{ "id": 4362166, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ELLEREK DERMOT VAUGHTERS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Vaughters", "decision_date": "2012-03-06", "docket_number": "No. COA11-1042", "first_page": "356", "last_page": "362", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "219 N.C. App. 356" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 497", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503-04", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4715737 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 73", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" }, { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 N.C.App. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524555 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" }, { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/66/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" }, { "page": "415", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566165 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" }, { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11869579 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007 WL 4105724", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Although Brown, and other cases cited in this opinion, were decided under the predecessor to the Structured Sentencing Act, our analysis is not affected.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9189987 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Although Brown, and other cases cited in this opinion, were decided under the predecessor to the Structured Sentencing Act, our analysis is not affected.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "596 S.E.2d 860", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "863", "parenthetical": "\"We note that many of the cases analyzing trial courts' decisions . . . were decided under the Fair Sentencing Act. Even though this case was heard under Structured Sentencing . . . the logic of the cases under the earlier act as to aggravating and mitigating factors remains valid.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N.C. App. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8898664 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/164/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9365693 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5", "parenthetical": "\"While decisions of one panel of this Court are binding upon subsequent panels unless overturned by a higher court ... we also have a responsibility to follow the decisions of our Supreme Court.\" (internal citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11201172 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456", "parenthetical": "\"While decisions of one panel of this Court are binding upon subsequent panels unless overturned by a higher court ... we also have a responsibility to follow the decisions of our Supreme Court.\" (internal citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" }, { "page": "580" }, { "page": "580" }, { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571719 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 S.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 788", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11713440 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0788-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 S.E.2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 670", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9082764 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0670-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527669 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 S.E.2d 126", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 N.C. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567591 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 S.E.2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.C. App. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523391 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/98/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798543 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0536-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 696, "char_count": 15482, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14873087195431084 }, "sha256": "6e099769bacc2700932a91e667f36bae6726a4871f139f69a7b43d832587a69a", "simhash": "1:ab28f46a763f070c", "word_count": 2554 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:16:59.313771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, Robert C. and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ELLEREK DERMOT VAUGHTERS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nI. Factual & Procedural Background\nOn 5 August 1991, the Durham County Grand Jury indicted Ellerek Dermot Vaughters (\u201cDefendant\u201d) for first degree murder. Subsequently on 19 August 1991, the Grand Jury indicted Defendant for first degree kidnapping and robbery with a dangerous weapon. Defendant initially pled not guilty, and testimonial evidence against Defendant was presented at trial beginning on 22 October 1992. On 23 October 1992, Defendant changed his plea to guilty on all charges including first degree murder under the theory of felony murder based on robbery with a dangerous weapon. Based on this plea, Defendant was adjudicated guilty of first degree murder and first degree kidnapping. The trial court arrested the charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon, as it merged with the first degree murder as an element of the offense. