes that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by the evidence, then this Court\u2019s next task is to determine whether the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are supported by the findings. The trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and must be legally correct.\nState v. Campbell, 188 N.C. App. 701, 704, 656 S.E.2d 721, 724 (2008) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).\nAlthough much of defendant\u2019s argument focuses on the confidential informant, we need not address these issues as we conclude that Officer O\u2019Hal had a reasonable suspicion to search defendant\u2019s vehicle based solely upon what he observed during the traffic stop. As to the traffic stop, defendant does not raise any arguments regarding the legality of the stop and does not contest the trial court\u2019s binding finding of fact that Officer O\u2019Hal personally observed defendant driving approximately 10 mph above the speed limit and pulled the vehicle defendant was driving over, at least in part, for that reason. See State v. Jacobs, 162 N.C. App. 251, 254, 590 S.E.2d 437, 440 (2004) (noting that unchallenged findings of fact are binding on appeal). Instead, defendant contends that the traffic stop was a pretext to search for drugs; however, this is irrelevant in light of the fact that defendant was lawfully stopped for speeding. See State v. Parker, 183 N.C. App. 1, 11, 644 S.E.2d 235, 243 (2007) (\u201cBecause Detective Darisse acted with probable cause to believe that defendant committed a traffic infraction, his initial stop of defendant\u2019s car did not violate the Fourth Amendment. It is irrelevant to the validity of the stop that Detective Darisse\u2019s primary reason for following defendant was that he had received a complaint that defendant was trafficking methamphetamine or that Detective Darisse did not subsequently issue defendant a citation for speeding.\u201d (citations and quotation marks omitted)).\nOnce a stop has been lawfully made,\nthe scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. Once the original purpose of the stop has been addressed, in order to justify further delay, there must be grounds which provide the detaining officer with additional reasonable and articulable suspicion or the encounter must have become consensual. Where no grounds for a reasonable and articulable suspicion exist and where the encounter has not become consensual, a detainee\u2019s extended seizure is unconstitutional.\nState v. Jackson, 199 N.C. App. 236, 241-42, 681 S.E.2d 492, 496 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nOur Supreme Court has stated that the police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot, even if the officer lacks probable cause. This Court has further noted that\nReasonable suspicion requires that the stop be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training. All the State is required to show is a minimal level of objective justification, something more than an unpartic-ularized suspicion or hunch. A court must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the officer possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion to make an investigatory stop.\nReasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.\nState v. Brown, _ N.C. App. _, _, 713 S.E.2d 246, 248 (2011) (citations, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted).\nHere, defendant does not contest the findings of fact that establish: (1) defendant informed Officer O\u2019Hal he did not have a valid driver\u2019s license in North Carolina or in any other state; (2) defendant told Officer O\u2019Hal he worked construction and had \u201cjust got[ten] off work\u201d but \u201cdefendant was very well kept, had clean hands, and... his clothing was clean\u201d leading Officer O\u2019Hal to conclude that \u201cdefendant\u2019s clothing and his hands w[ere] not consistent with his response to questions indicating he was employed in the construction business[;]\u201d (3) defendant \u201cbecame visibly nervous by breathing rapidly[;] ... his heart appeared to be beating rapidly[;] he exchanged glances with his passenger and both individuals looked at an open plastic bag in the back seat of the vehicle[;]\u201d (4) Officer O\u2019Hal \u201cobserved dryer sheets protruding from the open bag which also contained a yellow box of clear plastic wrap. Due to his training and experience in narcotics investigations, Officer O\u2019Hal is aware that items such as these are used to package drugs and conceal their identityf;]\u201d (5) \u201cOfficer O\u2019Hal... confirmed by radio communication that... [defendant] did not have a valid operator\u2019s license[;]\u201d and (6) \u201cOfficer O\u2019Hal asked about the car and the defendant stated that it was not his car and that he was not sure of his friend\u2019s name.\u201d\nWe first note that Officer O\u2019Hal\u2019s initial questions regarding defendant\u2019s license, where defendant was going to and coming from, and defendant\u2019s occupation were all within the scope of the traffic stop. See State v. Aubin, 100 N.C. App. 628, 633, 397 S.E.2d 653, 656 (1990) (\u201cWe recognize that an investigative stop and inquiry must be reasonably related in scope to the initial justification for it. In Jones, this Court refused to adopt a rule which would limit an officer\u2019s ability to investigate suspicious matters uncovered during an investigatory stop. In Morocco, Trooper Lowry asked about the driver\u2019s vehicle and registration in the patrol car while filling out a warning ticket. We held that such polite conversation was not improper. In this case, Trooper Lowry asked defendant about his plans for returning the car, whether he still lived in Quebec, what he did for a living and how the weather was in Florida. As in Morocco, this conversation did not exceed permissible police behavior. Lowry\u2019s investigation was reasonable in subject matter and scope.\u201d (citation and quotation marks omitted)), disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 328 N.C. 334, 402 S.