{ "id": 4362546, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SAMUEL JAMES COOPER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Cooper", "decision_date": "2012-03-06", "docket_number": "No. COA11-809", "first_page": "390", "last_page": "394", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "219 N.C. App. 390" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "629 S.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635719 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/629/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793127 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "869" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 841", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150721 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0841-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684963 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220086 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 L. Ed. 2d 1078", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1110-11", "parenthetical": "extending the rule that a suspect invoking the right to counsel must do so \"unambiguously\" to invocation of the right to remain silent" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3793005 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 540", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2401728 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "471", "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220002 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0073-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 541, "char_count": 10866, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14875596994264917 }, "sha256": "79163921a2cb35dd31185513896fff4bd874bfe4e7b28409886c862f701f6808", "simhash": "1:affa446257f44f76", "word_count": 1716 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:16:59.313771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ERVIN and THIGPEN, JR. concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SAMUEL JAMES COOPER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BEASLEY, Judge.\nSamuel James Cooper (Defendant) appeals from judgments based on his convictions for robbery with a dangerous weapon and five counts of first degree murder. For the following reasons, we find no error.\nOn 21 November 2007, Defendant robbed the Garner Plaza branch of Bank of America while possessing and threatening the use of a firearm. After Defendant was apprehended, his weapon was seized; the State Bureau of Investigation later linked that weapon to five unsolved murders. Defendant initially denied involvement in the murders, but eventually confessed that he had committed all five. Between 10 December and 11 December 2007, Defendant was indicted for robbery with a dangerous weapon and five counts of first degree murder.\nBy motion dated 22 October 2009, Defendant moved to suppress \u201call statements made by the defendant which were obtained by the police in violation of defendant\u2019s statutory and constitutional rights.\u201d This motion was denied on 17 December 2009 by the Honorable Henry W. Hight, Jr. Defendant was found guilty of all charges by a Wake County jury on 6 April 2010. By judgments dated 16 April and 20 April 2010, Defendant was sentenced to 117 to 150 months imprisonment for the charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon and to life imprisonment without parole for all five counts of first degree murder. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.\nI.\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements confessing to the murders because they were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights, and were the result of threats by the police. We disagree.\nFirst, we address Defendant\u2019s argument that his confession was not voluntary because it was obtained through threats by police. It is well-established that \u201cfindings of fact made by a trial judge following a voir dire on the voluntariness of a confession are conclusive ... if they are supported by competent evidence. Conclusions of law that are correct in light of the findings of fact are also binding on appeal.\u201d State v. Gainey, 355 N.C. 73, 84, 558 S.E.2d 463, 471 (2002) (citations omitted). When determining whether a confession is voluntary, we look at the totality of the circumstances. State v. Corley, 310 N.C. 40, 47, 311 S.E.2d 540, 545 (1984). \u201cThe proper determination is whether the confession at issue was the product of improperly induced hope or fear. [Our Supreme] Court has held that an improper inducement must promise relief from the criminal charge to which the confession relates, and not merely provide the defendant with a collateral advantage.\u201d Gainey, 355 N.C. at 84, 558 S.E.2d at 471 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).\nDefendant argues that his statements were coerced, because police threatened to imprison his father unless he confessed. The trial court concluded that \u201c[n]o promises, offers of reward, or inducements for Defendant to make a statement were made.\u201d The trial court further stated that \u201c[n]o threat or suggested violence or show of violence to persuade defendant to make a statement were made. The arrest of the Defendant\u2019s father was not wrongful pressure applied by law enforcement.\u201d\nIn support of these conclusions, the trial court found that \u201cat no point was the Defendant ever promised or told that his father would benefit by any statement from the Defendant.\u201d The testimony of Detective Passley that he never told Defendant\u2019s mother that if Defendant confessed, his father would be released supports this finding, as does the testimony of Defendant\u2019s sister that nobody told her that if Defendant confessed, her father would be released. Additionally, the trial court found that \u201cDefendant specifically acknowledged that T understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me by any officer.\u2019 \u201d These findings of fact are more than sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that Defendant\u2019s confession was not coerced. Accordingly, this argument is overruled.\nWe next address Defendant\u2019s contention that his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent was violated. The law is clear that \u201c[although custodial interrogation must cease when a suspect unequivocally invokes his right to silence, an ambiguous invocation does not require police to cease interrogation immediately.\u201d State v. Forte, 360 N.C. 427, 438, 629 S.E.2d 137, 145 (2006) (citation omitted).\nThe trial court found that \u201cDefendant did not invoke his right to counsel or his right to remain silent.