{ "id": 4362796, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CURTIS LEON FIELDS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Fields", "decision_date": "2012-03-06", "docket_number": "No. COA11-613", "first_page": "385", "last_page": "389", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "219 N.C. App. 385" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "673 S.E.2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642974 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "769" }, { "page": "769" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/673/0765-01" ] }, { "cite": "631 S.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636088 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206", "parenthetical": "quoting Inspirational Network, Inc. v. Combs, 131 N.C. App. 231, 235, 506 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/631/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 S.E.2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 N.C. App. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4165780 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/196/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 N.C. App. 740", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4164237 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "746" }, { "page": "746" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/195/0740-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 S.E.2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11198623 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8377534 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "quoting Inspirational Network, Inc. v. Combs, 131 N.C. App. 231, 235, 506 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 564", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150146 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 605100 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" }, { "page": "10" }, { "page": "1585" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/490/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989)" }, { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549311 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989)" }, { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 S.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8955191 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.E.2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" }, { "page": "630" }, { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135935 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" }, { "page": "206-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138343 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 563, "char_count": 9923, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.947487136851577e-08, "percentile": 0.3113938302966698 }, "sha256": "a31c0bc5f6528f1e76b62a48de4fee8d6d215f19c074eaf127d56f47188e12fe", "simhash": "1:8123cc62f46d247f", "word_count": 1594 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:16:59.313771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEELMAN and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CURTIS LEON FIELDS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nDefendant Curtis Leon Fields appeals from his convictions for habitual driving while impaired (\u201cDWI\u201d) and driving while license revoked. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress when, defendant argues, the police officer lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop him. We hold that the order denying the motion to suppress was amply supported by the trial court\u2019s uncontested findings that defendant\u2019s weaving in his own lane was sufficiently frequent and erratic to prompt evasive maneuvers from other drivers. The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying the motion to suppress.\nFacts\nAt the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress and at trial, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following facts. On 8 May 2010, Deputy Sheriff Joshua Akers of the Sampson County Sheriff\u2019s Department observed a white Chevrolet Metro automobile with dim taillights while he was going to lock up the post office in Garland, North Carolina. He called Deputy Sheriff Austin Kelly Coleman and alerted him regarding the automobile.\nDeputy Coleman followed the car for three quarters of a mile to a mile and observed that the driver, subsequently identified as defendant, was driving erratically. Defendant was weaving within his lane of travel constantly and drove on the center line at least once. There was a high level of traffic that evening, and Deputy Coleman stopped defendant when he observed oncoming drivers pulling over to the side of the road in reaction to defendant\u2019s driving.\nIt was approximately 10:30 p.m. when Deputy Coleman pulled over defendant. When Deputy Coleman approached defendant\u2019s car, he smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle and from defendant\u2019s person.\nDeputy Coleman called Deputy Akers for backup. Deputy Akers, who believed defendant appeared intoxicated, obtained defendant\u2019s consent to search his vehicle. In the car, Deputy Akers found an open container of malt liquor as well as other alcohol. Deputy Akers then asked defendant and his passengers to get out of the car.\nAlthough defendant performed fairly on three field sobriety tests, Deputy Coleman formed the opinion that defendant had consumed enough alcohol so as to impair his physical and mental faculties. Deputy Coleman charged defendant with DWI and driving with his license revoked and transported defendant to the Sampson County Sheriff\u2019s Office. An intoxilyzer test was performed at 12:44 a.m., and defendant registered .13 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.\nDefendant was indicted for driving with his license revoked and habitual DWI on 12 July 2010. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop in an order entered on or about 17 November 2010. The jury convicted defendant of DWI and driving with his license revoked, and defendant stipulated to three prior DWI convictions for purposes of the habitual DWI indictment. The trial court sentenced defendant to a presumptive-range term of 24 to 29 months imprisonment. Defendant timely appealed to this Court.\nDiscussion\nDefendant contends that Deputy Coleman lacked reasonable suspicion to justify his traffic stop of defendant and that the trial court, therefore, should have granted his motion to suppress. He further asserts that in the absence of the evidence obtained as a result of the stop, insufficient evidence existed to support his conviction, and the trial court should have granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\n\u201cThe scope of review of the denial of a motion to suppress is \u2018strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge\u2019s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge\u2019s ultimate conclusions of law.