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 842, 116 L.Ed. 2d 101 (1991). We conclude that Officer O\u2019Hal had a reasonable suspicion to detain defendant based upon defendant\u2019s driving an unnamed \u201cfriend\u2019s\u201d car without a valid driver\u2019s license, defendant\u2019s questionable story regarding his work and where he was going, defendant\u2019s nervous demeanor, and Officer O\u2019Hal\u2019s observation of the presence of dryer sheets, which cover odor, and plastic wrap, which through his experience he knew was often used to package drugs. See Brown, _ N.C. App. at _, 713 S.E.2d at 248; see also State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 664, 617 S.E.2d 1, 14 (2005) (\u201cDefendant had no driver\u2019s license with him and did not know the name of his friend to whom the car belonged. These [and other] articulable facts were sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion in the mind of a trained police officer that defendant was involved in criminal activity.\u201d), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1073, 164 L.Ed. 2d 523 (2006); State v. Hernandez, _ N.C. App. _, _, 704 S.E.2d 55, 62 (2010) (noting that lack of a driver\u2019s license and providing an inconsistent story were factors to be considered in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists); State v. Euceda-Valle, 182 N.C. App. 268, 274-75, 641 S.E.2d 858, 863 (\u201cWe hold that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact support .its legal conclusion that law enforcement had a reasonable, suspicion necessary to conduct the exterior canine sniff of the vehicle. Defendant was extremely nervous and refused to make eye contact with the officer. In addition, there was smell of air freshener coming from the vehicle, and the vehicle was not registered to the occupants. And there was disagreement between defendant and the passenger about the trip to Virginia. We conclude that these facts support a basis for a reasonable and cautious law enforcement officer to suspect that criminal activity is afoot.\u201d), disc. review denied or cert. denied, 361 N.C. 698, 652 S.E.2d 923 (2007); Jacobs, 162 N.C. App. at 258, 590 S.E.2d at 442 (\u201cDefendant\u2019s nervousness was, therefore, properly considered as one of several factors justifying further detention.\u201d)\nAs we have determined that Officer O\u2019Hal had reasonable suspicion for further detaining defendant and thus requesting to search the vehicle defendant was driving, we must turn to defendant\u2019s argument regarding whether his consent to search the vehicle was voluntary. But defendant\u2019s argument regarding the involuntariness of his consent is based solely upon defendant\u2019s contention that Officer O\u2019Hal did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him. Defendant contends that \u201c[b]y the time consent was sought, [he] was being wrongfully detained, and, as such, his \u2018consent\u2019 was tainted by the illegality of the extended detention.\u201d As we have already concluded that Officer O\u2019Hal did have reasonable suspicion upon which to further detain defendant, this argument is without merit.\nLastly, defendant contends that even if he voluntarily consented to Officer O\u2019Hal searching the vehicle he was driving, the consent did not extend to under the hood of the vehicle. Defendant argues that his \u201cconsent for Officer O\u2019Hal to look in the car does not reasonably extend to opening the hood, dismantling the air filter compartment, and opening the compartment.\u201d\nThe standard for measuring the scope of a suspect\u2019s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective reasonableness\u2014what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect? . . .\nThe scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object.\nFlorida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 114 L.E. 2d 297, 302-03 (1991) (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nOfficer O\u2019Hal asked, \u201cdo you mind if I search the vehicle?\u201d Thus, the \u201cexpressed object\u201d was the vehicle. Id. at 251, 114 L.Ed. 2d at 303. Citing Jimeno, defendant contends that \u201c[j]ust as consent to search a car does not extend to opening a closed case inside a trunk, consent to search here did not extend to opening the hood, disassembling the air filter compartment, and opening the air filter.\u201d However, a \u201cclosed case\u201d is an object separate and apart from the vehicle; whereas both the hood and air filter compartment are part of the vehicle.\nAs the Supreme Court stated in Jimeno,\n[T]he terms of the search\u2019s authorization were simple. Respondent granted Officer Trujillo permission to search his car, and did not place any explicit limitation on the scope of the search. . . .\nA suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents. . . . The community has a real interest in encouraging consent, for the resulting search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and prosecution of crime, evidence that may insure that a wholly innocent person is not wrongly charged with a criminal offense.\nId. at 251-52, 114 L.Ed. 2d at 303 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).\nHere too, \u201cthe terms of the search\u2019s authorization were simple\u201d and defendant did not specifically exclude the hood of the vehicle nor did defendant object when Officer O\u2019Hal began his search under the hood of the vehicle. Id. at 251, 114 L.Ed. 2d at 303. As Officer O\u2019Hal received voluntary consent to search the vehicle, we conclude that this consent extended to a search under the hood of the vehicle. See Aubin, 100 N.C. App. at 634, 397 S.E.2d at 654-57 (determining there was no error in the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress where a trooper searched a vehicle with consent including \u201cthe back seat area, including lifting the bottom portion of the seat up and out of position\u201d and noting that \u201cin State v. Belk, 268 N.C. 320, 150 S.E.2d 481 (1966), the Court held that defendant\u2019s consent to the officer\u2019s search of his trunk implied consent to search any part of his car. It found support for this holding in the fact that none of the defendants objected to the search once it was begun. In this case, defendant gave oral consent to a search of his car for contraband. He did not object in any way to what Trooper Lowry was doing. It was reasonable for Lowry to lift up the comer of the back seat in the progress of his search\u201d).