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison for the murder and an aggravated consecutive sentence of 25 years for the kidnapping.\nDefendant had been interviewed by Durham police detective Darrell Dowdy on 3 July 1991. The transcript and tape recording of this interrogation were introd\u00fcced at trial prior to Defendant\u2019s guilty plea. Defendant\u2019s admissions in that interview tended to show the following.\nOn 1 July 1991, Defendant and Greg Fray were at a convenience store in Raleigh and had been drinking heavily. In the parking lot, they came across Walter Eugene Burnett, who had pulled up in his van. They told Mr. Burnett to get in the back of the van, and Mr. Fray began driving the van with Mr. Burnett and Defendant in the back. Although Defendant had a gun with him, he had it in his pocket and did not pull it on Mr. Burnett at the time he ordered him into the van.\nWhile driving the van, Mr. Fray repeatedly told Defendant to kill Mr. Burnett, and Mr. Burnett begged them not to kill him. After Mr. Burnett moved, Defendant struck him in the back with his hand. After stopping for beer a few times, Mr. Fray pulled the van over, and everyone got out of the van. After Mr. Fray knocked Mr. Burnett to the ground, Defendant held Mr. Burnett at gun point and told him to take his clothes off. Defendant asserts that Mr. Burnett reached up to grab the gun and the gun discharged, killing Mr. Burnett.\nOn 15 September 2006, Defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief in Durham County Superior Court seeking a belated appeal of his greater than presumptive range sentence for his kidnapping conviction. On 22 September 2006, Judge Orlando Hudson dismissed Defendant\u2019s motion. On 6 October 2006, Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari to this Court, which was granted on 25 October 2006, remanding the case to the Superior Court for an evidentiary hearing whether Defendant was advised by counsel of his right to appeal.\nOn 23 March 2009, an evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Hudson. On 3 April 2009, Judge Hudson issued an order concluding that Defendant \u201cwas not apprised of his appellate rights as they relate to his aggravated sentence for first degree kidnapping\u201d and that his motion for appropriate relief as it related to the aggravated first degree kidnapping sentence should be allowed. On 28 March 2011, Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari to this Court, which was granted on 21 April 2011 allowing his appeal as to the aggravated sentence for first degree kidnapping.\nII. Standard of Review\nDefendant assigns error to the trial court\u2019s sentence, which we review for \u201c \u2018whether [the] sentence is supported by evidence introduced at the trial and sentencing hearing.\u2019 \u201d State v. Deese, 127 N.C. App. 536, 540, 491 S.E.2d 682, 685 (1997) (citation omitted). We review the trial court\u2019s weighing of aggravating factors and mitigating factors for abuse of discretion. State v. Summerlin, 98 N.C. App. 167, 177, 390 S.E.2d 358, 363 (1990). In reviewing sentencing, \u201c[a] judgment will not be disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless there is a showing of abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to defendant, circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play.\u201d State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 335, 126 S.E.2d 126, 133 (1962).\nIII. Analysis\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred in finding as an aggravating factor that Defendant \u201cwas armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the crime,\u201d as this is an element necessary to prove the kidnapping offense. We disagree.\nUnder the Fair Sentencing Act, which was applicable at the time Defendant was sentenced, the trial court can impose a sentence greater than the presumptive term if it considers the aggravating and mitigating factors for Defendant\u2019s convictions and makes written findings of fact delineating those factors and explaining that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. State v. Green, 101 N.C. App. 317, 322, 399 S.E.2d 376, 379 (1991). In the present case, the trial court found as an aggravating sentencing factor under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(1)i. (1988) that Defendant \u201cwas armed with or used a deadly weapon at the time of the crime.\u201d Section 15A-1340.4(a)(l) of the Fair Sentencing Act provided that \u201c[e]vidence necessary to prove an element of the offense may not be used to prove any factor in aggravation.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(1) (1988). Defendant argues that evidence he used a firearm was necessary to prove elements of kidnapping and thus the trial court erred in finding the use of a firearm as an aggravating factor.\nThe elements of first degree kidnapping are \u201c(1) confining, restraining, or removing from one place to another; (2) any person sixteen years or older; (3) without such person\u2019s consent; (4) if such act was for the purposes of facilitating the commission of a felony.