\u2019 \u201d State v. Bone, 354 N.C. 1, 7, 550 S.E.2d 482, 486 (2001) (quoting State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982)). The trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are fully reviewable on appeal. State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 208, 539 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000).\nUnder the Fourth Amendment, a police officer is permitted to \u201cconduct a brief investigatory stop of a vehicle and detain its occupants without a warrant[.]\u201d State v. McArn, 159 N.C. App. 209, 212, 582 S.E.2d 371, 374 (2003). However, \u201cin order to conduct a warrant-less, investigatory stop, an officer must have reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.\u201d Hughes, 353 N.C. at 206-07, 539 S.E.2d at 630. \u201cThe reasonable suspicion must arise from the officer\u2019s knowledge prior to the time of the stop.\u201d Id. at 208, 539 S.E.2d at 631.\nReasonable suspicion requires \u201ca minimal level of objective justification, something more than an \u2018unparticularized suspicion or hunch.\u2019 \u201d State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 442, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989)). \u201c[T]he overarching inquiry when assessing reasonable suspicion is always based on the totality of the circumstances.\u201d State v. Maready, 362 N.C. 614, 619, 669 S.E.2d 564, 567 (2008).\nIn its order, the trial court made the following findings pertinent to whether Deputy Coleman had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant:\n4. Deputy Coleman thereafter encountered a white Chevrolet Metro operating on Garland Highway with dim tail lights.\n5. While following [defendant\u2019s] vehicle for three fourths of a mile to one mile, Deputy Coleman noticed the vehicle weaving erratically within its travel lane, weaving from the \u201cfog line\u201d to the center line several times.\n6. Deputy Coleman described the movements of the vehicle as \u201clike a ball bouncing in a small room.\u201d\n7. Deputy Coleman observed that traffic was heavy in the opposite direction of the followed vehicle due to traffic going to a popular local lake.\n8. Deputy Coleman became concerned that the driver\u2019s ability to control the vehicle was impaired.\n9. Deputy Coleman became concerned for the safety of the oncoming traffic traveling in the direction opposite that of the followed vehicle after observing oncoming traffic taking evasive action by moving to the far right.\nSince defendant does not challenge these findings of fact on appeal, they are \u201c \u2018presumed to be correct.\u2019 \u201d State v. Pickard, 178 N.C. App. 330, 334, 631 S.E.2d 203, 206 (2006) (quoting Inspirational Network, Inc. v. Combs, 131 N.C. App. 231, 235, 506 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1998)). Based on these findings of fact, the trial court concluded that \u201c [t]he weaving within the lane, it\u2019s character as \u2018bouncing\u2019, the dim lights, the evasive movements of the oncoming traffic when viewed through the eyes of a reasonable cautious officer, guided by his training and experience, taken in total provide at least a minimal level of objective justification for stopping the vehicle.\u201d The court, therefore, determined that Deputy Coleman had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop of defendant\u2019s vehicle.\nDefendant contends that the trial court\u2019s findings are insufficient to support the trial court\u2019s conclusion. He argues that, at most, the court\u2019s findings establish that Deputy Coleman observed defendant weaving within his own lane of travel, which was insufficient to support the traffic stop.\nThis Court has previously held that a \u201cdefendant\u2019s weaving within his lane, standing alone, is insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol.\u201d State v. Fields, 195 N.C. App. 740, 746, 673 S.E.2d 765, 769 (2009). In this case, however, the trial court did not find only that defendant was weaving in his lane, but rather that defendant\u2019s driving was \u201c \u2018like a ball bouncing in a small room.\u2019 \u201d The driving was so erratic that the officer observed other drivers\u2014in heavy traffic\u2014taking evasive maneuvers to avoid defendant\u2019s car.\nDefendant\u2019s conduct in this case was distinguishable from that of the defendants in Fields and State v. Peele, 196 N.C. App. 668, 675 S.E.2d 682 (2009), the cases upon which defendant relies. In Fields, this Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support a traffic stop when the officer attempted to justify his stop based only on the fact that he saw the defendant weave within his lane three times over one and a half miles. 195 N.C. App. at 746, 673 S.E.2d at 769. In Peele, this Court found that an unreliable anonymous tip coupled with the defendant\u2019s weaving a single time did not create a reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. 196 N.C. App. at 671, 675 S.E.2d at 685. Thus, neither Fields nor Peele involved the level of erratic driving and potential danger to other drivers that was involved in this case.\nWe hold the trial court properly concluded that Officer Coleman had the \u201cminimal level of objective justification\u201d that our courts have required to constitute reasonable suspicion. Watkins, 337 N.C. at 442, 446 S.E.2d at 70. Therefore, the stop was proper, and the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nNo error.\nJudges STEELMAN and BEASLEY concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General William P. Hart, Jr., for the State.", "Mary MeCullers Reece for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CURTIS LEON FIELDS\nNo. COA11-613\n(Filed 6 March 2012)\nSearch and Seizure\u2014traffic stop\u2014weaving in lane\u2014reasonable suspicion\nThe trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the results of a traffic stop in a driving while impaired prosecution where defendant was weaving in his lane, the weaving was characterized by the officer as \u201cbouncing,\u201d and oncoming drivers were taking evasive maneuvers.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 17 November 2010 by Judge William R. Pittman and judgment entered 23 February 2011 by Judge W. Allen Cobb, Jr. in Sampson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 November 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General William P. Hart, Jr., for the State.\nMary MeCullers Reece for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0385-01", "first_page_order": 395, "last_page_order": 399 }