\nIn summary, we conclude that Officer O\u2019H\u00e1l lawfully stopped defendant based upon his personal observations of defendant speeding. Once Officer O\u2019Hal stopped the vehicle, he personally observed the circumstances which created reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for further detaining defendant. Officer O\u2019Hal then requested consent to search the vehicle defendant was driving, and defendant voluntarily gave his consent to a search of the entire vehicle, without restrictions, which included under the hood and in the air filter compartment of the vehicle. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, and therefore defendant certainly has not demonstrated plain error. Therefore, this argument is overruled.\nIII. Motion to Dismiss\nDefendant also contends that \u201cthe court erred by denying the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the cocaine trafficking charges because the evidence was insufficient to show that [defendant] \u2018knowingly\u2019 possessed or transported cocaine[.]\u201d (Original in all caps.)\nThe standard of review for a motion to dismiss is well known. A defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss should be denied if there is substantial evidence of: (1) each essential element of the offense charged, and (2) of defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator of the charged offense. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The Court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn from that evidence.\nState v. Johnson, 203 N.C. App. 718, 724, 693 S.E.2d 145, 148 (2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted). To establish both trafficking by possession and trafficking by transportation the State must show that defendant knowingly possessed or transported, respectively, the requisite amount of cocaine. See State v. Baldwin, 161 N.C. App. 382, 391, 588 S.E.2d 497, 504 (2003) (\u201cTrafficking in cocaine by possession and trafficking in cocaine by transportation . . . require the State to prove that the substance was knowingly possessed and transported.\u201d); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(a), (h3) (2009).\nHere, defendant contests only that the cocaine \u201cwas knowingly possessed and transported.\u201d Baldwin, 161 N.C. App. at 391, 588 S.E.2d at 504 (emphasis added). However,\nthe courts in this State have held consistently that the driver of a borrowed car, like the owner of the car, has the power to control the contents of the car. Moreover, power to control the automobile where a controlled substance was found is sufficient, in and of itself, to give rise to the inference of knowledge and possession sufficient to go to the jury.\nState v. Dow, 70 N.C. App. 82, 85, 318 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1984) (citation and quotation marks omitted). As the evidence showed defendant was driving the vehicle which contained cocaine, this alone was enough to show that defendant\u2019s possession was knowing and to support the denial of the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. See id.\nIV. Conclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress and motion to dismiss.\nAFFIRMED in part; NO ERROR in part.\nJudge Stephens concurs.\nJudge Beasley concurs in a separate opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." }, { "text": "BEASLEY, Judge.\nThough unpublished, because of the decision in State v. Burrell, 186 N.C. App. 132, 650 S.E.2d 66 (2007) where the facts and circumstances are parallel to those sub judice, I must concur.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "BEASLEY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Andrew 0. Furuseth, for the State.", "David L. Neal, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ENDY RAFAEL LOPEZ\nNo. COA11-957\n(Filed 21 February 2012)\n1. Search and Seizure\u2014motion to suppress\u2014traffic stop\u2014 reasonable suspicion\u2014voluntary consent\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking in cocaine by possession and transportation case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence. An officer had reasonable suspicion to search defendant\u2019s vehicle based solely upon what he observed during a traffic stop after defendant was lawfully stopped for speeding. Defendant voluntarily gave his consent to a search of the entire vehicle, which included under the hood and in the air filter compartment of the vehicle.\n2. Drugs\u2014cocaine trafficking\u2014motion to dismiss\u2014knowing possession or transportation\u2014driving vehicle\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the cocaine trafficking charges based on alleged insufficient evidence to show that defendant knowingly possessed or transported cocaine. The evidence that defendant was driving the vehicle which contained cocaine was alone enough to show that defendant\u2019s possession was knowing.\nJudge BEASLEY concurring in separate opinion.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 30 March 2011 by Judge James E. Hardin, Jr. and judgments entered on or about 6 April 2011 by Judge Stuart Albright in Superior Court, Guilford County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 January 2012.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Andrew 0. Furuseth, for the State.\nDavid L. Neal, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0139-01", "first_page_order": 149, "last_page_order": 161 }