\u201d Defendant argues that he refused to talk to police about the murders, other than to deny his involvement; thus he invoked his right to remain silent. Defendant\u2019s continued assertions of his innocence cannot be considered unambiguous invocations of his right to remain silent. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, _ U.S. _, _, 176 L. Ed. 2d 1078, 1110-11 (2010) (extending the rule that a suspect invoking the right to counsel must do so \u201cunambiguously\u201d to invocation of the right to remain silent). We find ample evidence in the record to support the trial court\u2019s finding that Defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent.\nFinally, we consider whether Defendant\u2019s confession was improperly obtained after he invoked his right to counsel. Much like the right to remain silent, the invocation of the right to counsel must be unambiguous. State v. Hyatt, 355 N.C. 642, 655, 566 S.E.2d 61, 70 (2002). The trial court concluded that \u201cdefendant fully understood ... his constitutional right to counsel[,]\u201d and that he \u201cfreely, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived each of those rights and thereupon made the statement. ...\u201d\nIt is uncontroverted that after the arrest of his father, Defendant reached out to police for the purpose of resuming interrogation. However, Defendant contends that by arresting his father and \u201cparading\u201d him in front of Defendant, the police first engaged in conduct that was the functional equivalent of re-initiating interrogation after Defendant invoked his right to counsel. Although it appears that Defendant did invoke his right to counsel prior to making the statements at issue, because Defendant was the one who re-initiated the conversation with police, his right to counsel was not violated when detectives took his later statements. See State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 406, 533 S.E.2d 168, 199 (2000).\nThe trial court found that Defendant was never promised that his father would benefit from any statement he made. This finding has adequate record support. Consequently, we decline to hold that the lawful arrest of Defendant\u2019s father constituted the re-initiation of the interrogation of Defendant. Defendant initiated further conversation with police after invoking his right to counsel, and then waived his rights and confessed to the five murders. This statement was given willingly and knowingly, and as such Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress was properly denied.\nII.\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred in its instruction of the jury as to the meaning of \u201cdeliberation.\u201d Defendant asked for a special instruction on the meaning of \u201cdeliberation\u201d at trial, requesting to have the jury instructed that deliberation means not only that Defendant acted \u201cin a cool state of mind,\u201d as the pattern jury instruction states, but also that Defendant \u201cweighed the consequences of his actions.\u201d The trial court declined to modify the pattern jury instruction. Our Supreme Court has instructed that \u201cthe trial court\u2019s omission of elements of a crime in its recitation of jury instructions is reviewed under the harmless error test.\u201d State v. Bunch, 363 N.C. 841, 845, 689 S.E.2d 866, 869 (2010). Even assuming, arguendo, that Defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court\u2019s refusal to alter the jury instruction on deliberation amounted to an omission of an element of the charged crimes, we find that the error was harmless.\nA trial court\u2019s error \u201c \u2018is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if it did not contribute to the defendant\u2019s conviction.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting State v. Nelson, 341 N.C. 695, 701, 462 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1995)). For each count of first degree murder Defendant was found guilty on the basis of malice, premeditation and deliberation and on the basis of the first degree felony murder rule. Thus, even if the trial court\u2019s jury instruction was in error and that error did change the jury\u2019s verdict as to the finding of deliberation, the error would still be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury\u2019s verdict was based on two separate, independent grounds.\nNo Error.\nJudges ERVIN and THIGPEN, JR. concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BEASLEY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Steven M. Arbogast, for the State.", "Mark Montgomery for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SAMUEL JAMES COOPER\nNo. COA11-809\n(Filed 6 March 2012)\n1. Confessions and Incriminating Statements\u2014defendant\u2019s statement\u2014not coerced\nDefendant\u2019s confession to five murders was not coerced where he contended that police threatened to imprison his father unless he confessed, but the trial court\u2019s findings sufficiently supported the conclusion that defendant\u2019s confession was not coerced. The findings included that defendant was not told that his father would benefit from defendant\u2019s statements and that defendant specifically acknowledged that no promises or threats were made.\n2. Constitutional Law\u2014right to remain silent\u2014invocation\nThere was ample evidence in the record to support the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent when he refused to talk to police about the murders other than to deny his involvement. Defendant\u2019s continued assertions of innocence cannot be considered unambiguous invocations of his right to remain silent.\n3. Constitutional Law\u2014right to counsel\u2014invocation\nDefendant\u2019s right to counsel was not violated where defendant invoked his rights, the police arrested his father, defendant re-initiated a conversation with police, and detectives took his statements. Although defendant contended that the police engaged in conduct that was the functional equivalent of re-initiating interrogation by \u201cparading\u201d his father in front of him, the trial court found that defendant was never promised that his father would benefit from any statement that he made and that finding had adequate support in the record.\n4. Homicide\u2014first-degree murder\u2014requested instruction on deliberation denied\u2014felony murder conviction\nThere was error in a first-degree murder prosecution in not giving defendant\u2019s requested instruction on deliberation where defendant was convicted on the basis of premeditation and deliberation and felony murder.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgments entered 16 April and 20 April 2010 by Judge Henry W. Hight, Jr. in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 December 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Steven M. Arbogast, for the State.\nMark Montgomery for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0390-01", "first_page_order": 400, "last_page_order": 404 }