{
  "id": 4362913,
  "name": "In the Matter of P.K.M.",
  "name_abbreviation": "In re P.K.M.",
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  "docket_number": "No. COA11-1094",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges ELMORE and STROUD concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "In the Matter of P.K.M."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "STEELMAN, Judge.\nWhere the trial court\u2019s order granting the juvenile\u2019s motion to suppress did not terminate the prosecution, the State has no right of appeal.\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\nThis case arises out of a delinquency petition filed against P.K.M., age twelve. The petition alleged that P.K.M. and several other juveniles broke into and vandalized a vacant building. The investigating detective received information indicating that P.K.M. was involved in the break-in. P.K.M. was called to the principal\u2019s office and then escorted to the school resource officer\u2019s office, where he met with the resource officer and the investigating detective. P.K.M. made incriminating statements during this meeting.\nP.K.M. filed a motion to suppress the statements made to the resource officer and detective. The trial court granted P.KM.\u2019s motion to suppress based upon the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 180 L. Ed. 2d. 310 (2011). The State appealed and certified \u201cpursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-979(c) .. . that the appeal [was] not taken for the purpose of delay and that the evidence suppressed [was] essential to the prosecution of the case.\u201d\nII. The State\u2019s Right to Appeal\nP.K.M. contends the State\u2019s appeal must be dismissed because the State lacks a statutory basis for appeal. We agree.\nA. Standard of Review\nWhether the State has a statutory right of appeal to this Court is a question of law that we review de novo. See State v. Lay, 56 N.C. App. 796, 798, 290 S.E.2d 405, 406 (1982) (reviewing this question as one of law and according no deference to the trial court proceedings).\nB. Analysis\nA \u201cproper party\u201d may appeal any \u201cfinal order\u201d made by the trial court under the North Carolina Juvenile Code. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2602 (2011). The State is a proper party. Id. \u00a7 7B-2604(a). However, the State is limited to appealing two types of orders in delinquency proceedings. Id. \u00a7 7B-2604(b). It may appeal orders ruling that a state statute is unconstitutional. Id. \u00a7 7B-2604(b)(l). It may also appeal \u201c[a]ny order which terminates the prosecution of a petition by upholding the defense of double jeopardy, by holding that a cause of action is not stated under a statute, or by granting a motion to suppress.\u201d Id. \u00a7 7B-2604(b)(2). Thus, the State may only appeal the order granting P.KM.\u2019s motion to suppress if that order terminated the prosecution.\nAlthough the State does not explicitly concede the issue, the State does not argue in its brief that the trial court\u2019s order terminated the prosecution. The trial court\u2019s order granting the motion to suppress did not state that the prosecution was terminated. The court did not dismiss the case. The State did not dismiss the case or inform the trial court that it could not proceed with the case for lack of evidence.\nGranting a motion to suppress does not, standing alone, dispose of a juvenile delinquency case. Cf. In re K.D.L., _ N.C. App. _, _, 700 S.E.2d 766, 773 (2010) (reversing the denial of a motion to suppress and remanding for further proceedings because of the possibility that the State could have elected to proceed without the confession). Assuming arguendo that dismissal of the case for insufficient evidence is not required in order to satisfy the \u201cterminates the prosecution\u201d standard created by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2604(b)(2), our review of the record suggests the State could present alternate evidence of P.K.M.\u2019s alleged involvement in the break-in. A teacher at P.KM.\u2019s school overheard several students discussing the break-in. This information led the police to develop P.K.M. as a suspect. The State does not argue on appeal that it could not have proceeded without P.K.M.\u2019s statements, and we decline to make this assumption.\nThe State\u2019s certification referencing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-979(c) has no bearing on this appeal. That statute governs the State\u2019s appeal of a motion to suppress in a criminal case. It does not apply to cases under the Juvenile Code.\n\u201cIn North Carolina, there is no inherent right to appeal. Rather, avenues of appeal are created by statute.\u201d Northfield Dev. Co. v. City of Burlington, 165 N.C. App. 885, 887, 599 S.E.2d 921, 924 (2004) (citing Cox v. Kinston, 217 N.C. 391, 396, 8 S.E.2d 252, 257 (1940)). The State has no statutory right of appeal in this case, and it has not petitioned for certiorari review. Therefore, the State\u2019s appeal is\nDISMISSED.\nJudges ELMORE and STROUD concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "STEELMAN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General LaToya B. Powell, for the State.",
      "The Law Office of Rich Cassady, by Rich Cassady, Esquire, for juvenile-appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In the Matter of P.K.M.\nNo. COA11-1094\n(Filed 20 March 2012)\nAppeal and Error\u2014juvenile delinquency\u2014no basis for appeal\nThe State had no right to appeal the trial court\u2019s motion to suppress the juvenile defendant\u2019s statement in a delinquency case. The State lacked a statutory basis for appeal because the trial court\u2019s order did not terminate the prosecution.\nAppeal by the State from order entered 18 July 2011 by Judge Kristina L. Earwood in Macon County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 February 2012.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General LaToya B. Powell, for the State.\nThe Law Office of Rich Cassady, by Rich Cassady, Esquire, for juvenile-appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0543-01",
  "first_page_order": 553,
  "last_page_order": 555
}