\u201d State v. Oxendine, 150 N.C. App. 670, 675, 564 S.E.2d 561, 565 (2002). Kidnapping is first degree if the victim either was not released by the defendant in a safe place or was seriously injured or sexually assaulted. Id.\nIn the present case, Defendant confined, restrained, and removed Mr. Burnett, an adult over the age of 16, without his consent, by telling Mr. Burnett to get in the back of the van and driving away with him in the van. Defendant committed the kidnapping for the purpose of committing robbery and facilitating the flight of Defendant following the robbery of the van. Mr. Burnett was not released in a safe place and was seriously injured, making the offense first degree. All of the elements of first degree kidnapping are present in this case, and Defendant\u2019s use of a firearm is not necessary in proving the elements as listed above.\nIn support of his argument, Defendant cites State v. Brice, where our Court found that \u201c[r]elying on the use of a firearm to prove the necessary element of restraint [in a kidnapping case] precludes employing the use of a firearm again to enhance the sentence.\u201d 126 N.C. App. 788, 795, 486 S.E.2d 719, 722-23 (1997). To the extent that Brice is inconsistent with State v. Ruff, 349 N.C. 213, 505 S.E.2d 579 (1998), discussed infra, we follow our Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Ruff. See State v. Coria, 131 N.C. App. 449, 456, 508 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1998) (\u201cWhile decisions of one panel of this Court are binding upon subsequent panels unless overturned by a higher court ... we also have a responsibility to follow the decisions of our Supreme Court.\u201d (internal citations omitted)).\nOur Supreme Court has allowed the enhancement of a sentence based on the use or display of a firearm in a second degree kidnapping case. See Ruff, 349 N.C. at 216, 505 S.E.2d at 581. In Ruff, the defendant kidnapped the victim at gunpoint and raped her. Id. at 215, 505 S.E.2d at 580. The defendant\u2019s sentence was enhanced pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.16A (1997), which allowed for enhancement where the defendant \u201cused, displayed, or threatened to use or display a firearm at the time of the felony.\u201d Id. \u201cThis provision does not apply, however, where \u2018[t]he evidence of the use, display, or threatened use or display of a firearm is needed to prove an element of the underlying . . . felony.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 216, 505 S.E.2d at 580 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.16A(b)(2)) (alterations in original).\nIn upholding the enhancement, the Court stated that \u201c[bjecause the use or display of a firearm is not an essential element of second-degree kidnapping, the trial court was not precluded from relying on evidence of defendant\u2019s use of the firearm and enhancing defendant\u2019s term of imprisonment pursuant to the firearm enhancement section.\u201d Id. at 216-17, 505 S.E.2d at 581.\nIn State v. Boyd, our Court followed Ruff in finding the firearm enhancement applicable where the defendant pointed a firearm at one of the victims of second degree kidnapping. 148 N.C. App. 304, 307, 559 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2002). We see no reason to distinguish the first degree kidnapping conviction in this case from the second degree kidnapping convictions in Ruff and Boyd. Thus, using a firearm is not an essential element of first degree kidnapping and the trial court was correct to find the use of a firearm as an aggravating factor.\nDefendant points out in his reply brief that Ruff was decided under the Structured Sentencing Act, which applies to cases where the date of offense is after 1 October 1994. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.10 (2011). Since the date of the offense in this case is 1 July 1991, Defendant is correct that the Fair Sentencing Act, not the Structured Sentencing Act, applies to the present case. However, this Court has repeatedly applied the logic of cases decided under the Fair Sentencing Act to cases arising under the Structured Sentencing Act. See e.g., State v. Byrd, 164 N.C. App. 522, 527, 596 S.E.2d 860, 863 (2004) (\u201cWe note that many of the cases analyzing trial courts\u2019 decisions . . . were decided under the Fair Sentencing Act. Even though this case was heard under Structured Sentencing . . . the logic of the cases under the earlier act as to aggravating and mitigating factors remains valid.\u201d); State v. Radford, 156 N.C. App. 161, 164 n.1, 576 S.E.2d 134, 137 n.1 (2003) (\u201cAlthough Brown, and other cases cited in this opinion, were decided under the predecessor to the Structured Sentencing Act, our analysis is not affected.\u201d).\nThis Court recognized in an unpublished case that the provision in question from the Fair Sentencing Act is \u201calmost identical\u201d to the one used in Ruff from the Structured Sentencing Act, stating:\nthe Fair Sentencing Act. . . contained a provision almost identical to the provision of the Structured Sentencing Act at issue in the present case. Compare N.C. GemStat. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(l) (Cum.Supp.1981) (providing that \u201c[e]vidence necessary to prove an element of the offense may not be used to prove any factor in aggravation, and the same item of evidence may not be used to prove more than one factor in aggravation\u201d), with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A1340.16(d) (providing that \u201c[e]vidence necessary to prove an element of the offense shall not be used to prove any factor in aggravation, and the same item of evidence shall not be used to prove more than one factor in aggravation.\u201d).\nState v. Talley, No. COA07-89, 2007 WL 4105724, (N.C. App. November 20, 2007). In addition, Defendant\u2019s initial brief to this Court cited State v. Smith, 125 N.C. App. 562, 567, 481 S.E.2d 425, 427-28 (1997), a case decided under the Structured Sentencing Act. Defendant refers to the provision from the Structured Sentencing Act as being \u201ca later identical statute\u201d to the one in the Fair Sentencing Act. As the provisions are essentially identical, we apply our Supreme Court\u2019s logic in Ruffin concluding the trial court properly applied the use of a firearm as an aggravating factor.\nDefendant also argues that the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors was an abuse of discretion. We disagree.\nThe trial court found one statutory aggravating factor and 19 mitigating factors, 5 statutory and 14 nonstatutory. The trial court weighed the factors and found that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors.\n\u201cThe balance struck by a trial court when weighing mitigating and aggravating factors will not be disturbed if there is support in the record for the trial court\u2019s determination.\u201d State v. Canty, 321 N.C. 520, 527, 364 S.E.2d 410, 415 (1988); see also State v. Baucom, 66 N.C.App. 298, 302, 311 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1984). \u201c[A] discretionary decision of a trial court will be reversed only if it is \u2018manifestly unsupported by reason.\u2019 \u201d Canty, 321 N.C. at 527, 364 S.E.2d at 415 (citation omitted). This discretionary decision is not a matter of mathematics, and \u201cthe fact that there are more mitigating factors than aggravating factors is not determinative.\u201d Id. In fact, \u201conly one factor in aggravation is necessary to support a sentence greater than the presumptive term.\u201d Baucom, 66 N.C. App. at 302, 311 S.E.2d at 75.\nWe find no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s decision that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors. Defendant points to State v. Parker, which proposes that \u201c[i]n some cases, a single, relatively minor aggravating circumstance simply will not reasonably outweigh a number of highly significant mitigating factors.\u201d 315 N.C. 249, 260, 337 S.E.2d 497, 503-04 (1985) (emphasis added). However, we cannot agree that the aggravating factor in the present case that Defendant was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the crime was \u201crelatively minor\u201d or that the mitigating factors were \u201chighly significant.\u201d We see no reason to disturb the trial court\u2019s discretion.\nIV. Conclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, the trial court\u2019s determinations on sentencing are\nAffirmed.\nJudges HUNTER, Robert C. and GEER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Ward Zimmerman, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Daniel R. Pollitt, for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ELLEREK DERMOT VAUGHTERS\nNo. COA11-1042\n(Filed 6 March 2012)\n1. Sentencing\u2014aggravating factors\u2014deadly weapon\u2014not element of kidnapping offense\nThe trial court in a first-degree kidnapping prosecution did not err by finding as an aggravating factor under the Fair Sentencing Act that defendant was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the crime. Although defendant argued that this was an element necessary of kidnapping, defendant confined, restrained, and removed the victim without his consent, committed the kidnapping for the purpose of committing robbery and facilitating flight afterwards, and the victim was seriously injured and was not released in a safe place. All of the elements of first-degree kidnapping were present without defendant\u2019s use of a firearm.\n2. Sentencing\u2014Fair Sentencing Act\u2014balancing aggravating and mitigating factors\u2014no abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not err by concluding that aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors when sentencing defendant for first-degree kidnapping under the Fair Sentencing Act. The trial court found nineteen mitigating factors and one aggravating factor, but the aggravating factor was that defendant was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the crime. The discretionary decision was not a matter of mathematics.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 27 October 1992 by Judge Craig A. Thompson in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 December 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Ward Zimmerman, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Daniel R. Pollitt, for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0356-01", "first_page_order": 366, "last_page_order": 372 }